Sunday, July 10, 2022

Elon’s Out : Matt Levine


www.bloomberg.com
Elon’s Out
Matt Levine
29 - 37 minutes

Musk lost interest in pretending to buy Twitter.
By

Matt Levine
9 July 2022 at 11:40 pm GMT+9

Programming note: Ugh, here we are again, huh?
Oh Elon

I think it is helpful to start with the big picture. Elon Musk is the richest person in the world, and, like many other rich people, he has some unusual and expensive hobbies. One of his hobbies is that he sometimes likes to pretend that he will acquire public companies. 1 He seems to find this fun, and why not? When he pretends that he’ll buy a public company, it creates a big drama with him at the center of it. He gets to boss people around, mobilize legions of bankers and lawyers and financing sources and random hangers-on 2 hoping to get the deal done, and then when he gets bored he can tell all those people to go home. “Haha got you,” he can say, and they can all have a good laugh, or he can anyway.

This is an expensive hobby! When Musk pretended in 2018 that he was going to take Tesla Inc. private, he had to pay the US Securities and Exchange Commission a $20 million fine and stop being the chairman of Tesla’s board. You’re not really supposed to go around pretending that you will buy a public company; the SEC sometimes considers that securities fraud. But Musk is very rich and he can easily afford to pay $20 million for his little joke. His appetite for pretending to buy public companies was, apparently, undiminished.

So this April, Musk announced that he wanted to buy Twitter Inc. Why not? Musk seems to get a lot of joy out of using Twitter, and pretending to buy Twitter is a good way to create drama on Twitter. At the time, I assumed that, as with Tesla, he was doing a bit. “Ordinarily,” I wrote, “if a billionaire chief executive officer of a public company offers to buy a company, the odds that he is kidding are quite low. When it’s Elon Musk, the historical odds are, like, 50/50.” 

But he surprised me by quickly lining up financing (paying millions of dollars of fees to banks for commitment letters) and signing a merger agreement with Twitter. If he was pretending he was going to buy Twitter, those were pretty elaborate lengths to go to? But he frequently goes to elaborate (and expensive) lengths for a joke — he sold 20,000 branded flamethrowers to make a joke about flamethrowers, and also founded Boring Co. to make a joke (???) about tunnels — so who knows. Would he line up billions of dollars of financing and sign a binding merger agreement with a specific-performance clause and a $1 billion breakup fee as a joke? I mean! Nobody else would! But he might!

In any case, shortly after he signed the deal, the market went down. Twitter’s stock closed at $44.48 on April 12, the day before Musk announced his offer; he agreed to pay $54.20 per share (420 is a weed joke). Since then Twitter has surely lost value: The stock closed at $36.81 on Friday, and other social-media stocks are down significantly since April. (Snap Inc. is down about 57% since April 13; even Meta Platforms Inc. — Facebook — is down more than 20%.) Meanwhile Tesla Inc. stock, the main source of Musk’s wealth, is down almost 27% since he announced his offer for Twitter. Twitter is worth less than Musk agreed to pay for it, and Musk is less rich than he was when he agreed to buy it. These are not valid reasons for Musk to get out of the deal: The legally binding merger agreement that Musk signed with Twitter does not allow him to terminate the deal due to changes in the stock market or his own wealth. But they are reasons that Musk might want to get out of the deal, even if he wasn’t kidding when he first signed it.

Still, one should remain open to the possibility that he was kidding when he first signed the deal. “Elon Musk had a well-thought-out business and financial plan for Twitter that worked in the economic conditions of early April 2022, but conditions have changed and the model no longer works” does not strike me as the most plausible description of what is going on here. “Elon Musk whimsically thought it might be fun to own Twitter, so he signed a merger agreement without taking it too seriously and then lost interest a week later” feels more true to the situation. My first reaction to his proposal to buy Twitter, that it was a joke, may have been the correct one. He was just a lot more committed to the bit than I expected.

Anyway:

    Elon Musk said he’s terminating his $44 billion agreement to acquire Twitter Inc. and take it private, triggering a legal fight with the company.

    Twitter has made “misleading representations” over the number of spam bots on the social network, and hasn’t “complied with its contractual obligations” to provide information about how to assess how prevalent the bots are, Musk’s representatives said Friday in a letter to Twitter as part of a regulatory filing.

    Twitter said it will fight back in court.

Here is the letter, signed by Mike Ringler of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Musk’s lawyer. It … ehhhhhhh. Ehhhhhhhhhhhhhhh. Do we have to talk about this? Fine. Ringler offers three pretexts for why Musk should be allowed out of the deal.

The first pretext is: Twitter has been lying about bots. For at least eight years, Twitter has said in its SEC filings that it estimates that fewer than 5% of its monetizable daily active users are “false or spam accounts,” and in the merger agreement it represents that its SEC filings are accurate. Ringler says that “it appears that Twitter is dramatically understating the proportion of spam and false accounts represented in its mDAU count.” There is not a whisper of evidence for this claim, no hint that there might be evidence, no acknowledgement that a reasonable reader of this letter might want to see evidence. The only basis for the claim is that “preliminary analysis by Mr. Musk’s advisors of the information provided by Twitter to date causes Mr. Musk to strongly believe that the proportion of false and spam accounts included in the reported mDAU count is wildly higher than 5%.” Notice that Ringler does not say that the analysis shows that the bots are “wildly higher than 5%” of mDAUs: That would be a factual claim that, I suspect, Musk’s advisers know is false. They make only the subjective claim that Musk “strongly believes” it. I don’t even believe that he believes it! But that’s harder to disprove.

The bots thing, man, I don’t know. We have talked about this before. Back before the market crashed, back when he was pretending to want to buy Twitter, Musk was pretending that he wanted to buy Twitter in order to clean up the bot problem. Now he is pretending to want to get out of the deal because of the bot problem. It is tiresome to pretend to take this seriously, so let’s not.

Still, as a legal matter — and here I should emphasize that nothing in this column is legal or investing advice; if you are Twitter or Elon Musk you should consult your very expensive lawyers, and if you are reading this column to make bets on Twitter’s stock, cut it out — but as a legal matter: Is this pretext good enough to get him out of the deal? Well, look. If Musk can prove that in fact Twitter has been running a years-long fraud on its shareholders and advertisers — that it has knowingly been massively understating the number of bot accounts in order to trick companies into buying Twitter ads and shareholders into buying Twitter stock — then, sure, maybe that will get him out of the deal. Twitter does represent in the merger agreement that its SEC filings are correct, and the SEC filings do say that Twitter estimates that bots are under 5% of mDAUs, though they caveat that “this estimate is based on an internal review of a sample of accounts and we apply significant judgment in making this determination.” If Twitter were simply lying — if it knew that bots were really 75% of mDAUs — then I suppose the rep would be false. Again there is absolutely no evidence for this, Ringler’s letter makes it fairly clear that Musk is never going to offer evidence for it, Twitter has publicly and persuasively defended its methodology, and third-party analyses that are sympathetic to Musk nonetheless seem to support Twitter’s numbers. But if you just pretend that Musk can somehow prove that Twitter is lying then, sure, fine, the representation would be false.

Even so, though, Musk cannot get out of the deal just because one of Twitter’s representations is false. He still has to close the deal unless the representation is false and it would have a “material adverse effect” on Twitter. This is a famously under-defined term but it generally needs to be a pretty catastrophic effect. If the bots are 6% of mDAUs, whatever. If the bots are 75% of mDAUs and Twitter has been knowingly misleading its advertisers, and Musk can expose that scam and advertisers flee and Twitter faces legal trouble for its fraud, then, sure, material adverse effect. 3 There is no evidence for this at all despite Musk’s months of looking for it. Also it is obviously untrue! Companies advertise on Twitter because it sells products! People use Twitter because other, non-bot people also use Twitter, so it is a useful and enjoyable social network! Elon Musk — who has far more interactions with bots than most Twitter users — is addicted to Twitter because it is full of real people! It’s how he met the mother of some of his children! The pretense that Elon Musk has somehow exposed the secret truth that nobody uses Twitter except himself and some spam bots is just absurd! But we have to keep talking about it! It’s so stupid!

The second pretext is: Twitter is not giving Musk enough information about the bot problem. This is a better pretext, for technical legal reasons, which we have also discussed previously. In the closing conditions to the merger, representations are qualified by “material adverse effect”; just finding that a representation is false would not give Musk the right to terminate the deal unless it caused an MAE. But covenants are qualified by “all material respects”: In the merger agreement, Twitter promised to do certain things between signing and closing, and it has to do those things, whether or not there would be a material adverse effect from not doing them. So if Musk can prove that Twitter hasn’t complied with its obligations, he can get out of the deal.

The covenant at issue here is Section 6.4(a) of the merger agreement (important part bolded):

    Upon reasonable notice, the Company [i.e. Twitter] shall (and shall cause each of its Subsidiaries to) afford to the representatives, officers, directors, employees, agents, attorneys, accountants and financial advisors (“Representatives”) of Parent [i.e. Musk] reasonable access (at Parent’s sole cost and expense), in a manner not disruptive in any material respect to the operations of the business of the Company and its Subsidiaries, during normal business hours and upon reasonable written notice throughout the period commencing on the date of this Agreement until the earlier of the Effective Time and the termination of this Agreement pursuant to Article VIII, to the properties, books and records of the Company and its Subsidiaries and, during such period, shall (and shall cause each of its Subsidiaries to) furnish promptly to such Representatives all information concerning the business, properties and personnel of the Company and its Subsidiaries as may reasonably be requested in writing, in each case, for any reasonable business purpose related to the consummation of the transactions contemplated by this Agreement; provided, however, that nothing herein shall require the Company or any of its Subsidiaries to disclose any information to Parent or Acquisition Sub if such disclosure would, in the reasonable judgment of the Company, (i) cause significant competitive harm to the Company or its Subsidiaries if the transactions contemplated by this Agreement are not consummated, (ii) violate applicable Law or the provisions of any agreement to which the Company or any of its Subsidiaries is a party, or (iii) jeopardize any attorney-client or other legal privilege. … Prior to any disclosure, the Company and Parent shall enter into a customary confidentiality agreement with respect to any information obtained pursuant to this Section 6.4 (or otherwise pursuant to this Agreement).

Ringler says that Musk has reasonably demanded a bunch of information about bots, and Twitter hasn’t given him enough:

    Mr. Musk and his financial advisors at Morgan Stanley have been requesting critical information from Twitter as far back as May 9, 2022—and repeatedly since then—on the relationship between Twitter’s disclosed mDAU figures and the prevalence of false or spam accounts on the platform. If there were ever any doubt as to the nature of these information requests, the May 25 Letter made clear that Mr. Musk’s goal was to understand how many of Twitter’s claimed mDAUs were, in fact, fake or spam accounts. That letter noted that “Items 1.03 to 1.13 of the diligence request list contain high-priority requests for enterprise data and other information intended to enable Mr. Musk and his advisors to make an independent assessment of the prevalence of fake or spam accounts on Twitter’s platform…” The letter then provided Twitter with a detailed list of requests to this effect.

    Since then, Mr. Musk has provided numerous additional follow-up requests, all aimed at filling the gaps in the incomplete information that Twitter provided in response to his broad requests for information relating to Twitter’s reported mDAU counts and reported estimates of false and spam accounts.

When we last discussed this, I wrote:

    Musk can ask Twitter, like, “give me the cell phone numbers of every one of your monetizable daily active users so I can call them and see if they’re bots,” and Twitter will have to decide if that is reasonable, if it violates any laws, etc. If they say no, Musk can disagree, and it might end up in court, with Musk having the ability to walk away if he wins. If they say yes, Musk can just keep asking for more things. “Tell us what all of your users were thinking about last Thursday,” why not.

And in fact Ringler’s letter makes it pretty clear that that’s what Musk was up to: He’d ask for information about bots, and they’d give it to him, and he’d ask for more, and he’d keep trying to get information that he could use to undermine Twitter’s SEC reports. He buried Twitter in an avalanche of demands for data:

    On June 17, 2022 (the “June 17 Letter”) Mr. Musk reiterated his request for “access to the sample set used and calculations performed, as well as any related reports or analysis, to support Twitter’s representation that fewer than 5% of its mDAUs are false or spam account.” To that end, Mr. Musk requested that Twitter provide “daily measures of mDAU for the previous eight quarters, and through the present.” This information is derivative of the information Mr. Musk first sought in Sections 1.01-1.03 of the May 19 diligence request list. Although Twitter has provided certain summary data regarding the mDAU calculations, Twitter has not provided the complete daily measures as requested.

Musk has also asked for a random assortment of other information from Twitter including, hilariously, its investment bankers’ financial model for their fairness opinion:

    To that end, Mr. Musk requested on June 17 a variety of board materials, including a working, bottoms-up financial model for 2022, a budget for 2022, an updated draft plan or budget, and a working copy of Goldman Sachs’ valuation model underlying its fairness opinion. Twitter has provided only a pdf copy of Goldman Sachs’ final Board presentation.

What a weird ask. It is so in keeping with this deal. Musk, of course, did not do any financial modeling before whimsically offering to buy Twitter at $54.20 per share. But Goldman did some modeling before recommending to Twitter’s board that they accept the offer. 4 So now Musk wants Goldman’s Excel spreadsheets (which Twitter surely doesn’t have), and for some reason thinks that the merger agreement requires Twitter to give them to him. 

Will this pretext work? Well, like I said, it’s better than the one about the bots. It still strikes me as pretty implausible. Just from reading Ringler’s own letter you can tell that Twitter has done a lot to give Musk the information he reasonably requires, and that Musk keeps coming up with increasingly baroque requests. It is hard to imagine a judge sympathizing with Musk here.

Also, though, the covenant does not actually say “you have to give Musk any information he asks for.” It says that Twitter has to give Musk information that he needs “for any reasonable business purpose related to the consummation of the transactions contemplated by this Agreement.” Since he has made it clear for months that he wants all of this information to avoid consummating the merger, Twitter has a decent argument that they don’t have to give it to him. Nothing that Musk is doing has any purpose related to the consummation of the merger! It has the opposite purpose! As he keeps saying!

Similarly, Twitter doesn’t have to give Musk any information that would “cause significant competitive harm to the Company or its Subsidiaries if the transactions contemplated by this Agreement are not consummated,” and it seems pretty clear that Musk plans to use any information that he gets from Twitter to undermine its business by saying that it is running a massive fraud on its advertisers, because that is what he is doing already. So Twitter has a pretty reasonable case not to give him any more information.

Still this seems like uncharted territory. I am not aware of any merger agreement that has ever been terminated for a breach of an information covenant. It is generally pretty easy to comply with an information covenant — just give the buyer the information they want! — and buyers don’t generally use it as a way to harass sellers and create an excuse for walking away. But if Musk gets away with it then I guess this will become a more common tactic.

The third pretext is another covenant. In Section 6.1 of the merger agreement, Twitter promises to “use its commercially reasonable efforts to conduct the business of the Company and its Subsidiaries in the ordinary course of business” between signing and closing. Ringler’s letter argues that Twitter has not been running its business in the ordinary course:

    Twitter’s conduct in firing two key, high-ranking employees, its Revenue Product Lead and the General Manager of Consumer, as well as announcing on July 7 that it was laying off a third of its talent acquisition team, implicates the ordinary course provision. Twitter has also instituted a general hiring freeze which extends even to reconsideration of outstanding job offers. Moreover, three executives have resigned from Twitter since the Merger Agreement was signed: the Head of Data Science, the Vice President of Twitter Service, and a Vice President of Product Management for Health, Conversation, and Growth. The Company has not received Parent’s consent for changes in the conduct of its business, including for the specific changes listed above. 

This is tossed in at the end, and I doubt that a court would really let Musk out of the deal because Twitter fired two employees. (It certainly wouldn’t let him out of the deal because other employees quit, which is not something that Twitter can control; also most of them probably quit because of Musk.) Firing employees and reducing hiring are pretty ordinary-course things to do, especially in response to an economic downturn. (Obviously Tesla has instituted a hiring freeze, because Musk has a “super bad feeling” about the economy.)

Still it is weird that they didn’t send Musk a little courtesy notification before firing those people? Buyers have gotten out of merger agreements for breaches of the ordinary-course covenant, and it always seems avoidable by just over-communicating. If Twitter’s CEO had shot Musk an email saying “hey I’m gonna fire some guys, you cool with that,” Musk would absolutely have said yes! He wants to fire everyone at Twitter! Why not just run it by him first?

What will happen? Ugh, I don’t know. Twitter “plans to pursue legal action to enforce the merger agreement,” tweeted the chairman of its board, and is “confident we will prevail in the Delaware Court of Chancery.” I don’t really disagree. The pretexts in this letter are pretty laughable, and I doubt a court would side with Musk on any of this. He has been too open about the fact that he’s messing around; it’s impossible to take any of this bot stuff seriously.

But the question really is the remedy. If a court finds for Twitter — that is, if a judge concludes that Musk’s pretexts are not good enough to get him out of the deal — then there are two possible outcomes, and they are very different:

    Musk might have to pay a $1 billion reverse termination fee for unjustifiably walking away from the deal; or
    The court might order “specific performance,” meaning that Musk would have to fund his entire $33.5 billion equity commitment and buy Twitter. 5 

Musk’s goal here is presumably to walk away from Twitter and pay only $1 billion in damages. That would make this whole lark of pretending to buy Twitter an expensive joke, but definitely one he can afford. Paying $33.5 billion and having to own and run Twitter would sort of spoil the fun. 

(To be clear: Musk’s goal here might actually be to renegotiate the deal at a lower price. I actually kind of think it isn’t, and he really wants out of the deal — because he was kidding in the first place, or has gotten bored by now. But the conventional wisdom is that the goal of Musk’s letter is to get a lower price, and that does make sense and would be more typical. His bargaining leverage for that depends on whether a court would likely order only a $1 billion breakup fee — in which case he has a ton of leverage to get a much lower price — or specific performance — in which case he has very little leverage. When we talk, below, about what a court might do, we are also talking about what Musk’s and Twitter's lawyers will think a court will do, which will inform their negotiating posture.)

In order for the court to order specific performance, two things have to happen. First, the court has to want to. It is a drastic remedy, forcing a person to spend $33.5 billion to buy a company he doesn’t want, and you could imagine a Delaware chancellor blinking and just making him pay the $1 billion breakup fee. Do you want an aggrieved Musk in charge of Twitter? Twitter is, to some extent, a public utility, “the town square,” as Musk has called it; what if he shuts it down out of spite?

The fact that Musk is working in such bad faith here — that he seems so unconcerned with law and the contract he signed — cuts both ways. On the one hand, it will certainly annoy a Delaware chancellor; Delaware likes to think of itself as a stable place for corporate deals, with predictable law and binding contracts, and Musk’s antics undermine that. On the other hand it might intimidate a Delaware chancellor: What if the court orders Musk to close the deal and he says no? They’re not gonna put him in Chancery jail. 6 The guy is pretty contemptuous of legal authority; he thinks he is above the law and he might be right. A showdown between Musk and a judge might undermine Delaware corporate law more than letting him weasel out of the deal would.

But the other thing that has to happen, for Twitter to get specific performance, is that “the Debt Financing ... has been funded or will be funded at the Closing.” Musk agreed to buy Twitter with $33.5 billion of his own money and $13 billion of debt financing from his banks, 7 and if the banks don’t put up their $13 billion then he doesn’t have to put up his $33.5 billion: In that case, he can pay the $1 billion to walk away.

Now, the banks have signed commitment letters obligating them to put up the money, and those commitment letters do not give the banks a ton of outs. (The outs are in Exhibit E here.) Still:

    The banks surely want to get out of this deal, because the market for buyout loans has soured since they signed their commitment letters, and they will probably lose a lot of money if they have to fund their commitments. (Also because Musk is their client, and he wants out.)
    If Musk purports to terminate the merger agreement, that gives the banks an excuse to avoid funding the financing, which at least makes it arguable that the financing is not available, which makes it arguable that Musk should not be ordered to close the deal and should instead pay only $1 billion.

So Ringler’s letter could be part of an effort by Musk to blow up his financing to avoid specific performance.

This is not a perfect out: In theory, Twitter could ask a court to order Musk (to specifically perform his covenant) not to blow up his financing. There is some history of Delaware courts doing that, and of not being fooled by merger buyers who try to blow up their own financing. The banks’ commitment letters do not give them an out for anything that Musk does or doesn’t do; if Twitter cooperates with the financing banks and a court finds that there’s no cause to terminate the merger agreement, then in theory the banks should have to fund, so specific performance should still be available. But it’s messy, and you can sort of see a path to “Musk says the deal is off, so his banks walk away, so his financing isn’t available, so he doesn’t have to close the deal and can get away with just paying $1 billion.”

I like Twitter’s odds — its odds of getting specific performance and making Musk close the deal — in court, but I don’t think anything is a certainty at this point. And obviously Musk will make this fight as unpleasant as possible; already the attorney general of Texas has opened an investigation of Twitter’s bot numbers in order to harass Twitter and capitalize on Musk’s popularity with Republican voters. I have suggested in the past that Twitter’s best weapon in this dispute would be banning Musk from Twitter, because he is such an addict, but in fact he recently stayed off Twitter voluntarily for nine days, which I assume he did just to prove to Twitter the company that he can survive without Twitter the product. It is all going to be pretty awful and stupid.

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Is it fun for him? If he manages to walk away having spent only millions in financing fees, millions in legal fees and say $1 billion in termination fees, was it worth it? What did he get out of this? The guy really seems to like being on Twitter, and he did make himself the main character in Twitter's drama for months on end. That’s nice for him I guess. Also he made the lives of Twitter’s executives and employees pretty miserable; as a fellow Twitter addict I can kind of see the appeal of that? I always assume that “everyone who works at Twitter hates the product and its users,” and I suppose this is a case of the richest and weirdest user getting some revenge on the employees. He also gave himself an excuse to sell a bunch of Tesla stock near the highs. He maybe got an edit button too? Maybe that’s worth a billion dollars to him?

I tell you what though. I have learned my lesson. The next time Elon Musk announces that he is going to buy a public company — and he will do it again! — I will know not to believe him. I will definitely know not to write about it.

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    This is an *unusual* rich-person hobby, but by no means an *unprecedented* one. Famously Donald Trump spent some time in the 1980s pretending he was going to buy public companies. But he did this as a way to make money — by extracting greenmail out of the companies — while Musk seems to do it mostly for fun.

    And, let’s face it, writers of financial newsletters.

    The letter says: “Twitter’s representation in the Merger Agreement regarding the accuracy of its SEC disclosures relating to false and spam accounts may have also caused, or is reasonably likely to result in, a Company Material Adverse Effect, which may form an additional basis for terminating the Merger Agreement. While Mr. Musk and his advisors continue to investigate the exact nature and extent of this event, Mr. Musk has reason to believe that the true number of false or spam accounts on Twitter’s platform is substantially higher than the amount of less than 5% represented by Twitter in its SEC filings. Twitter’s true mDAU count is a key component of the company’s business, given that approximately 90% of its revenue comes from advertisements. For this reason, to the extent that Twitter has underrepresented the number of false or spam accounts on its platform, that may constitute a Company Material Adverse Effect under Section 7.2(b)(i) of the Merger Agreement. Mr. Musk is also examining the company’s recent financial performance and revised outlook, and is considering whether the company’s declining business prospects and financial outlook constitute a Company Material Adverse Effect giving Mr. Musk a separate and distinct basis for terminating the Merger Agreement.”

    One factor here is that Goldman, in doing a fairness opinion, is generally in the position of telling Twitter’s board that the company is worth *less* than $54.20 per share: The fairness opinion says to the board “go ahead and accept this deal, you’re not worth more as a stand-alone company.” So if Musk is trying to find arguments that Twitter is bad, the fairness model might be a decent place to start snooping around.

    Some of that equity commitment — about $7 billion — has been syndicated to co-investors, so really we’re talking about $26 billion or so of his own money, though one could imagine the co-investors worming their way out, in which case Musk is on the hook for their money.

    I made this joke before, and a reader pointed out that a Delaware chancellor did once order someone arrested, though not over a merger.

    Originally some of the $33.5 billion came from margin loans from his banks against his Tesla stock, but those have gone away and been replaced by equity.

This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.

To contact the author of this story:
Matt Levine at mlevine51@bloomberg.net

To contact the editor responsible for this story:
Brooke Sample at bsample1@bloomberg.net

Saturday, July 9, 2022

Elon Musk Does Not Care About Spam Bots / Matt Levine


Miscellany Central

Saturday, July 9, 2022
Elon Musk Does Not Care About Spam Bots / Matt Levine
What you need to know: Elon Musk Is Buying Twitter. What’s Next and What Does It Mean? 
Elon Musk Does Not Care About Spam Bots / Matt Levine
Also the merger proxy and Allianz Structured Alpha.

By Matt Levin
18 May 2022 at 01:52 GMT+9
Programming note: Money Stuff will be off tomorrow, back on Thursday. Unless. You know.

Oh Elon
Elon Musk is the richest person in the world, and an active Twitter user. When he tweets, he gets a lot of spammy replies, many of which seem to be written by automated bots. He has complained about this a lot. Eventually he decided to do something about it. The thing that he decided to do about it was buy Twitter. On April 13, he sent a letter to Twitter Inc.’s board of directors offering to buy the company for $54.20 per share in cash. “If our twitter bid succeeds,” he tweeted, “we will defeat the spam bots or die trying!”


His Twitter bid succeeded. On April 25, Twitter and Musk issued a joint press release announcing that he had agreed to buy Twitter for $54.20 per share. The press release included a quote from Musk promising to “make Twitter better” by, among other things, “defeating the spam bots.” He was really mad at the spam bots! He wanted to buy Twitter because of the spam bots.

Yesterday he announced that he does not want to buy Twitter because of the spam bots:

Elon Musk declared he won’t proceed with his $44 billion takeover of Twitter Inc. unless the social media giant can prove bots make up fewer than 5% of its users, casting yet more uncertainty over the deal.

The billionaire tweeted “this deal cannot move forward” unless Twitter provides proof of its claims, reiterating his own view that the ratio is far higher. …

Twitter said it is “committed to completing the transaction on the agreed price and terms as promptly as practicable,” in a statement on Tuesday. …

The battle over bots has become a sticking point for Musk, who told a tech conference in Miami on Monday that fake users make up at least 20% of all Twitter accounts, possibly as high as 90%. Twitter regularly states in its quarterly results that the average of false or spam accounts “represented fewer than 5% of our monthly daily active users during the quarter,” adding that it applied “significant judgment” to its estimate, and the true number could be higher.

I think it is important to be clear here that Musk is lying. The spam bots are not why he is backing away from the deal, as you can tell from the fact that the spam bots are why he did the deal. He has produced no evidence at all that Twitter’s estimates are wrong, and certainly not that they are materially wrong or made in bad faith. (Musk can only get out of the deal if Twitter's filings are wrong in a way that would cause a “material adverse effect” on Twitter, which is vanishingly unlikely.) His own supposed methodology for counting spam bots is laughable. Yesterday Twitter’s chief executive officer, Parag Agrawal, tweeted a thread explaining in general terms how Twitter estimates that fake accounts represent fewer than 5% of its count of active users, and how this analysis can’t be easily replicated by outsiders (because they don’t know which accounts are real, and also because they don’t know which accounts Twitter counts as daily active users). It seems clear that Agrawal’s thoughtful answer is basically correct. 1 Musk responded with a poop emoji.


More important, nothing has changed about the bot problem since Musk signed the merger agreement. Twitter has published the same qualified estimate — that fewer than 5% of monetizable accounts are fake — for the last eight years. Musk knew those estimates, and declined to do any nonpublic due diligence before signing the merger agreement. He knew about the spam bot problem before signing the merger agreement, as we know because he talked about it constantly, including while announcing the merger agreement. If he didn’t want to buy Twitter because there are spam bots, he should not have signed a contract to buy Twitter. No new information has come to light about spam bots in the last three weeks. 

What has happened in the last three weeks? Well, the prices of tech stocks have gone down, making the $54.20 price that Musk agreed to look a bit rich. (Snap Inc., a social-media competitor to Twitter, is down more than 30% since Musk made his offer on April 13.) And the price of Tesla Inc. stock, which he is relying on to finance part of the purchase price, has also gone down, making him poorer and making the $54.20 price look even more expensive. (Tesla is down almost 30% since he made his offer.) So he is angling to reprice the deal for straightforward market reasons. But that is very clearly not allowed by the merger agreement that he signed: Public-company merger agreements allocate broad market risk to the buyer, and he can’t get out just because stocks went down.

So he is pretending that he wants to reprice the deal for other reasons. He is not pretending very hard — the poop emoji is not going to hold up in court! — but he’s doing enough to confuse the public and give his fans a pretext to believe that he is really the victim here.

Poor Twitter. After Musk announced that he had taken a 9% stake in Twitter, but before he offered to buy the company, he signed a standstill agreement under which he would join Twitter’s board of directors and promise not to buy more than 14.9% of the stock. Four days later he tore up that agreement; then he made his bid. I wrote at the time:

This is an awkward situation for Twitter's board. They can’t really accept Musk's offer. For one thing the price is embarrassingly low; again, Twitter traded above the offer price last October. For another thing, the financing seems to be made up of cobwebs and phlogiston. But also Musk has joked about taking companies private before, and he generally changes his mind a lot. (He agreed to join Twitter’s board last week! And then changed his mind four days later!) If you are a well-advised professional public company board, it is just catastrophic to imagine that you might say “okay Elon $54.20 it is” and then he’d say “ha no I was kidding, psych!” That would be crippling for a public company. Also that is basically what he did to Twitter’s board last weekend! 

Well, nobody listens to me, and here we are. Twitter accepted Musk’s offer, and three weeks later, he said “ha no I was kidding, psych!” And it is catastrophic.


What can Twitter do about it? Certainly they can walk Musk through their methodology and give him evidence that spam accounts represent fewer than 5% of monetizable daily active users, but what good will that do? He doesn’t care, he’s lying about this, and no evidence that they can give him will have any effect. Twitter could get all 229 million of its monetizable daily active users in a room and have them say “hello Elon, we are real,” and that would not convince him, because he does not want to be convinced. He wants to pay a lower price. 

Or Twitter can do what he actually wants, which is renegotiate the deal at a lower price. But what good will that do? What does Twitter get from signing a new merger agreement with him at, say, $42 per share? 2 He has not lived up to any of his agreements with Twitter — the standstill, the non-disparagement clause of the merger agreement, apparently a nondisclosure agreement, the merger agreement itself — and he’s not going to live up to a repriced merger agreement unless he feels like it. An agreement with Elon Musk is worthless, as Twitter has learned over and over again. 

Or Twitter can try to hold him to the terms of his current deal, but that is also risky. The way the merger agreement works is that Musk’s damages are capped at a $1 billion reverse termination fee: If he walks away and Twitter sues for damages, it can’t get more than $1 billion, or about $1.30 per share, which is nowhere close to enough to compensate for losing this deal.

The agreement does, however, allow Twitter to sue for “specific performance,” meaning that it can go to a Delaware court and ask a judge to order Musk to close the deal (and fund his $27.5 billion equity commitment). But this is tough and there is no guarantee it will work. Specific performance is only possible if Musk’s debt financing is available, which seems likely but not certain, 3 and if a judge is willing to order it. On the one hand, Musk’s lawlessness and bad faith will probably annoy a judge and make her more likely to specifically enforce the merger agreement. On the other hand, Musk’s lawlessness and bad faith might worry a Delaware judge and make her less likely to specifically enforce the merger agreement. 4 It is bad, for the rule of law generally and for confidence in Delaware corporate law in particular, if Musk blatantly ignores a merger agreement and a judge lets him get away with it. But it’s even worse if a court orders him to close and he ignores the order. Musk has a history of ignoring court orders and getting away with it.

Or, as I said yesterday, the fairest consequence for all of this might be for Twitter to kick him off Twitter (they run Twitter! they can do that!), but I bet they won’t. 

I don't know what will happen here. Twitter has no good options. The market thinks that the most likely outcome is that the deal gets done at a lower price, rewarding Musk for his bad faith. 

One weird point is that, while Musk has tweeted about not going ahead with the deal, and talked about it at a private conference for his fans, it doesn’t seem like he has sent any formal notice to Twitter saying that the deal is off. (Certainly neither Musk nor Twitter have made any SEC filings about that sort of notice, which you might expect if he'd sent one.) Perhaps his lawyers are less willing to ignore the agreement than he is, or at least need a better pretext than he's managed so far.

So arguably Twitter’s best option is to do nothing: Let Musk tweet, ignore him, and continue acting as though everything is normal and the deal is going to close. Don’t give him any more pretexts to walk away, just keep trying to get regulatory and shareholder approvals, and then come to him ready to close and see how serious he is about all of this. The basic problem with Musk, for Twitter, is that he changes his mind a lot. Maybe he'll change it again.

The merger proxy
In that vein, this morning Twitter calmly filed the preliminary proxy statement for its deal with Musk, a key step toward getting shareholder approval. In general, the most interesting part of a merger proxy is the “Background of the Merger” section, which describes in detail how the deal was negotiated and what the board of directors was thinking, and that is true here.


One fun thing to do with this proxy is to go through it and count how many times Musk violated US securities laws in his efforts to buy Twitter. For instance:

Also on March 26, 2022, Mr. Musk contacted Egon Durban, one of Twitter’s directors, to set up a discussion between Mr. Musk and Mr. Durban. Mr. Musk and Mr. Durban subsequently spoke on March 26, 2022 and March 27, 2022 and discussed the potential of Mr. Musk joining the Twitter Board, as well as the fact that Mr. Musk had purchased a significant stake of more than five percent of our common stock. …

On March 27, 2022, Messrs. Musk, [the chairman of Twitter’s board of directors, Bret] Taylor and [Twitter Chief Executive Officer Parag] Agrawal discussed Mr. Musk’s interest in Twitter and potentially joining the Twitter Board. As part of that discussion, Mr. Musk stated that he was considering various options with respect to his ownership, including potentially joining the Twitter Board, seeking to take Twitter private or starting a competitor to Twitter.

Musk started buying Twitter stock in late January, and crossed over 5% on March 14. Under the securities laws, he had 10 days — until March 24 — to disclose this fact publicly. In fact he waited until April 4, disclosing his stake 11 days late. During this period — when he was legally required to disclose his Twitter stake, but had not — he (1) kept buying more stock and (2) had discussions with Twitter’s board of directors about taking over the company. That seems like it would have been material information, for the people who were selling him the stock!

Then, when he finally did disclose his stake on April 4, he did it on a form (Schedule 13G) that is limited to passive investors, checking a box indicating that he had “not acquired the securities with any purpose, or with the effect, of changing or influencing the control of the issuer.” Again, he was already in discussions about taking over Twitter or joining its board. He was very much not eligible to use Schedule 13G, and by using 13G — and representing he had no plans to influence the company’s control — he was lying to the US Securities and Exchange Commission and the market.

Then Musk negotiated a board seat and standstill with Twitter, which was made public; he filed a Schedule 13D, belatedly but accurately indicating that he was going to be an active investor. The 13D said that, while he was keeping his options open, he had “no present plans or intentions” to take Twitter private. A few days later he decided to scrap the standstill agreement and buy Twitter instead; again from the merger proxy’s background section:

On April 9, 2022, before Mr. Musk’s appointment to the Twitter Board became effective, Mr. Musk notified Messrs. Taylor and Agrawal that he would not be joining the Twitter Board and would be making an offer to take Twitter private. Mr. Agrawal informed the members of the Twitter Board of Mr. Musk’s communication.

That was a Saturday; that Monday, Musk filed an amended Schedule 13D announcing that he was not joining the board. This 13D said that he “might engage in discussions with the Board” about “potential business combinations,” but neglected to mention that he had already told Twitter he would be making an offer.

I don’t know; it all seems bad. The SEC is supposedly “investigating” Musk’s disclosure failures in this deal, and I suppose these admissions will help with the investigation, but what can they do about it? Fine him? He's so rich. Prevent him from buying Twitter? That’s what he wants! Ban him from running a public company? That is probably more drastic than the SEC (or a judge) could stomach, and will just lead to another annoying effort to take Tesla private. 

Anyway the merger proxy also does give some insight into Twitter's board deliberations. For one thing, the board called big Twitter shareholders and seems to have gotten a pretty clear message of “just take the deal”:

Over the subsequent four days [after April 17], Messrs. Taylor and [Twitter director Patrick] Pichette held meetings with a number of Twitter’s largest institutional stockholders to discuss the perspectives of these stockholders on Mr. Musk’s acquisition proposal and Twitter more generally. As part of these meetings, these Twitter stockholders generally (1) expressed that Twitter has much opportunity, but indicated a perceived failure of historical execution; (2) expressed understanding there has been recent management change and openness to a stand-alone plan to give them confidence in the long term; and (3) encouraged the Twitter Board to seriously consider Mr. Musk’s proposal and weigh the risks of future execution. 

The board also heard from its financial advisers that $54.20 was pretty good. (In hindsight, tech stocks fell after they signed the deal, and it looks even better.) The proxy summarizes the fairness opinions of Twitter's advisers at Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and JPMorgan Chase & Co., which included, for instance, discounted cash flow valuations of $36.50 (the bottom of JPMorgan’s range) to $60.90 (the top of Goldman’s). The proxy also includes Twitter’s management financial projections for the next few years, which included growing revenue from $5.9 billion in 2022 to $12.9 billion in 2027, and growing unlevered free cash flow from $561 million to $3.7 billion. (Musk’s own pitch to co-investors in his Twitter buyout projected revenue of $26.4 billion and free cash flow of $9.4 billion by 2028, so I guess he is more ambitious.)


The board did not contact other potential buyers, on the theory that (1) “Mr. Musk’s acquisition proposal had been publicly disclosed (and the subject of significant press coverage),” so if anyone else wanted to buy Twitter they would know to call Twitter, (2) there probably weren’t any other realistic buyers and (3) trying to find another buyer might scare off Musk. Given the shareholder feedback (to take the deal), the analyses of Twitter's financial advisers (that $54.20 was a pretty good price), and “the recent general decline in trading prices of social media companies,” the board figured that $54.20 was the best they were going to do, so they tried to pin down the deal with Musk.

In doing this they were — or at least, the merger proxy now says they were — properly focused on making sure that Musk was actually committed to closing the deal:

Throughout the remainder of April 24, 2022, and into April 25, 2022, Twitter, Parent and Mr. Musk and their respective legal advisors negotiated the terms of the merger agreement and related transaction documents. Key terms negotiated between the parties included (1) Twitter’s specific enforcement rights to require Parent and Mr. Musk to perform their obligations under the merger agreement and consummate the closing on the terms set forth in the merger agreement, as well as third-party beneficiary rights under the equity commitment letter to enforce Mr. Musk’s obligations to fund the equity commitment; (2) the circumstances in which a termination fee would be payable by Parent and Mr. Musk and the amount of the termination fee; (3) the availability of potential monetary damages under the merger agreement; (4) the terms and conditions applicable to Parent’s and Mr. Musk’s obligations to obtain regulatory approvals, and the closing conditions related to regulatory approvals; (5) the terms and conditions applicable to Parent’s and Mr. Musk’s obligations to complete debt financing arrangements for the acquisition, and Twitter’s obligations to assist Parent and Mr. Musk in such efforts; …

In the section titled “Reasons for the Merger,” the proxy adds that one reason the board agreed to the deal is:

Reasonable Likelihood of Consummation. The belief of the Twitter Board that an acquisition by Mr. Musk has a reasonable likelihood of closing. In that regard, the Twitter Board considered Mr. Musk’s business reputation and financial resources, as well as those of Parent’s debt financing sources, which the Twitter Board believed increased the likelihood that the required debt and equity financing for the merger would be available.

Well. When they announced the deal, I pointed out that Musk’s “business reputation” was in fact that he is perhaps the only billionaire chief executive officer of a US public company who has ever offered to take a public company private as a joke. I wrote:

Musk has some history here: In 2018 he pretended that he was going to take Tesla Inc. private; he wasn’t, and eventually he settled fraud charges with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Ordinarily if a billionaire chief executive officer of a public company offers to buy a company, the odds that he is kidding are quite low. When it’s Elon Musk, the historical odds are, like, 50/50. (He really bought SolarCity.)

Nobody listens to me. Now the historical odds are 1 in 3! 

Tony Lee at 3:27 PM
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The case for a gas tax increase / Matthew Yglesias


Miscellany Central

Thursday, July 7, 2022
The case for a gas tax increase / Matthew Yglesias

The case for a gas tax increase / Matthew Yglesias


 — Read time: 9 minutes


The case for a gas tax increase

Yes, it's politically toxic — but it makes more sense than a gas tax holiday


The inaugural Slow Boring book club meets tomorrow! Join us at 8:30 p.m. Eastern on July 7 for a discussion with Princeton professor Leah Boustan about her new book Streets of Gold. Buy the book here, and sign up for the discussion here. This event is for paid subscribers.


Last week, Joe Biden got a good question about high energy prices and the war in Ukraine: how long does he expect the American people to make this sacrifice? The answer, though noble, is probably not what people want to hear.


Politics aside, it’s worth thinking this through as a question of policy.


We previously discussed the fact that negative shocks to energy supply are very economically damaging, which means this is not only a political problem for Biden but a substantive one as well. The shortfall of oil (and in Europe, gas) is causing real damage, which will only increase during the winter when inadequate supplies for home heat can create genuinely dangerous situations. Most Americans rely on natural gas for heat and are therefore semi-insulated from global market conditions by the fact that there is only so much liquified natural gas (LNG) export capacity. But Northern Europe is in for a world of pain, as is New England and parts of New York where oil is widely used for home heat.


At the same time, the policy objective of waging economic war on Russia has a very legitimate motivation. Countries commonly accept some economic sacrifice in pursuit of national security objectives, and that is essentially what we are doing here.


But while there is no wartime economy without sacrifice, prudent governments do try to modify their domestic economic policies in order to minimize economic pain and maximize the efficacy of the war effort itself. So far, though, we’re not really doing that. The Biden administration has made large releases from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, which is good, but Democrats’ other main idea has been to promote the idea of a gas tax holiday. This makes some sense as a political gimmick, but if you’re really serious about putting the squeeze on Russia, you’d do the opposite and raise the gas tax.


A gas tax hike hurts Russia and curbs inflation

While sanctions on Russia have been highly effective at crimping Russia’s imports, the high global price of oil means that Russia’s export earnings remain robust. Indeed, oil has gotten so expensive that Russia is earning more than ever, even though their production is down. So far this hasn’t actually helped Russia because sanctions are deterring exporters from selling Russian stuff. But over time, someone who has cash and wants to buy things is likely to find a way to do it.


So it would be good to drive down the global price of oil.


And one of the main ways to do that is to reduce domestic gasoline consumption.


Gas taxes are particularly valuable in this regard because they also free up crude oil for more economically important uses, like diesel for commercial vehicles and jet fuel for commercial air travel.


What’s more, while the country is suffering from high gasoline prices, it is also suffering from inflation outside the volatile food and energy sectors. The Federal Reserve is currently trying to address that by choking off overall demand with interest rate increases. This works and is broadly appropriate. But there is a key problem with rate hikes as the exclusive tool of anti-inflation policy: they reduce investment when in some sense, the optimal anti-inflation strategy is to have tons of investment and thus expanded production. So to the extent that you can directly curtail consumption and reduce the need for rate hikes, you leave the economy in better long-term shape.


A higher gas tax would cut gas consumption, of course, but since people have only limited ability to cut back on gas use in the short term, it would also cut back on all kinds of consumption. In “normal” economic times that might be bad, hurting growth. But with core inflation running above target and the Fed trying to slow the economy, this reduced general consumption is a pro, not a con; it would minimize the need for rate hikes and preserve the investment side of the economy.


An offsetting tax cut

You could just leave it at that — use the higher gas tax to reduce inflation and help the economy.


But I do think that would be viciously regressive in a troubling way.


In California, Gavin Newsom is reacting to his state’s revenue windfall by handing out inflation impact checks. You could do that with gas tax revenue, too. But the problem, of course, is that while stimulus checks were great stimulus back when the economy needed stimulus, right now we don’t need stimulus.


What I would do is try to funnel the money into an offsetting tax cut that is both progressive and pro-work in its structure, something like an enhancement to the Earned Income Tax Credit or a payroll tax cut. I don’t think anyone knows exactly why, but prime-age employment is still a bit below pre-pandemic levels, which in turn were below dot-com era levels.



At this point we can’t count on additional fiscal or monetary stimulus to pull more workers into the labor force. But we know the people are out there.


So a tax swap — higher taxes on consuming gasoline, lower taxes on working — would help to encourage work and minimize the economic damage of the war even while turning the screws on Russia.


Increasing domestic oil production

The other thing we can do, of course, is increase domestic oil production.


Here I think it is useful to look at the larger context, which is that global output crashed during the pandemic and has not yet recovered. It’s just very challenging to have a full economic recovery without a full recovery of oil production.



Now of course in theory you could say this is all good. Burning oil creates pollution, which is bad. What we want to do over time is encourage people to drive electric cars and then we wouldn’t be pumping all this oil and setting so much gasoline on fire.


But I really do encourage people who are worried about climate change to pay attention to what the constraints are here. Want to buy a new Tesla Model 3? Well, you can’t because they’re all sold out. But if you put in an order, they will get you one in the September-December range.



Annoyed by Elon Musk’s politics and heard that the hottest new thing in luxury EVs is the Lucid Air? Well, they are taking reservations with no guarantee of shipment dates. Nissan had to halt U.S. orders of their new Ariya electric crossover because they are struggling to meet the demand for domestic orders in Japan. Ford has halted orders on the Maverick. In other words, the EV demand problem that we long worried about has been solved. If you want to boost demand for electric vehicles, you need ideas to boost the production of batteries, which as I understand it goes back to regulatory bottlenecks in terms of mining for the minerals that go into batteries.


In a world where EV adoption is constrained by battery shortages, we need an oil production recovery to have an economic recovery. And compared to where we were right before the pandemic, OPEC has risen a ton. The fall in Russian output, while large relative to the Russian economy, is pretty small relative to the scale of the global oil market.



The biggest source of deficit is the USA.


Increasing domestic oil output is a win-win that both helps the American economy and also, by reducing global oil prices, hurts the Russian economy. What can be done? There is some stuff Republicans complain about on the permitting and regulatory front and for the sake of pure politics, I might just give them what they want. But the basic issue is economic — U.S. output is rising steadily, and investors worry that if they accelerate their pace of output, they’ll lose their shirts in a price crash. That happened three times in the past decade and now they’re scared.


The biggest thing the Biden administration could do is use the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and the Exchange Stabilization Fund to guarantee high future prices of oil, even if the global situation changes. That might end up costing the Treasury money. But by the same token, all the military assistance we are giving to Ukraine definitely costs money. The premise of our policy, though, is that money spent on helping Ukraine to beat Russia is money that is well spent. By the same token, money spent on bolstering U.S. production to crush the Russian economy and keep the American consumer afloat is money well spent.


The refinery bottleneck

There are also refinery issues that have been interesting to progressives lately. Compared to the depths of the pandemic, gasoline prices have risen by more than oil prices because refinery capacity has declined in recent years as companies have stopped investing in new facilities or in repairing ones that break. This isn’t a conspiracy; it’s a response to the perception that the long-term trajectory of demand is heading downward.


Part of the reason a higher gasoline tax might be useful is that given the refinery bottleneck, a large share of the incidence would fall on refiners. In other words, for every one cent per gallon that the tax goes up, consumer prices would rise by less than one cent — potentially a lot less, with the remainder coming out of refiners’ pockets.


Then either in addition to taxation or instead of it, we could subsidize additional refinery capacity with loan guarantees or outright state ownership. Democrats in other contexts are precisely the party that believes you can’t leave things up to an unconstrained market.


What are we doing here?

The consumption-constraining aspect of this is, of course, a pure fantasy given the politics.


Joe Biden isn’t going to raise gas taxes, and he’s not going to ask people to carpool for Ukrainian freedom. It also seems like he doesn’t want to engage in outside-the-box ideas to increase domestic production because that contradicts his environmental policy goals. But that has left Democrats trying to soothe domestic pain by subsidizing consumption, which is counterproductive from the standpoint of the original policy goal of punishing Russia and trying to help Ukraine.


All in all, it seems to me like there should have been a big meeting at the White House before the vote on the oil embargo where Mitch McConnell, Kevin McCarthy, Janet Yellen, and Tony Blinken tried to hash out what exactly they think America’s policy response should be. I actually do think that at the moment of peak pro-Ukrainian fervor, a revenue-neutral Ukraine Solidarity Tax to finance a tax cut for working people might have stood some kind of chance of securing bipartisan support.


At a minimum, the State of the Union would have been a perfect opportunity for Biden to announce a pivot.


Back in 1943, FDR had a famous moment where he announced that he’d transformed himself from Dr. New Deal into Dr. Win The War. Not because the ideas of the New Deal were mistaken, but because the situation had changed. Biden could have specifically invoked this and said that Dr. Green New Deal was taking a break in favor of Dr. Beat Russia. Noting, of course, that the sanctions on Russia by crippling their ability to pump oil and gas are themselves reducing CO2 emissions. New pro-production measures in the United States would only partially offset the impact of the foreign policy measures already taken. If you paired that with a gas-for-work swap, it’s even better for the environment.


Now I’ll admit that on some level these ideas are bummers politically. But we started with Brian Deese breaking the bummer news that people may need to put up with economic disruptions for however long it takes for Ukraine to win the war. This is just to say that the decision to take a stand against Russia was a serious one, and I think it’s one Biden and his team believe in. But then you need to carry the logic of your own policy forward and really do everything possible to put it in a position to succeed.
Tony Lee at 11:48 AM
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Electric cars have a dirty secret — and it's a big one / Ian Morse


Miscellany Central

Saturday, July 9, 2022
Electric cars have a dirty secret — and it's a big one / Ian Morse
Electric cars have a dirty secret — and it's a big one / Ian Morse

By Ian Morse

Electric vehicles require certain minerals like lithium, cobalt, and nickel. Converting the world's one billion cars would require dozens of new mines across the globe.

iStock; Rebecca Zisser/Insider

This story is available exclusively to Insider subscribers. Become an Insider and start reading now.

Earth is in bad shape. Each new United Nations report declares we are closer than before to global catastrophe and implores leaders to take drastic action immediately. But even when policymakers agree the situation is dire, deciding how to tackle the problem is where things get heated.

Global emissions from greenhouse gasses need to be almost halved by 2030 to prevent a rise of more than 1.5 degrees Celsius in temperatures before 2050 and the resulting cascade of extreme weather, sea-level rise, biodiversity loss, and crop failure. To get there, the energy sector needs to transition away from fossil fuels like oil and coal toward renewable energy from things like solar panels, wind turbines, and electric cars.



To make this shift, the world will need to produce the raw goods that make these technologies possible. Materials like lithium and graphite play a central role in producing lithium-ion batteries, which are used in electric vehicles and the storage systems for wind and solar energy. Since 2017, the World Bank has predicted that stifling rising temperatures will push demand for these minerals several times higher than their current supplies.



But massively increasing production of these minerals may cause more problems than it solves. Climate policies have traditionally favored new technologies like electric vehicles to help replace fossil fuels with renewable electricity. But given the amount of mining required to electrify the world's more than 1 billion cars, creativity around consuming less or in different ways could move the world more beneficially toward sustainable development goals than the replacement of the consumption with cleaner versions. For the one-third of greenhouse-gas emissions that come from industry, for example, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change found the most significant steps to help the planet would be slashing the amount of material used, produced, and wasted.



"We've seen studies that hypothetically see the potential for drastic reductions — up to 50% — of energy demand in the next 20 or 30 years. That's a significant reduction in materials," Narasimha Rao, an associate professor of energy systems at Yale and a contributing author on the IPCC's chapter that assessed demand-side climate tools, said.



More institutions are following the IPCC's lead. BloombergNEF, an energy-transition analyst group, found in a May report that a "modest 10% reduction" in car travel could take pressure off companies straining to meet EV demand. 



"What was really striking when we were modeling EV uptake was how challenging it would be to produce enough electric cars to have a zero tailpipe emissions fleet by 2050," Andrew Grant, a BloombergNEF intelligent-mobility analyst, said.



Reducing and altering consumption can quickly and efficiently slash harmful emissions. Yet a core goal in many climate policies is not reduction but an inflation of thirst for newly mined materials. Financial institutions, consultancies, and the International Energy Agency (which was formed to support the oil industry) have framed climate action as a trade-off between mining for critical minerals and reducing emissions. In the process, they have given dreamlike forecasts to mining companies and investors who scour the world for minerals.



"This says that our approach to the climate crisis is a consumer-driven one, which is bad news for the planet, the climate, and many communities worldwide," Javiera Barandiarán, an associate professor of global studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara, told me. She joins a suite of advocates, researchers, and communities challenging climate policy that requires more mining.



Signs are set up in front of two tents to protest a lithium mine at Thacker Pass in Nevada.

Many local communities, like this Native American tribe in Nevada, are pushing back against new mining projects in their backyards.

Ty O'Neil/SOPA Images/LightRocket/Getty Images

Adopting technology as fast as possible seems like the simple solution — develop products like electric vehicles that make it easy to switch energy from dirty hydrocarbons to clean electrons. But balancing the need for a clean-energy grid and fewer fossil-fuel cars with the harms of mining is tricky. We do need more minerals for a clean-energy transition, but how many, which ones, and how we get those minerals are important questions to answer.



Raquel Dominguez, a circular-minerals-economy policy advocate with the nongovernmental organization Earthworks, told me: "Who is it the most easy for? It's not easier for people who live on the front lines of extraction for the minerals we need for these vehicles. It's further shoving frontline communities under the electric bus."



'Climate minerals' get low environmental scores

Mines typically take a decade or more to get from discovery to operation. And when they are operational, they are capital-intensive, risky, and a major source of greenhouse gasses. Mineral processing predominantly depends on fossil-fuel combustion to shape molten rock, and the process is difficult to decarbonize. The industry's emissions already make up 7% of the global total, but the mines' indirect emissions grow as more cars demand manufacturing, roads, and deforestation.



Plus, mines can cause damage to the communities and ecosystems where they are built. They displace people and forests, and exposed land can pollute waters and cause dramatic flooding. Metals like lithium and nickel exist in very small quantities, and processing them turns the remaining rock into toxic waste that companies struggle to manage — they sometimes even dump it into waterways or store it behind shaky dams.



Across the globe, companies are facing backlash for new climate-branded mining projects. In Serbia last year, the multinational mining company Rio Tinto announced its next major lithium project, stirring the country's largest protests since the downfall of its dictator and causing the government to suspend the project. Around the same time that Tesla began to seek out iron-based batteries for its cars, an iron-ore miner in Australia blew up Aboriginal heritage sites to develop a mine — pushing the country to review its mining governance. A Canadian company is using the climate crisis to justify mining at the bottom of the Pacific, despite warnings of a biodiversity disaster and financial fallout in Pacific island states.



In the US earlier this year, a Chilean company lost a years-long bid to mine copper and nickel and lost several lawsuits from environmentalists — the plan was expected to disrupt Minnesota's 1 million-acre Boundary Waters protected wilderness. In Arizona, what analysts call the most promising source of copper in the energy transition has caught flak from protesters who say it will trample the rights of a local Apache community and dehydrate natural life. And in Idaho, a gold miner says it can join the fight for clean energy, even though the Environmental Protection Agency found the mine would have disproportionately adverse effects on water for the Nez Perce tribe.



Mining waste destroyed a village in Brazil in 2015.

A dam burst at a mining waste site in Brazil in 2015 unleashing a deluge of thick, red toxic mud that smothered an entire village.

Christophe Simon/AFP/Getty Images

Despite the local pushback, politicians in Washington, DC, have carried mining into the climate conversation in a bipartisan agreement to boost the industry. The Trump administration smoothed the path both for mining companies to acquire permits and avoid cleaning up pollution from their mines. The Biden administration has also emphasized the need for expanded mining to address its climate policies. In both parties, senators say Chinese companies dominate in almost all industries for battery materials, which threatens US businesses and national security. Therefore, the US needs to step up its production, they say.



But these debates are largely dominated by people with a vested interest in driving as much demand as possible, rather than managing both the demand and the supply sides of the equation. Electric-car companies loom large in scientific studies and media debates on climate, and some mining companies have branded themselves as climate saviors, encouraged by financial institutions like Morgan Stanley and consultancies like Wood Mackenzie. 



"These companies are not acting out of altruism. They're acting out of their own interest, and their own interest is billions of dollars of profits per year," Dominguez said of mining companies. 



Which minerals does climate action require?

Mineral-demand forecasts are built on a string of assumptions and ever-changing data about EV use and battery prices.



"We know that the green transition is more intensive in terms of minerals," Perrine Toledano, who leads the mining and energy team at the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, told me. "But it's very difficult to identify which minerals and in which quantity. The only thing you can do is make forecasts based on current technologies, but 10 to 15 years down the road, we don't know."



The World Bank's projections from 2020 are still widely cited today. If the global economy is to shrink its emissions to keep temperatures below a 2-degree Celsius rise by 2100, demand for lithium and graphite in climate technologies like batteries will need to increase five times the total production of 2018.



But those projections keep changing — sometimes shrinking. In 2017, the World Bank predicted the need for lithium would be at least 10 million tons; but in its most recent report, it predicted the need would be less than 5 million tons. Its 2017 forecast on cobalt demand was also several times higher than its more recent predictions. The International Energy Agency in 2021 concluded that climate action demanded lithium production leap by 42 times by 2040, with needed graphite, cobalt, and nickel growth roughly half as steep. Many materials are left out of these projections, such as steel, which can make up to 10% of global emissions and is used in battery packs, car frames, road construction, and charging infrastructure.



These predictions are setting the tone for global leaders to increase mining capacity, but Toledano advised caution at the World Bank's projections. Commodity prices could rise, or a company could be worried about taking materials from politically unstable places or countries where consumers worry about human rights concerns. Batteries could get more efficient or long-lasting. If charging ports become ubiquitous, there would be less reason to design a battery that lasts 300 miles. A small change in battery chemistry, deployed at a large scale, could mean dozens of mines are opened or closed. Plus, new innovations emerge constantly that could require fewer or different minerals. 



"The mineral compositions of technologies are changing, have been changing, will change again," Toledano, who works with public and private institutions to craft sustainable-extraction policy, said. 



Minerals will be needed for all sorts of climate technologies, but planning economies around specific ones may leave entire industries treading water. That uncertainty should raise questions about a climate plan focused exclusively on extraction. 



A better approach

Electric vehicles are crucial to the energy transition and far better than gas-guzzlers, but they are just one piece of a much larger climate puzzle. Moving the spotlight from electric vehicles and mining doesn't leave a dearth of action. Vehicle-sharing schemes, plant-based diets, and taxes on large cars not only reduce emissions quickly but also can lead to less demand for raw materials. A strict carbon price could push companies to shrink fossil-fuel-based supply chains and strengthen local supply that uses less transportation.



One of the primary reasons the World Bank's projections were scaled down in 2020 was the inclusion of reusing and recycling materials. Even so, the projections maintain a "flat assumption on recycling that is staying at current levels," Toledano told me.



Not everyone agrees that recycling can play a role in climate policy. Industry players, mostly those tied to carmakers, are beginning to build out factories that would recover pieces of lithium-ion batteries. These plants face major hurdles, and some industry players predict that recycled minerals may make a dent in the need for newly mined minerals in a decade.



Dominguez of Earthworks said the switch to recycled materials could be even more significant if started quickly. A report last year found that getting recycling programs started soon could offset half the demand for copper and at least one-quarter of the demand for lithium, cobalt, and nickel. The European Commission, which is rewriting its battery regulation, will likely implement a requirement that manufacturers reuse or recycle their own products. A recent California review recommended similar steps. In a report with the Natural Resources Defense Council, Barandiarán of UC Santa Barbara and her coauthors suggested expanding public transportation to reduce the pressures on communities in South America's "Lithium Triangle." 



These kinds of policies, in tandem with a targeted approach to the clean-energy transition, could save humans from disastrous warming more quickly than exclusively relying on mineral production. The prominence of climate minerals in clean-energy policy stems from a long history in the US and elsewhere of encouraging mining to support the consumption of luxury goods, like cars, Barandiarán told me.



"We need to address climate change urgently," she said, "but with a human- and planet-centered approach that is committed to real solutions, not false solutions like the privately owned individual electric car."



Ian Morse is a science and environment journalist with a focus in Indonesia. He investigates land and extractive businesses, reports on the natural sciences, and writes the Green Rocks newsletter.




Electric cars have a dirty secret — and it's a big one / Ian Morse

Electric cars have a dirty secret — and it's a big one / Ian Morse

By Ian Morse

Electric vehicles require certain minerals like lithium, cobalt, and nickel. Converting the world's one billion cars would require dozens of new mines across the globe.

iStock; Rebecca Zisser/Insider

This story is available exclusively to Insider subscribers. Become an Insider and start reading now.

Earth is in bad shape. Each new United Nations report declares we are closer than before to global catastrophe and implores leaders to take drastic action immediately. But even when policymakers agree the situation is dire, deciding how to tackle the problem is where things get heated.

Global emissions from greenhouse gasses need to be almost halved by 2030 to prevent a rise of more than 1.5 degrees Celsius in temperatures before 2050 and the resulting cascade of extreme weather, sea-level rise, biodiversity loss, and crop failure. To get there, the energy sector needs to transition away from fossil fuels like oil and coal toward renewable energy from things like solar panels, wind turbines, and electric cars.


To make this shift, the world will need to produce the raw goods that make these technologies possible. Materials like lithium and graphite play a central role in producing lithium-ion batteries, which are used in electric vehicles and the storage systems for wind and solar energy. Since 2017, the World Bank has predicted that stifling rising temperatures will push demand for these minerals several times higher than their current supplies.


But massively increasing production of these minerals may cause more problems than it solves. Climate policies have traditionally favored new technologies like electric vehicles to help replace fossil fuels with renewable electricity. But given the amount of mining required to electrify the world's more than 1 billion cars, creativity around consuming less or in different ways could move the world more beneficially toward sustainable development goals than the replacement of the consumption with cleaner versions. For the one-third of greenhouse-gas emissions that come from industry, for example, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change found the most significant steps to help the planet would be slashing the amount of material used, produced, and wasted.


"We've seen studies that hypothetically see the potential for drastic reductions — up to 50% — of energy demand in the next 20 or 30 years. That's a significant reduction in materials," Narasimha Rao, an associate professor of energy systems at Yale and a contributing author on the IPCC's chapter that assessed demand-side climate tools, said.


More institutions are following the IPCC's lead. BloombergNEF, an energy-transition analyst group, found in a May report that a "modest 10% reduction" in car travel could take pressure off companies straining to meet EV demand. 


"What was really striking when we were modeling EV uptake was how challenging it would be to produce enough electric cars to have a zero tailpipe emissions fleet by 2050," Andrew Grant, a BloombergNEF intelligent-mobility analyst, said.


Reducing and altering consumption can quickly and efficiently slash harmful emissions. Yet a core goal in many climate policies is not reduction but an inflation of thirst for newly mined materials. Financial institutions, consultancies, and the International Energy Agency (which was formed to support the oil industry) have framed climate action as a trade-off between mining for critical minerals and reducing emissions. In the process, they have given dreamlike forecasts to mining companies and investors who scour the world for minerals.


"This says that our approach to the climate crisis is a consumer-driven one, which is bad news for the planet, the climate, and many communities worldwide," Javiera Barandiarán, an associate professor of global studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara, told me. She joins a suite of advocates, researchers, and communities challenging climate policy that requires more mining.


Signs are set up in front of two tents to protest a lithium mine at Thacker Pass in Nevada.

Many local communities, like this Native American tribe in Nevada, are pushing back against new mining projects in their backyards.

Ty O'Neil/SOPA Images/LightRocket/Getty Images

Adopting technology as fast as possible seems like the simple solution — develop products like electric vehicles that make it easy to switch energy from dirty hydrocarbons to clean electrons. But balancing the need for a clean-energy grid and fewer fossil-fuel cars with the harms of mining is tricky. We do need more minerals for a clean-energy transition, but how many, which ones, and how we get those minerals are important questions to answer.


Raquel Dominguez, a circular-minerals-economy policy advocate with the nongovernmental organization Earthworks, told me: "Who is it the most easy for? It's not easier for people who live on the front lines of extraction for the minerals we need for these vehicles. It's further shoving frontline communities under the electric bus."


'Climate minerals' get low environmental scores

Mines typically take a decade or more to get from discovery to operation. And when they are operational, they are capital-intensive, risky, and a major source of greenhouse gasses. Mineral processing predominantly depends on fossil-fuel combustion to shape molten rock, and the process is difficult to decarbonize. The industry's emissions already make up 7% of the global total, but the mines' indirect emissions grow as more cars demand manufacturing, roads, and deforestation.


Plus, mines can cause damage to the communities and ecosystems where they are built. They displace people and forests, and exposed land can pollute waters and cause dramatic flooding. Metals like lithium and nickel exist in very small quantities, and processing them turns the remaining rock into toxic waste that companies struggle to manage — they sometimes even dump it into waterways or store it behind shaky dams.


Across the globe, companies are facing backlash for new climate-branded mining projects. In Serbia last year, the multinational mining company Rio Tinto announced its next major lithium project, stirring the country's largest protests since the downfall of its dictator and causing the government to suspend the project. Around the same time that Tesla began to seek out iron-based batteries for its cars, an iron-ore miner in Australia blew up Aboriginal heritage sites to develop a mine — pushing the country to review its mining governance. A Canadian company is using the climate crisis to justify mining at the bottom of the Pacific, despite warnings of a biodiversity disaster and financial fallout in Pacific island states.


In the US earlier this year, a Chilean company lost a years-long bid to mine copper and nickel and lost several lawsuits from environmentalists — the plan was expected to disrupt Minnesota's 1 million-acre Boundary Waters protected wilderness. In Arizona, what analysts call the most promising source of copper in the energy transition has caught flak from protesters who say it will trample the rights of a local Apache community and dehydrate natural life. And in Idaho, a gold miner says it can join the fight for clean energy, even though the Environmental Protection Agency found the mine would have disproportionately adverse effects on water for the Nez Perce tribe.


Mining waste destroyed a village in Brazil in 2015.

A dam burst at a mining waste site in Brazil in 2015 unleashing a deluge of thick, red toxic mud that smothered an entire village.

Christophe Simon/AFP/Getty Images

Despite the local pushback, politicians in Washington, DC, have carried mining into the climate conversation in a bipartisan agreement to boost the industry. The Trump administration smoothed the path both for mining companies to acquire permits and avoid cleaning up pollution from their mines. The Biden administration has also emphasized the need for expanded mining to address its climate policies. In both parties, senators say Chinese companies dominate in almost all industries for battery materials, which threatens US businesses and national security. Therefore, the US needs to step up its production, they say.


But these debates are largely dominated by people with a vested interest in driving as much demand as possible, rather than managing both the demand and the supply sides of the equation. Electric-car companies loom large in scientific studies and media debates on climate, and some mining companies have branded themselves as climate saviors, encouraged by financial institutions like Morgan Stanley and consultancies like Wood Mackenzie. 


"These companies are not acting out of altruism. They're acting out of their own interest, and their own interest is billions of dollars of profits per year," Dominguez said of mining companies. 


Which minerals does climate action require?

Mineral-demand forecasts are built on a string of assumptions and ever-changing data about EV use and battery prices.


"We know that the green transition is more intensive in terms of minerals," Perrine Toledano, who leads the mining and energy team at the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, told me. "But it's very difficult to identify which minerals and in which quantity. The only thing you can do is make forecasts based on current technologies, but 10 to 15 years down the road, we don't know."


The World Bank's projections from 2020 are still widely cited today. If the global economy is to shrink its emissions to keep temperatures below a 2-degree Celsius rise by 2100, demand for lithium and graphite in climate technologies like batteries will need to increase five times the total production of 2018.


But those projections keep changing — sometimes shrinking. In 2017, the World Bank predicted the need for lithium would be at least 10 million tons; but in its most recent report, it predicted the need would be less than 5 million tons. Its 2017 forecast on cobalt demand was also several times higher than its more recent predictions. The International Energy Agency in 2021 concluded that climate action demanded lithium production leap by 42 times by 2040, with needed graphite, cobalt, and nickel growth roughly half as steep. Many materials are left out of these projections, such as steel, which can make up to 10% of global emissions and is used in battery packs, car frames, road construction, and charging infrastructure.


These predictions are setting the tone for global leaders to increase mining capacity, but Toledano advised caution at the World Bank's projections. Commodity prices could rise, or a company could be worried about taking materials from politically unstable places or countries where consumers worry about human rights concerns. Batteries could get more efficient or long-lasting. If charging ports become ubiquitous, there would be less reason to design a battery that lasts 300 miles. A small change in battery chemistry, deployed at a large scale, could mean dozens of mines are opened or closed. Plus, new innovations emerge constantly that could require fewer or different minerals. 


"The mineral compositions of technologies are changing, have been changing, will change again," Toledano, who works with public and private institutions to craft sustainable-extraction policy, said. 


Minerals will be needed for all sorts of climate technologies, but planning economies around specific ones may leave entire industries treading water. That uncertainty should raise questions about a climate plan focused exclusively on extraction. 


A better approach

Electric vehicles are crucial to the energy transition and far better than gas-guzzlers, but they are just one piece of a much larger climate puzzle. Moving the spotlight from electric vehicles and mining doesn't leave a dearth of action. Vehicle-sharing schemes, plant-based diets, and taxes on large cars not only reduce emissions quickly but also can lead to less demand for raw materials. A strict carbon price could push companies to shrink fossil-fuel-based supply chains and strengthen local supply that uses less transportation.


One of the primary reasons the World Bank's projections were scaled down in 2020 was the inclusion of reusing and recycling materials. Even so, the projections maintain a "flat assumption on recycling that is staying at current levels," Toledano told me.


Not everyone agrees that recycling can play a role in climate policy. Industry players, mostly those tied to carmakers, are beginning to build out factories that would recover pieces of lithium-ion batteries. These plants face major hurdles, and some industry players predict that recycled minerals may make a dent in the need for newly mined minerals in a decade.


Dominguez of Earthworks said the switch to recycled materials could be even more significant if started quickly. A report last year found that getting recycling programs started soon could offset half the demand for copper and at least one-quarter of the demand for lithium, cobalt, and nickel. The European Commission, which is rewriting its battery regulation, will likely implement a requirement that manufacturers reuse or recycle their own products. A recent California review recommended similar steps. In a report with the Natural Resources Defense Council, Barandiarán of UC Santa Barbara and her coauthors suggested expanding public transportation to reduce the pressures on communities in South America's "Lithium Triangle." 


These kinds of policies, in tandem with a targeted approach to the clean-energy transition, could save humans from disastrous warming more quickly than exclusively relying on mineral production. The prominence of climate minerals in clean-energy policy stems from a long history in the US and elsewhere of encouraging mining to support the consumption of luxury goods, like cars, Barandiarán told me.


"We need to address climate change urgently," she said, "but with a human- and planet-centered approach that is committed to real solutions, not false solutions like the privately owned individual electric car."


Ian Morse is a science and environment journalist with a focus in Indonesia. He investigates land and extractive businesses, reports on the natural sciences, and writes the Green Rocks newsletter.


Elon Musk Does Not Care About Spam Bots / Matt Levine

What you need to know: Elon Musk Is Buying Twitter. What’s Next and What Does It Mean? 
Elon Musk Does Not Care About Spam Bots / Matt Levine
Also the merger proxy and Allianz Structured Alpha.

By Matt Levin
18 May 2022 at 01:52 GMT+9
Programming note: Money Stuff will be off tomorrow, back on Thursday. Unless. You know.

Oh Elon
Elon Musk is the richest person in the world, and an active Twitter user. When he tweets, he gets a lot of spammy replies, many of which seem to be written by automated bots. He has complained about this a lot. Eventually he decided to do something about it. The thing that he decided to do about it was buy Twitter. On April 13, he sent a letter to Twitter Inc.’s board of directors offering to buy the company for $54.20 per share in cash. “If our twitter bid succeeds,” he tweeted, “we will defeat the spam bots or die trying!”


His Twitter bid succeeded. On April 25, Twitter and Musk issued a joint press release announcing that he had agreed to buy Twitter for $54.20 per share. The press release included a quote from Musk promising to “make Twitter better” by, among other things, “defeating the spam bots.” He was really mad at the spam bots! He wanted to buy Twitter because of the spam bots.

Yesterday he announced that he does not want to buy Twitter because of the spam bots:

Elon Musk declared he won’t proceed with his $44 billion takeover of Twitter Inc. unless the social media giant can prove bots make up fewer than 5% of its users, casting yet more uncertainty over the deal.

The billionaire tweeted “this deal cannot move forward” unless Twitter provides proof of its claims, reiterating his own view that the ratio is far higher. …

Twitter said it is “committed to completing the transaction on the agreed price and terms as promptly as practicable,” in a statement on Tuesday. …

The battle over bots has become a sticking point for Musk, who told a tech conference in Miami on Monday that fake users make up at least 20% of all Twitter accounts, possibly as high as 90%. Twitter regularly states in its quarterly results that the average of false or spam accounts “represented fewer than 5% of our monthly daily active users during the quarter,” adding that it applied “significant judgment” to its estimate, and the true number could be higher.

I think it is important to be clear here that Musk is lying. The spam bots are not why he is backing away from the deal, as you can tell from the fact that the spam bots are why he did the deal. He has produced no evidence at all that Twitter’s estimates are wrong, and certainly not that they are materially wrong or made in bad faith. (Musk can only get out of the deal if Twitter's filings are wrong in a way that would cause a “material adverse effect” on Twitter, which is vanishingly unlikely.) His own supposed methodology for counting spam bots is laughable. Yesterday Twitter’s chief executive officer, Parag Agrawal, tweeted a thread explaining in general terms how Twitter estimates that fake accounts represent fewer than 5% of its count of active users, and how this analysis can’t be easily replicated by outsiders (because they don’t know which accounts are real, and also because they don’t know which accounts Twitter counts as daily active users). It seems clear that Agrawal’s thoughtful answer is basically correct. 1 Musk responded with a poop emoji.


More important, nothing has changed about the bot problem since Musk signed the merger agreement. Twitter has published the same qualified estimate — that fewer than 5% of monetizable accounts are fake — for the last eight years. Musk knew those estimates, and declined to do any nonpublic due diligence before signing the merger agreement. He knew about the spam bot problem before signing the merger agreement, as we know because he talked about it constantly, including while announcing the merger agreement. If he didn’t want to buy Twitter because there are spam bots, he should not have signed a contract to buy Twitter. No new information has come to light about spam bots in the last three weeks. 

What has happened in the last three weeks? Well, the prices of tech stocks have gone down, making the $54.20 price that Musk agreed to look a bit rich. (Snap Inc., a social-media competitor to Twitter, is down more than 30% since Musk made his offer on April 13.) And the price of Tesla Inc. stock, which he is relying on to finance part of the purchase price, has also gone down, making him poorer and making the $54.20 price look even more expensive. (Tesla is down almost 30% since he made his offer.) So he is angling to reprice the deal for straightforward market reasons. But that is very clearly not allowed by the merger agreement that he signed: Public-company merger agreements allocate broad market risk to the buyer, and he can’t get out just because stocks went down.

So he is pretending that he wants to reprice the deal for other reasons. He is not pretending very hard — the poop emoji is not going to hold up in court! — but he’s doing enough to confuse the public and give his fans a pretext to believe that he is really the victim here.

Poor Twitter. After Musk announced that he had taken a 9% stake in Twitter, but before he offered to buy the company, he signed a standstill agreement under which he would join Twitter’s board of directors and promise not to buy more than 14.9% of the stock. Four days later he tore up that agreement; then he made his bid. I wrote at the time:

This is an awkward situation for Twitter's board. They can’t really accept Musk's offer. For one thing the price is embarrassingly low; again, Twitter traded above the offer price last October. For another thing, the financing seems to be made up of cobwebs and phlogiston. But also Musk has joked about taking companies private before, and he generally changes his mind a lot. (He agreed to join Twitter’s board last week! And then changed his mind four days later!) If you are a well-advised professional public company board, it is just catastrophic to imagine that you might say “okay Elon $54.20 it is” and then he’d say “ha no I was kidding, psych!” That would be crippling for a public company. Also that is basically what he did to Twitter’s board last weekend! 

Well, nobody listens to me, and here we are. Twitter accepted Musk’s offer, and three weeks later, he said “ha no I was kidding, psych!” And it is catastrophic.


What can Twitter do about it? Certainly they can walk Musk through their methodology and give him evidence that spam accounts represent fewer than 5% of monetizable daily active users, but what good will that do? He doesn’t care, he’s lying about this, and no evidence that they can give him will have any effect. Twitter could get all 229 million of its monetizable daily active users in a room and have them say “hello Elon, we are real,” and that would not convince him, because he does not want to be convinced. He wants to pay a lower price. 

Or Twitter can do what he actually wants, which is renegotiate the deal at a lower price. But what good will that do? What does Twitter get from signing a new merger agreement with him at, say, $42 per share? 2 He has not lived up to any of his agreements with Twitter — the standstill, the non-disparagement clause of the merger agreement, apparently a nondisclosure agreement, the merger agreement itself — and he’s not going to live up to a repriced merger agreement unless he feels like it. An agreement with Elon Musk is worthless, as Twitter has learned over and over again. 

Or Twitter can try to hold him to the terms of his current deal, but that is also risky. The way the merger agreement works is that Musk’s damages are capped at a $1 billion reverse termination fee: If he walks away and Twitter sues for damages, it can’t get more than $1 billion, or about $1.30 per share, which is nowhere close to enough to compensate for losing this deal.

The agreement does, however, allow Twitter to sue for “specific performance,” meaning that it can go to a Delaware court and ask a judge to order Musk to close the deal (and fund his $27.5 billion equity commitment). But this is tough and there is no guarantee it will work. Specific performance is only possible if Musk’s debt financing is available, which seems likely but not certain, 3 and if a judge is willing to order it. On the one hand, Musk’s lawlessness and bad faith will probably annoy a judge and make her more likely to specifically enforce the merger agreement. On the other hand, Musk’s lawlessness and bad faith might worry a Delaware judge and make her less likely to specifically enforce the merger agreement. 4 It is bad, for the rule of law generally and for confidence in Delaware corporate law in particular, if Musk blatantly ignores a merger agreement and a judge lets him get away with it. But it’s even worse if a court orders him to close and he ignores the order. Musk has a history of ignoring court orders and getting away with it.

Or, as I said yesterday, the fairest consequence for all of this might be for Twitter to kick him off Twitter (they run Twitter! they can do that!), but I bet they won’t. 

I don't know what will happen here. Twitter has no good options. The market thinks that the most likely outcome is that the deal gets done at a lower price, rewarding Musk for his bad faith. 

One weird point is that, while Musk has tweeted about not going ahead with the deal, and talked about it at a private conference for his fans, it doesn’t seem like he has sent any formal notice to Twitter saying that the deal is off. (Certainly neither Musk nor Twitter have made any SEC filings about that sort of notice, which you might expect if he'd sent one.) Perhaps his lawyers are less willing to ignore the agreement than he is, or at least need a better pretext than he's managed so far.

So arguably Twitter’s best option is to do nothing: Let Musk tweet, ignore him, and continue acting as though everything is normal and the deal is going to close. Don’t give him any more pretexts to walk away, just keep trying to get regulatory and shareholder approvals, and then come to him ready to close and see how serious he is about all of this. The basic problem with Musk, for Twitter, is that he changes his mind a lot. Maybe he'll change it again.

The merger proxy
In that vein, this morning Twitter calmly filed the preliminary proxy statement for its deal with Musk, a key step toward getting shareholder approval. In general, the most interesting part of a merger proxy is the “Background of the Merger” section, which describes in detail how the deal was negotiated and what the board of directors was thinking, and that is true here.


One fun thing to do with this proxy is to go through it and count how many times Musk violated US securities laws in his efforts to buy Twitter. For instance:

Also on March 26, 2022, Mr. Musk contacted Egon Durban, one of Twitter’s directors, to set up a discussion between Mr. Musk and Mr. Durban. Mr. Musk and Mr. Durban subsequently spoke on March 26, 2022 and March 27, 2022 and discussed the potential of Mr. Musk joining the Twitter Board, as well as the fact that Mr. Musk had purchased a significant stake of more than five percent of our common stock. …

On March 27, 2022, Messrs. Musk, [the chairman of Twitter’s board of directors, Bret] Taylor and [Twitter Chief Executive Officer Parag] Agrawal discussed Mr. Musk’s interest in Twitter and potentially joining the Twitter Board. As part of that discussion, Mr. Musk stated that he was considering various options with respect to his ownership, including potentially joining the Twitter Board, seeking to take Twitter private or starting a competitor to Twitter.

Musk started buying Twitter stock in late January, and crossed over 5% on March 14. Under the securities laws, he had 10 days — until March 24 — to disclose this fact publicly. In fact he waited until April 4, disclosing his stake 11 days late. During this period — when he was legally required to disclose his Twitter stake, but had not — he (1) kept buying more stock and (2) had discussions with Twitter’s board of directors about taking over the company. That seems like it would have been material information, for the people who were selling him the stock!

Then, when he finally did disclose his stake on April 4, he did it on a form (Schedule 13G) that is limited to passive investors, checking a box indicating that he had “not acquired the securities with any purpose, or with the effect, of changing or influencing the control of the issuer.” Again, he was already in discussions about taking over Twitter or joining its board. He was very much not eligible to use Schedule 13G, and by using 13G — and representing he had no plans to influence the company’s control — he was lying to the US Securities and Exchange Commission and the market.

Then Musk negotiated a board seat and standstill with Twitter, which was made public; he filed a Schedule 13D, belatedly but accurately indicating that he was going to be an active investor. The 13D said that, while he was keeping his options open, he had “no present plans or intentions” to take Twitter private. A few days later he decided to scrap the standstill agreement and buy Twitter instead; again from the merger proxy’s background section:

On April 9, 2022, before Mr. Musk’s appointment to the Twitter Board became effective, Mr. Musk notified Messrs. Taylor and Agrawal that he would not be joining the Twitter Board and would be making an offer to take Twitter private. Mr. Agrawal informed the members of the Twitter Board of Mr. Musk’s communication.

That was a Saturday; that Monday, Musk filed an amended Schedule 13D announcing that he was not joining the board. This 13D said that he “might engage in discussions with the Board” about “potential business combinations,” but neglected to mention that he had already told Twitter he would be making an offer.

I don’t know; it all seems bad. The SEC is supposedly “investigating” Musk’s disclosure failures in this deal, and I suppose these admissions will help with the investigation, but what can they do about it? Fine him? He's so rich. Prevent him from buying Twitter? That’s what he wants! Ban him from running a public company? That is probably more drastic than the SEC (or a judge) could stomach, and will just lead to another annoying effort to take Tesla private. 

Anyway the merger proxy also does give some insight into Twitter's board deliberations. For one thing, the board called big Twitter shareholders and seems to have gotten a pretty clear message of “just take the deal”:

Over the subsequent four days [after April 17], Messrs. Taylor and [Twitter director Patrick] Pichette held meetings with a number of Twitter’s largest institutional stockholders to discuss the perspectives of these stockholders on Mr. Musk’s acquisition proposal and Twitter more generally. As part of these meetings, these Twitter stockholders generally (1) expressed that Twitter has much opportunity, but indicated a perceived failure of historical execution; (2) expressed understanding there has been recent management change and openness to a stand-alone plan to give them confidence in the long term; and (3) encouraged the Twitter Board to seriously consider Mr. Musk’s proposal and weigh the risks of future execution. 

The board also heard from its financial advisers that $54.20 was pretty good. (In hindsight, tech stocks fell after they signed the deal, and it looks even better.) The proxy summarizes the fairness opinions of Twitter's advisers at Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and JPMorgan Chase & Co., which included, for instance, discounted cash flow valuations of $36.50 (the bottom of JPMorgan’s range) to $60.90 (the top of Goldman’s). The proxy also includes Twitter’s management financial projections for the next few years, which included growing revenue from $5.9 billion in 2022 to $12.9 billion in 2027, and growing unlevered free cash flow from $561 million to $3.7 billion. (Musk’s own pitch to co-investors in his Twitter buyout projected revenue of $26.4 billion and free cash flow of $9.4 billion by 2028, so I guess he is more ambitious.)


The board did not contact other potential buyers, on the theory that (1) “Mr. Musk’s acquisition proposal had been publicly disclosed (and the subject of significant press coverage),” so if anyone else wanted to buy Twitter they would know to call Twitter, (2) there probably weren’t any other realistic buyers and (3) trying to find another buyer might scare off Musk. Given the shareholder feedback (to take the deal), the analyses of Twitter's financial advisers (that $54.20 was a pretty good price), and “the recent general decline in trading prices of social media companies,” the board figured that $54.20 was the best they were going to do, so they tried to pin down the deal with Musk.

In doing this they were — or at least, the merger proxy now says they were — properly focused on making sure that Musk was actually committed to closing the deal:

Throughout the remainder of April 24, 2022, and into April 25, 2022, Twitter, Parent and Mr. Musk and their respective legal advisors negotiated the terms of the merger agreement and related transaction documents. Key terms negotiated between the parties included (1) Twitter’s specific enforcement rights to require Parent and Mr. Musk to perform their obligations under the merger agreement and consummate the closing on the terms set forth in the merger agreement, as well as third-party beneficiary rights under the equity commitment letter to enforce Mr. Musk’s obligations to fund the equity commitment; (2) the circumstances in which a termination fee would be payable by Parent and Mr. Musk and the amount of the termination fee; (3) the availability of potential monetary damages under the merger agreement; (4) the terms and conditions applicable to Parent’s and Mr. Musk’s obligations to obtain regulatory approvals, and the closing conditions related to regulatory approvals; (5) the terms and conditions applicable to Parent’s and Mr. Musk’s obligations to complete debt financing arrangements for the acquisition, and Twitter’s obligations to assist Parent and Mr. Musk in such efforts; …

In the section titled “Reasons for the Merger,” the proxy adds that one reason the board agreed to the deal is:

Reasonable Likelihood of Consummation. The belief of the Twitter Board that an acquisition by Mr. Musk has a reasonable likelihood of closing. In that regard, the Twitter Board considered Mr. Musk’s business reputation and financial resources, as well as those of Parent’s debt financing sources, which the Twitter Board believed increased the likelihood that the required debt and equity financing for the merger would be available.

Well. When they announced the deal, I pointed out that Musk’s “business reputation” was in fact that he is perhaps the only billionaire chief executive officer of a US public company who has ever offered to take a public company private as a joke. I wrote:

Musk has some history here: In 2018 he pretended that he was going to take Tesla Inc. private; he wasn’t, and eventually he settled fraud charges with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Ordinarily if a billionaire chief executive officer of a public company offers to buy a company, the odds that he is kidding are quite low. When it’s Elon Musk, the historical odds are, like, 50/50. (He really bought SolarCity.)

Nobody listens to me. Now the historical odds are 1 in 3!