Sunday, July 24, 2022

Radical Taxation - Dissent Magazine - Vanessa Williamson


www.dissentmagazine.org
Radical Taxation - Dissent Magazine
Vanessa Williamson
18 - 23 minutes
Radical Taxation

Taxes demonstrate the legitimacy of democratic control of the economy. This is what conservatives cannot accept—and what surviving climate change will require.
Grover Norquist, founder of Americans for Tax Reform, displays a copy of the “Taxpayer Protection Pledge” in 2011. (Bill O'Leary/Washington Post via Getty Images)

This spring, legislators of both parties, from Connecticut to Georgia, responded to higher energy prices with “gas tax holidays,” temporary tax reductions for consumers that provide an additional windfall to the immensely profitable fossil fuel industry at precisely the moment when we should be ending the global warming economy. Thirty-six years after Grover Norquist first introduced the “taxpayer protection pledge”—by which thousands of legislators have committed to oppose all tax increases—American policymaking remains trapped in an anti-tax paradigm that leaves us unable to cope with the crises we face.

Given that the stakes are the habitability of the planet, paradigms might seem a relatively minor concern. But conservative tax opposition can lead us to imagine barriers to climate action that are in fact no great obstacle at all. For instance, most Americans are far more willing to pay for government services, and far less thrilled by tax cuts, than is generally believed. Anti-tax thinking also, ironically, makes taxation loom excessively large in our policy imagination, as though taxes are the only power governments have over the economy.

The shortest road out of the anti-tax swamp is to face tax opposition head on. But to do so, we must grapple more seriously with what might seem like an easy question: what conservatives hate about taxes. The common but incomplete answer is that taxes can be progressive, and thereby reduce wealth concentration. But conservative tax antipathy is not simply a bulwark against a more equal distribution of wealth; it stems from a recognition that taxation, more than other economic policies that have an equal or greater redistributive capacity, rests on the principle that private property can be reassigned to public purposes—simply because public works are worthwhile.

In other words, taxes demonstrate the legitimacy of democratic control of the economy. This is what conservatives cannot accept, and what surviving climate change will require.

Anti-tax politics in the United States is often ascribed to an immutable aspect of the American character—either a laudable preference for individual effort or a childish unwillingness to pay bills. But these arguments lack an empirical foundation. In surveys, most Americans report that they are personally willing to pay more in taxes to improve education and healthcare and reduce poverty and homelessness; when it comes to Social Security and Medicare, more Republicans prefer tax increases to benefit cuts. About three-fifths of Americans say they are bothered “a lot” that corporations and the wealthy are not paying their share, compared to a third who say they are bothered “a lot” about the amount of taxes they themselves pay. Plans to tax the rich are consistently popular; they receive extremely high support from Democrats plus substantial support from working-class Republicans. Most low-income Republicans even support the estate tax once they learn it is only the very rich who pay it. Anti-tax hysteria is not a psychological condition of the American people; it is a pathology of American politics.

For at least twenty years, tax cuts have not been popular with voters. George W. Bush and Barack Obama both cut income taxes for the vast majority of Americans, but polling shows that most voters forgot about the breaks they had received long before the next election. When Hillary Clinton and John McCain each proposed a gas tax holiday in 2008, the idea was not popular with voters. The Trump-era Tax Cuts and Jobs Act fared even worse; the legislation is remarkable for having been less popular at the time of its passage than the tax increases under Bill Clinton and George H.W. Bush.

Conservative anti-tax rhetoric is not, therefore, tapping into some deep wellspring of popular hatred of taxation. Nonetheless, taxation remains a reliable bogeyman of the Republican Party. This winter, Florida Republican Senator Rick Scott learned this lesson the hard way when he advocated that “all Americans should pay some income tax,” a proposal that would raise taxes predominantly on the poor and working class. Scott may have thought he was safe with such a regressive plan, but he was wrong. He was immediately excoriated by Republican leadership and on Fox News for planning to raise taxes.

Scott’s heresy was suggesting that the income tax should ever be raised, under any circumstances, for anyone. Income taxes continue to abide in a special sub-basement in the lowest circle of conservative Hell. It might seem obvious why: put bluntly, income taxes could take money from rich people, and that money might be spent on poor people. The full answer is more subtle, and worth understanding if we are to have any hope of preventing civilizational collapse.

Tax policy can either buttress or undermine economic hierarchy. Usually, taxation is arranged to reinforce privilege. (The word privilège, meaning “private law,” referred to the special immunity nobles and the clergy had from paying taxes before the French Revolution.) In the United States today, the tax system heaps additional advantages onto the white and the wealthy. Income tax breaks for homeownership, health insurance, and college savings exacerbate the racial wealth gap. Grocery taxes make poor people go hungry. Still, the egalitarian potential of progressive taxation is extraordinary. For decades after the Second World War, progressive income and estate taxation kept America’s economic inequality in check. The rollback of those taxes led to our contemporary oligarchy. The last forty years of wealth concentration could have been almost entirely prevented by an annual wealth tax with a top rate of only 8 percent.

Taxes are also egalitarian to the extent that they fund the welfare state, and this, too, provokes conservative ire. Aficionados of what is commonly but dubiously termed the “free market” actually favor heavy state involvement in the economy to create what Mike Konczal calls “market dependency”: systems of law under which people must rely on markets outside of their control to acquire things that they need to survive, like housing, healthcare, and food. In the place of a welfare state, conservatives argue poverty should be mitigated through charity (ensuring that access to both market and non-market subsistence is dominated by the preferences of the wealthy) and the traditional family (a system in which care for workers and non-workers—children, the sick, the elderly—is provided by women for free). Charity and family will never eliminate poverty, and poverty ensures business owners and consumers a pool of workers too desperate to contest their meager compensation. Tax-funded public goods and entitlement programs are effective at reducing poverty and therefore threaten the domination and exploitation that poverty makes possible.

Thus anti-tax rhetoric is intended both to shield the rich from taxation and to starve government services that increase the autonomy of poor and working people. It also usefully distracts from the government’s larger role in the economy. Although conservatives treat taxation and welfare spending as uniquely dangerous interventions in an otherwise self-regulating and natural economy, the government is in fact constantly engaged in the business of wealth distribution. The three largest redistributions of wealth in American history were the direct result of government action: the seizure of the land of native people and its division among white settlers and speculators; the defense of chattel slavery; and emancipation. But we need not look at the most extreme expropriations to recognize that politicians and bureaucrats constantly make decisions that rapidly alter the distribution of enormous sums of money. Billions of dollars hang in the balance when the U.S. government determines what is legal business (like marijuana sales or stock buybacks), decides what can be owned and how (like patents or emissions credits), or protects certain owners instead of others (like who gets bailed out or how the police behave). Government intervenes in the market in the same way your skeleton intervenes in your body; it is the organizing structure, not an external force. All economic allocations, from the greatest fortunes to the deepest poverty, are political products.

What is distinct about taxation is not that it somehow changes distributional outcomes more than other economic policies, but simply that it seems to occur after an initial distribution. Taxes therefore appear to reclaim private property and deliver it to the public. But taxes are not really an “after the fact” policy; they are generally predictable and therefore affect decision-making before the tax is applied. For example, high-income taxes reduce the incentive for corporate boards to overpay executives. More fundamentally, pre-tax income and wealth are fictions, because taxes fund the state that defines and defends property rights in the first place. As the philosophers Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel point out, what most of us would earn absent taxation is nothing, because most of us would struggle to survive in a government-free state of nature.

Still, you can typically calculate how much more money you would have if for some reason you, alone, didn’t have to pay taxes on this paycheck or that purchase. Philosophers and economists can say what they will; taxes take money out of your pocket, or at least it feels like they do. In other words, taxes are unique because they remind us that private property, legitimately held, can nonetheless be redirected to public purposes.

What is more, taxes suggest that this fundamental primacy of the public interest is utterly ordinary. Where fines and forfeitures are premised on the putative misbehavior of the payer, most taxes (barring “sin” taxes) are applied on activities that are deemed respectable: legal ways of acquiring, selling, and owning. Taxes are not just both radical and boring; they are radical because they are boring. Taxes normalize the reassignment of private property to the state, and therefore wield the everyday power of the polity over the economy.

Because taxes are a daily demonstration that private gain is subordinate to the public interest, taxation becomes controversial when the scope of the public is contested—that is, when there is the potential for democratization. Taxes in America have not always been the subject of partisan vitriol; in the mid-twentieth century, federal tax policy was not a major component of the political platform of either the Democratic or the Republican Party. This period of fiscal consensus collapsed, not coincidentally, after the civil rights movement restored voting power to black people. The economic upheavals of the later twentieth century ensured that policymaking would have been complicated under any circumstances, but it is racial backlash that called into question the very project of democratic governance of the economy. In the Reagan era, as during the white supremacist reaction to Reconstruction, taxes were strategically useful to conservatives in turning working- and middle-class whites against tax-funded government spending that would benefit black people as well as whites. As anyone could guess who remembers Reagan’s dichotomy of the hard-working taxpayer and the welfare queen, anti-tax politics succeeds when it latches on to American racism in order to deem the entire endeavor of democratic government corrupt. Conservatives find taxes objectionable because they find democracy objectionable. They do not believe that the public interest, as determined by a democratic majority, should take precedence over private accumulation.

What is disheartening is that, for forty-some years, Democrats have rarely contested the Republicans’ core claim. The asymmetry here is important. Republicans design tax policies that predominantly aid the rich, but rhetorically, their antipathy is to all taxation. Democrats do not hold the opposite position. They favor taxes that fall primarily on the rich, but they do not defend taxation on principle.

Instead, Democrats are eager to insist that they will not raise your taxes. President Obama, for example, raised taxes on the rich while cutting taxes for everyone else. In his State of the Union Address, President Biden held a similar line, promising that “nobody earning less than $400,000 a year will pay an additional penny in new taxes.” Many progressive national Democrats twist themselves in knots rather than propose a broad-based tax increase. As recently as 2015, Bernie Sanders shied away from admitting his proposals would increase taxes on middle-class households. In 2019, Elizabeth Warren insisted her Medicare for All plan would not raise taxes on the middle class. This claim was strategically misguided both because it was unconvincing and because broad-based payroll taxes are among the most popular taxes Americans pay. But it was also a missed opportunity to make the affirmative case for public goods over private profit, and to defend the legitimacy of democracy in the economic sphere.

Rather than making a case for taxes, Democrats have, at best, demanded more progressive taxation. Doing so contests the inequity of Republican tax policy: good and important, but inadequate. There are any number of excellent reasons to make taxation progressive, from the mild (the rich can afford it) to the militant (the rich are only rich because they exploited the poor). My personal favorite is Thomas Paine’s: extreme wealth should be taxed away because it undermines the equality essential to the functioning of republican government. But the case for taxation is not, and should not be, simply that it is progressive. In a democracy, taxes assert the right of the people to prioritize the public welfare ahead of private accumulation. Focusing exclusively on raising taxes on the extremely wealthy studiously avoids the essential proposition that the public interest is worth paying for—and that we are all responsible for paying our share. 

In retrospect, it is obvious that the forty-year failure to defend democratic taxation would leave Democrats unprepared to defend democracy. Having for decades benefited from minoritarian institutions under the U.S. Constitution, Republicans have become increasingly willing to distort election rules to win, and to overturn election results if they lose. Democrats, on the other hand, have failed to pass legislation to ensure fair elections or make long-term material improvements in the lives of most Americans. Instead, we get gas tax holidays—an especially futile variation on the position that what middle America needs is a tax cut, and that the best government can do is to do less.

Conservative frothing over taxation serves many purposes. One is to naturalize and depoliticize “pre-tax” market distribution. In other words, an overemphasis on taxation distracts from the government’s many other powers over the distribution of wealth and the functioning of the economy. All of those powers—not just taxation—will be needed to limit the impending climate catastrophe.

Taxation on its own won’t stop climate change. Taxes are by their nature incremental, the ideal policy to help achieve steady outcomes over time, like ensuring well-funded child care or preventing wealth consolidation. A carbon tax could be a plausible solution to global warming only if it were accompanied by the time machine required to implement it fifty years ago. Today, the scale and speed of effective climate action is simply not well matched to fiscal policy solutions.

Global warming is an existential crisis and therefore requires an immediate wartime footing. War is the right metaphor, not only because it captures the scope of the endeavor and the destruction that will accompany our inaction, but because it lays out the fiscal strategy. In the face of cataclysm, you regulate, nationalize, conscript, and above all, spend . . . then you tax. Twentieth-century democracies only adopted and expanded progressive taxation once they were mobilized for a total war. And those taxes were popular, as political scientist Andrea Louise Campbell has demonstrated. In 1943, when Gallup asked Americans, most of whom had never paid federal income tax before the war, whether their taxes were fair, only 15 percent said no. (That figure is 43 percent today.)

What was it about mass warfare that made taxation—and progressive taxation—not only very popular, but possible? For one, a shared threat makes a compelling case for shared sacrifice. But I think there is more to it. We have no shortage of shared threats today, and markedly little shared sacrifice. Indeed, we have a major political party so preternaturally opposed to sharing that not even risks can be admitted to be held in common. And this is where the government actions associated with mass warfare are so important. The government’s response to war helps the citizenry recognize what is at stake; conditions become problems when we believe they can be solved. When war provokes governments to engage in massive, up-front public spending, it demonstrates what the country is capable of and allows people to choose action over denial. The result is high morale, even when difficult things are required.

By the end of the Second World War, the United States was spending 40 percent of GDP annually on the war, the equivalent of about $9 trillion a year today. I need hardly mention that our current plan to address climate change is nothing like the plan to defeat Hitler. What we are doing today is more like sending the Nazis a sternly worded letter and a blank check.

It is hard to keep faith in the power of ideas when what is so clearly needed is not talk but action. But I believe that the Herculean task ahead demands that we entirely overturn the anti-tax politics that has dominated American policymaking for my entire lifetime. That includes the misperception of Americans as unwilling to pay for public goods, the wrong-headed tactical assumption that low taxes are good politics, and the neoliberal sleight-of-hand that makes taxes appear as an exceptional interference in a natural economic order.

Ending the anti-tax era also requires recognizing that what is anathema to conservatives about taxation is not merely their economic effects but their political implications. Yes, conservatives dislike taxes because they are redistributive. But the redistribution they object to is not only from the rich to the poor. Taxes always, every day and by definition, redistribute wealth from private interests to the public. Taxes assert that private property is under the control of the polity—in a democracy, the people. This is precisely what we need to do if we are to preserve a livable planet. The principle of taxation so hated by conservatives is the principle that the common good comes first, and this is the principle for which we are fighting.

Vanessa Williamson is a senior fellow in governance studies at the Brookings Institution.

Saturday, July 23, 2022

Russia’s Economy Really Is Crumbling Under Sanctions


foreignpolicy.com
Russia’s Economy Really Is Crumbling Under Sanctions
Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, Steven Tian
14 - 18 minutes

Five months into the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there remains a startling lack of understanding by many Western policymakers and commentators of the economic dimensions of President Vladimir Putin’s invasion and what it has meant for Russia’s economic positioning both domestically and globally.

Far from being ineffective or disappointing, as many have argued, international sanctions and voluntary business retreats have exerted a devastating effect over Russia’s economy. The deteriorating economy has served as a powerful if underappreciated complement to the deteriorating political landscape facing Putin.

That these misunderstandings persist is not entirely surprising given the lack of available economic data. In fact, many of the excessively sanguine Russian economic analyses, forecasts, and projections that have proliferated in recent months share a crucial methodological flaw: These analyses draw most, if not all, of their underlying evidence from periodic economic releases by the Russian government itself. Numbers released by the Kremlin have long been held to be largely if not always credible, but there are certain problems.

First, the Kremlin’s economic releases are becoming increasingly cherry-picked—partial and incomplete, selectively tossing out unfavorable metrics. The Russian government has progressively withheld an increasing number of key statistics that, prior to the war, were updated on a monthly basis, including all foreign trade data. Among these are statistics relating to exports and imports, particularly with Europe; oil and gas monthly output data; commodity export quantities; capital inflows and outflows; financial statements of major companies, which used to be released on a mandatory basis by companies themselves; central bank monetary base data; foreign direct investment data; lending and loan origination data; and other data related to the availability of credit. Even Rosaviatsiya, the federal air transport agency, abruptly ceased publishing data on airline and airport passenger volumes.

Since the Kremlin stopped releasing updated numbers, constraining the availability of economic data for researchers to draw upon, many excessively rosy economic forecasts have irrationally extrapolated economic releases from the early days of the invasion, when sanctions and the business retreat had not taken full effect. Even those favorable statistics that have been released are dubious, given the political pressure the Kremlin has exerted to corrupt statistical integrity.

Mindful of the dangers of accepting Kremlin statistics at face value, our team of experts, using private Russian-language and direct data sources including high-frequency consumer data, cross-channel checks, releases from Russia’s international trade partners, and data mining of complex shipping data, have released one of the first comprehensive economic analyses measuring Russian current economic activity five months into the invasion, with contributions from Franek Sokolowski, Michal Wyrebkowski, Mateusz Kasprowicz, Michal Boron, Yash Bhansali, and Ryan Vakil. From our analysis, it becomes clear: Business retreats and sanctions are crushing the Russian economy in the short term and the long term. Based on our research, we are able to challenge nine widely held but misleading myths about Russia’s supposed economic resilience.
Myth 1: Russia can redirect its gas exports and sell to Asia in lieu of Europe.

This is one of Putin’s favorite and most misleading talking points, doubling down on a much-hyped pivot to the east. But natural gas is not a fungible export for Russia. Less than 10 percent of Russia’s gas capacity is liquefied natural gas, so Russian gas exports remain reliant on a system of fixed pipelines carrying piped gas. The vast majority of Russia’s pipelines flow toward Europe; those pipelines, which originate in western Russia, are not connectable to a separate nascent network of pipelines that link Eastern Siberia to Asia, which contains only 10 percent of the capacity of the European pipeline network. Indeed, the 16.5 billion cubic meters of gas exported by Russia to China last year represented less than 10 percent of the 170 billion cubic meters of natural gas sent by Russia to Europe.

Long-planned Asian pipeline projects currently under construction are still years away from becoming operational, much less hastily initiated new projects, and financing of these costly gas pipeline projects also now puts Russia at a significant disadvantage.

Overall, Russia needs world markets far more than the world needs Russian supplies; Europe received 83 percent of Russian gas exports but drew only 46 percent of its own supply from Russia in 2021. With limited pipeline connectivity to Asia, more Russian gas stays in the ground; indeed, the Russian state energy company Gazprom’s published data shows production is already down more than 35 percent year-on-year this month. For all Putin’s energy blackmail of Europe, he is doing so at significant financial cost to his own coffers.

Read More
A currency exchange office in Moscow
A currency exchange office in Moscow
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With oil exports strong in April, Putin avoids economic ruin while hammering Ukraine.
A woman walks past a currency exchange office in central Moscow.
A woman walks past a currency exchange office in central Moscow.
The Fall and Rise of the Russian Ruble

Western sanctions ravaged the ruble after Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. How did the currency bounce back?
Myth 2: Since oil is more fungible than gas, Putin can just sell more to Asia.  

Russian oil exports now also reflect Putin’s diminished economic and geopolitical clout. Recognizing that Russia has nowhere else to turn, and mindful that they have more purchasing options than Russia has buyers, China and India are driving an unprecedented approximately $35 discount on Russian Urals oil purchases, even though the historical spread has never ranged beyond $5—not even during the 2014 Crimean crisis—and at times Russian oil has actually sold at a premium to Brent and WTI oil. Furthermore, it takes Russian oil tankers an average of 35 days to reach East Asia, versus two to seven days to reach Europe, which is why historically only 39 percent of Russian oil has gone to Asia versus the 53 percent destined for Europe.

This margin pressure is felt keenly by Russia, as it remains a relatively high-cost producer relative to the other major oil producers, with some of the highest break-evens of any producing country. The Russian upstream industry has also long been reliant on Western technology, which combined with the loss of both Russia’s erstwhile primary market and Russia’s diminished economic clout leads to even the Russian energy ministry revising its projections of long-term oil output downward. There is no doubt that, as many energy experts predicted, Russia is losing its status as an energy superpower, with an irrevocable deterioration in its strategic economic positioning as an erstwhile reliable supplier of commodities.
Myth 3: Russia is making up for lost Western businesses and imports by replacing them with imports from Asia.

Imports play an important role within Russia’s domestic economy, consisting of about 20 percent of Russian GDP, and, despite Putin’s bellicose delusions of total self-sufficiency, the country needs crucial inputs, parts, and technology from hesitant trade partners. Despite some lingering supply chain leakiness, Russian imports have collapsed by over 50 percent in recent months.

China has not moved into the Russian market to the extent that many feared; in fact, according to the most recent monthly releases from the Chinese General Administration of Customs, Chinese exports to Russia plummeted by more than 50 percent from the start of the year to April, falling from over $8.1 billion monthly to $3.8 billion. Considering China exports seven times as much to the United States than Russia, it appears that even Chinese companies are more concerned about running afoul of U.S. sanctions than of losing marginal positions in the Russian market, reflecting Russia’s weak economic hand with its global trade partners.
Myth 4: Russian domestic consumption and consumer health remain strong.

Some of the sectors most dependent on international supply chains have been hit with debilitating inflation around 40-60 percent—on extremely low sales volumes. For example, foreign car sales in Russia fell by an average of 95 percent across major car companies, with sales ground to a complete halt.

Amid supply shortages, soaring prices, and fading consumer sentiment, it is hardly surprising that Russian Purchasing Managers’ Index readings—which capture how purchasing managers are viewing the economy—have plunged, particularly for new orders, alongside plunges in consumer spending and retail sales data by around 20 percent year-over-year. Other readings of high-frequency data such as e-commerce sales within Yandex and same-store traffic at retail sites across Moscow reinforce steep declines in consumer spending and sales, no matter what the Kremlin says.
Myth 5: Global businesses have not really pulled out of Russia, and business, capital, and talent flight from Russia are overstated.

Global businesses represent around 12 percent of Russia’s workforce (5 million workers), and, as a result of the business retreat, over 1,000 companies representing around 40 percent of Russia’s GDP have curtailed operations in the country, reversing three decades’ worth of foreign investment and buttressing unprecedented simultaneous capital and talent flight in a mass exodus of 500,000 individuals, many of whom are exactly the highly educated, technically skilled workers Russia cannot afford to lose. Even the mayor of Moscow has acknowledged an expected massive loss of jobs as businesses go through the process of fully exiting.
Myth 6: Putin is running a budget surplus thanks to high energy prices.

Russia is actually on pace to run a budget deficit this year equivalent to 2 percent of GDP, according to its own finance minister—one of the only times the budget has been in deficit in years, despite high energy prices—thanks to Putin’s unsustainable spending spree; on top of dramatic increases in military spending, Putin is resorting to patently unsustainable, dramatic fiscal and monetary intervention, including a laundry list of Kremlin pet projects, all of which have contributed to the money supply nearly doubling in Russia since the invasion began. Putin’s reckless spending is clearly putting Kremlin finances under strain.
Myth 7: Putin has hundreds of billions of dollars in rainy day funds, so the Kremlin’s finances are unlikely to be strained anytime soon.

The most obvious challenge facing Putin’s rainy day funds is the fact that of his around $600 billion in foreign exchange reserves, accumulated from years’ worth of oil and gas revenues, $300 billion is frozen and out of reach with allied countries across the United States, Europe, and Japan restricting access. There have been some calls to seize this $300 billion to finance the reconstruction of Ukraine.

Putin’s remaining foreign exchange reserves are decreasing at an alarming rate, by around $75 billion since the start of the war. Critics point out that official foreign exchange reserves of the central bank technically can only decrease due to international sanctions placed on the central bank, and they suggest that nonsanctioned financial institutions such as Gazprombank could still accumulate such reserves in place of the central bank. While this may be technically true, there is simultaneously no evidence to suggest that Gazprombank is actually accumulating any reserves given sizable strain on its own loan book.

Furthermore, although the finance ministry had planned to reinstate a long-standing Russian budgetary rule that surplus revenue from oil and gas sales should be channeled into the sovereign wealth fund, Putin axed this proposal as well as accompanying guidelines directing how and where the National Wealth Fund can be spent—as Finance Minister Anton Siluanov floated the idea of withdrawing funds from the National Wealth Fund equivalent to a third of the entire fund to pay for this deficit this year. If Russia is running a budget deficit requiring the drawdown of a third of its sovereign wealth fund when oil and gas revenues are still relatively strong, all signs indicate a Kremlin that may be running out of money much faster than conventionally appreciated.
Myth 8: The ruble is the world’s strongest-performing currency this year.  

One of Putin’s favorite propaganda talking points, the appreciation of the ruble is an artificial reflection of unprecedented, draconian capital control—which rank among the most restrictive of any in the world. The restrictions make it effectively impossible for any Russian to legally purchase dollars or even access a majority of their dollar deposits, while artificially inflating demand through forced purchases by major exporters—all of which remain largely in place today.

The official exchange rate is misleading, anyhow, as the ruble is, unsurprisingly, trading at dramatically diminished volumes compared to before the invasion on low liquidity. By many reports, much of this erstwhile trading has migrated to unofficial ruble black markets. Even the Bank of Russia has admitted that the exchange rate is a reflection more of government policies and a blunt expression of the country’s trade balance rather than freely tradeable liquid foreign exchange markets.
Myth 9: The implementation of sanctions and business retreats are now largely done, and no more economic pressure is needed.  

Russia’s economy has been severely damaged, but the business retreats and sanctions applied against Russia are incomplete. Even with the deterioration in Russia’s exports positioning, it continues to draw too much oil and gas revenue from the sanctions carveout, which sustains Putin’s extravagant domestic spending and obfuscates structural economic weaknesses. The Kyiv School of Economics and Yermak-McFaul International Working Group have led the way in proposing additional sanctions measures across individual sanctions, energy sanctions, and financial sanctions, led by former U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul and the experts Tymofiy Mylovanov, Nataliia Shapoval, and Andriy Boytsun. Looking ahead, there is no path out of economic oblivion for Russia as long as the allied countries remain unified in maintaining and increasing sanctions pressure against Russia.

Defeatist headlines arguing that Russia’s economy has bounced back are simply not factual—the facts are that, by any metric and on any level, the Russian economy is reeling, and now is not the time to step on the brakes.

La Dolce Mailbag by Matthew Yglesias


www.slowboring.com
La Dolce Mailbag
Matthew Yglesias
20 - 25 minutes

Back from Italy soon — it’s been a fantastic trip, but vacation can’t last forever.

BD Anders: Have recent developments changed your prior generous evaluation of Joe Manchin and his negotiation style?

Yes.

Genevieve: Thoughts on the degrowth interview in the New York Times yesterday? “This Pioneering Economist Says Our Obsession With Growth Must End.” Herman Daly is very critical of G.D.P. as a metric.

There are a lot of problems with degrowth as a movement, and I think their obsession with critiques of GDP underscores how conceptually weak degrowth is.

You can come up with a lot of contrived scenarios where GDP fails to track broader concepts of well-being. But if you look at the international correlates of GDP with almost anything, they are very strong. The only important exception to the “GDP is good” rule of thumb is that it doesn’t account for the value of leisure time. So enslaving people is bad and allowing people to retire is good even though an exclusive focus on GDP might not show that. But that’s easily captured by looking at something like “GDP per hour worked,” which doesn’t involve throwing GDP overboard as a concept.

And if you look at the things that cause GDP/hour to grow — innovation, deepening of the capital stock, productivity growth — those things are also the main long-term drivers of simple GDP growth. Conversely, if you look at the kind of harms that degrowthers worry about — shifting weather patterns wrecking agriculture, floods rendering existing capital useless, etc. — these harms absolutely show up in GDP statistics.

Ryan: Do you, Matt, think Joe Biden should run again? And, if the party decides that he should not for whatever reason how should that process look? The presidency and politics has always been tied to some ego, hard to say you can’t do the job.

I unfortunately don’t have direct access to information about Joe Biden’s well-being and mental state. He’s made his share of mistakes, but I think the odds are that if he doesn’t run for re-election, he ends up getting replaced by someone worse — so in that sense, I think he should run again. But that’s contingent on him feeling that he can do the legitimately very difficult job of running the country while also running for re-election.

Tracy Erin: Ok, last week I asked whether the irrational hate you get on Twitter is hard for her to see, but this week I am trying a different angle. I find it odd that you are the target of such intense rage on Twitter from people who are pretty well ideologically aligned with you, and while I think you earn a smidge of it by being too provocative at times, I think most of it is some kind of irrational style over substance reaction and I am wondering if you ever have a similar reaction to anyone on Twitter. When I try and understand the outrage I think about how I am probably ideologically in between Bari Weiss and Elizabeth Bruenig, but for some reason they both have a style that annoys me and makes me less open to what they are saying. Is there anyone on Twitter that bugs Matt the way that he drives a certain kind of progressive takester over the edge?

I think people you are ideologically adjacent to are more annoying than people you are deeply distant from, because you view their bad takes as influencing the persuadable. For this reason, I’m actually not going to share any secret Twitter annoyances because the people whose tweets annoy me most are people who I like and respect and it drives me crazy that they tweet dumb stuff!

That’s all a little bit different from someone like me or Liz Bruenig becoming a Twitter Hate Figure because we have come to symbolize something that people see as larger than any one person.

Jerry: Everyone seems to take "The Rise of China" as a given, but my understanding of their demographic inverted pyramid is that they've arguably peaked pre-Covid, and are in for a very bumpy ~50+ years. I'd be curious to hear Matt's take on this.

I kind of dispute the premise here. When I was working on “One Billion Americans,” I ended up delving into the debates on this, and my take was that there is very vigorous expert disagreement about the outlook for China.

I think that fundamentally, the United States can’t just count on the Chinese economy unraveling as our strategy for strategic competition. But they are not only facing a lot of demographic headwinds, Xi Jinping’s leadership seems increasingly erratic and marred by bad judgment. I don’t think I know enough about it to have an informed forecast but I’d put at least 20 percent odds on “Chinese growth stalls out and they never overtake U.S. GDP at market exchange rates,” but also at least 20 percent odds on “U.S./China per capita GDP continues to converge and China leaves us in the dust in the aggregate.”

Dave Orr: In the private sector, it's rare for old sclerotic companies to change into something dynamic and competitive — instead something new comes along and outcompetes it. In the public sector, we never shut down agencies, they just get older and sclerotic-er. How should we think about that? Should we consider rebooting agencies, creating some kind of competition, or just struggle through trying to reform them because that's the only option?

It’s not actually true that public sector agencies never shut down. The most recent big example that I can think of is that part of the Dodd-Frank overhaul of financial regulation was disbanding the Office of Thrift Supervision and parceling its responsibilities out to other agencies. I thought that was a good idea. But there’s also a negative example from the 1970s when the Atomic Energy Commission was disbanded and replaced with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission with what was essentially a mandate to create a new agency that would have a structural bias against licensing new reactors.

That initiative was extremely successful at achieving its policy goal, the goal was just bad. But I think that underscores the point that agency elimination should be in the policy toolkit. The U.S. Secret Service, for example, has fucked up enough stuff at this point that Congress should look at scrapping it. The Diplomatic Security Service could handle presidential protection and the FBI could handle counterfeiting. Obviously expanding the DSS and FBI like that would require them to hire new people, and former Secret Service agents would be plausible candidates for those jobs. But they would have to apply as new candidates.

Marie Kennedy: Freddie deBoer was pretty rude about it, but he had a critique of YIMBY-ism today, namely that YIMBYs can be dismissive of the immediate needs of working class people, especially working class people of color, that can get screwed over in the short term vis a vis gentrification. And that this is anti-popularist in that it alienates would-be allies. Thoughts?

I think a lot of people want to argue that YIMBYism is wrong without actually arguing against the core proposition of YIMBYism, which is “relaxing housing regulation in order to increase supply would be an improvement on the status quo.”

From reading FDB over the years, I know he has a lot of complaints about YIMBYs, about YIMBYism, etc., etc., etc., but I can’t really tell whether or not he agrees that relaxing housing regulation in order to increase supply would be an improvement on the status quo. My view is that relaxing housing regulation in order to increase supply would be an improvement on the status quo. That’s why I’m a YIMBY and why I think YIMBYism is good. Improving things is good! It is also true that any effort to change housing supply dynamics will operate with a pretty long lag, so nobody’s short-term problems are efficaciously solved this way. There are lots of good things we could do in life to help various people in various ways, and YIMBYism has nothing to do with denying that. But I do insist that relaxing housing regulation in order to increase supply would be an improvement on the status quo, and I think this is actually a very important subject because housing is such a large share of the economy.

Brian T: The Afghanistan withdrawal seems to be correlated with a permanent decrease in Biden's approval rating, which I didn't expect. What are your thoughts on that?

Mainstream media coverage is, on average, kinder to Democratic presidents than to Republican ones. But because rank-and-file Democrats care much more about what the mainstream media says than rank-and-file Republicans do, negative media coverage (of Obama on Ebola or Biden on Afghanistan) is much more harmful to Democrats’ political standing.

But I also suspect that the real permanent political hit Biden took around that time wasn’t Afghanistan but the emergence of Delta and the ensuing series of somewhat immune-evasive variants. Biden’s coalition is a mix of vaxxed and relaxed people and Covid hawks. And ever since Delta, the hawks have been annoyed that Biden isn’t shutting down the virus, and the V&R have been annoyed that he continued clinging to various things like the airplane mask mandate. Republicans face a Covid split of their own between a V&R faction and a denialist faction. But the reduced efficacy of the vaccines — and in particular the dramatic reduction of their efficacy at blocking transmission — has reduced the tension between these groups.

I think Biden could have handled this situation better by more fully embracing the V&R worldview. But it was a genuine wedge issue that was not easy to navigate. The virus’ ability to mutate just wrecked a lot of the optimism of early 2021.

Nancy Gale: How should cities and towns in desirable vacation spots deal with second or mostly vacant homes? Clearly one answer is building more housing, but that's a long term solution to a short term crunch. Do you think it's wise to tax vacant or mostly vacant properties to discourage out of state buyers vacuuming up housing? And what about Airbnb?

Vacation homes are a fiscal bonanza to towns because they contribute to property taxes and consume very few local services. If you want to directly plow some of that bonanza into creating subsidized housing for locals, I think that’s great. And you should absolutely zone for more supply.

Indeed, I’d go so far as to say that if you’re worried too much of your existing housing stock is being converted to Airbnbs, that’s a good sign that you should zone for more hotels. Hotels are also a fiscal bonanza that should always be welcomed.

Eric P: Conservatives talk a lot about squishy-sounding college majors (gender studies, etc.) I don’t agree that this is an issue — I know tons of humanities majors who get lucrative jobs. The thing is that it’s almost never connected to said major, it’s just a corporate job, law, etc. I think this is fine and I think those majors can actually prepare you well for your career and life. But it begs the question - what the hell is the point of a college major anyway? Should college kids just do what interests them and but take the job at BCG or Goldman Sachs? I sort of feel bad for the Ivy League English professors...

Any good humanities course of study teaches you to read complicated documents and produce written and oral analyses of their content. That’s a totally legitimate job skill.

The legitimate concern about “soft” majors is that because the science professors have much more research funding than the English professors, the English professors need undergraduate enrollment much more than the science professors do. That means the English professors have an objective incentive to lower standards and not actually provide a rigorous cycle of teaching, learning, and assessment. That’s not inherent to the idea of studying the humanities, but it’s a feature of modern university architecture that I think needs to be taken seriously.

Nathan Kosk: Hey Matt, what do you make of the argument, made in take circles in Europe and elsewhere right now, that America is “selfishly” fighting inflation too much to the point of causing a recession for the rest of the world? The argument goes that this is primarily due to the Fed raising rates very aggressively.

Marie Kennedy: Well this is maddening. Gonna turn me into a nationalist. It’s selfish to manage our monetary policy to optimize our own economy???

I think this is downstream of the European Central Bank doing such a terrible job in the wake of the Great Recession. The narrative took hold that European domestic economies were critically influenced by the demand situation in the United States. But that was only true because the ECB wasn’t generating sufficient demand at home.

So not only do I agree with Marie that there’s nothing selfish about managing our monetary policy for domestic needs, but I think the globally optimal thing is for each central bank to manage the domestic situation correctly. The U.S. economy would have been stronger had the ECB handled things better 10 years ago. Europe would be in better shape today if the United States had started cooling demand earlier.

Avery James: There's a progressive thread doing the rounds today that made some interesting claims on demography and politics. Without getting into that thread's controversial claims, it reminded me that you tweeted a while back about how the end of the British-Protestant ethnic majority a century ago was a much more consequential majority-minority transition. I think you are correct and I also believe that shift became inevitable basically a century before that (Jackson's "victory" at New Orleans). But I would be very curious for you to expand on that point, as it seems worthwhile for more people to think about.

The basic idea here is that, as I think everyone agrees, race is a social construct and the social category of “white” is not well-defined and has never been particularly stable. It is absolutely true that if we construe people who are partially descended from immigrants from Latin America or Asia (people like me, in other words) as “non-white,” the country will soon be majority non-white. But just as Professor Boustan was saying in the book club, these immigrant groups are assimilating at a pretty rapid pace — including via intermarriage and Americanization of names — and I think ultimately “majority-minority America” is going to be a bit of a nothingburger.

By contrast, the Protestant/Catholic divide had a pretty firm conceptual basis in a world of high levels of religious affiliation.

Protestants would do things like establish a “non-denominational church” on the Harvard campus and decide they have thereby solved the problem of inclusiveness, even though to Catholics (and Jews, Muslims, Hindus, etc.), the idea of a non-denominational church doesn’t make sense. Protestants decided to make alcohol illegal even though drinking wine is a religious obligation for Catholics and Jews. Today we of course dismiss fears that Catholics would put allegiance to the Pope over allegiance to the constitution as bigoted paranoia, but it really is true that there is a transnational church bureaucracy that has been in conflict with the logic of the secular nation-state for centuries.

This all worked out in the end. But I think the shift involved in the loss of Protestant domination is much more profound because “being a Protestant” is a much more real and substantial thing than “being a white person.” If you were worried in 1922 that Protestant ideas would lose influence in future America, you were correct to worry — because there actually is such a thing as Protestant ideas that can lose influence.

Trevor Austin: Is the Federation right to ban genetically modified individuals from service? Dr Bashir from DS9 and Number One from Strange New Worlds are fine officers and IIRC neither *chose* to be modified.

The introduction of this genetic modification plotline is one of my real doubts about Strange New Worlds, which I otherwise love.

Story-wise, the purpose of the Federation's ban on genetic modification is to let them tell human stories that are set in space rather than stories about future genetically modified people who due to their modification behave in very different ways from the humans we know. But it doesn’t actually make a lot of sense as a policy measure, and every time it’s foregrounded in a story it just makes you think about how it’s obviously just a plot convenience.

James B: When assessing the relative “extremism” of Trump's candidacy in the 2016, how do you account for the proposed “Muslim Ban”? That seems like a pretty extremist position to me. I can see how his anti-illegal immigration stuff could be viewed as less extreme by moderates who have a “law & order” predisposition, but there's no excusing the Muslim ban. That was the reason that my Dad, a lifelong Republican, said he would never vote for Trump. Was there simply a bunch of latent islamophobia among white working class Obama voters?

The Muslim ban was, in a sense, extreme in that many people had a strong negative reaction to it, including tons of GOP elites — Mike Pence, Paul Ryan, and other influential Republicans denounced it. That kind of thing is always politically dicey and I bet it did hurt Trump on net — it’s certainly telling that he basically walked away from it as president.

That said, when Trump did roll out his much more limited travel ban, it had majority support. I suspect that had there been a significant Islamist terror attack on U.S. soil during the Trump years, his administration might have gone in a very dark direction.

Patrick Benitez: Why aren’t suburban and rural voters or politicians more supportive of (state-level) housing deregulation targeting cities? Would seem like a good way to keep development pressure off currently low-density areas.

I’m just not sure how true this is. The California state assembly recently passed a bill reducing parking mandates, and while its main sponsors were urban Democrats, it got some Republican votes from suburban and rural areas of California. Utah did a zoning reform in 2019. What I don’t think we’ve yet seen is a serious stab at something like having the Texas state legislature preempt Austin zoning. But I’d love to sell Texas Republicans on the idea — they’d doubtless be skeptical at first, but honestly they should do it and I think they might be persuadable.

Mike: The tech sector is tanking right now. Does it come back once we're past the Fed/inflation-induced financial uncertainty, or has it been fundamentally built around a high-unemployment/low-demand world and faces more fundamental obstacles?

When interest rates go up, the value of “I might get $1 billion 10 years from now” goes down as a result of discounting. This means that a depressed, low-interest economy is very good for the valuations of speculative startups and for the general VC business model. Are we currently experiencing just a dip in that model or a structural shift? I’m not sure, but it definitely could be the latter.

I just think it’s worth saying that while the technology industry is closely associated with venture capital and speculative startups, it now also includes companies like Apple and Microsoft that are not even remotely young growth stocks. I feel very confident that making and programming computing devices is going to continue to be an important part of the economy.

Dan: You tweeted earlier today parties should choose from eight ideologies: "Radical left, social democratic, green, social liberal, market liberal, christian democratic, kinda fashy, real deal violent rightist." Looking at the European Parliament, we see this spread across seven parliamentary groups (liberals get smushed together). In this chart, it appears that the social democrats+greens and, separately, the two most conservative groups basically coinhabit the same spaces, getting us down to five.

Do you think these are roughly the five (or seven or eight) ideologies that are destined to emerge in liberal democracy? In Lee Drutman's STV America, do you think roughly the same groups would emerge?

Okay, let’s talk about European Parliament groups.

They have a hard-left group, a green group, and a social democratic group. But then they have a liberal group that contains a mix of social liberals and market liberals. And they have the European People’s Party which contains a mix of market liberals and Christian democrats, then the ECR and EFDD groups on the far right who can stand in for my “kinda fashy” group (or more politely, populist nationalists).

I don’t think it’s a law of nature that these are the only possible ideological formations. It’s just that lots of parties around the world do fit into one of those grooves, and when it happens it’s easy to characterize the party. This came up because I was complaining that Italian politics has a low level of legibility because the Five Star Movement is a key player right now, and their party doesn’t conform to this schema.

My guess about America is that we would fragment into an asymmetrical six-party system. You’d have a populist-nationalist party, a Christian party, a market liberal party, a green party (that would incorporate a lot of the constituency for a social liberal party), a labor party, and a left party. But the nationalists would be a lot bigger than the other parties.

Friday, July 22, 2022

I'm worried about Chicago by Matthew Yglesias

I'm worried about Chicago by Matthew Yglesias


 — Read time: 8 minutes


I'm worried about Chicago

Slowing national population growth plus remote work spell big trouble for Midwestern cities


The large hedge fund Citadel announced last week that it’s leaving Chicago.


That’s hot on the heels of two even larger companies, Boeing and Caterpillar, departing for greener pastures. This has naturally prompted a lot of narrowly partisan and narrowly political bickering in and around the state of Illinois. But stepping back, I think it’s an opportunity to reflect on some more fundamental issues. In particular, while the shift to remote work is a challenge for all kinds of places, I think it’s a dire threat to places like Chicago that were affordable but slow-growing before the pandemic.


These are the kinds of places that get discussed least in the American discourse, which tends to pay a lot of attention to the struggles of the expensive coastal metro areas (New York, Boston, Seattle, San Francisco) and the fast-growing Sun Belt ones (Atlanta, Houston, Dallas, Phoenix). But as we are reminded every time we look at the Electoral College, there are still a lot of people living in these low-cost, slow-growing parts of America. Of these places, Chicago is by far the largest. And while it’s perhaps not quite as economically successful as Minneapolis or Columbus, it’s also clearly the economic center of the region.



So if Chicago enters a downward spiral — which I think it will — that bodes poorly for a whole bunch of other central cities but also I think really for the region as a whole.


Expensive cities are going to get cheaper

I grew up in Manhattan, a place I love, but everything in Manhattan is impossibly expensive — including both the housing and the office space.


This to me is a really good reason not to live in New York. But how did it get so expensive? Well, there was a lot of demand for New York, but that demand ran up against what’s known in economics as “inelastic supply.” In other words, it’s really hard to build more. Some of that is due to fundamentals; the economics of knocking down a building that is already enormous in order to replace it with an even more gigantic building are really bad. But a lot of it is due to zoning, historic preservation, and other supply constraining policies.


The low supply elasticity means that when demand for NYC surged, the response was much higher prices and a slightly larger supply.



A city like Houston, where the history and policy are different, has seen the other outcome: a huge surge in the number of homes (and people) and only modest increases in price. All things considered, the Houston way is better.


But one thing New York does have going for it is that even though Midtown is currently unusually empty due to the Zoom shock, it shouldn’t stay empty for too long. Before the pandemic, Midtown Manhattan office space was very expensive due to high demand and inelastic supply. Now that demand for office space in general has fallen, the price of Midtown office space will fall a lot, but at the new cheaper prices you’d still expect someone to lease it. Ultimately, all the retailers serving the office commuters should have customers. And the same thing happens on the residential side. To the extent people leave the city now that they no longer “have to” live there for work, the price will fall, and someone else moves in at the new lower price.


This price adjustment is a problem for the tax base, and local officials might completely bungle it. But it’s fundamentally a solvable problem. There is tons of “shadow demand” for both dwellings and office space in New York.


This is to say that I expect post-pandemic New York to more closely resemble pre-pandemic Chicago — a city that was poorer than New York but that had very appealing big city amenities and noticeably lower prices. The first two times I went to Chicago, all I could think about was, “why doesn’t everyone move here?” Then I went in February and I found out. But still. For anyone who liked cities but wasn’t a billionaire, it had a lot of appealing qualities. But that greater affordability means that Chicago doesn’t have the same cushion in the face of a relative decline in demand compared to America’s exurbs and rural areas.


Chicago housing might get too cheap

Housing costs are up a lot nationally as part of overall inflation, which can create sort of distorted impressions of what’s going on. I’ve spoken to Realtors, for example, who were under the impression that the D.C. real estate market was “going crazy” at least until recent Federal Reserve interest rate hikes.


In reality, though, the D.C. area’s 8 percent increase in rents is one of the smallest in the country. There’s been a large relative decline in housing demand in D.C., but in the context of overall rising prices. The right way to think about this is that metro areas like D.C., the Bay Area, Seattle, Chicago, Houston, and St. Louis have gotten cheaper relative to the national average, relative to wages, and relative to the cost of construction.



If you zero in on the city of Chicago, as opposed to the metro area, you can see that it’s gotten cheaper since the pandemic struck and people place less of a premium on convenient commuting access to the Loop.



And while cheaper is in some ways good, it can actually be bad if your city was already cheap. Before the pandemic, Issi Romem wrote a great analysis that compared the cost of houses in different metro areas to the cost of building a house. Places with very high ratios on this chart are places where land is super-expensive and new housing is hard to build. That’s bad. Then there’s a healthy Chicago/Atlanta zone where homes are more expensive than construction costs, but only a little bit more expensive.


But then you have the Detroit Zone where the cost of buying a home is less than the construction cost of building one.



Once a city slips into this zone, bad things happen. Suddenly if you’re a landlord, it doesn’t make sense in cost-benefit terms to do timely repairs on your building. If you’re an owner-occupant, you’re of course going to treat yourself better than a profit-seeking landlord would and so you do the repairs anyway. But that just means your house has become a sinkhole for money and sweat equity. Construction jobs tend to vanish. If a home gets foreclosed on or becomes badly damaged, there’s a tendency for it to become vacant, dealing a blow to the city’s tax base and creating a source of blight. If your home value to replacement cost ratio is really high, then a negative shock to demand just means the city reaches a new more affordable equilibrium. But if it’s already modest, as it was in Chicago pre-pandemic, then you can easily tilt into a cycle of decline.


The downward spiral

When cities start shrinking, things can get really bad.


The tax base shrinks, but legacy pension obligations don’t, and the ratio of taxes to public services becomes worse.


With the number of customers in structural decline, it’s harder for any local restaurant or retail business to succeed, so people with aspirations to found their own business tend to migrate elsewhere.


Under-used infrastructure is wasteful and expensive to maintain.


Because the existing stock of buildings isn’t worth replacing or refurbishing, your city’s capital base wastes away.


We have seen lots of examples of this happening to American cities, mostly in the midwest but also in a lot of smaller northeastern industrial cities. Sometimes a city in decline turns around the way Boston and New York have, by reinventing themselves as information-age havens. But this is the exception rather than the rule, and I think it’s also more attributable to good luck1 than to any smart policy choices made by the leaders of those cities.


Chicago becoming distressed is potentially very dire because so many other midwestern cities were already depressed before the pandemic, and their central business districts will be experiencing similar blows from remote work. And since cities are impacted by the cities they’re connected to, Chicago joining the cycle of decline will, I think, tend to drag down Detroit and Cleveland and St. Louis.


San Francisco vs. Austin and New York vs. Miami have a kind of fun regional rivalry dynamic that is intensified by the fact that these cities symbolize larger ideological trends. But the entire Midwest slipping deeper into a funk as its cities decay and its biggest employers depart is just depressing, and people don’t generally seem to want to talk about it.


The rising tide we don’t have

Someone is sure to say, “You’re always complaining about NIMBYs and how the rent is too damn high and now you’re telling me it’s bad if Chicago gets cheaper?”


The thing to remember is that in this post, we’ve been talking about prices falling due to a fall in demand.



That’s different from prices falling due to an increase in the elasticity of supply.



My general view is that whether we’re talking about labor or housing, restricting supply in order to raise prices is a terrible idea. But prices rising due to strong demand is good. The problem facing Chicago and other midwestern cities is that low demand is not an affordability strategy — it’s a recipe for failure.


And the solution, fundamentally, has to come from outside the region. The only reason that falling relative demand for Chicago is translating into falling absolute demand for Chicago is that overall American population growth has slowed to a crawl as the once-robust flow of immigrants has turned into a trickle and the birthrate has continued to decline. In the longer run, we should be doing much more to support parents and children. But in the shorter term, the country would benefit from significantly more immigration. I’d be thrilled to defer to immigration skeptics about exactly which immigrants we let in and under which terms, but it should be more people. Make them speak English, make them pass some public charge test, make them have college degrees or score over 100 on an IQ test or whatever you want.


But it ought to be more people. Per capita GDP in Illinois is higher than Norway and more than 50 percent higher than Italy, to say nothing of the many countries around the world that are poorer than Italy. Whatever Chicago’s problems, there are billions of people on the planet who could secure superior opportunities in life by gaining permission to live there. And there could be big advantages to the United States in accelerating our population growth rate rather than allowing cities with below-average demand to slip into spirals of decline.

Wednesday, July 20, 2022

Good-bye to Biden’s Social-Policy Agenda


&c. by Jonathan Chait
 
 
Good-bye to Biden’s Social-Policy Agenda
 

Photo-Illustration: Intelligencer. Photo: Chris Kelponis-Pool/Getty Images
 
The most depressing thing about the demise of the Biden administration’s social-policy agenda — other than the demise itself, of course — was the atmosphere of sheer economic illiteracy that surrounded it. Critics of the measure, ultimately including Joe Manchin himself, made arguments against it that were not so much misguided as lacking any elemental grasp of the basic principles involved (“not even wrong”).

The main argument used against Biden’s plan was that it would worsen inflation. Most of them scolded Biden for ignoring the sage insights of Larry Summers. Here, to take just one example, is conservative pundit Marc Thiessen: Biden signed an economic stimulus in March 2021 “despite warnings from even liberal economists, such as former Treasury secretary Lawrence H. Summers, who cautioned the president that his plan would ‘set off inflationary pressures of a kind we have not seen in a generation,’” Thiessen scolds. “The first rule of holes is: When you are in one, stop digging. So, when you are in a hole of spiraling inflation, the obvious first step is: stop spending.”

Later in the same column, Thiessen switches metaphors, scolding again, “But instead of trying to tamp down the flames, Biden keeps trying to pour gasoline on the inferno, with more spending and more free money from Washington.” The tone of this column, like many of the right-wing polemics, is one of incredulous condescension. Biden is such a blithering idiot that he is ignoring the obvious conclusion and instead digging holes and pouring gasoline or whatever.

Whatever the case against Build Back Better, this was not it. The American Rescue Plan did contribute to inflation. Its purpose was to stimulate demand by injecting deficit-financed spending into the economy. Build Back Better had a different purpose: to address social needs over a long period of time and finance that spending through taxation.

Spending financed by new taxes is not inflationary. That is why Summers himself endorsed Build Back Better. Yet conservatives spent the better part of a year citing Summers as the authority on why Biden’s long-term plans would cause inflation, oblivious to the fact that any economist, very much including Summers, would say otherwise.

In deference to public concerns about inflation, Manchin ultimately reshaped the last version of the bill as an anti-inflationary measure. The plan would have raised $1 trillion in new revenue (or reduced spending) and used half the proceeds for deficit reduction. This would not have had a large effect on inflation, but there is no question that, directionally, it would place downward pressure on prices.

Conservatives simply refused to acknowledge this aspect of the plan at all. In the end, even Manchin himself abandoned his own plan, which was designed in part to reduce inflation, on account of inflation, which is like deciding not to cut greenhouse-gas emissions because it’s too hot.

Playbook reports, via a source close to Manchin, “when the 9.1% inflation number was released Manchin just said to Schumer, ‘Why can’t we wait a month to see if the numbers come down structurally? How do you pour $1 trillion on that tempo with inflation?’”

Remember, $1 trillion is not the size of the spending in the bill; $1 trillion is the size of the revenue. That’s the pay-for aspect of the bill Manchin insisted on maintaining in order to fight inflation. The $1 trillion would not be poured onto economic growth. It would be poured out of economic growth.

In the end, Biden’s attempt to enact permanent social change died in an atmosphere in which the most ignorant fallacies carried the day.


The most important actors in American politics are parties, not individuals. And political parties are large groups of people that change slowly over long periods of time.

These facts are important to keep in mind because I think they help clarify many questions that people often find confusing. One of those is a mystery that has come up repeatedly: Why are Democrats running ads in Republican primaries designed to bolster extreme opponents?

I’ve read a dozen columns and op-eds about this phenomenon, all making essentially the same argument: Democrats are acting irresponsibly by trying to encourage Republican primary voters to nominate their craziest candidates. The conclusion of these columns is that the extremists might win. (Look at Donald Trump, whom everybody considered unelectable in 2016.) They generally follow this up by arguing that Democrats must not believe their own rhetoric about the threat to democracy posed by the far right — if they did, why would they take any steps to facilitate the most unhinged Trumpists gaining power?

I agree with the conclusion: It is irresponsible to help put the most authoritarian elements of the GOP in a position to hold office. But I certainly understand why Democrats are doing it, and it absolutely does not mean they don’t believe their own warnings about the opposition.

The reason, of course, is parties. A single individual can do only so much damage. Trump was unable to gain an unelected second term because he failed to build consensus within his party for a coup attempt.

Now, the more authoritarian the Republican Party gets, the more likely it is to make a different decision next time. That’s a good argument for why Democrats should try to arrest that slide into authoritarianism on the margins rather than accelerate it.

But if you’re wondering why Democrats are taking this risk, as so many pundits are, the answer isn’t that they don’t really doubt the GOP’s commitment to democracy; it’s that they have no faith in the party at all. Indeed, Republicans ignored, excused, or abetted Trump’s abuses of power throughout his presidency. Just one of them voted to impeach Trump over his gross misuse of authority when he leveraged American foreign policy to smear his campaign rival. A handful of them voted to impeach him after he launched a violent coup attempt — and then almost all of them backed off that position.

If you’re a Democrat, you probably think the Republican Party’s pro-democracy wing no longer has a veto. The party is tipping into authoritarianism. Democrats aren’t trying to line up races against the most extreme Republicans because they’re not worried about extremists but because they think the only way to protect democracy is to keep Republicans out of power.

Again, I think that strategy is a terrible mistake because margins matter. But the danger posed by the Republican Party is not confined to Trump or a handful of his acolytes. The danger lies in the Republican Party’s center of gravity.


Many conservatives who finally acknowledged after January 6, 2021, that democracy may not be completely safe in the hands of Donald Trump insist Ron DeSantis poses no danger to democracy whatsoever. Tim Miller recently joined this debate by posing a question: If DeSantis is less dangerous than Trump, why won’t he say so?

DeSantis has publicly refused to concede Joe Biden legitimately won the 2020 election. In the wake of the election, he floated a scheme to have legislatures appoint pro-Trump electors. He has encouraged beliefs that endemic voter fraud exists, publicly speculated January 6 was an inside job, and given supporters of the insurrection state-appointed posts. As Miller argues, “We are being asked, without evidence from DeSantis himself, to trust that he won’t support the kind of anti-democratic insurrection that he encouraged last time.”

The answer to Miller’s question can be found in a column by Dan McLaughlin of National Review. McLaughlin fervently hopes for DeSantis to capture the Republican nomination in any way he can. But he argues DeSantis “needs to do so in a way that keeps Trump’s most passionate supporters behind him come that November. It would be a Pyrrhic victory to defeat Trump in the way that Napoleon captured Moscow in 1812, presiding over the burned-out shell of a city surrounded by hundreds of miles of scorched earth in the onset of winter.”

Of course Trump’s passionate supporters are most passionate about the idea that Democratic election victories are inherently illegitimate. This belief is the foundation of the movement Trump is inspiring to take over the party at every level, from grassroots volunteers getting into election administration to candidates for senator and governor. Staying on their good side means placating their belief that Democrats engage in systematic, undetected voter fraud and that Republicans are obligated to fight back with a variety of tactics ranging from the formally legal (like having state legislatures override the vote, the plan DeSantis suggested) to outright violence.

DeSantis enthusiasts are not only failing to push him to denounce Trump’s authoritarianism, they are also openly encouraging him not to do so. And of course the logic is perfectly sound, as far as it goes. McLaughlin is right that DeSantis needs authoritarian Republicans, not only to win the nomination but also to win the general election. “Out of 340 Republican nominees for Senate, House, governor, attorney general and secretary of state so far,” FiveThirtyEight finds, “120 are full-blown election deniers (35 percent)” and “an additional 48 nominees (14 percent) have expressed doubts about the election.” That is, half the GOP’s nominees for those offices deny or doubt Biden won. Even defining democracy in the narrowest possible way — opposing Trump’s use of a violent mob to overturn the election results — there simply aren’t enough pro-democracy Republicans to form a winning national coalition.

There are three reasons to treat DeSantis as a serious threat to democracy. The first is that he subscribes ideologically to a strain of right-wing thought that prioritizes market outcomes over democracy (he devoted an entire book to this idea). The second is his record in Florida, ranging from a Kafkaesque poll tax to his Orbanesque bullying of Disney, which has done more to erode democracy than any sitting governor has managed.

The final reason is his core political strategy of refusing to break ranks with the right. Even when activists pick a fight DeSantis would not have selected, he throws himself into it regardless. The “Don’t Say Gay” bill is a prominent example: Christian conservatives designed this bill, and DeSantis merely went along with it.

DeSantis has built his political identity on a promise to side with the right in every battle against the left. The battles many of them want to fight now are against the democratic system itself.

To believe that DeSantis is not a threat to the system, you have to believe he will abandon the “no enemies to the right” posture that is the foundation of his political strategy. What’s more, you have to believe that, after DeSantis refused to condemn anti-democratic steps taken to secure power for Trump, he would condemn such steps taken on behalf of himself.

Is that possible? Sure. It seems far more likely, though, that the reason DeSantis won’t deny he is a threat to the republic is that he is, in fact, a threat to the republic.

Political leaders mold themselves to the coalition that sustains them. Their choices are bounded by what is acceptable to their supporters. In that coalition, what counts as mainstream thinking is open to legal avenues to subvert democratic processes, and the ideas on the edges of the coalition — but still inside the tent — flirt with political violence. DeSantis’s strategy is to leave in place the authoritarian-led coalition built by Donald Trump.


A recent economics paper found that unionizing workforces reduces product quality. The authors measured product quality by “product recalls mandated by the FDA, the Consumer Product Safety Commission and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,” a metric they chose because it is objective. They found firms in which union elections passed by a narrow margin subsequently had more product recalls than ones in which union elections failed by a narrow margin.

I think liberals can still believe unions play a positive social role without disputing the factual basis of this finding. One question here is the mechanism that leads unionization to harm product quality. The paper’s author’s suggest it is the financial strain caused by higher labor costs. Alex Tabarrok proposes a different mechanism: Having a union prevents firms from disciplining or firing ineffective employees.

Tabarrok’s hypothesis seems persuasive to me. But, assuming it is correct, what does it tell us? It may be in the interest of individual firms to block unions and maintain the ability to weed out unproductive workers. But it hardly follows that it is in the interest of society as a whole.

A firm can fire its way to a more productive workforce, but an entire country can’t. Creating a more productive workforce means improving education, training, nutrition, health care, transportation, social care, and so on.

Now, you can believe that some sectors are especially important and need to have the ability to remove ineffective workers. I would say policing and teaching are the two such occupations. The social damage done from bad cops and bad teachers (especially in the case of low-income children, whose parents usually lack the resources to compensate for inadequate teaching) is too great to let these occupations be burdened with subpar employees. I’ve written in the past about the problems caused by union protections that make it difficult or impossible to fire the worst of the worst.

But in the absence of an economywide strategy to make all workers productive — an ambitious, if not utopian, project — we are going to be stuck with some unproductive workers. Having them work somewhere is better, in most cases, than having them work nowhere. If unions are protecting their ability to hold down a paycheck at a factory or a warehouse or a coffee shop, that is not a negative social function. It is a vital social function.



Tuesday, July 19, 2022

Amtrak's proposed Union Station renovation is a terrible idea / Matthew Yglesias

Amtrak's proposed Union Station renovation is a terrible idea / Matthew Yglesias — Read time: 11 minutes


Amtrak's proposed Union Station renovation is a terrible idea

An object lesson in American agencies' refusal to coordinate


A bit over a year ago, New York City premiered the Moynihan Train Hall at Penn Station, a very expensive train-related infrastructure project that did not increase the number of trains that can roll through Penn Station nor make the trains go faster nor increase the number of destinations the station can serve. In other words, it was a train project that had nothing to do with trains.


And now Amtrak wants to undertake a $10 billion reconstruction of Union Station in D.C. The project looks great in the renderings, but that raises similar questions. Amtrak is not saying this will allow them to provide new service to and from Union Station. They’re not saying it will increase the frequency of the trains that serve the station. Nor will the trains pass through, into, or out of the station faster. Because the renovation is not actually a renovation of the functional part of the station.


They’re also not talking about touching the historic Union Station building, a gorgeous architectural gem. Instead, the plan is basically to build a nicer shopping mall between the historic building and the platforms:


Visitors can make their way from the historic building to a new train hall, which is designed for daylight and for passengers to more easily spot where to catch their bus or train. The station also connects to Metro and DC Circulator services.


Parking is located at the lowest level, along with the majority of the pickup and drop-off area and two of the four concourses lined with retailors. From there, visitors have their pick of escalator or elevator to travel up to the train station. And above the train station is the bus facility. The project assumes increased use, so bus and train capacity has been added. The highest level offers an outdoor deck where people can be dropped off or picked up, or simply leisure along some green space.


There is also an ambitious plan to build a deck over the platforms themselves and the tracks north of the station to create a 15-acre mixed-use real estate development called Burnham Place.


These are just weird ideas to be seeking public funding for. Replacing the dingy existing train hall has some obvious upsides, but this is a commercial real estate project — either the nicer shopping facility will generate enough in additional sales and retail rents that it pencils out or it won’t. Either way, a real estate development project adjacent to the station should be a source of revenue for Amtrak, not something that it asks money for.


The point of spending public funds on train-related infrastructure upgrades should be to make the trains better.


The D.C. area needs infrastructure investments

As I’ve written a couple of times before, the D.C. area has most of the infrastructure it needs to stitch together MARC commuter rail to Maryland and VRE commuter rail to Virginia into a high-quality, high-frequency regional rail system similar to the RER in Paris or to the S-Bahns in the German-speaking world.


D.C. (unlike, say, Boston) already has a tunnel under the city that connects the tracks heading north to Baltimore to the tracks that head south. So just as some Amtrak trains currently pass through the city to serve points south, Maryland commuter trains could pass through the city to serve the huge job center at the Pentagon and then run out into the Virginia suburbs. And Virginia commuter trains could pass through the city into the Maryland suburbs and reach Baltimore. But a few changes are needed to make this a good experience that involves trains that run quickly and frequently at an affordable price:


Electrifying two of MARC’s three lines (one is already electrified) and both of the VRE lines


Replacing the MARC/VRE rolling stock with electric multiple units that accelerate faster out of the stations and can speed things up


Lots of small station upgrades in Virginia to create high platforms that let passengers board level with the train doors — this speeds ingress and egress and is a huge deal for accessibility


Replacing the Long Bridge over the Potomac River with one that has a higher capacity


Paying off a lot of wasteful conductors and replacing them with a system that requires spot checks of tickets in order to reduce labor costs and fares


These are non-trivial infrastructure investments, but they have a clear purpose related to transportation. Trips that are possible with the current infrastructure would become faster, more frequent, and more affordable with these upgrades. And many trips that are not currently possible would become possible. That’s the kind of thing the United States should be spending transportation infrastructure money on, making transportation infrastructure better.


Alon Levy, outraged by the extraordinary expense of the $10 billion station renovation project, has billions in new Metro construction projects they think D.C. should do over and above these commuter rail upgrades. I would love for everyone to get their shit together and do that stuff, too. But what I’m struck by is that before you even get into details of what’s a good project and what’s a bad one or what’s cost-effective and what isn’t, there’s a basic category error in these station projects: I want America’s transportation agencies to spend money on ideas to improve ridership while they want to do generic real estate development.


Train stations aren’t airports

Ever since I started writing about Amtrak’s peculiar ideas about how to board trains, I’ve noticed that the agency is inevitably run by an American airline-industry veteran rather than by a foreigner who has experience working at a successful passenger railroad. So really basic points like “trains have multiple doors while airplanes have just one and this makes a difference” seem to slip their grasp.


While planes have a lot of good features, those features often mean that the air travel experience involves a lot of waiting around in airports. Not only are planes fast, but they can also connect arbitrary geographies, which lets airlines do two things very well that even the more successful train systems don’t:


Low-frequency routes — United flies once a day between D.C. and Rome. So if you’re booked on that flight, missing it carries a very high cost. To avoid the high cost of missing that flight, most people arrive quite a bit early and end up waiting in the airport.


Hub and spoke transfers — People from smaller cities across the southeastern United States can take small planes to Dulles and switch to a larger plane serving Rome or other major international destinations. But transfer passengers need to wait for their flight.


On top of these two sources of waiting around, airports are generally very far from the city center. And even when they are kind of close, the security requirements mean there is a hard boundary between what’s inside the airport and what’s outside the airport. So making the airport a pleasant place to sit around and wait is a crucial determinant of the trip experience. The fact that Dulles isn’t very nice is a legitimate reason for a would-be traveler on a connecting flight to prefer to go through a different airport. That’s a bona fide competitive disadvantage for United vis a vis other carriers that use nicer hubs. So while making the airport nicer isn’t the biggest priority in the world for the airline (if it were, they’d have done it already), it’s absolutely on the list.


Train stations aren’t really like that — transfers are pretty unimportant. What trains are good at providing is frequent service along a busy corridor, mostly to commuters. And most of all, the station is right in the middle of the city with no security barriers.


Train stations aren’t important

Historically, of course, train stations were very important locations for buying train tickets.


They also contained big signs alerting people about train departure times and track assignments. Today, though, these functions are much less crucial because people have e-tickets on their phones and because railroads should (though they oftentimes don’t) deliver schedule updates and track information to people’s phones. This means that in the modern world, train stations are more different from airports than ever since the main “a lot of people need to wait around here” functions of a train station are now obsolete. There’s absolutely no reason passengers couldn’t kill time at a coffee shop across the street from a train station and then zip directly to the track based on a mobile update.


None of which is to say that cities should be demolishing their train stations, eliminating ticket vendor machines, or pulling down clocks and signs with schedule information. As long as you have the building, you may as well use it.


But if you don’t, that’s okay. Consider the L’Enfant Plaza VRE station that’s south of the national mall. Even though this is right in the city, it’s essentially identical to a very humble commuter rail station in the middle of nowhere. It has some tracks and a couple of platforms. With through-running investments, more riders would use the station. But there’s no need for a huge investment in improving the station itself. Passengers who want to buy some food before boarding a train at L’Enfant can go to one of the food trucks that park nearby or to one of the shops in the surrounding city blocks. It’s just a place in the city. Its important function is that trains stop there and people can get off or on.


The existing historic Union Station building is already a very nice shopping-type venue — they’ve got a Chopt, a Chipotle, a Cava, a Shake Shack, a Blue Bottle, a Roti, a Potbelly, and I think a Pizzeria Uno. If the modern building between the historic building and the tracks is overcrowded, that reflects two things.


One is that they don’t let people directly access the train platforms and wait there. The other is that they are stuffing the building with this additional tier of retail — a Sbarro’s, a Claire’s, a Victoria’s Secret, a Jamba Juice and a Juice Press, etc. — right where the most reasonable place for people to wait is.



I don’t feel that the crowding situation really is that bad or that it would necessarily warrant removing some of the existing retail. Giving people access to the platforms is a good idea for other reasons and would reduce crowding. But if the feeling is that something needs to be done that would cost money and alleviate crowding, then opening up the space and accepting reduced retail revenue seems like the obvious choice rather than a $10 billion construction project. Meanwhile, there is plenty of space to develop more retail options.


The Architect of the Capitol is the real villain here

Far and away the biggest design flaw with Union Station is that rather than being surrounded by a busy district of office buildings with ground-floor retail, it’s surrounded by surface parking lots (directly east of North Capitol and between 1st Street and 2nd Street) and a totally vacant park (between the station and D Street).



This is not land that is owned by Amtrak, so it can’t be the focus of an Amtrak-specific real estate development project. It’s instead controlled by the United States Congress, specifically the Architect of the Capitol’s office, which controls the Capitol building itself and the nearby congressional office buildings.


If you gave me magic powers, I would turn one of these blocks into a large new congressional office building and the others could be sold for private development. Pre-Zoom, I would have guessed that meant commercial office space, but these days housing is probably more likely. Either way, you’d have underground parking garages and plenty of street-level retail. The benefit to Union Station would be that the station is more knit into the neighborhood and there is less need for loitering passengers to specifically congregate in the station rather than nearby.


In the real world, of course, the issue is that Amtrak controls Union Station but does not control those adjacent parcels — that’s Congress. At the same time, we’re talking about the national legislature here and a state-owned railroad company. And the inability of the American public sector to coordinate with itself is a constant source of problems.


A failure to communicate

Think back to the idea of S-Bahn service for the D.C.-Baltimore area. Delivering it would require some infrastructure investments: a bunch of stations would need their platforms raised, plus a new bridge, electrified tracks, and new rolling stock.


But while this isn’t trivial, it’s very much doable, especially in a world where numbers like $10 billion are being thrown around.


The harder part is that for MARC/VRE through-running to work, MARC and VRE would need to coordinate with each other and with Amtrak. They would also need to lay off a bunch of conductors to reduce fares and operating costs. Now many more trains would be running under this paradigm, so there wouldn’t even necessarily be job losses in the aggregate. But jobs would have to be reallocated. And of course you’d need to cooperate with the Architect of the Capitol on developing the real estate assets.


Coordination on anything resembling this level just seems far beyond the capacity of American agencies.


A key element in the German S-Bahn model is fare integration. What you pay to get from Point A to Point B in Berlin is determined by how far you traveled, not whether you went on S-Bahn or U-Bahn or a combination of the two or whether or not a bus was involved. Currently, neither MARC nor VRE integrates fares with the Metro system run by WMATA. In New York, the commuter rail systems and the subway are both run by the MTA, but they don’t integrate fares. MetroNorth and LIRR can’t even agree on whether it’s “rail road” or “railroad.” And in D.C., WMATA doesn’t integrate bus fares with metro fares.


There’s no one single reason why America spends too much money on low-value transportation projects. Some of it has to do with NIMBYism and adversarial legalism. But a lot of it has to do with this inability to cooperate. Many of the highest-value projects require a lot of coordination to implement, and in practice a lot of agency project planning is driven by a desire not to coordinate. This Union Station plan isn’t the answer to the question “what’s a good way to improve train service in the D.C. area?” — it’s an answer to the question “what would be a cool asset for Amtrak to own and control?”


But that’s the wrong question.

Thursday, July 14, 2022

Republican Boycott of Jan. 6 Committee Is Backfiring

Republican Boycott of Jan. 6 Committee Is Backfiring

Jonathan Bernstein | Bloomberg — Read time: 4 minutes


Democracy Dies in Darkness

Republican Boycott of Jan. 6 Committee Is Backfiring

Analysis by Jonathan Bernstein | Bloomberg

July 13, 2022 at 1:57 p.m. EDT

Tuesday’s hearing of the House committee investigating the assault on the US Capitol of Jan. 6, 2021 provided a stark reminder of how the boycott by all but two Republicans has set the context of the proceedings. Remember: After Speaker Nancy Pelosi vetoed Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy’s suggestions for Republicans to serve on the panel, McCarthy pulled all Republican participation, leaving Pelosi to name two Republican adversaries of former President Donald Trump who defied the boycott.


The hallmark of these hearings — seven this summer and one last year — has been that they’ve run smoothly. They start on time. There is no partisan sniping. No motions made and argued over. The use of taped segments — from depositions and from other evidence — has been professional and effective. The hearings even appear to end on time.


The committee has been shockingly effective at teasing each session in advance without giving away the bulk of their story. There’s even a ritual at the end in which Representative Liz Cheney of Wyoming, the senior of the two Republicans, previews the next hearing and drops a bombshell, supplying the media with a sidebar story and keeping everyone’s interest up to the last moment. This Tuesday’s Cheney surprise was the revelation that Trump tried (unsuccessfully) to contact a committee witness.


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It’s not unusual for a lot of what happens in congressional hearings to be scripted; indeed, it’s pretty normal. But even when partisanship is minimized and members are cooperative (and yes, even in these days of partisan polarization, there’s plenty of cooperation), representatives almost always read off their own individual scripts, with no more than halting coordination even within the parties. For a hearing to be centrally scripted … that’s highly unusual.


Some of this would have been possible had there been additional, dissenting Republicans on the committee. But it would have been a lot harder. Even if the other Republicans had been pro-democracy and acted in good faith — unlikely, but let’s suppose — they probably would have appealed to the impulse of many journalists to hold both parties responsible for any disputes that break out. More likely, they would have deliberately provoked fights to make the story about committee squabbling, rather than the evidence presented. They also could have selectively leaked things from the depositions to take the steam out of the hearings. But even just adding minority member time would have broken up the force and the effectiveness of the presentations.


To be sure, it would also have given critics a chance to expose weak points in the committee’s argument. Tuesday’s session demonstrated how. The topic was actions taken by Trump after losing the 2020 election, from mid-December up to Jan. 6, with the committee trying to pin the eventual violence on Trump himself.


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If the committee’s goal was simply to prove that Trump was aware of the potential for violence, including violence by organized militia-like groups, and even encouraged it, it was successful. However, I thought it was less successful at tying Trump directly to those groups. Overlap between the extended Trump camp and the extremist groups was exposed — Trump confidant Roger Stone, in particular, was involved with both — but a few skeptics on the committee could have pushed the majority harder about whether there was more to Trump’s involvement than simply inspiring anyone who was willing to follow him to commit mayhem.


I don’t mean to minimize what the committee did demonstrate, which was certainly more than enough to produce a legitimate impeachment and conviction if Trump was still president, and may now be enough for indictment and conviction. And the committee has said that it hasn’t yet revealed all the evidence it has gathered. But the feel of the hearing would have been different had there been someone present to poke holes at the conclusions drawn by the current members. Different, but perhaps not weaker; after all, one defense Trump can now trot out on the political stage is that no one is standing up for him in the committee, which is true even if the bulk of what is being presented is irrefutable.


One thing that is clear after eight hearings: Pelosi was correct to veto the Republican attempt to add committee members who were deeply involved in Trump’s plotting. But that still left McCarthy with plenty of options, including strong Trump supporters who didn’t get involved in planning to overturn the election and, in doing so, to overthrow the legitimate US government.


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Because if there’s one thing that’s been obvious starting on Election Day 2020 and is even more obvious now that we’ve seen hours of evidence, not to mention 18 months of Trump’s public behavior, that overthrowing the government is exactly what Trump and his allies were attempting to do. Unfortunately, it seems that there are only two Republicans in the entire House of Representatives willing to side with democracy and against the former president. But they’ve made the committee a lot more effective.


This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.


Jonathan Bernstein is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering politics and policy. A former professor of political science at the University of Texas at San Antonio and DePauw University, he wrote A Plain Blog About Politics.


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