Saturday, June 26, 2021

Thirteen ways of looking at a bipartisan infrastructure deal

Thirteen ways of looking at a bipartisan infrastructure deal

By Matthew Yglesias, June 25, 2021.

A clear path to a successful 117th Congress is emerging

A bipartisan group of senators, working with the Biden White House, agreed yesterday on a broad framework for an infrastructure bill including hundreds of billions of dollars in new spending allocated across various budgets and a mix of fiscal offsets that everyone could agree on.


There honestly aren’t enough details here for me to do the kind of deep dive into what it actually means for transportation policy that I would like to. It’s a framework, it’s not a legislative text or even really an outline of a bill.


But I do think this is the kind of thing where the takes can kind of skip ahead too closely to the details and miss the forest for the trees. Here’s thirteen slightly scattered observations — but what I think it leads up to is that we’re now seeing a clear path toward a very successful 117th Congress that could get a lot done for the American people. But even though we can now see what that path looks like, it’s still a fairly treacherous trail.


Context for the infrastructure deal: As of November 1, 2020 progressives were looking at polls that told them to expect 55-56 senate seats and an expanded House majority. Their legislative goals were adding states, ending gerrymandering, possibly packing the Supreme Court, and enacting the most sweeping progressive legislative agenda in American history. Once the actual numbers come in and it’s a 50-50 senate and a six-seat House majority everything is bound to disappoint.


Context for the infrastructure deal: This package is almost as big as Obama’s American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, and in terms of fresh spending on infrastructure it’s bigger than ARRA and that’s coming after the much larger American Rescue Plan already took place.


Context for the infrastructure deal: Biden said he would make old-school legislating work again. USICA (née endless frontier) passed the senate through regular order. We’ve done feel-good bills on Juneteenth and hate crimes. Tim Scott and Karen bass say they have a deal on police reform. They did this water bill nobody cares about. These are singles or doubles, not home runs, but the impact exists in the aggregate.


Context for the infrastructure deal: Stuff in a reconciliation package basically has to be paid for with tax increases, but since Democrats need unanimity to pass partisan bills it’s inherently challenging to get all of Biden’s tax ideas enacted. In the bipartisan bill, congress is agreeing to roughly $1 trillion in new spending without using up any of Biden’s tax hike proposals so those revenue-raisers are now avaiable for the reconciliation package.


Reconciliation linkage: A lot is being made of progressive sour grapes about how they don’t want to agree to this deal unless they are guaranteed a later reconciliation package with more partisan ideas. I think the real linkage goes the other way — Joe Manchin and Kyrsten Sinema (and quietly the dozen other senate Dems who kinda agree with them) now get to say that bipartisan legislating is happening, and it’s happening thanks to them. They are now open to a reconciliation bill on its own terms.


Personally, I am not that jazzed up about the idea of spending a bunch of money on infrastructure so I am not per se throwing a party over this bill.


But if you accept the premise that we should be doing an infrastructure bill and not just redefining various things as “infrastrcucture” then this is a good bill. Notably the highway/transit split at 2/1 is very favorable to transit in historical terms. A lot of the money, appropriately, goes to electrical grid, water, resilience, and broadband rather than transportation. Doing this as a non-reconciliation bill also lets it include policy measures (around emissions standards, road safety requirements, etc.) that might not fly with the parliamentarian.


There’s $15 billion for EV charging and bus electrification and I think it’s good to see that stuff in the bipartisan bill since turning electrification into a culture war food fight could be very harmful.


House Democrats’ bad ideas about freight rail are not in the package, but instead there is $66 billion in fresh money for freight and passenger rail upgrades.


If you know me, you know there are a lot of policy questions about how transportation money gets spent. The deal that was announced does not address any reforms in that regard. But the negotiators do have ideas on these fronts, and there is desire on both sides to incorporate some as the deal gets fleshed out. This is a broad framework and not a legislative text, so the answer to a lot of specific questions is TBD.


The very best and most important ideas that Biden has put forward in his administration — housing reform, clean energy R&D and deployment money, and the expanded Child Tax Credit — have all been deferred to a reconciliation bill. As I said in (5), I think that’s a win not a loss. This deal coming together makes it easier not harder to do a reconciliation bill.


In the reconciliation process, prioritization is going to matter. Moderate Democrats are unreasonably leery of taxing the rich. There will be money to work with, but not the full amount called for in Biden’s Jobs Plan and Families Plan. But that means some of Biden’s ideas will make the cut and some won’t. That’s why I’m laying down the market here — expanded CTC, clean energy, and housing are the most important bits. Whatever you can get of the other stuff is good, but those three are the most important.


This whole thing could still fall apart! The painstaking negotiations were driven by the perceived political needs of moderate Senate Democrats, who wanted to make a deal with Senate Republicans. But Democrats’ House majority is very thin and it’s not clear that bipartisanship in the Senate will carry over into votes from House Republicans. I don’t think anyone on either side of the aisle in the House is thrilled about having been cut out of these talks. Watch what happens there!


The Two Republican Presidential Contests

The Two Republican Presidential Contests

By Seth Masket. June 25, 2021.


There are two 2024 Republican presidential nomination contests currently underway.



The first is the traditional “invisible primary.” I’m just wrapping up a research trip to Iowa and can report that that contest is well underway, with lots of candidates already showing up to campaign for the 2024 caucuses.



Former Ambassador Nikki Haley spoke to the Iowa Republican Party’s big annual Lincoln Dinner in West Des Moines yesterday and is doing a number of other smaller events around the state throughout the week. U.S. Senator Tom Cotton will be in Sioux Center next week for a party event. And next month is the Family Leader Christian conservative summit, which will feature former Vice President Mike Pence, former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and South Dakota Governor Kristi Noem.



There have been a number of reasons to worry that the caucuses were defunct or at least passé. For one, there’s the Covid environment, which makes lots of in-person meetings (on which this sort of retail campaigning thrives) difficult or even dangerous, although Iowa (especially Republicans) moved pretty quickly to reopen and vaccinations are pretty widespread.



For another, Democrats are raising a lot of concerns about their Iowa Caucuses – both for being unrepresentative of the broader party and for a rather public administrative belly flop last February. The caucuses could get demoted, but they still have a lot of allies, and there’s a good chance that if the Democrats moved their caucuses later, the Republicans might seek to keep theirs first in the nation anyway.



But another important wrinkle is what I'm considering the second presidential contest – what we might call the “invisible invisible primary.” That is the decision by Donald Trump to enter the presidential contest, or not. To some extent, this is a decision that he gets to make by himself. But it’s also being influenced by external factors, such as the Manhattan District Attorney’s investigation of his finances.



Trump is, of course, still very popular within the Republican Party and especially within Iowa, where he ran stronger in 2020 than he did in 2016. Trump would likely dominate the Iowa caucuses and win the party’s nomination if he ran, but it remains unclear whether he is actually running.



As such, the GOP is in a roughly similar position the Democrats were in around 1990, waiting for Mario Cuomo to decide whether he would actually run for president. (Spoiler: He didn’t.) This has the effect of freezing the race in place. Yes, candidates are campaigning, honing their messages, hiring preliminary staff, paying homage to the various local poohbahs, etc. But the uncertainty about Trump means that few are willing to make major donations to the campaign, few are willing to endorse, etc.



What's more, those interested in running are being careful not to position themselves as a threat to Trump should he decide to run. Nikki Haley has said that she won’t run if Trump does. No major candidate thus far seems to be running as the anti-Trump candidate; they all recognize that he’s still popular within the party and won’t cross him.



It is a very different nomination contest with Trump in the race than with him not running. Most likely very few viable candidates would remain in the race if he declares himself a candidate. And since Trump a) has universal name recognition, b) can put together a campaign organization pretty late in the process, and c) likes to have people speculating about him, he might well make this decision fairly late.



Needless to say, this all means a lot more uncertainty than usual for a lot longer than usual. And there was already quite a bit of uncertainty about how the Iowa Republican caucuses work given changes in the political environment since Trump’s first run for office.



Importantly, though, the candidates aren’t sitting back and waiting. Their goal is to do as well as possible in the more public contest, knowing that the other contest is beyond their control.


Friday, June 25, 2021

We should try to make good trains

We should try to make good trains

Quality service provision, not make-work jobs

Matthew Yglesias.  Jun 24.


The tragedy of trains in America is that instead of treating trains as technology that does something useful, they tend to be treated on the right as a culture war totem to be denigrated and on the left as a job-sink that’s supposed to generate make-work employment.


In the highway sector, by contrast, a relatively pragmatic spirit prevails.


Republicans are generally skeptical of spending money, but they acknowledge that it’s good to have roads and roads are useful, and they are normally willing to open the wallet here. And while Democrats always have their concerns about jobs and unions and such, they also recognize that if you do things to make cars drastically more expensive, it will make people’s lives worse and they’ll get mad.


But most people do not ride trains, and therefore nobody seems to particularly mind if the policies they adopt make trains bad. One major culprit here, discussed in a recent Niskanen Center policy brief by Alon Levy, is Buy America rules which hurt train quality in an effort to turn rolling stock manufacturing into a job-creation engine. And House Democrats unfortunately have a bunch of new ideas that would impose all sorts of inefficiency on freight rail again for the sake of jobs.


This is bad stuff. I am glad the Biden administration and the Powell Fed are pushing so hard for full employment. But one reason to push is when you have good macroeconomic policy, you can also insist on good microeconomic policy. You want a fully stimulated economy, and then you want to do things efficiently. We should get the best trains we can, not the most overstaffed ones.


The weirdest strategic industry

One way of thinking about the world is that you should just have free markets, open trade, and not really worry too much about anything — let the chips fall where they may.


I think experience shows us that’s a bit naive, and successful countries try to do a bit of “industrial policy” where they back national champions and try to have certain leading sectors. A good example of this is the airline industry where, over the years, the American government has done various things to ensure that the United States remains a country where big passenger jets are manufactured. Like any policy approach, this has some costs, but it also has real benefits — we really do have a major airplane industry, and we export those planes to others, and it’s something we excel at.


In theory, we could try to use federal procurement policy to turn the United States into a world leader in manufacturing passenger trains or equipment that’s related to passenger trains.


But part of the point of an industrial policy is that you need to pick and choose. And Americans need to take a deep breath and ponder the passenger train industry with a modicum of realism. The United States has one-third the population density of France and one-sixth the density of Germany. The U.K., Netherlands, Belgium, Japan, China, Korea, and Taiwan are all denser than Germany. The whole point of a train is that it has extremely high passenger capacity, which makes it an extremely potent solution to certain problems of urban geometry. But the United States is much less impacted by these problems than Western Europe or developed Asia. It would not make much sense us for to be world leaders in developing technical solutions to these problems.


Then conservatives go off the rails (so to speak) and denounce the whole thing as un-American and irrelevant. But it’s not!


Most Americans don’t live in the northeast corridor, but a lot of people do. Intercity transportation between D.C. and Boston is a very legitimate use case for rail. Over 6% of the country lives in the New York City Combined Statistical Area. America needs mass transit. Not in the sense that most Americans need mass transit, but in the sense that in a country of 330 million, something can be relevant to only 20% of people and still be a big deal. It’s just that this is not an area where we should be trying to lead — we should buy off-the-shelf solutions from around the world and use them.


The high cost of Buy America

The idea of Buy America is that federally funded transit projects (which are basically all of them) should use U.S.-built trains.


And the biggest problem with this is that the market for U.S.-built trains is just not that large. Companies that build trains invest in production facilities in Europe and Japan, first and foremost because that’s where a lot of customers are. It’s a deep, competitive market with lots of players and an incentive to stay on the frontier. But bringing innovations to the American market would cost a lot of money — you’d need to retool the factories, etc. — for minimal benefit since there aren’t that many orders.


While the United States remains a peripheral player in transit, innovations developed elsewhere take a long time to reach here. Buying the same modular products that work elsewhere is difficult because the vendors have to effectively reproduce the manufacturing capacity in the United States, whose market is small relative to the effort this requires. In particular, American subway car technology has largely stood still since the 1980s and early 1990s. For example, recent European subway trains have what are known in industry parlance as open gangways, which permit passengers to walk through from one end of the train to another. American trains do not have open gangways and are only beginning to experiment with the technology. In fact, in San Francisco, Bay Area Rapid Transit’s Fleet of the Future is similar to a modular product running in London, Singapore, Stockholm, and Toronto, but without open gangways.


In exchange for this inferior technology, we also pay a higher price. Excluding double-decker trains and high-speed trains, a normal European rail car costs $100,000 per meter of train. In America, things cost more:


Indeed, recent American rolling stock costs have been escalating. New York’s next train model, the R211, will finally replace the R44s at a cost of $3.7 billion, or about $130,000 per linear meter. Bilevel cars for Caltrain and New Jersey Transit cost about 35 percent and 60 percent more than their European counterparts respectively, the New Jersey Transit order also burdened by compliance with obsolete regulations. A Los Angeles light rail vehicle order from the last decade went up to $3.8 million per car or $140,000 per meter of train length (the average cost in Europe is under $100,000 per meter), while a San Francisco one went up to $170,000 / meter. In Boston, an order with little premium, built at a new factory in Springfield, Massachusetts, was given to Chinese manufacturer CRRC. But European and Japanese vendors had bid $135,000/meter, leading to worries about Chinese dumping and a congressional investigation.


Cost is cost, and it’s not the end of the world.


But the fact that we’re paying a price premium for technologically inferior equipment is the tell here. The idea of industrial policy is that you are paying a short-term cost in order to create a world-leading industry that can compete in global markets. But the United States is not actually trying to have world-leading railcars — we are much too small a market. We’re just making agencies overpay for inferior products.


The case for it is that you get jobs. Steven Greenhouse, in a 2018 American Prospect piece hailing transit protectionism, cited this move in Los Angeles as a success story for creating good union jobs:


L.A. Metro awarded the contract to Kinkisharyo, and Janis was furious. L.A. Metro chose Kinkisharyo because its bid was 5 percent lower than Siemens's and because it had an excellent reputation for quality and on-time delivery. Its Osaka factory manufactures Japan's high-speed trains.


Janis hadn't realized, however, that Kinkisharyo, after talking with L.A. Metro officials, had improved its final offer, saying it would build a 250-employee factory in Los Angeles County.


These 250 positions paying $20.64 per hour cost $1 million each in terms of excess costs. And it’s not like there’s no other way for local governments in LA to spend money on employing people. Hire some guys to keep the sidewalks cleaner. Open up some public child care facilities. Install solar panels. Do anything.


The point is that while there’s a case for industrial policy, this is really just wasteful featherbedding. And that’s what happens when you think of trains as jobs programs rather than as transportation technology. And unfortunately, things could get worse.


Featherbedding freight rail

The main thing people are currently talking about in federal transportation policy is the bipartisan talks on infrastructure between the White House and moderate Senate Republicans.


But there’s also the original, bigger Biden proposal. Progressives are urging the White House to pull the plug on the bipartisan talks and try to jam the moderate Democratic senators into backing a reconciliation bill along the lines of the bigger Jobs Plan. But then there’s a second bipartisan initiative in the Senate — a surface transportation reauthorization bill that Senators Tom Carper and Shelley Moore Capito have written. And then last but by no means least, there’s a second partisan bill, a surface transportation reauthorization bill that Rep. Pete DeFazio wrote in the House.


This last bill has gotten almost no mainstream attention. But alongside many admirable provisions, it has some really dunderheaded efforts to undermine the cost-effectiveness of American freight rail.


Probably the highlight here has to do with a two-person crew mandate. This is an extremely tedious battle that’s been passing back and forth for years, originating in the ongoing rollout of Positive Train Control technology on American railroads. Freight operators want to take advantage of this technology to, in some cases, cut back train staffing to just a single person. Labor interests don’t want to lose the jobs, so after quite a bit of tussling, they got the Federal Railroad Administration to propose a regulation requiring two-person crews. It took a lot of tussling because the FRA never had any real evidence this would deliver safety benefits. Then Trump won the election, and after a couple of years, his administration rescinded the rule. But while Trump’s FRA was working on rescinding the rule, this became a legislative effort to impose the mandate by statute. If Democrats got their way on this, freight shipping would be a bit more expensive than it should be and more cargo would go in trucks and it would be worse for the environment.


But the real doozy has to do with freight trains coming from Mexico.


Specifically, there’s a rail bridge from Nueva Laredo, Mexico into Laredo, Texas that a lot of rail passes over. The way the geography works is the trains cross over near downtown Laredo. So when the trains stop at the international border to switch crews and test the air brakes, it causes delays that block the at-grade crossings. The city and Union Pacific pushed for a new system where the brake test could be done by the Mexican crew in Mexico, who would then drive the train over the bridge, through Laredo, and then over to the railyard north of town.



House Democrats, over the objections of the city and the local House member — Blue Dog Henry Cuellar — want to prohibit this, basically to protect a tiny number of jobs that have the specialist task of shuttling trains from the bridge to the rail yard.


It’s very stupid.


Full employment means bad policy is costly

The Biden administration has placed a big bet on aggressive stimulus and full employment. It’s the kind of bet I’ve been advocating for over a decade, and I think it’s going to have a lot of benefits.


And I’ve always hoped that one of the benefits will be to clarify for the public and for policymakers exactly how costly it is to do things purely for the sake of “creating jobs.” When you have a long spell of mass unemployment, then job creation can be a very tempting siren. Part of the genius of a full-employment economy is that when all kinds of employers are desperate for a chance at hiring an experienced, reliable worker, you don’t need to worry so much about that kind of thing. Anyone who loses a job through no fault of his own will be able to get another job.


What’s costly in a full-employment economy is retaining labor where it’s not needed. Right now, America needs people staffing sawmills, making steel, driving trucks, and doing other things for which we have no good substitutes. But we do have good substitutes for redundant staffing on freight trains. We could buy our light rail vehicles from Japan or Germany or France where they are really good at building that stuff. We could focus on what we really need workers to be doing. And we could let our trains just try to be really good trains that deliver valuable services in cost-effective ways.



The political science of returning to the Iran deal

The political science of returning to the Iran deal

By Daniel W. Drezner

If the United States and Iran revive the nuclear deal, will anything change?

Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, arrives to cast his ballot in the country’s presidential election on Friday. (Atta Kenare/AFP/Getty Images)

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Over the weekend, Iran “elected” hard-liner Ebrahim Raisi to be its next president. That word is in quotes because it’s pretty clear that Iran’s Guardian Council blocked presidential runs by more popular, more moderate candidates. This enabled Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, to ensure Raisi, his protege, would replace moderate Hassan Rouhani, whose government negotiated the 2015 nuclear accord with the United States.


Anointing a hard-liner could cause uninformed observers to be more pessimistic about the prospects of reviving the nuclear deal. As the New York Times’s David E. Sanger and Farnaz Fassihi report, however, this election going off as expected paradoxically increases the chances of a deal being signed. For one thing, the only thing needed is the signatures: “The detailed wording of the resurrected agreement was worked out weeks ago in Vienna, the same city where the original accord was finalized six summers ago, senior officials say. Since then, the resurrected agreement has sat, largely untouched, awaiting an election whose outcome had seemed engineered by the ayatollah.”


Why would this outcome increase the chances of a deal being reached? The political moment is perfect for Khamenei to cut a deal. Raisi will not take office until August, so the Rouhani government can complete the deal. Why does this matter? Sanger and Fassihi explain:


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That means Iran’s moderates would be set up to take the blame for capitulating to the West and bear the brunt of popular anger inside Iran if sanctions relief does not rescue the nation’s stricken economy.

But if the deal comes together, the new conservative government under Mr. Raisi can take the credit for an economic upswing, bolstering his case that it took a hard-line, nationalist government to stand up to Washington and bring the country back.

“For Iran, this is a real Nixon-goes-to-China moment,’’ said Vali Nasr, a professor of political science at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, who is close to the negotiations. “If anyone other than the conservatives made this deal with Biden, they would be torn up,” he said of Iran’s new leadership. “The bet is that they can get away with it. No one else could.”

If the Iranians are lined up to revive the deal, what about the Americans? Clearly the Biden administration is prepared to reach an agreement, but I am old enough to remember what happened after the nuclear deal was negotiated in 2015. Conservatives in the United States, Israel and Saudi Arabia all hated it, helping to torpedo the deal after Donald Trump was elected in 2016. Does a revived deal stand any better chance of success?


To be fair, the conservative case is not without its merits. That case has always been presented disingenuously, however. The deal restrains Iran’s nuclear ambitions, but only temporarily. The cost is that the lifting of sanctions gives Iran more resources to pursue revisionist aims in the region. For conservatives, a richer, more adventurist Iran is worse than an enriching Iran.


The problem is that, under Trump, the conservative policy option did not prove to be any more successful. U.S. sanctions and targeted killings helped to dent Iranian power and plenty. But contrary to conservative claims, it did not destabilize the Iranian regime. Tehran was still able to exercise influence in the region. Furthermore, the U.S. exit from the deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA, enabled Iran to restart its nuclear enrichment program.


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There are other ways the current situation is different from 2015. Israel is no longer led by Benjamin Netanyahu, but Naftali Bennett. True, Bennett dislikes the Iran deal as much as Netanyahu, but he leads a much broader coalition. Simply put, he has less juice to influence U.S. domestic politics than Netanyahu did.


The more significant difference is that Saudi Arabia seems to be in a different foreign policy place. In 2015, the Saudis bitterly opposed the JCPOA. In 2017, the Saudi leadership forged a close bond with the Trump administration based in part on that opposition. There were orbs and everything.


The situation looks a little bit different in 2021. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman faces a hostile Beltway climate after his alleged role in the murder of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi. The Biden administration has been very clear in its desire to reduce its Middle East footprint.


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The Saudis were well aware after Trump’s loss that they would need to earn some goodwill with the Biden team. This helps to explain why the Saudis are negotiating with the Iranians about a normalization of ties.


U.S. conservatives will continue to oppose any deal with the current regime in Iran. In contrast to 2015, however, the governments in Jerusalem and Riyadh have less pull. That does not mean a revived nuclear deal will have staying power, but it might have a better chance than one would expect given the incoming Iranian president.


‘Luck’ didn’t win Biden the presidency. Party solidarity did.

‘Luck’ didn’t win Biden the presidency. Party solidarity did.

Seth Masket, a professor of political science and director of the Center on American Politics at the University of Denver, is the author of "Learning from Loss: The Democrats 2016-2020."
June 23, 2021 at 10:35 p.m. GMT+9

Democrats swore they’d present a united front against Trump. Biden was the beneficiary.

President-elect Joe Biden addresses the nation with a victory speech in the parking lot of the Chase Center on the Riverfront in Wilmington, Del. on November 7, 2020. (Jonathan Newton/The Washington Post)

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The title of a new book, “Lucky: How Joe Biden Barely Won the Presidency,” by the journalists Jonathan Allen and Amie Parnes, sums up its thesis concisely: Biden is essentially president by accident. Allen and Parnes write, “All along the way, Biden caught breaks — at the Iowa caucuses, in the pivotal South Carolina primary, and from an incumbent president who mishandled the major crisis he faced.” In a piece published shortly after Biden’s victory last fall, Politico’s Michael Kruse sounded a similar note, observing that Biden had been “barely alive” as he entered the South Carolina primary — “soundly trounced in Iowa, roundly rebuffed in New Hampshire, a distant second in Nevada. Then, on the last day of February, he won in South Carolina. And his luck changed. And luck matters.”  


This is a common thread in a lot of coverage of the 2020 Democratic presidential primary race: that had Biden not caught a few breaks, someone else would have gone up against President Donald Trump last fall — and that Biden may have been lucky to beat Trump as well. Incumbent presidents tend to win reelection, and but for a once-in-a-century pandemic, Trump might have, too.


But this argument deeply discounts the degree to which major players in the Democratic Party backed Biden even before the primaries began, precisely because he was perceived as the candidate most likely to prevail over the incumbent. The “luck” narrative dismisses the hard work the Democratic Party did between 2016 and 2020 to determine the qualities of a candidate who could beat Trump. If Biden appeared to draw a good hand at a few key points in the race, it’s because the party had stacked the deck in his favor.  


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How did Biden get to be the chosen candidate? After 2016, Democratic insiders, reeling from Hillary Clinton’s loss, struggled to understand what had gone wrong. There were many competing (and overlapping) theories — that Clinton was an unappealing candidate, that working-class people didn’t relate to the Democratic message, that there was more latent racism and sexism in society than Democrats had believed, and that voters were turned off by “identity politics,” among other ideas. Many party activists and leaders decided that the solution was nominating an older, moderate White man the next time around. The party’s elites were willing to surrender a fair amount of its policy priorities to get Trump out of the White House, and they saw Biden as the instrument to do that.


Overwhelmingly, Democratic voters prioritized candidate electability over other issues last year, to a degree that they normally don’t. According to a June 2019 Economist-YouGov poll, for instance, 58 percent of Democrats said it was more important that the nominee be able to win in the general election than that they agreed with him or her on the issues. (Forty-two percent cited stances on issues as more important.) The skew toward electability over issues was even greater for self-described liberals. And overwhelmingly, voters saw Biden as the candidate who could beat Trump, while they worried that other contenders couldn’t. Even Democrats who said their first choice was Sen. Elizabeth Warren (Mass.) or then-Sen. Kamala D. Harris (Calif.) or Sen. Cory Booker (N.J.) were strongly leaning toward supporting Biden, precisely because they thought he could defeat Trump (and their first choice couldn’t).


In that same Economist-YouGov poll, Biden was most popular among both the “electability” and the “issues” groups, attracting plurality support of 29 percent and 24 percent, respectively. (Among Democrats who valued electability, Warren came in second out of five candidates, at 13 percent; among those who wanted a nominee who agreed with them on issues, Sen. Bernie Sanders (Vt.) came in second, at 23 percent.)


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By the end of 2019, Biden was also the leader in endorsements. According to Five­ThirtyEight’s measure of “endorsement points” — which weights endorsements by status in the party (one point for a regular Democratic National Committee member, six for a senator, eight for a governor) — Biden had roughly 180 points at the end of that year, while Sanders had fewer than 50. That showed that party insiders, who often get the nominee they want, were strongly leaning toward Biden. The former vice president was also ahead in another marker of backing by the party faithful: By the fourth quarter of 2019, he was getting money from nearly 50 percent of donors who also gave money to the Democratic Party as an institution. In terms of polling, Biden held a steady 28 percent on average at that point in the race, roughly his number all year, while Sanders was in second place at a consistent 19 percent.


Biden wasn’t the overwhelming consensus party pick the way, say, Clinton was in 2016 or Al Gore was in 2000, but he still had massive internal advantages, and they manifested in a way that helped protect him through the primaries and caucuses. Party leaders, elected officials, interest group leaders, activists and others can make their preferred candidate’s path a lot smoother, largely by minimizing the candidate’s stumbles and magnifying the successes.


Think back, for example, to two of the most dramatic clashes during the Democratic primary debates in 2019 and 2020. The first occurred when Harris went after Biden — in June 2019, in Miami — for saying that he had gotten along well with segregationist senators in the 1970s. The second happened when Warren attacked Mike Bloomberg at a February 2020 debate for his crude words about, and actions toward, women.


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In both cases, a prominent White male candidate had committed a transgression against a large and pivotal group within the Democratic Party and was called onto the carpet for it by a member of that group. Harris described Biden’s words as “hurtful,” and she sharpened the attack by personalizing his past opposition to forced busing to reduce school segregation. Speaking of the typical beneficiary of such policies, she said: “I was that little girl.” Warren, for her part, repeated Bloomberg’s worst statements about women and compared him to Trump, saying that Democrats were taking a great risk “if we just substitute one arrogant billionaire for another.”


Harris’s and Warren’s criticisms were similar in their nature and their onstage effectiveness. The difference had to do with the target. By mid-2019, Biden was already a party favorite, the poll leader with the bulk of Democratic endorsements going his way. To be sure, Harris’s attack hurt him; his polling position dropped by about five points immediately following the debate. But he recovered within a few weeks, and the attack did no lasting damage.


On the other hand, while Bloomberg had impressed some Democratic insiders in early 2020, he was still a dark horse. His polling position had been improving rapidly since early January, jumping from 7 to 16 percent. Then Warren’s attack halted that surge. Bloomberg dropped out a few weeks later, having won only American Samoa.


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Just as being the party favorite can minimize your stumbles, it can also magnify your victories. We can see that in endorsement patterns after the contests of early February 2020. Former South Bend, Ind., mayor Pete Buttigieg narrowly won the Iowa caucuses, and in the following days he received the endorsements of two semi-prominent Democrats, Rep. Andy Kim (N.J.) and Indianapolis Mayor Joe Hogsett. Sanders’s victories in New Hampshire and Nevada netted him endorsements just from his former rivals Marianne Williamson and New York Mayor Bill de Blasio. But when Biden won in South Carolina — the first contest with a substantial number of Black voters — more than 30 prominent Democrats jumped in to endorse him, including former Senate party leader Harry M. Reid (Nev.), former DNC chair Terry McAuliffe, and Biden’s former rivals Sen. Amy Klobuchar (Minn.) and Buttigieg.


So Biden’s victories brought him more support, but that didn’t occur for the other candidates. That wasn’t happenstance. The early, consistent and enthusiastic support Biden received from across the Democratic Party was a notable change from the 2016 cycle. In that year, although Clinton had a wide range of endorsements, many people on the progressive left remained wary of her and hesitant about her candidacy. Concerned that this lack of enthusiasm helped cost Democrats the 2016 election, many of those same people came out swinging for Biden in 2020, not because they agreed with him on all issues but because they wanted to present a united front. Their enthusiasm probably helped boost Democratic turnout in 2020 and deliver crucial victories in swing states like Georgia, Arizona and Nevada.


Biden may indeed be a lucky man; if you ask him, he’ll probably agree with that. Given his narrow margins in a number of swing states in November, a few minor differences over the course of the campaign could have meant a different outcome. On the other hand, the elevated turnout Biden received from Democrats across the board came in part because the party had settled on him very early in the process for the specific purpose of defeating Trump. Biden may have gotten some good breaks, but the more his party backed him, the luckier he got.


Twitter: @smotus


Anti-Blackness and transphobia are older than we thought

Anti-Blackness and transphobia are older than we thought

By Roland Betancourt

In the Byzantine Empire, ideas of race and gender were deeply intertwined.

A fresco of Emperor John II Komnenos and Empress Irene in Hagia Sophia, Istanbul. (iStock)

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When did racism begin? Because of how ideas about race shape our contemporary world, some have argued that racism did not exist in the ancient and medieval worlds, that it was a modern invention. Proposing that there was a past before racism helped prop up the notion that Americans were living in a post-racial present, in the decades after the Civil Rights movement.


But nothing could be further from the truth.


More than just race thinking and varied forms of racialized prejudices, the ancient and medieval world provide us with a deep legacy of anti-Blackness. This history of anti-Blackness has not only defined modern racism as we know it, but also shaped how gender and sexuality have been explained and represented for centuries. Remembering this longer history of racism and transphobia should remind us of how deeply ingrained these ideas are — and how much effort it will take to root them out.


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Recognizing anti-Blackness in the deep past, particularly the Christian Middle Ages, allows us to better understand how colorist prejudices were racialized and transmitted from Ancient Greece and Rome to the modern Western world. Throughout this period, Christianity attempted to position itself as a new “race” (genos) or group of people that transcended ethnic categories and civilizations by proselytizing across the known world from India to Ethiopia. But Christianity still retained the deep anti-Blackness rooted in ancient theories of racialized and gendered differences.


The Byzantine Empire (or, more accurately, the medieval Roman Empire) controlled the eastern Mediterranean from 330 to 1453 C.E. with its capital in Constantinople, modern-day Istanbul. Constantinople was the envy of the Western medieval world, a cosmopolitan center at the crossroads of the Mediterranean, Eastern Europe and Asia. Because of its lineage dating to antiquity, the Byzantine Empire provides a unique lens on how racial tropes persisted across millennia and how they were transmitted and reconceived under Christian rule.


European visitors to Constantinople often remarked on the city’s racial diversity and commented on the darker skin of its emperors and peoples. Surprisingly, Byzantine sources were often silent on this racialized difference, potentially taking it for granted in their cosmopolitan empire. Yet while Byzantines were not White in the eyes of their European neighbors, they also privileged Whiteness in their descriptions of feminine beauty and often contoured their own identity through a prism of anti-Blackness.


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For example, Byzantine intellectuals boasted about the students who came to work with them from around the globe and imperial authors praised the diversity of the imperial court. In 1174, Eustathios of Thessaloniki celebrated the diversity of the emperor’s entourage by listing all the various envoys from foreign lands present, including, “the Indian too, slightly tinged with black, and the Ethiopian with his whole skin burnt dark.” At the same time, the popular epic romance, “Digenes Akritas,” dating to the same period, described its hero’s Arab father as knowing the Romans’ (i.e. Byzantines’) language perfectly, having curly hair and saying that his complexion was “not black like the Ethiopians but fair and handsome.”


While outsiders could be scorned for their dark complexion, dark skin wasn’t considered bad in all cases for the subjects of the Byzantine Empire. In fact, it was associated with the admirable strength of ancient heroes, like Odysseus, who Homer described as “black skinned” (melanochroous) in the “Odyssey.” But whether dark skin was seen as virtue or ugliness depended on one’s gender and sexuality.


A dark complexion was prized as a sign of masculinity: Manly men were said to have dark skin. But dark skin was considered unfeminine, and therefore dark-skinned women were viewed negatively — as were light-skinned men. Since white skin was associated with feminine beauty, when translated onto the male body it became a sign of queerness and “effeminacy.”


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One Byzantine emperor, Manuel I Komnenos, was praised at length for his dark complexion. But his eulogy revealed the gendered view on dark skin in this period. Komnenos’s dark skin matched his dignity since it did not display “an effeminate paleness … having aspired to an appearance that one does not find on womanly or soft people.” In Greek, terms like “womanly” (gynaikias) and “soft” (malthakous) were slurs for effeminate men and for men who slept with men respectively. Malthakos was even a technical term in late antique medicine to pathologize same-gender desire, particularly for men acting as the passive partner in such acts.


When discussing this same emperor in the early 13th century, chronicler Niketas Choniates wrote that “in complexion he was neither snow-white like those reared in the shade nor the color of deep black smoke like those exposed to the burning rays of the sun; he was, consequently, not fair-complexioned but swarthy in appearance.” Like the emperor’s eulogizers, Choniates is clear to highlight Komnenos as someone who spent his time in the sun doing manly things. Yet he also walked a careful racial tightrope: wanting to praise the emperor’s dark skin — and therefore his masculinity — while also making sure not to associate him with “those exposed to the burning rays of the sun.” In other words, making sure to not associate the color of his skin with a distinctly racialized group, such as Black Africans, what Greek texts would have vaguely referred to as “Ethiopians” (literally meaning, “burnt-faced”).


This reference to the burning rays of the sun is crucial, because since antiquity it was believed that not only did the sun’s rays darken the skin, but the climate also altered people’s character. For example, those reared in the extreme cold and shade were understood as having been burned white by the cold, and Hippocrates even said that the men in these places became eunuchs and behaved like women. Thus, the understanding that dark skin was associated with masculinity and virility emerged from this broader dialogue involving both racialized and gendered identities.


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Some unique tales of transgender saints from the 5th to the 9th centuries provide a vivid illustration of how these identities intersect. These saints had been assigned female at birth but lived out their lives as men in male monastic communities. Across their stories, we read how their bodies changed over the years, with their breasts withering, the cessation of menstruation — and their skin gaining a darker and coarse complexion. One trans monk’s former husband does not even recognize his former wife because he appeared “just as an Ethiopian.” Part of affirming the male gender of these trans monks involved articulating a transformation in skin color.


These associations between race thinking and gender were so central that in depictions of the Ethiopian Eunuch (a figure assigned male at birth who was castrated in childhood) from the Acts of the Apostles in the Bible, the figure of the eunuch was rarely depicted as a Black person — even though “Ethiopian” was defined in contemporaneous dictionaries as literally meaning “a black person.” Instead, the Ethiopian eunuch was depicted as a White youth because it was pale whiteness that was associated with the appearance of eunuchs.


Eunuchs played an important role in the Byzantine Empire, understood not quite as men, and often attacked with misogynistic language and stereotypes. Therefore, it was their disputed gender identity that came to determine the depiction of eunuchs’ skin by artists, deploying the same palettes used for the depiction of courtly women with pale, white skin and rosy cheeks.


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It is in these rich and nuanced crossings of gender, sexuality and race that the Middle Ages can productively shatter many of our preconceptions — and also make us aware of the deep and interlaced histories of racism and transphobia. Across history, racializing peoples as others often went far beyond epidermal, physiognomic or genetic markers of race alone. Accurately understanding the complex and intertwined history of these ideas is key to understanding our world where racism and transphobia have become the dominant ideologies of hatred.


The Middle Ages offer crucial lessons to us today as we continue the struggle for trans rights, work against anti-Black police brutality and articulate the importance of teaching our history of racism in classrooms.


How to call the GOP’s bluff on its ‘election integrity’ talking point

How to call the GOP’s bluff on its ‘election integrity’ talking point

Washington Post

Opinion by 
Columnist
June 25, 2021 at 6:07 a.m. GMT+9

House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.), who voted with scores of other House Republicans to object to President Biden's electors. (Jabin Botsford/The Washington Post)

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One of the most worrisome scenarios involving the 2024 election is the possibility that one or more GOP legislatures could send rogue presidential electors to Congress, in defiance of their state’s true popular vote.


Though the permutations are complicated, it’s plausible that this would result in a major constitutional crisis, or worse, a stolen presidential election. As one expert recently put it: “We should start to very much worry about what Jan. 6, 2025, looks like.”


That’s the date that Congress will count the electors from the 2024 election, and as you may recall, a lot of Republicans objected to President Biden’s electors on Jan. 6, 2021, though Congress did count the right ones. As you’ll also recall, then-President Donald Trump actually did try very hard to get some GOP state legislatures to send rogue electors, though they resisted.


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But we can’t count on either of those things happening next time. With Republicans who recognized the legitimacy of Trump’s loss facing purges and primary challenges, such civic virtue will likely be in even shorter supply.


Which is why we need institutional reforms that will make this nightmare scenario less likely. One is for Congress to revise the Electoral Count Act, which sets the process for the congressional counting of electors.


In an interview with the New Yorker, election law expert Rick Hasen discusses what reform of the ECA might look like:


One of the provisions in there says you only need an objection from one senator and one representative in order to go into separate trial sessions to negotiate over whether or not Electoral College votes should be accepted or rejected. There should be a much higher threshold, and there should be a substantive standard for rejecting those votes, so we would not see something like a hundred and forty-seven members of Congress that voted to object to state Electoral College votes on January 6th.

What Hasen means is that Congress could require a lot more than one senator and one representative to object to electors before the full Congress has to consider such objections. And Congress could set a stricter evidentiary standard under which objections to electors could be lodged. On Jan. 6, Republicans objected to Biden electors based on fictions.


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Hasen suggests other ideas — you should read the interview — but for now, suffice it to say that if Congress did want to act to reduce the chances of a stolen election or a constitutional crisis arising out of such a scenario, it could.


Which raises a question: If Republicans are so concerned about “election integrity” and “voter confidence,” isn’t this something they should support?


Republicans swear up and down that their escalating voter suppression efforts are really just about restoring “election integrity” via cracking down on (nonexistent) voter fraud, to reinforce voter “confidence” in election results. If so, supporting revisions to the ECA should fit the bill perfectly.


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After all, this would not represent federal encroachment on how states run elections (a frequent objection to federal efforts against voter suppression and partisan gerrymanders), but rather clarification of already existing processes. And it would reinforce election integrity and voter confidence by making it less likely that electors are counted in defiance of a state’s popular vote.


Meanwhile, Republicans who profess pure motives about future elections should want this kind of reform for another reason. When Trump pressured state legislators in 2020 to send rogue electors, which they mercifully resisted, it put them in a terrible position.


If the ECA were clarified to make such a scheme far less likely to succeed in Congress, then that sort of pressure on them would be far less likely to happen, and they would not be forced to stand up against it in defiance of the party base. And by the way, in a closer future election, given the drift of today’s GOP, that pressure could very well be much more intense.


As we debate how to protect democracy, Democrats should pursue this reform in Congress. Most importantly, it needs to happen to avert disaster. But in addition, it will call Republicans’ bluff. Isn’t a revised ECA something Republicans worried about election integrity and voter confidence should want?