Sunday, August 7, 2022

Natural Gas Is Better Than Many Environmentalists Admit


www.bloomberg.com
Natural Gas Is Better Than Many Environmentalists Admit
Matthew Yglesias
6 - 8 minutes

While most of progressive Washington has celebrated the announcement of the Inflation Reduction Act, at least one left-wing gadfly isn’t having it. “A pipeline?” asked Nina Turner on Twitter last week. “In a climate bill? It’s not a climate bill.”

Turner, a former state senator from Ohio and co-chair of Bernie Sanders’s 2020 presidential campaign, is referring to provisions of the IRA that would all but guarantee the construction of the Mountain Valley Pipeline between Virginia and West Virginia. (The proposal also includes some broader reforms that would generally make it harder to block pipeline construction.) And while Turner’s view that this provision invalidates the entire bill is very eccentric — essentially every mainstream environmental group has said that the legislation is, on balance, very good — her specific opposition to the construction of new pipelines is very mainstream.

It’s also very wrong.

The fundamental issue is that, at current margins, natural gas is a better option than many environmentalists would care to admit. That’s not because the gas itself is clean (though it is cleaner than coal and oil), but because it nicely complements renewable wind and solar power. Technological progress has made these sources of power cheap on a per-kilowatt-hour basis — when the sun is shining or the wind is blowing, and when the panels or turbines are optimally placed for sunshine or wind.

Gas plants have the convenient property of being easy to turn on and off. So a grid with plenty of gas attached to it can run mostly from wind and sunshine, with gas being provided on calm or cloudy days to ensure reliability. This mix of cheaper-than-ever renewables with cheap gas helped bring about large reductions in American CO2 emissions over the past 15 years, helping to drive many coal plants out of business and making the air much cleaner.

But the world is still not done with coal and oil. The US still has more than 200 coal-fired power plants. Oil is widely used to keep houses warm in the Northeast. And beyond US borders, Europeans are actually re-opening coal plants as Russia shuts off supplies of natural gas. Increasing the flow of supplies from the Marcellus shale to the Northeast, as well as using the Atlantic coast LNG terminals to ship gas to Europe, will make the energy mix cleaner, not dirtier.

That’s mostly a second-order effect of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. But the geopolitical angle is exactly what makes trying to address climate change through restrictions on the supply side so misguided.

Given that pollution is genuinely very bad — both in terms of its global climate impact and the localized impact of air particulates — it’s often the case that restraining fossil-fuel consumption is worth the cost. That’s true whether it’s done through a formal pricing mechanism such as a carbon tax, or through something like the EPA’s Clean Air Act authority, under which new rules are subject to cost-benefit analysis.

Under normal circumstances, however, blocking one cubic meter of gas production does not reduce consumption by one cubic meter, because much of the lost gas is simply obtained from some other slightly-higher-cost source. So the domestic economy ends up paying a large price in foregone production in exchange for a tiny reduction in pollution. Meanwhile, bad actors such as Russia gain revenue and leverage.

Environmentalists will argue, rightly, that to meet global emissions goals, the world eventually needs to move to zero or even negative emissions, and that is incompatible with the current natural gas infrastructure. But the painful truth is that there is not yet the technical capacity to do this in a way that is compatible with continued global economic growth.

What there is, mercifully, is technology that can generate very large reductions in emissions. That means replacing virtually all current use of liquid fossil fuels with electricity while simultaneously eliminating all use of coal and oil to generate electricity. Replacing coal-fired power plants and gasoline-fueled cars with renewable energy — supported by gas — is both economically feasible and environmentally advantageous. Some places even have enough hydroelectrical resources that they can do without gas entirely and build a genuinely zero-carbon grid.

For most of the world, though, getting to zero emissions will require a technological breakthrough. That could mean advanced nuclear (which I am enthusiastic about, as it is compact and can go anywhere), or it could mean better batteries and long-term electrical storage (which many environmentalists are enthusiastic about). Advanced geothermal power could do the job. It’s also possible that the fossil fuel industry’s bet on carbon capture and sequestration will pan out, and the world will be able to keep burning gas.

Partisans of these rival technologies like to get into arguments about which of them is genuinely promising and which is vaporware. That’s why it’s smart of the Inflation Reduction Act to provide financial support for all of them. It also explains why some people have chosen this moment to criticize a pipeline.

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Investing in the development of technologies that might make gas obsolete is great. So is regulating the consumption of gas to account for its pollution externalities. But removing Russian gas from world markets has made it harder for the world to meet its climate goals — and shown that the practical environmental impact of gas is less than many feared: With today’s technology, in today’s global economy, more gas means lower emissions, not higher. That’s why a pipeline absolutely does belong in a climate bill.


Friday, August 5, 2022

Kyrsten Sinema - Still Completely Terrible


talkingpointsmemo.com
Kyrsten Sinema - Still Completely Terrible
By Josh Marshall
4 - 5 minutes

You’ve probably seen the news that Kyrsten Sinema has signed on to the Schumer/Manchin climate and inflation deal. She did so in exchange for nixing the carried interest loophole fix, an almost comically mercenary demand – a payoff to working families in the venture capital and private equity businesses. She also ramped back the corporate minimum tax with some depreciation tweaks. On the plus side, they seem to have made up the revenue and added a bit more with a small surtax on stock buybacks. A modest additional amount of spending goes to drought mitigation, which is of course a big deal for the Southwest.

In other words, the bill emerges from her mercenary and showboating demands more or less unscathed, which is a great thing. I’ve been saying that Sinema’s career is over regardless of what she does. I’m not sure that’s totally true. If she allows this to go through and, perversely, even takes credit for it, I think she’s at least opened a path for herself to run again successfully. But when I say a ‘path’ I mean it is highly dependent on her future actions in the next two years as well as other eventualities beyond her control.

I figured she was going this direction when we heard her talking about drought mitigation funding. That was the first thing we’ve heard from her in 18 months that showed she was thinking about her need to get not only reelected but even renominated in 2024. She may shift more when she realizes just how dire a position she’s placed herself.

The big thing Sinema has always had in her favor is that in a close run state like Arizona, a divisive primary usually leads to a weakened nominee, whoever that is. What’s more, the most likely challenger to Sinema, Rep. Ruben Gallego – who I’m a big fan of – is likely too far left to win in what is after all still a more Republican than not state. That doesn’t mean you need an ersatz ‘moderate’ like Sinema. What you want is someone like Mark Kelly, who won in 2020 and is looking surprisingly strong this year too.

If your a big Gallego fan (I am too). I’m not saying he shouldn’t run or that he can’t win. I’m simply saying that a Democrat running in Arizona still is very much a needle threading exercise. That would be a challenge for a progressive Democrat like Gallego. Critically, a successful primary challenge would require him to focus on his conventionally Democratic or progressive positions which would make the general election needle threading a serious challenge. I’d love to be wrong.

In any case, let’s conclude by simply remembering and taking a few moments to contemplate just how terrible a Senator and politician Sinema is. Politicians all have big egos and many are focused mostly on their own personal advancement. All are at some level. But I mean, having their main eye on the next rung on the ladder. But I cannot think of any contemporary politician more openly contemptuous of her own constituents, both on the retail and the wholesale level. Nor can I think of one more openly self-serving and egomaniacal. And truly – My God! – that’s saying a lot!!! The true comedy of her ridiculous Senate career is that she’s so profoundly high on her narcissistic and egomaniacal supply that she managed to torch her own career. She has apparently thought all her antics were cueing her up for a successful presidential run.

People think she’s crazy for her constant attempts to ape John McCain and his supposed maverickism. But the truth is a well-executed version of that strategy could have worked very well for her, even if it would have irritated a lot of Democrats. Always be the last one to get on board with Democratic legislation; don’t be a reliable vote; find a few key initiatives to buck her party. Especially given her personal story and political background this likely would have allowed her to carve out a strong base which included most Democrats along with a good chunk of middle of the road libertarian-leaning independents. Arizona Democrats simply can’t afford to be too choosy. But occasionally bucking your party isn’t the same as trying to annihilate your party. At the end of the day she was just too clumsy and gullible to pull it off. It’s great news if she allows this bill to pass. But she’s still terrible, as terrible as they come.

Thursday, August 4, 2022

The Decline and Fall of John Yoo by James Larock

The Decline and Fall of John Yoo by James Larock

The man who was the conservative legal movement’s favorite torture enthusiast has been reduced to taking unearned victory laps over the Supreme Court’s COVID-19 jurisprudence.

By James Larock

Read time: 9 minutes


All careers end. They just don’t all end the same way. Some people pull a graceful Calvin Johnson and retire at the top of their games, perhaps too early but with their dignity intact. Others stay in the job for years, transforming into shells of their former selves, perhaps longing to walk away but unsure what else they’d do with their time once the spotlight is finally, blessedly on someone else.


Particularly in sports, that decline can be perversely funny. The first time I saw 40-year-old alleged sex offender Ben Roethlisberger trot onto the field and spray a half-dozen passes to nobody, I laughed for half an hour. But after a four-month NFL season of watching the same thing over and over, it wasn’t funny to me anymore. I was just watching a guy be bad at his job in public.


One of the chief legal architects of America’s Bush-era torture program, John Yoo, is going through a similar career twilight. After burning hot and bright as a young law professor-turned-waterboarding justifier, his career has been about as boring and pathetic as the last few years of Ben Roethlisberger’s. Just like Big Ben, what started out as funny is turning more and more dreary as he shamelessly copies whatever the day’s conventional conservative wisdom happens to be. (Also like Big Ben, he will likely never face the justice he deserves.)


Had you met a young Yoo in the 1990s, you would have been hard-pressed to predict a decline like this. He did everything a rising right-wing lawyer should: clerking for a Reagan nominee on the D.C. Circuit, and then for Justice Clarence Thomas on the Supreme Court, and then working on the Republican-led Senate Judiciary Committee before scoring a prestigious tenured professorship at Berkeley Law. These days, he teaches courses on separation of powers and the history of the Constitution’s framing, which are only occasionally interrupted by protesters dressed in the familiar orange jumpsuits of the Guantanamo Bay prisoners whose torture he helped facilitate.



Pictured L-R: John Yoo; relevance; time (Photo by Jamie Squire/Getty Images)


Much of Yoo’s early-career scholarship focused on a simple question: whether treaties matter. Article VI of the Constitution provides that treaties are the “supreme Law of the Land” and override any state law to the contrary. Way back in 1796, the Supreme Court recognized that treaties are often self-executing—that once the president signs a treaty with the support of two-thirds of the Senate, Congress didn’t need to pass any additional laws to implement them, because “from the nature of them, they require no further act to be done.”


This is sometimes a problem for conservatives. The states are laboratories of reaction, fiefdoms for used car dealers in gerrymandered districts to enact laws restricting abortion rights, empowering police, and stopping minorities from voting. And the United States is a party to a lot of treaties, from treaties that regulate harms to migratory birds to the humane treatment of prisoners of war. The more treaties the Senate endorses, the more federal law they’re making, and the more state laws they could be preempting.


Luckily for conservatives, sometimes a treaty isn’t self-executing. For example, American treaty negotiators sometimes explicitly agree that a treaty will only take effect once Congress passes a law to implement it. But Yoo had the insight to push this argument to its absolute limit: Over multiple law review articles, he argued that as a general rule, treaties aren’t self-executing, regardless of what the treaty actually says.


This flew in the face of an emerging academic consensus that courts should respect and uphold treaties as binding law in individual cases. His contemporaries saw his position as extreme, pointing out that courts would undermine the plain text of Article VI if they cast treaties as mere suggestions without an act of Congress to implement them. But Yoo recognized the threat that international agreements posed to his political project and he reacted accordingly.



(Photo by Robert Lachman/Los Angeles Times via Getty Images)


Yoo wasn’t just a Republican hack, though. He had principles. Specifically, he supported any president’s authority to unilaterally start wars. In 2000, he wrote glowingly about President Bill Clinton’s authority to order American troops into what was then Serbia, as well as Clinton’s other military actions in Sudan, Afghanistan, Somalia, Macedonia, and Rwanda. Congress didn’t usually authorize these missions, but Yoo argued that claims of a “unilateral executive war power” could “find support in the Constitution’s text and original understanding.” The egghead “international law scholars” who whined about Congress’s enumerated responsibility to declare war, according to Yoo, had “failed to describe reality.”


These tenacious defenses of the president’s right to invade foreign countries and states’ rights to ignore international law drew the attention of scouts at the highest levels of conservative legal thought. In 2001, President George W. Bush promoted him to deputy attorney general in the Office of Legal Counsel, where Yoo would pull off his masterpieces: the Torture Memos, which justified some of the worst atrocities America committed during the War on Terror.


In his memos, all of Yoo’s pontifications about the wishy-washy nature of international law paid off. He answered a series of questions from the CIA and Defense Department with veteran confidence: Al Qaeda? Not a “state,” and thus not covered by the Geneva Conventions. The Taliban? Not a real “government,” and thus not covered, either. Anyone we detain? If they’re not wearing army uniforms, they might as well be al Qaeda. And what can we do to them? Since the Geneva Conventions don’t apply to “enemy combatants,” we can do whatever we want. These memos and their principles were used to justify years of extraordinary renditions, waterboarding, and assassinations. Torture went from a rumor about CIA blacksites to official U.S. government policy, all thanks to John Yoo and the other merry men at the Office of Legal Counsel.


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And he wasn’t a pariah. He was a rockstar. By the time Bush left office, torture was more popular than ever, and so was Yoo, who slipped right back into the world of conservative legal academia and uncorked a series of law review articles explaining why everything he had done was legally justified. He was in his prime, and in his prime, John Yoo was untouchable. No treaty could stand before him. No human rights principle could stand against him. No unique method of torture could go unjustified. He had a novel legal argument for anything. He didn’t care if it made him a “war criminal.” He clocked in ready, able, and willing to ruin a motherfucker’s life.


Yoo expanded his policy portfolio after Bush left office, staking out right-wing positions on domestic issues, too. (Maybe he thought that just being The Torture Guy wouldn’t be enough to score him a cushy nomination the next time a Republican president rolled into office.) During the Obama administration, he began writing about the limits on executive power he had suddenly discovered. For example, in 2013, Yoo and a former colleague argued that Obama did not have the authority to decline to prosecute immigration cases. By 2016, he had discovered the evils of the administrative state. Strangely, what concerned him wasn’t how a faceless, unaccountable government could kidnap and torture random people without repercussions. Rather, in the series of essays he co-edited with the ‘70s B-movie title Liberty’s Nemesis, he was apparently concerned about the horrors of government regulation of stock exchanges, health care reform, and wetlands protection.



Protesters confront Berkeley Law Dean Christopher Edley at graduation on May 17, 2008 (Photo By Paul Chinn/The San Francisco Chronicle via Getty Images)


This dip into domestic affairs was the beginning of Yoo’s decline. In 2016, like every other fancy Republican lawyer, he abhorred Trump before becoming a reluctant and then enthusiastic fan. He started publishing increasingly niche law review articles about whatever the Trump priority of the day was—abolishing national monuments, the Space Force, impeachment—but it was never enough to get that judicial nomination he coveted.


As I’ve written for this site, when the Trump administration was drawing to a close, Yoo wasn’t even the first to argue that the Twelfth Amendment enabled Mike Pence to steal the 2020 presidential election. Instead, he was beaten to the punch by John Eastman, of all people, who is so dumb that he once tried to get the Supreme Court to rule that Congress doesn’t have the authority to spend money. Bested by charlatans like that, Yoo would never be the first to crack a nut like the Geneva Conventions again.


That pattern continues in Yoo’s most recent law review article, “Emergency Powers During a Viral Pandemic.” As you might be able to guess from the title, Yoo has suddenly rediscovered serious constraints on the presidency now that a Democrat occupies the office. But just like with the Twelfth Amendment, he’s late to the party.


The article focuses on the Centers for Disease Control’s COVID-19 eviction moratorium and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s vaccine mandate—two areas in which landlords and business owners bitterly contested federal authority and ultimately persuaded the Supreme Court to throw both policies out. The article isn’t so much a nuanced examination of administrative agencies’ authority to enforce federal laws as it is John Yoo’s unearned victory lap celebrating someone else’s Supreme Court wins a year later.



When you helped write the Torture Memos and know how to stand (Photo By Michael Macor/The San Francisco Chronicle via Getty Images)


Even under these circumstances, Yoo apparently feels the need to rewrite history. The CDC eviction moratorium, which started under the Trump administration and ended several months after President Joe Biden took office, somehow becomes “the Biden Administration’s effort to ban evictions nationwide.” The proposed OSHA rule, which required large employers to ensure their employees get vaccinated, somehow becomes Biden’s “nationwide vaccine mandate,” even though it wouldn’t have applied to anywhere near the whole country. It’s not clear whether Yoo is doing this to troll left-wing readers or just because he’s a moron. At this point in his career, I feel compelled to say it’s the latter.


Significantly, Yoo’s analysis ignores federal pandemic responses that the Court didn’t overturn—most importantly, the vaccine mandate for health care workers promulgated by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. The old Yoo would have gladly taken on this fight, searching out some way to declare that this, too, was a brazen and unconstitutional overreach that the Court was wrong to allow. But today’s Yoo is too soft. Instead of dealing with this challenge to his conception of executive power, he ducks it. Although he cites sources that explicitly compare the CMS rule with the OSHA rule, he can’t bring himself to acknowledge it.


This is how it ends for John Yoo: His legal thinking keeps getting less bold, less vicious, more circular. This once-proud man, this legal titan of the neocons, is reduced to chasing Trump’s star to avoid the irrelevance that threatens to overtake him at any moment. But it’s hard for me to take too much joy in seeing a war criminal begging for the limelight again. We’re all just watching a guy be bad at his job in public.



James LaRock is a practicing lawyer and recovering legal podcaster whose commentary has been featured in The Outline.  The views he expresses on this web site do not represent those of his employer.


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Monday, August 1, 2022

Joe Manchin to the rescue


www.slowboring.com
Joe Manchin to the rescue
Matthew Yglesias
15 - 19 minutes

Back in the July 22 mailbag, BD Anders asked, “Have recent developments changed your prior generous evaluation of Joe Manchin and his negotiation style?”

I answered, “Yes.”

But as I explained in my July 24 Bloomberg column, the apparent breakdown of negotiations really surprised me. Contrary to all the whining and complaining from the left, it really seemed to me that Manchin had spent the past year pursuing a mostly consistent and mostly correct set of concerns with Democrats’ Build Back Better proposal. And as of early July, it seemed that Chuck Schumer was finally prepared to give Manchin what he was asking for: a bill based on the three-legged stool I described back in February of deficit reduction, health care, and technology-neutral energy investments. But having finally gotten what he wanted, Manchin killed it.

I remained hopeful that he would reconsider, then he did, and as of Wednesday evening, Senate Democrats have a deal that now needs to get through the House.

I have more in-depth thoughts on a few aspects below, but a few quick reactions:

    It’s very good legislation that both helps address an acute problem (inflation) and a significant long-term challenge (climate) while also continuing to move the ball forward on Democrats’ signature issue of health care.

    Even as Biden became quite unpopular over the course of 2022, there is essentially zero popular backlash or mobilization against these proposals. The Democratic Party has a bunch of short-term and long-term political problems, but all things considered, having these ideas front and center helps.

    This deal is not only far short of progressives’ February 2021 hope of sweeping social change (which I think was never realistic given the vote count); it’s a significantly less progressive deal than the one Manchin and Schumer agreed to in July 2021. The decision to back out of that deal in the hopes of pressuring Manchin from the left was a strategic and tactical debacle for which there ought to be accountability.

    Judged purely as a climate measure, this package contains many deviations from a pure groups-driven environmentalist bill. But the vast majority of those deviations actually make it a more potent emissions-reducing bill than a bill that simply did what environmentalists want.

    Climate is a very high priority for the high-SES liberals who dominate both the media and Democratic Party staff, but for persuadable voters, the health care and deficit reduction provisions of the bill are probably more appealing. And it’s important to try to encourage public discussion of that stuff so people realize it continues to be a significant divide between the parties. 

Last but by no means least, with the framing of this proposal as the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, I hope we can find our way to a more mature place in our understanding of the politics of fiscal policy.

During the 2009-2016 era of American politics, U.S. fiscal policy was consistently too tight and budget deficits were too low. Many people made that point at different times and in different ways, but in terms of Democratic Party factional infighting, it was largely the left — to its enormous credit — that made this point. But over time that curdled into the idea that “deficits should be bigger” was a per se progressive stance and that the whole way forward for left politics was to embrace the view that deficits never matter and economic orthodoxy should be entirely overthrown. This just never made sense.

“Should we expand or shrink the welfare state” is a left/right ideological conflict, but “should the deficit be higher or lower” is a pragmatic, conditions-based assessment. Joe Biden happens to be president at a time when reducing the deficit is, in fact, the correct course of action, and recognizing that is not an ideological betrayal.

One of the central claims Democrats are going to make about this bill is that it will reduce inflation.

But when it comes to inflation, it’s best to think of the Federal Reserve as the ultimate decider. So while something like the American Rescue Plan certainly stimulated demand and increased inflationary pressure, on some level the reason we ended up with high inflation in 2022 is that the Fed allowed it to happen. Today, though, the Fed seems quite determined to recover its inflation-fighting credibility and is going to keep raising interest rates until inflation falls to target. That will be true whether or not IRA passes.

But if fiscal policy is draining demand from the economy, then the Fed can stabilize inflation with fewer interest rate hikes.

That’s important because high interest rates are essentially a tax on investment that can impair the economy’s long-term productive capacity. Republicans will say that the problem with IRA is that taxing the rich reduces investment and thereby impairs the economy’s long-term productive capacity. But while it’s certainly true that highly progressive taxes like the ones in IRA fall partially on investment, they also fall on rich people’s consumption. So given the inflationary circumstances, taxing the rich to reduce the deficit and diminish the burden on the Fed helps protect the inflation side of the economy while also protecting the lowest-income consumers.

This was the big economic debate way back in 1993 when Republicans swore that Bill Clinton taxing the rich would crush investment and economic growth while Clinton argued (correctly) that deficit reduction to reduce interest rates would be good.

It is worth saying that everything on the inflation-fighting front needs to be balanced with other concerns. Probably the single most potent anti-inflation fiscal measure you could adopt would be a huge, across-the-board cut in Social Security benefits. Elderly people tend to consume a very high share of their income because there’s no need to save for retirement, so this would really take a bite out of consumption while having a minimal impact on investment. The problem is it would be cruel and inhumane. Taxing the rich to fund a mix of direct public sector investment and deficit reduction is anti-inflationary in a way that has side benefits. Don’t take my word for it, ask inflation hawk Larry Summers.

Meanwhile, on the investment side, the bill would do a lot to increase American energy production while also making it cleaner.

On energy, this bill is a really big deal. Jesse Jenkins, my go-to source for emissions modeling, says it will push American greenhouse gas emissions down to 40 percent of their 2005 level.

But I also think it’s worth discussing this on a more abstract level. I don’t want to rehash these pieces, but relative to mainstream environmentalist views I think:

    Making energy more abundant is much more important than promoting conservation of energy.

    Curbing domestic fossil fuel production is an inordinately costly way to reduce pollution.

    At the current margin, natural gas reduces rather than increases emissions.

This is, I think, roughly the worldview that Joe Biden campaigned on in 2020. His positioning on climate and energy reflected a greater engagement with labor union views than the other candidates, and it’s not surprising that he did a lot better in the primary with working-class Democrats than with more upscale post-materialist types.

Since taking office, though, the Biden administration has seemed torn between implementing Joe Biden’s campaign platform and implementing Elizabeth Warren’s, with internal staff fights breaking out over things like support for carbon capture and blue hydrogen. The really good news is that what emerged from negotiations with Manchin is a truly Bidenist climate agenda, one that is technology agnostic and supportive of carbon capture and sequestration, direct air capture, nuclear, geothermal, and hydrogen along with solar and wind. This is going to be characterized in a lot of the press as a compromise between environmental groups’ asks and Manchin’s views. And that’s correct. But it’s important to understand that this means the bill is a more potent emissions reducer than it would be if the environmentalists weren’t forced to compromise.

The same is true, I think, of the as-yet-somewhat-vague side bargain that Manchin apparently reached with Nancy Pelosi on permitting reform.

Manchin’s main interest in this, as I understand it, is that he’d like to build pipelines to bring West Virginia natural gas to New England and East Coast LNG export terminals. Environmentalists don’t like these ideas, but factually speaking, building those pipelines will reduce emissions by displacing heating oil (in New England) and coal-fired power plants (in Europe). Permitting reform should also make it easier to build zero-carbon power sources.

For a sense of scale, it’s worth noting that this bill’s climate investment is substantially larger than the EU’s comparable package from last year. And I think it’s also qualitatively better. The Europeans largely focused on promoting energy efficiency; that’s fine, and if I were in Congress I would support energy efficiency spending. But climate change is a global problem, and the building retrofits doesn’t scale globally. By contrast, if we can generate a technological breakthrough in seasonal electricity storage, geothermal power, nuclear power, or carbon capture, that would reduce global emissions. So if I had to pick one approach or the other, I would choose the American approach.

I saw urbanist Twitter express disappointment that the bill includes tax credits for buying electric cars but not for buying e-bikes, and I agree that it would have been better to be technology-agnostic here.

But some people spun that out into a larger complaint that the bill really doesn’t do much to address the energy consumption of our transportation and land use patterns. Here I think it’s important to remember that we did the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act just last year. IIJA (formerly known as the Bipartisan Infrastructure Framework) features both the biggest investment in passenger rail ever and also the most generous transit/highway split of any surface transportation bill.

Unfortunately, IIJA is not expected to generate large emissions reductions. That’s because experts are generally plausibly pessimistic that even large amounts of transit/rail spending will actually generate large increases in ridership.

But note that this is a pessimistic forecast about implementation, not an iron law of the future. If Amtrak spends its money on smart things rather than dumb things, then people will ride trains more. If Los Angeles upzones around its metro stations, then its metro system will get more riders. Pre-pandemic LA was an outlier in terms of the scope of its metro system versus its actual usage, but today, thanks to remote work, New York, Chicago, Boston, D.C., and San Francisco all have substantial spare transit capacity too. And four out of the five could clearly generate more transit-oriented development with zoning reform, and even though I’m pessimistic about Chicago, the Windy City might prove me wrong, too.

All of which is to say that most of America’s transportation system upside is under the control of blue cities and state legislatures. Advocates should not waste their time looking to the United States Senate to solve these issues.

Speaking of blue states, with Manchin now on board, it looks like the biggest possible stumbling block is the commitment of a handful of Democrats — especially from New Jersey — to the idea that a reconciliation bill ought to address the State and Local Tax Deduction (SALT).

The story here is that people used to be able to fully deduct the taxes they pay to their state and local government from their federal income tax bill. This provision was extremely regressive for two reasons. One is that all tax deductions are regressive because the nature of a deduction is that the value of a $100 deduction is higher when you’re in a higher tax bracket. But what made this one especially regressive is that rich people have higher state and local tax bills.

Then along came the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. The main purpose of TCJA was a gigantic deficit-financed corporate income tax cut. But moderate Senate Republicans insisted on limiting how much deficit financing could be used, so Paul Ryan designed TCJA to be partially paid for by eliminating certain tax deductions. One of those pay-fors was limiting SALT to $10,000. The argument for this was bog standard conservative tax policy analysis: conservative economists think that marginal tax rates are a really big deal, and the SALT deduction, like all tax deductions, gives people a tax break while doing nothing to lower their marginal tax rate. In theory, conservative economists would favor totally eliminating all tax deductions and plowing the revenue into cutting rates for the rich.

Real-world politics is, of course, somewhat different, so in this case Ryan sold his caucus on limiting the SALT cap with an exaggerated argument that this would really stick it to blue states, which are richer on average and also have higher taxes.

Then because of polarization, Democrats were invested in the idea that if Paul Ryan thinks something is bad, it must be good, so some of them started defending SALT. And even though the SALT deduction is extremely regressive, TCJA as a whole was even more regressive. Flash forward a few years and Josh Gottheimer and Bob Menendez are acting like raising the SALT cap makes them huge fighters for the New Jersey middle class. But note that not only is SALT inherently regressive, but thanks to other TCJA provisions, fewer people than ever itemize their tax reductions at all. And the $10,000 SALT deduction that remains isn’t peanuts — the vast majority of people are either not itemizing or else are able to deduct their state and local taxes fully.

The upshot, per this analysis from the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, is that even in New Jersey the vast majority of households receive no benefit from lifting the SALT cap.

Long story short, this would be a total nonsense complaint to hold up important legislation over.

Not to end on too much of a downer note, but I really do think it’s worth recalling that this deal ultimately involves Schumer settling in July 2022 for less than Manchin was willing to do in July 2021.

In part that’s Manchin being a bit ornery and in part it’s the inflation situation changing over the past year. But it illustrates, I think, the relatively high price of the Democratic Party’s failure to set priorities. How priorities get set is a somewhat mysterious thing. The United States doesn’t have a very strong formal party system. Everyone is elected separately and accountable to their own constituents. But still, there are people with leadership roles — both formal roles in elected office and informal roles at party-aligned institutions.

And I think those people did build a rough consensus that climate was a higher priority than welfare state expansion,1 but beyond that they didn’t really put in the work. The assumption seemed to be that they would win in a huge landslide and then pass a bill that was dramatically larger than the Affordable Care Act. Then when they won but only secured narrow congressional majorities, they still went forward with a proposal for a welfare state expansion that was dramatically larger than the Affordable Care Act, even though welfare state expansion wasn’t their top priority.

The result was that they wound up settling for a pretty small investment in health care affordability when the opportunity existed a year ago to get more done.

I think the IRA as written is a really good bill, and I don’t want to spoil the vibes by dwelling too much on what might have been. Coordination and priority-setting in America’s highly decentralized system are objectively difficult, and I’m glad they got something important done. But it really would be good next time to try harder on prioritization.

Friday, July 29, 2022

Back in the USA mailbag


www.slowboring.com
Back in the USA mailbag
Matthew Yglesias
24 - 30 minutes

Vacation was lovely but it is nice to be back home enjoying all that America has to offer — primarily ice water, vented driers, and spicy food. And of course some spicy takes to complement it all.

dysphemistic treadmil: Does it make it harder for you to recruit guest essayists when your commenters are so ill-mannered and horrible to them?

Sadly, I don’t have access to the counterfactual universe where y’all are nicer, so I can’t say for sure.

Rustbeltjacobin: Let’s say you hit the lottery. Not the “start a blog in 1999” lottery that you did hit, but some unspecified windfall made it so you no longer had to concern yourself with making a living from your endeavors. What project would you do then?

Probably something very similar to what I’m doing now, just without the subscriptions.

If the jackpot was really enormous and I had enough money to start giving out grants, I’d probably try to do more stuff in the YIMBY space.

Jake Mulcahy: What do you think of the macro debate behind the race between Liz Truss and Rishi Sunak in the UK? Broadly, Sunak believes that deficit reduction now can cool inflation quite a bit and worries about a sharp rise in debt service costs if fiscal policy isn’t tightened.

Truss OTOH sees Britain’s chronic productivity growth as a much greater problem than inflation and thinks a planned rise in corporation tax would dent it further. She also thinks the inflationary impulse of payroll and fuel tax cuts would be muted, and has hinted at some vague form of financial repression to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio.

I don’t know a lot about Sunak’s platform, but Truss’ diagnosis seems broadly wrong to me. The point of low corporate taxes is to make your country more attractive as a net destination for global capital flows, which lowers local interest rates and spurs investment. Current U.K. interest rates are already pretty low, and more to the point, the Bank of England is deliberately raising them to cool inflation. If you’re worried about the impact of higher rates on the investment climate in the U.K. (which seems reasonable), the way to address that is with deficit reduction to reduce the need for monetary tightening. If you do what Truss is suggesting, you’re going to end up with higher rates, not lower.

More broadly, in contrast to Italy’s complicated and hard-to-fix economic problems, I think the U.K.’s economic problems are really simple to diagnose — it’s housing, housing, and housing with incredible unmet demand for housing in London and the Southeast due to a brutal planning regime.

What the U.K. needs to do is first and foremost liberalize housebuilding and, secondarily, improve intercity transportation between London and other centers. Everything else in British politics is a distraction.

Zirkafett: What’s your top summer fiction recommendation?

I really enjoyed Elif Batuman’s “Either/Or.” But this is a book about a Harvard student in the 1990s, complete with detailed descriptions of the UNIX email system we used at the time. Her protagonist is assigned to live in DeWolf Street overflow housing as a sophomore just like I was and applies to write for Let’s Go Russia and gets rejected just like I was. I’m not sure how appealing it would be to someone who hasn’t had this very specific personal biography, but personally, I loved it.

Thomas L. Hutcheson: What does Matt think about Arnold Kling's concept of “enabler” of woke-ism, whether or not he agrees that he is one?

I’m not sure I really believe in “woke-ism” as a real or useful concept, though it is absolutely true that people can be enablers of an ideological or political movement without subscribing to its tenets.

To me, the most clear-cut example of this happening on the left comes from a different corner of the issue landscape entirely: climate change. Joe Biden will every once in a while slip the idea that climate change is an “existential threat” into his rhetoric on the issue. Now there really are people who, wrongly, believe that climate change is likely to bring about the extinction of the human species. They tend to advocate for really extreme climate policies and tactics that would make sense if climate change were genuinely an existential threat but that don’t make sense in the real world, where climate is a serious problem but not genuinely existential. And if you look at Biden’s actual climate policies, I think they are generally very sensible and reflect a sound assessment of the issue. But on this level of broad rhetoric, Biden (like a lot of progressives) is kind of casually enabling a much more extreme view than the view he actually holds.

And I do think this kind of enabling ends up confusing people. Climate change really is a serious problem and there genuinely are bad actors peddling absurd denialism and lobbying for dirty energy interests. So if you hear a debate that’s polarized between denialism and “existential threat,” it’s natural to start thinking the existential threat view is correct and then become puzzled as to why Biden doesn’t try to immediately halt all fossil fuel production in a last-ditch effort to ward off extinction. The reason he doesn’t do that is he (rightly) thinks this would fail cost-benefit scrutiny. But the reason it fails cost-benefit scrutiny is that the downside of three to four degrees of warming, though large, is not “all of humanity goes extinct.”

David H: As you say, it's great for DC if it does all the things you recommended in Monday's column, and for the people who live there. But what are the impacts on the larger region if the central city achieves that kind of upzoning? Not that DC has to worry about it, since unlike say Charlotte or Austin they don't have to worry about a state legislature interfering just for spite. But even if DC grows to a million by 2035, that's an extra quarter million people in a region of (depending on which metro stat you prefer) 5-10 million. Do you project spillover effects into the inner suburbs, or does it end up not mattering much unless Fairfax and MontCo make big changes as well?

The regional consequences of broad D.C. upzoning seem unpredictable to me.

At one extreme, you could say that if Fairfax County were to become the suburb of a bigger and richer central city, demand for Fairfax living would only go even higher. At the other extreme, you could posit there is a fixed quantity of people who want to live in the D.C. metro area, so growth in the core city comes at the expense of suburban demand. The truth is obviously somewhere between the two, where some suburban communities would see demand rise as a result of core city growth and others would see demand fall.

But on balance, I think the impact would be to divert growth not from other parts of the D.C. metro area but from other large metro areas. Some people who in Real World 2025 will end up moving to the suburbs of Atlanta, Phoenix, Houston, and Dallas would instead move to the suburbs of D.C. in the YIMBYtopia version of 2025.

Alex Newkirk: What is political capital actually? Is it fungible across issues? Can it be wasted?

It’s a pretty confused metaphor. Normally when we decide to get fancy and start calling money “capital,” we’re trying to call attention to the fact that if you invest your capital wisely, you earn a return and thus have more capital than you started with. A person who starts out very rich and is reasonably prudent with his money can both live comfortably off his capital income and also reinvest enough of it to continually get richer.

Politics is much more like consumption than investment. You win an election and you start with hopefully a good amount of political support in Congress and among the public. Then as you start doing things, the tendency is to alienate or disappoint people and end up with less support — it’s like spending down a stack of cash. The hope is that you spend it on stuff that’s good and useful rather than stuff that’s pointless. But it’s not really “capital” that’s going to earn returns.

James: You argue that proportional representation would be good for America. It seems to me that the biggest problem with proportional representation in America is that it would lead to the creation of one or more Black political parties. This would be bad for everyone, including Black people, because it would prevent Black politicians from gaining power in mainstream politics. Barack Obama's political career would be impossible, for example, and in an earlier era the Civil Rights movement would have been delayed as White political parties would not have been competing for Black voters. This is not a problem in most European countries because most European countries do not have any demographic group that is really analogous to Black Americans, but it is a problem in Israel where proportional representation has allowed the Jewish political parties to collude informally to exclude the Arab parties from power for decades. Any thoughts on this?

I think this is an overreading of the Israeli situation.

Here’s another example. In Finland, there is a Swedish-speaking minority. Its members generally vote for the Swedish People’s Party (SFP), which tends to get around 5 percent of Finnish MPs. The SFP focuses pretty narrowly on a handful of issues related to the status of the Swedish language and doesn’t really take a strong view on other topics, other than being pro-EU. That makes them a useful addition to pretty much any potential coalition, so they’re almost always in government as junior partners.

In the real world United States, northern Black voters somewhat surprisingly realigned and backed FDR’s reelection in 1936 despite his bad record on civil rights issues because New Deal relief was so important to the African American population. FDR won landslide reelections in 1940 and 1944, but the Black vote was actively contested in the 1948 election (part of the reason Harry Truman desegregated the military), and Eisenhower made real and partially successful efforts to court Black voters in his two campaigns. By 1960, Kennedy and Nixon were both trying to have it both ways, vying for both the Black vote and the southern white vote. It’s a very murky and ideologically confused situation, but multiple pieces of civil rights legislation (not just the big Civil Rights Act of 1964, but its more modest predecessors in 1957 and 1960) emerge from this dynamic.

In a counterfactual PR United States, I think you’d see the same basic dynamic, except instead of Kennedy and Nixon courting Black voters directly, they’d be courting the Black Party as a coalition partner. The Black Party’s weakness would be that it would hold fewer seats in parliament than the Dixiecrat Party. But its strength would be that by 1960, most northern whites clearly favored Civil Rights and found the Dixiecrats to be fairly politically toxic. So ultimately Lyndon Johnson might be the man to break the logjam, leading a small group of southern white moderates into a coalition with northern liberals and the Black Party to pass civil rights legislation, enfranchising southern African Americans, and thereby trying to grow the coalition. Then later you’d see the backlash — the Dixiecrats would give up on re-imposing segregation but return to power as junior partners in the Nixon coalition.

Doug Orleans: Do you consider yourself a feminist?

Reader email1: I initially discovered Matt's writing through the feminist blogosphere, probably via a Pandagon connection. At that time, my sense was that Matt was pretty closely connected to the feminist conversation. I would imagine that Matt still considers himself a feminist (?) but it's not really part of his personal brand anymore! Internet feminism has changed a lot since the mid-aughts, I know. But I would personally be very interested in hearing from Matt about his current relationship to feminism. I would also be really interested to see him engage with some of the interesting stuff coming out of feminist philosophy, e.g. Amia Srinivasan's work.

I do consider myself a feminist. In college, I was fortunate to take courses with the feminist philosophers Melissa Barry and Ti-Grace Atkinson and was introduced to the work of Susan Moller Okin, whose books influenced my thinking and who I got to meet when she was lecturing on “Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?”

I guess to the extent that I’ve disengaged a bit from some of the internet debates around these topics, it’s largely because I don’t think the world necessarily needs a man jumping in to explain how feminism ought to work. Part of this is my sense that there are actually plenty of early- and mid-career women doing good journalism and my role should mostly be to promote them. It’s not a coincidence that all but one of the paid freelance pieces on Slow Boring have been written by women or that a majority of Weeds interview guests were women or that we launched Slow Boring Book Club with a woman’s book. It always struck me as kind of non-classy to lampshade this with giant “I AM DOING THIS FOR FEMINIST REASONS” text, but maybe I should say that more clearly?

But if I were to offer my two cents on one feminist-adjacent controversy that I have strong feelings about, I think it was a big mistake to so strongly echo Hillary Clinton’s assertion that misogyny was the key factor in her 2016 defeat. I understand where that came from. And I don’t deny that as a woman in the public eye, she faced misogynistic criticism, but I think this kind of salted the earth against other women in politics. But I think the electability case for Amy Klobuchar was really strong, and I wish I’d seen more people asserting that women can (and should!) be popular and win elections.

Charles Herrig: Do you think the internet has increased or decreased the value of original art pieces?

Has the fact that everyone is able to see any Van Gogh, at any time, anywhere on earth, decreased the value of the originals, by making it unnecessary to see them in person? Or has it increased the value, by making more people interested in them?

I’m not sure I’m convinced that the internet has made a big difference here. Pre-internet, we saw lots of prints of Van Gogh paintings all over the place, and I was familiar with the work of Paul Cézanne from my mom’s book of reproductions of Cézanne paintings.

Walter Benjamin’s classic 1935 essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” considers the practical and theoretical implications of the rise of widely available prints and reproductions in books, and it’s a classic for a reason. And I think that correctly dates the relevant hinge point to around a century ago, with the change from mechanical to digital reproduction being relatively minor compared to the rise of mechanical reproduction in the first place.

JC: In your post on Monday, you suggested several measures that YIMBYs should offer in DC to make YIMBYism there more politically feasible-modest inclusionary zoning measures, making parking passes permanent and letting low income neighborhoods opt out. Are there equivalent political compromises the open borders folks should offer on immigration?

My sense of YIMBY/NIMBY issues is that most people’s concerns about YIMBYism are genuinely practical in nature — worries about parking and traffic and property values — and so the upside to addressing those practical concerns is potentially large.

My sense of immigration issues is that this is mostly not the case, and opposition is grounded in a sincere preference for homogeneity and stasis more than any specific practical issue. People’s aesthetic preferences just vary. After two weeks in Italy, I was excited to have a burrito for dinner one night and then ramen for lunch the next because I take routine access to a broad variety of cuisines for granted. Italy is more homogenous than the United States and has less of that. But within Italy, Rome is much more diverse and cosmopolitan than Montalcino, just as D.C. is more diverse and cosmopolitan than Blue Hill, Maine. People who grow up in rural areas and are annoyed by the homogeneity tend to end up leaving, so in rural areas in particular you have electorates that are very hostile to immigration and aren’t going to be talked out of it with charts and graphs.

Still, I do think it’s worth trying to be pragmatic about this simply because the gains from immigration are so large.

The big one where I think we could do better is on the fiscal consequences of immigration. The gains to immigrants themselves are so large that it should be easy to design a system that essentially guarantees immigration is a good deal for the public budget, which isn’t always the case under the current system.

What’s tougher are the “cultural” concerns that people have about immigrants from this place or that. Here’s where I do advocate for just trying to push folks to get to yes. Donald Trump infamously remarked that he wanted more immigrants from Norway instead of from “shithole countries.” So can we work with that? Why not create a special category of unlimited visas for Norwegians? My guess is very few Norwegians want to emigrate to the United States. But if they want to come and Trump wants them to come, why not let them? How about open borders with Canada? The Bahamas is full of English-speaking Christians. Maybe if you’re Bahamian under 45, finished high school, and can pass a criminal background check, you should be able to move to the U.S. if you want. Throw in the rest of the Anglophone Caribbean. I dunno. These are not my cultural hangups, so I can’t really speak to what would satisfy those who have them.

The point is that those of us who favor expanded immigration should be open to expanding it on whatever terms are acceptable to those who are more skeptical. What we should insist on, though, is that we want expansion — add Norwegians to the mix, don’t swap someone else out.

Wigan: Why, when it comes to some sports, are women athletes paid as much, or more than men (I'm thinking Tennis, Figure Skating and Volleyball) but in other sports it's not even close (WNBA vs NBA)? There's also a 3rd category of sports where very few competitors are women, but the females are paid just as well (Nascar and Danica Patrick, MMA and Ronda Roussey, Chess...).

Obviously the single most important factor is audience demand, but I think there are probably some other layers or intersections with current cultural-political arguments ( gender pay-gap, trans athletes, fairness, gender roles, etc..), that leave space for additional takes on why that is or what “should be.”

I don’t think there’s a singular correct explanation for all this. In tennis, I think the root issue is that the sport is somewhat unusual in having professionals and random amateurs play on courts that are the exact same size. The result is that, I think, the pro men overmatch the equipment — like if you were watching Steph Curry shoot threes on a high school court — and the women’s games are more fun. With figure skating, I think the whole sport is seen as “unmanly” (I don’t think it’s a coincidence that you have more out gay men in this sport than in others), so there’s a tilt toward celebrating women.

Gymnastics is a bit odd because unlike in most sports, being tall is a disadvantage and the men and women don’t use the same apparatus. At the other end of the spectrum, basketball is a really tough comp for women because being tall is extremely important.

The main thing to remember in terms of big-picture political and cultural arguments is that these are all games that were devised by humans in order to be fun to participate in and watch. In some sports, the pros play on the same court as amateurs (tennis) while in others (basketball) they don’t. In some sports (soccer) the pros play with basically the same equipment as amateurs whereas in other sports (baseball) they don’t. But it’s not like it would be against the laws of nature for MLB to allow aluminum bats or for the NBA to put the three-point line closer. The people in charge have just decided that would be less fun. When the WTA is deciding who should and shouldn’t be allowed to participate in women’s tennis competitions, their only real obligation is to try to maximize audience and sponsor interest in the tour. If people want to see trans women playing against cisgender women, that’s fine. If they don’t want to see that, then that’s also fine.

Barry: You talk a lot about “The Groups”, but I don’t see a lot of journalism out there exploring and explaining who they are, where they fundraise from, and how they exert influence. Why is this such an under-covered part of the way American politics works?

Unfortunately, the nature of the nonprofit-verse is that it is deliberately opaque.

Take the intense interest of Americans for Financial Reform in using financial regulation as a tool to tackle climate change. What I can tell you for sure is that when AFR was originally spun up in 2009 to advocate for stronger bank regulations in the wake of the financial crisis, this was not on their radar. What I have heard is that once it became clear that the Trump administration wasn’t going to push hard for the Dodd-Frank repeal, the progressive donor community largely lost interest in this topic. That left AFR sort of casting about for other angles. The climate advocacy world, meanwhile, has tons of money. So finreg groups got pumped-up with climate money to do what’s really climate advocacy. That’s what I’ve heard at any rate. But I can’t prove it because there’s very little transparency about these financial flows, and also because “so-and-so is a climate funder and not a financial regulation funder” is itself a judgment call and not a legal category or anything.

Another thing that makes this hard is that the funders themselves tend to be disingenuous about the influence they wield. In a January 2022 piece defending the world of progressive philanthropy, for example, former Democracy Alliance chief Gara LaMarche flatly denies that anyone at DA pushed progressive groups to endorse defunding the police. But in a June 2020 blog post, he personally endorsed the defund police movement. Now does that mean he was ordering the recipients of DA money to embrace the defund movement? No. But was there pressure? I think there was. But it’s hard to prove. And what would proof look like anyway? Nobody is going to be so uncouth as to write down a memo that says “embrace the Current Thing or else your grant next year will shrink.”

As for why The Groups matter, I think there are a few means of influence:

    It makes your life easier as a journalist to just kind of pretend that Group X has a real constituency and membership and that quoting its leaders in your stories is adding a valuable perspective. That makes the task of article assembling easier and gives The Groups some real influence over the media.

    The Groups provide a steady source of employment, so being on their good side is a hedge against the highly cyclical nature of campaign employment and the reality that the number of jobs available in Congress or the executive branch varies over time.

    Elizabeth Warren’s successful stigmatization of private sector work as a corrupting revolving door has made people even more dependent on staying in the good graces of the nonprofit advocacy community — not only because the nonprofits provide “clean” employment, but because they can semi-arbitrarily declare that Jonathan Kanter’s private sector work isn’t disqualifying even though private sector work done by someone they dislike would have been disqualifying. 

This should probably be a full article down the road. But I’d also say that Varys’ riddle about power is relevant here — one reason The Groups are influential is that other people treat them as influential.

Paul G: How should the US approach the apparent inevitability of a nuclear-armed Iran? Perhaps we'd promise massive retaliation in kind if Iran were ever to use nuclear weapons against the US or our allies. The idea of going to (conventional) war to prevent Iran from getting the bomb, as Walter Russell Mead suggests in the WSJ today, seems crazy to me. The known downside is that we'd be less engaged and have diminished influence in the Middle East, which seems like not the worst thing to me. A risk would be that Israel and perhaps Saudi Arabia would try to bounce us into military action by staging their own operation. I think we'd need to be clear that they couldn't rely on direct US support. I must be missing something here, because I can't see that that Iran acquiring the means to ensure its annihilation results in a strategic crisis for the US.

The best way to address this was Obama’s JCPOA. Unfortunately, opposition to that from the Republican Party, the Gulf States, and Israel led to its demise, and I’m not surprised it was impossible for Biden to revive it — after all, why would Iran make a deal with us when the next GOP administration would tear it up?

Given that, I don’t really think we should do anything at all about a nuclear-armed Iran. Obviously if Iran were to attack us, we should respond massively. But Iran going nuclear is literally a direct consequence of the policy course that the Saudis, Emiratis, and Israelis favored, and now you have Mead and others saying we should fight a war on their behalf. I think that’s crazy. The purpose of the U.S.-Saudi relationship is that the Saudis are supposed to stabilize world oil prices in the event of a crisis with Russia. They’ve totally failed to uphold their side of the bargain and we should not do anything at all to help them vis-a-vis Iran unless their behavior changes.

Thursday, July 28, 2022

The way forward on health care


www.slowboring.com
The way forward on health care
Matthew Yglesias
10 - 13 minutes

After being a bit provocative in Tuesday’s post by saying the U.S. health care system has some unappreciated virtues, I want to loop back to my very normal lib opinion that the enormous number of uninsured people in the United States is a huge problem.

Indeed, I think Democrats have erred by placing less emphasis on this issue after saving the Affordable Care Act, a big political success for them in the 2018 election cycle. Polling from Gallup shows that a substantial majority of Americans believe that making sure everyone has health insurance should be the government’s responsibility, and Democrats have a consistent trust edge on health care. It’s bad when the health care conversation gets hijacked by activists demanding Democrats run on a Medicare for All platform, because giant tax increases and big changes to the status quo scare voters. But Democrats shouldn’t abandon the issue. The high-level M4A pitch that “health care should be a right” polls well as an abstraction, and the trick is to roll out incremental proposals that embed that value in a non-threatening way.

I believe that means first and foremost Medicaid expansion, the big unfinished business of the fight for the Affordable Care Act.

Our story starts with the weird tale of Medicaid expansion and the Affordable Care Act.

In its initial conception, Medicaid was not supposed to be a major element of the ACA. The bill’s designers really wanted to do a bipartisan bill with lots of industry support, which led to the much-discussed three-legged stool of regulatory reform, subsidy, and mandatory purchase of private insurance. But while the ACA’s architects often said they were inspired by the Dutch and Swiss systems, those systems have a crucial fourth leg — price controls — which are also used in the Singaporean system that conservatives often claim to admire. Without price controls, American health insurance is very expensive, and subsidizing it for poor people requires a lot of federal spending. Medicaid, by contrast, relies on the federal government’s massive purchasing power to obtain health care services at sub-market prices.

In other words, giving people Medicaid turns out, in most cases, to be cheaper than subsidizing the purchase of private insurance.

And because the same centrist Democrats who preferred a market-based approach also favored a deficit-reducing approach and also were skeptical of tax increases, the ACA ended up relying more and more on Medicaid expansion and less and less on the three-legged stool to drive coverage expansion. Democrats also got cold feet about imposing really tough penalties on people for non-purchase of health insurance, so the individual mandate was relatively weak and ineffectual. And because it was also very unpopular, repealing this piece of the ACA was doable for Republicans, leaving the three-legged stool with only two legs.

The upshot of this is that in terms of reducing uninsurance, the ACA was mostly a Medicaid expansion law, even though almost all of the discourse focused on the insurance exchanges.

Things were further complicated by the Supreme Court, where Justice Kagan and Chief Justice Roberts seem to have struck a deal to resolve the ACA litigation. Kagan agreed to join Roberts and the conservatives in a ruling which held that Congress’ effort to force states to expand Medicaid violated alleged federalism provisions of the constitution.1 In exchange, Roberts upheld the individual mandate. This was a totally Pyrrhic victory for Democrats who would’ve been better off with the court making the opposite trade.

The result is that many states, mostly in the South but also in Wisconsin and a few others, haven’t expanded Medicaid. Getting them to do it is the biggest and most important thing we can do to tackle uninsurance.

The best way to accomplish this by far is for Democrats to run and win “narrow target” pro-Medicaid campaigns in red areas.

That means that in a state like South Carolina, Democrats would run someone for governor who is more progressive than her opponent in the sense that she supports expanding Medicaid, but is probably way more conservative than your average Democrat on a number of other important issues. The proof of concept for this is John Bel Edwards who ran and won in Louisiana on Medicaid expansion, delivered health insurance to hundreds of thousands of low-income Louisianans, and is also pro-gun and anti-abortion.

For many progressives, this is — understandably — a hard pill to swallow. But it’s important to acknowledge that running a pro-choice candidate in Louisiana would have done nothing to protect abortion rights. Unlike in the Midwest where abortion outperforms generic partisanship, abortion rights in the Deep South are even less popular than the Democratic Party due to the presence of a reasonably large number of anti-abortion Black Democrats. But Edwards winning has given low-income women in his state access to contraceptives, obstetric care, and other health services.

There really isn’t any other great way to achieve expansion.

Raphael Warnock and Jon Ossoff promoted a Build Back Better provision that would have basically given an even bigger boatload of money to non-expansion states to cover the Medicaid-eligible people in the exchanges. That’s a good deal for Georgia, and in the context of what Democrats were originally hoping would be a $4 trillion spending package, it’s a pretty trivial amount of money. But given realistic fiscal constraints, it’s always going to be difficult for a sweetheart fiscal deal for red states to make it onto a Democratic priority list.

A superficially more plausible approach might be to find creative new ways to punish non-expansion states. But the Supreme Court might toss that. And a huge share of the victims of such punishment would likely be Black Democrats who didn’t vote for the anti-expansion Republicans in the first place. So Democrats need to win the races, either by running conservative pro-Medicaid Democrats or else by ditching the Democratic brand altogether and running independents on a pro-Medicaid platform. It’s not that there’s nothing useful the federal government could do, but it would probably have to be bigger.

In the context of the insane 2020 Democratic Party presidential primary, the following was considered a moderate proposal:

    Create a new “public option” for health insurance with payment rates linked to Medicare.

    Automatically enroll all newly born kids in the public option.

    Allow people who purchase health insurance on the ACA exchanges to access this public option.

    Allow companies to use the public option as their insurance provider.

This proposal is actually a sweeping change to the American health care system that was only coded as moderate because of the bizarre nature of that primary. Leftists pretended it was small time because it wasn’t Bernie Sanders’ proposal, and moderates who praised this idea when they were trying to beat Bernie Sanders in a primary forgot all about it the moment it served its purpose.

But it’s actually a good idea that left-wing Democrats should take up.

Notwithstanding the specific dynamics of the 2020 primary, it really lands in their sweet spot of taking on corporate interests (insurance companies and hospitals hate this idea) without involving politically toxic broad tax increases on the middle class. And while I don’t see any short-term prospect for getting to 50 votes with this idea, it’s a good framework for thinking about next-step reforms to the health care system. You want to try to get the payment rates for Medicaid up to the higher Medicare levels so that more providers are willing to see Medicare patients. You want to try to get the payment rates for ACA exchange plans down to the lower Medicare levels so they are less costly and you can make the premiums cheaper for patients without increasing the subsidy level. And then you want to create the possibility for employers to get out of the insurance underwriting business and simply write a check to the government so their workers get health care.

This is more likely to take the form of multiple reforms — or perhaps state-led initiatives in the more progressive states — than a single Big Bang. But the basic vision of “Medicare for More People Than Have It Now” as a series of steps toward the goal of an M4A-type system deserves more thought and support.

Then the flip side of the coin is that we need to dismantle regulatory barriers to the supply of health care.

So far we’ve been talking about lefty-type stuff — expanding and deepening public provision of health insurance.

But there are also lots of important neoliberal-type reforms we should be making to the health care system. The United States has fewer doctors per capita than Canada or any European country, largely because Congress capped the number of residency slots years ago in a misguided effort to save money. That whole exercise exemplifies why I’ve never loved the rhetoric of “health care costs.” The idea was that creating a scarcity of doctors would help contain Medicare costs because the government can’t pay for a doctor visit that doesn’t happen.

This kind of penny-wise, pound-foolish behavior has been with us for a long time. Over 40 years ago, my uncle wrote a book called “Controlling Hospital Costs: The Role of Government Regulation.” This is largely about the fashionable-in-the-1970s idea that states could reduce hospital spending by adopting Certificate of Need (CON) regulations that stopped the opening of unnecessary hospitals.

The problem here, as with the doctors, is that while creating artificial scarcity may reduce aggregate spending, it also generates higher prices.

Our system is unfortunately full of this kind of nonsense: rules that make it hard for foreign-trained doctors to move here and practice, rules that make it hard for dental hygienists to clean teeth without the supervision of a dentist, rules that unnecessarily restrict what a nurse practitioner or a pharmacist can do without the supervision of an MD, rules that unnecessarily restrict the cross-state provision of telehealth. And we ought to be working to tear it all down. Moves to reduce the price of health care services are a good idea, but we shouldn’t be trying to constrain the quantity of services consumed out of a misguided idea that spending is per se bad. It’s good for people to get health care, and we should be facilitating that both on the regulatory side and on the insurance side.

I don’t think expanding the public option or tackling supply-side reforms should be an either/or choice, and I would advocate for both options. But realistically, the legislative coalitions for the two paths look pretty different. Either approach could work, though, and would be worth pursuing. Ultimately, the goal should be to reduce people’s financial downside from getting sick and seeking care (this is what insurance is for) while also trying to improve health care by unleashing more abundance of health care services.

Wednesday, July 27, 2022

The Conservative Agenda Depends On Judges Being Terrible Historians

The Conservative Agenda Depends On Judges Being Terrible Historians

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Deeply rooted in this nation's history and traditions, since 2021

The Conservative Agenda Depends On Judges Being Terrible Historians

By giving lower court judges a task they can’t complete, the Court’s conservatives are setting themselves up as the only amateur historians who matter.

BY JACOB HAMMOND  JULY 25, 2022. 



The Supreme Court has once again started the summer by upending many Americans’ understanding of what rights are afforded to them under the Constitution. Our 50-year experiment with something resembling sex equality was dashed aside in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization. Our 200-year, already-rapidly-failing experiment with maybe not getting shot in public came to a screeching halt in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen. Examples abound.


Already, people are hurting because of the Court’s decisions. Drafting another blog post complaining about the vacant logic the conservatives on the Court use to impose their minoritarian ideology feels, to a certain extent, like throwing a water balloon at a forest fire. But despite what the David Frenches of the world might tell you, the work of this radical Supreme Court is not done. That’s because the Court’s use of “originalism” doesn’t just compel the most conservative result in every case; it also lets the justices tee themselves up as the only people in this country capable of answering the call.


Whenever the conservatives want to dispense with a constitutional argument they view as protecting “liberal” causes, they follow a pretty straightforward playbook. First, the conservatives define their inquiry as narrowly as possible. In Vega v. Tekoh, released a few days before Dobbs, Justice Samuel Alito held that your “right against compelled self-incrimination” is not at stake when a cop bullies you into testifying in violation of your Miranda rights, because the Miranda warning is not a right at all. Instead, Alito thinks Miranda is just a “prophylactic rule” used to “protect the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination.” In Dobbs, Alito concluded the Court wasn’t examining the “right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy”; it was only the more limited “right to obtain an abortion.” Narrowing constitutional questions like this serves only to help the Court skirt around any obstacle in their path to ruling how they want.



When you’re trying to look at some centuries-old documents but can’t zoom in any further on the PDF (Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images)


Next, the Court moves on to step two: Do an originalism. In Kennedy v. Bremerton School District from this term, Justice Neil Gorsuch concluded that the boundaries of the Establishment Clause “must be interpreted by reference to historical practices and understandings.” In Bruen, Justice Clarence Thomas concluded firearm restrictions conflicting with the “plain text” of the Second Amendment must be supported by evidence that it is “consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” And of course, in Dobbs, Alito mandates that any due process protections not written out word-for-word in the Fifth Amendment be “objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”


To answer these questions, the Court conducts surveys of what they say is the relevant historical material and compares it to the modern rights at issue through “reasoning by historical analogue.” Thomas’ opinion in Bruen spends 30 pages comparing and contrasting modern gun restrictions to those enacted in 1787 by rifling through a panoply of Anglo-Saxon statutes. To support his conclusion about the history of pre-viability abortion access, Alito’s Dobbs opinion cites treatises and laws from the 13th goddamn century, when the most common way to conclusively determine you were pregnant was feeling the fetus Rockette-kick inside you.


There are layers of bullshit buried beneath this mode of analysis. For one thing, it’s a barbaric way to determine your rights. As Yale Law Professor Reva Siege remarked in an op-ed for The Washington Post, the Court’s originalist approach “excuses [the Court] from considering whether politicians’ views of gender roles, in a period when women were disenfranchised, shaped the campaign to ban abortion, which of course they did.” The expressed ideology in these cases takes the same history we as a country applaud ourselves for moving past and weaponizes it against us.


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More practically, the level of historical survey the Court conducts is just not something judges are qualified to do. Three years of law school teaches you very little, and none of it includes a crash course in the analytical methods historians use in their work. Your time as a law student isn’t much different from other academic disciplines: You pretend to read a bunch of cases, get badgered with questions every class by some decaying law professor, and take exactly one test (sometimes while hung over) at the end of the semester. Nothing about that experience trains you how to evaluate primary source documents like a historian, which is why law students make such embarrassingly bad gaffes when they try.


The Court’s myopic focus on history amplifies this problem. The more detailed the historical question, the harder it becomes to find centuries-old cases and statutes that specifically trace the lineage of some ethereal liberty to the present. Even so, every conservative justice believes themselves qualified to dig through old libraries with a kerosene torch like Nic Cage looking for morsels of evidence about the Second Amendment. No wonder every originalist opinion is met with long thinkpieces by actual historians kicking the shit out of the myriad analytical flaws.


But perhaps most crucially, this originalist framework rigs the game so conservatives only have to hear the cases and write the decisions they want. At a time when the Court is taking fewer and fewer cases, caseloads in federal courts have been skyrocketing since the 1970s. Most federal judges balance several hundred cases at a time , rotating between conducting hearings in court and researching and writing complex orders. By contrast, no single justice has written more than 40 opinions in a calendar year for the past decade, and Thomas is the only one to break 30. It’s at this moment the Supreme Court, in their dipshit wisdom, is mandating that each massively overworked federal district court conduct a thorough historical analysis for any potent constitutional claim that reaches their docket.



When you’re a judge charged with writing down all your qualifications to do history (Photo by Tom Williams-Pool/Getty Images)


Courts do not have the education, time, or resources to conduct these historical surveys adequately. The dissents in Bruen and Bremerton lay out how impossibly impractical this method of analysis is: how it “offers essentially no guidance for [government officials like] school administrators,” and “imposes a task on the lower courts that judges cannot easily accomplish.” In Bruen, Thomas responds that judges can rely upon the “historical record compiled by the parties.”


Attorneys, though, have no more experience cosplaying as historians than judges. Your average lawyer has no idea where to begin researching how our past restrictions on gun laws shape the present limits of the government’s authority. Thomas, by contrast, can push a big red button in his desk and force twelve sweaty Claremont Institute fellows to vomit out some shoddily researched nonsense on sodomy laws in a matter of weeks.


Therein lies the conservative justices’ trick: When the Court is deciding which cases to take, they can cherry-pick the ones they want and blame the necessity of their review on having to redo the historical “analysis” the lower court was too inexperienced and beat down to carry out. They can then use the mask of originalism to massage away any consideration of the disastrous effects of their ideology, all while complaining that the lower court hasn’t watched enough OAN to understand the Constitution. Thomas did so explicitly in Bruen, dismissing the lower court’s analysis as “inconsistent” with his preferred “historical approach.”


The Court as an institution—especially this Court as an institution—is not interested in finding the clearest, most historically accurate answer to legal questions, and wouldn’t know how even if they tried. The rigid implementation of originalism as the test for any and all constitutional questions lays bare what the conservatives are actually engaged in: the exercise of unchecked power. Until the composition of the Court changes, thanks to the framework the Court has built, the results of these exercises are only going to get worse.


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