At the World Economic Forum in Davos this year, two people stood
out: Greta Thunberg, the 17-year-old Swedish climate activist, and
Donald Trump, the US president. In their messages on climate change, these two could not have been more opposed: panic, confronted with indifference.
But one thing they share is that they are not hypocrites: Ms Thunberg
does not pretend we are doing anything relevant; Mr Trump does not
pretend he cares. Most participants in the climate debate, however,
pretend to care, pretend to act, or both. If anything is to be done,
this must change.
Ours remains what it has been since the early
19th century: a fossil-fuel civilisation. There have been two energy
revolutions in human history: the agricultural revolution, which
exploited far more incident sunlight; and the industrial revolution,
which exploited fossilised sunlight. Now we must return to incident
sunlight — solar energy and wind — along with nuclear power, while
maintaining our high standards of living.
The
point of this latest energy revolution, however, is not to raise our
standard of living directly, but to preserve the only home we know in
the state to which life is now adapted. It is to avoid an irreversible
experiment with the climate of our planet. So far, however, despite
decades of talk, trends in emissions remain in the wrong direction.
What
is to be done? Discussions last week at the Oslo Energy Forum clarified
things for me. My principal conclusion was that a transformation from
our current energy system to a different one is the only option. Some
suggest we should halt growth as well. But this would not only be
impossible, it would also not be nearly enough.
Over the past
three decades CO2 emissions per unit of global output have been falling
at a little below 2 per cent a year. If this were to continue and world
output were to stagnate, global emissions would fall by 40 per cent by
2050 — far too little. Relying on actual reductions in output, in order
to cut emissions by, say, 95 per cent, by 2050, would require a fall in
world output of roughly 90 per cent, bringing global output per head
back to 1870 levels.
The conclusions are simple. We will not
stop relying on fossil fuels by choosing universal impoverishment. But
we also cannot stop using them soon enough, at our present glacial rate
of reduction in emissions per unit of output. So we must massively
accelerate technological progress away from burning fossil fuels. We
must move beyond them almost completely. If we do achieve that, the size
of our economy ceases to be the issue: however big it becomes, it
ceases to emit greenhouse gases. But note: to achieve this by 2050, the
rate of reduction of emissions per unit of output needs to jump
massively.
Is this achievable? From a technological point of view, it appears so. So, at least, argues the Energy Transitions Commission
in a number of important reports. The essential ideas are simple. The
core of the new energy system is electricity generated by renewable
means (solar and wind) and nuclear power. This needs to be backed up by a
variety of storage systems (batteries, hydroelectricity, hydrogen
and natural gas, with carbon capture and storage). Reductions in costs
have already been large enough and technological progress rapid enough
to make this transition feasible, at manageable cost.
This
would, however, be a revolution. A zero-carbon economy would require
about four to five times as much electricity as our present one, all
from non-carbon-emitting sources. In running such an economy, hydrogen
(much of it produced by electrolysis) would play an essential role.
Hydrogen consumption might jump 11-fold by 2050.
In many sectors,
the costs of decarbonisation are (or soon will be) competitive. Yet in
some, they will not be. There will need to be incentives and regulations
to force the shift. In order to avoid merely moving production, in its
most emissions-intensive forms, elsewhere, it will be essential to
impose offsetting taxes on imports from jurisdictions that refuse to
support the needed changes.
Suppose
that a transition towards a global zero-emissions economy by 2050 is
indeed technically feasible. That does not mean it is likely to happen
as a result of purely economic forces. This is so for two main reasons.
The first is that the cost advantages of the decarbonised alternatives
are, in many areas, at best modest. These are not (at least not yet)
close to being dominant technologies in all relevant areas. The second
is that there is always huge inertia in making shifts to new
technologies, especially in areas where familiar methods and systems are
to be replaced by entirely new ones. We know very well how to run a
fossil-fuel economy reliably and at vast scale. A reliable, entirely
renewable energy-economy is an unfamiliar beast.
A
global systems transition of this scale will not happen by itself. It
will require large-scale policy interventions, via a mixture of
regulation, incentives and government-supported research and
development. It will require global co-operation and clear recognition
of the very different positions — in terms of past behaviour, present
responsibility and future needs — of the countries of the world. It will
take changes in finance and accounting. It will, in short, take a
historic global effort of a kind we have never seen before to avoid a
danger that still seems remote to the vast bulk of human beings.
This
does need to be done. But will it be? Ms Thunberg fears our inaction.
Mr Trump is one of the reasons why she is right to do so. We have so
much to do and so little time. If we are to succeed in halting climate
change, we have to change course now.
Climate change explained: what can ordinary people do?
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