Wednesday, August 4, 2021
It's good to act before the emergency
Biden’s Vaccine Push Looks Like a Win
Biden’s Vaccine Push Looks Like a Win
By Jonathan Bernstein
Bloomberg 3 min
View Original
jonathan bernstein
Better late than never.
Better late than never.
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On Tuesday, the U.S. finally reached President Joe Biden’s goal of having at least 70% of adults receive their first vaccination shot — except that Biden back in May had set the goal for July 4, and Tuesday was the second day of August.
That seems like a clear loss for Biden. But it turned out that setting and failing to hit the goal did no noticeable damage to the president. Yes, plenty of reporters noticed it and there were some stories about it on July 4. Hitting 70%, moreover, was a news story framed by the fact that it was a month later than Biden had wanted.
Yet there’s been little blame cast on the administration for falling short. Partly that’s because a fair number of Republican politicians and media figures were publicly ambivalent or worse about vaccinations — some of them being extremely irresponsible — and made it easy for those who supported Biden’s goal to blame them. Partly it was because the mechanics of distributing the vaccine have gone smoothly and been mostly scandal-free. There has been criticism of the administration’s messaging about masks, but it hasn’t turned into a significant controversy.
To some extent, Biden’s aggressive public goal may have been helpful. Everyone knew at the time it was going to be one of the president’s top priorities, which meant that White House and executive-branch personnel would focus on making it happen. And setting a clear target defined success. It gave members of the administration a metric to judge their performance by and made it more likely that the media would focus on the failure to hit vaccination targets in states such as Florida and Louisiana when the current spike began.
In other words, the public target was a net plus, even though Biden didn’t hit it. I wouldn’t recommend making a habit of setting targets and failing to meet them, but in this case it seems to have worked.
That said: Biden and the administration aren’t blameless. Only over the past week or so has the president established (partial) vaccination mandates for federal employees and contractors, a decision he could’ve made much earlier. Indeed, his actions took place amid of a bunch of new private and public mandates, which were happening only after vaccination rates had begun to rebound. Perhaps Biden played this well, and being more aggressive would’ve been polarizing. But perhaps he was overly timid and wound up losing valuable time by hesitating. There’s no easy way to test that question, but I’d certainly be interested in any reporting on internal administration deliberations on it.
What I do have some confidence about is that the spin, which the White House has basically won, matters less than the substance, which is a lot harder to judge.
Tuesday, August 3, 2021
We shouldn’t be cruel about covid deaths. We should focus on getting everyone vaccinated.
We shouldn’t be cruel about covid deaths. We should focus on getting everyone vaccinated.
The text, “I should have gotten the damn vaccine,” from a dying fiance and father, captures the delta moment in America. The courage of the man’s fiancee in sharing their story, hoping that other covid-19 vaccine holdouts would learn from it, is deeply admirable. The messages on social media blaming her family for its own tragedy are typical of depersonalized Internet viciousness.
But they should also lead to some reflection. Many people, I suspect, felt a tinge of vindication when the pandemic turned hard against portions of the country where vaccine skepticism has been, for many, an ideological commitment, a cultural assumption or a result of distrusting science. This reaction, for the most part, has not been against individuals or families but against the aggregate. Yet the aggregate, of course, is the sum of dying individuals and suffering families. And at least one of those families now has five children without a father.
Some of America may be suffering an outbreak of schadenfreude. Many have walked past the empty vaccination sites at Walmart and Costco, in a country where only half the people have taken the full dose of a miracle medicine that could save their lives. At some point, doesn’t recklessness deserve its reward?
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But God help us if everyone got the health outcomes we deserved, when we eat poorly, or refuse to exercise, or ignore symptoms of illness — any of which might eventually bring a higher risk of death than covid vaccine hesitancy. Some of us take our recklessness in smaller, extended dosages. (Though it is worse when your neighbor might suffer a cost.)
And finding satisfaction in someone else’s pain is ugly. Just ugly. A recent reminder of this on the hard right stuck with me. Many in right-wing media chose to mock the emotion displayed by police officers last week testifying before the Jan. 6 select committee about their experiences during the Capitol assault. Such malice in reaction to pain is an essential part of the MAGA ethos. But the face of Dinesh D’Souza — one of the right’s professional trolls — remains haunting. It was a picture of glee in reaction to trauma and injury. Cruelty is the very worst emotion on the face — a horrid parody of joy.
This is a time when the golden rule comes in particularly handy. Would we want others to feel satisfaction at our death and the suffering of our families? Even if we were miniaturized to the size of a statistic? As individuals and as a country, we need to talk ourselves down from this ledge.
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The dramatic vaccine uptake in some red states in response to the delta variant surge should not be a source of self-satisfaction but of actual satisfaction. It indicates that not all hesitancy is rooted in unreachable ideology. We know from the statistics that much of this refusal can be traced to age and income. The full vaccination rate for people ages 65 to 74 is more than 80 percent. For people 25 to 39, it is about 48 percent. By comparing regional figures, we know that some hesitancy must be fed by ideology. But certainly not all. We have not yet reached the line where hesitancy becomes a stone wall of ideological refusal. And people who do the right thing now are coming to the aid of their families, neighbors and country, just like those vaccinated before them.
This does not mean that I am reconciled to the capitalization on vaccine hesitancy by right-wing media and politicians. One quote in a story featuring a Southern Missouri man who ended up on a ventilator should haunt all the ideological entrepreneurs selling skepticism. “I was strongly against getting the vaccine,” he said. “Just because we’re a strong conservative family.”
Who defined the refusal of an essential medicine as an attribute of a “strong conservative family”? Who sold medical Russian roulette as a traditional value? Certainly those who make money off the listeners, hits and viewers that sowing doubt brings.
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Yet it is political figures who merit the most disgust. Consider Florida’s Republican governor, Ron DeSantis. His state is the epicenter of the delta outbreak, accounting for 1 of every 5 new covid infections nationwide. Yet he is not, as the Daytona Beach News-Journal points out, holding daily emergency briefings. Instead: “DeSantis sent out a campaign email accusing Dr. Anthony Fauci … of somehow scheming with the Chinese over the spread of the coronavirus — while at the same time proclaiming the economic folly of taking basic precautions against the disease.” Last month, the DeSantis campaign rolled out a line of T-shirts and beer koozies with anti-Fauci themes. “Yep,” the News-Journal concluded, “He has merch.”
This remains lethal lunacy.
Emily Oster says you should run your family like a business. Does that work in 2021 — or ever?
Emily Oster says you should run your family like a business. Does that work in 2021 — or ever?
Back before daily life was consumed with questions about masks and PCR tests and cohorts and social distancing and ventilation and positivity rates and exposures and quarantines, parents were apparently worried about the best age to give their kid a phone.
It’s the first quandary Brown University economist Emily Oster — yes, the one who courted controversy this past yearpushing to get kids and teachers back in classrooms — addresses in the introduction to “The Family Firm: A Data-Driven Guide to Better Decision Making in the Early School Years.” Landing on an answer isn’t as simple as it might be for prenatal testing or solid foods, writes Oster, who tackled those kinds of topics in her earlier bestsellers, “Expecting Better” and “Cribsheet.”
“The Family Firm” author Emily Oster. (Rachel Hulin)
As is the case for many common questions about how to parent the 5-to-12 set, there’s just not much meaningful research out there about phones. Plus, so much depends on the specific kid and situation. Does this mean you should throw your hands up and just go with your gut? Absolutely not, writes Oster, who instead argues that the decision requires a lengthy multistep process of evidence gathering, logistical and financial analysis and a series of meetings. And it couldn’t hurt to include a Google Doc or two.
If that sounds like a whole lot of work, well, that’s the point. Oster’s pitch is that parenting is a job, specifically CEO of the “Family Firm.” Good bosses can’t operate on whims and the latest playground chatter. Although there are some upfront time costs to this strategy, Oster promises it leads to a better overall business model. Her book offers a targeted mini-MBA program designed to help moms and dads establish best practices for day-to-day operations and glean lessons from “case studies” that present potential scenarios, like how to respond to a kid who’s begging to go to sleep-away camp.
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The first step: Craft your family’s “Big Picture,” which is essentially a vision for how your family interacts with each other and the world. What’s your schedule? What are your priorities? What are your rules? That’s the backdrop for applying Oster’s “Four F’s” whenever a decision pops up:
Frame the question: This means not just knowing that there’s a problem to solve, but defining what exactly needs to be answered to solve that problem. (So not, “Where should I send my kid to school?” but “Should I send my kid to school X or school Y?”)
Fact-find: Gather intel from a variety of sources, whether that’s scientific research or other parents you know. Consider the likely impact of your choices, maybe by making up sample schedules or budgets.
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Final decision: Don’t hem and haw. Schedule a meeting and be done with it.
Follow-up: After a decision has been implemented and you’re seeing results, meet again to revisit the choice.
Because this is an Oster book, there’s data scattered everywhere — on the development of reading skills by age, on the concussion risks of playing soccer, on the benefits of dipping Brussels sprouts in sweetened cream cheese. It’s all presented in the breezy, skeptical style that’s made Oster’s work a must-read for parents who don’t have the time to investigate Finnish studies about integrating extracurriculars into the school day.
But because the vast majority of this must have been written pre-pandemic, it reads kind of like an out-of-date time capsule. The book’s first case study deals with whether to redshirt your kid, a.k.a. start school a year late. Amid Oster’s discussion of pros and cons and, of course, data, there’s nothing about the ripple effects of this bizarro year and the number of families that opted out of kindergarten.
The sections devoted to differing philosophies on subjects such as homework, screen time and tutoring all come off as quaint. And it was news to me that some parents sign their kids up for music lessons to make them better at math. (We had our daughter start ukulele this year because classes were held outdoors with each kid confined inside hula-hoops spaced six feet apart. Which, come to think of it, may have boosted her geometry skills.)
(Penguin Press)
To find examples, Oster often self-deprecatingly mines her own family’s experiences. There’s the time that she and her husband, Jesse, used Google Calendar to set up a meeting with their 8-year-old daughter, Penelope, to discuss the school year schedule. (“We presented an agenda and draft schedule in advance,” she notes.) And after 4-year-old Finn had a meltdown involving a bagel and not enough time to eat it, they established “a new family principle”: “You must be downstairs by 7:05, or else someone will come get you. We cannot force you to eat, but we’ll make you come downstairs and at least briefly sit at the table. Breakfast has a hard stop at 7:25.”
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Needless to say, the events of the past 18 months put these hyper-organized, hard-and-fast rules to the ultimate test. To try to figure out how to salvage some structure from utter chaos, Oster’s family spent a spring break in a rental cottage on a llama farm. “No matter how many Google Forms I used, I could not make more hours in the day,” she admits.
Despite the shifting circumstances, Oster stuck with her system and applied the four F’s to previously unfathomable questions like, “Should we see my parents?” In her attempt to fact-find, she developed an entire website devoted to coronavirus risks, “which may have taken things a bit far,” she jokes. The final decisions became a lot tougher.
It’s a needed reality check for a book that, despite its throwback vibe, benefits from some serendipitous timing, with so many people thinking about their “Big Picture” right now and launching into their sorta-post-pandemic lives. Families that had fallen off their rhythms and routines have a shot to take a step back and examine their choices. For the most part, Oster’s data-driven findings indicate that there is no universal right way to do things. So it’s up to parents to figure out the best path for them and their kids. That message is one we can all embrace, even if Oster’s workbook sheets might not be the right fit for the company you keep.
Vicky Hallett is a freelance writer and former MisFits columnist.
The Family Firm: A Data-Driven Guide to Better Decision Making in the Early School Years
By Emily Oster
Penguin Press. 320 pp. $28
The Democratic establishment’s attacks on progressives are counterproductive. There’s a better way forward.
The Democratic establishment’s attacks on progressives are counterproductive. There’s a better way forward.
The Democratic establishment and more center-left elements in the party want to stem the growing power of the party’s progressive left. That makes sense — party factions always want to dominate rival factions. But the establishment’s approach to keeping control is counterproductive and is likely to harm long-term Democratic goals and ideals.
There’s a better way being charted — and by a few surprising figures — and the party establishment should follow it.
You might think the party establishment doesn’t have much to worry about — after all, first Hillary Clinton and then Joe Biden defeated more left-wing candidates in the most recent presidential primaries, and establishment figures such as House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (Calif.) and Senate Majority Leader Charles E. Schumer (N.Y.) remain in charge on Capitol Hill. But while the establishment has kept formal power, the left has gained a lot of ground the past several years. On race, economics and basically every other issue, the Democratic Party is markedly more progressive than it was even five years ago, often pushing policies that were initially proposed by left-wing figures such as Sens. Bernie Sanders (Vt.) and Elizabeth Warren (Mass.).
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The party establishment has noticed — and is fighting back. Immediately after the 2020 election, the No. 3 Democrat in the House, Rep. James E. Clyburn (S.C.), blamed the “defund the police” slogan for ruining the Senate campaign of Clyburn protege Jaime Harrison. As election analysis, this was nonsense — Harrison lost by a very similar margin as previous Democratic candidates in South Carolina, so it’s hard to pin his defeat on a new slogan. But as intraparty warfare, it was a great tactic. Democrats wanted someone or something to blame when the election wasn’t the total annihilation of the Republicans that they were expecting. Clyburn’s critique simultaneously absolved himself and other party leaders for the party’s underperformance while knocking Black Lives Matter activists who have long suggested that Democratic establishment leaders aren’t bold enough on racial issues.
Rep. Hakeem Jeffries (N.Y.), the No. 5 in leadership in the House and the favorite of more establishment Democrats to become the caucus’s leader whenever Pelosi retires, recently started a political committee to defend longtime House incumbents against primary challenges — in other words to block the path by which Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (N.Y.) and several others in “the Squad” got into Congress. A coalition of more establishment Democrats, including Clyburn and Clinton, has gotten unusually involved in an open-seat primary in a heavily Democratic district in the Cleveland area, backing the opponent of Nina Turner, who was a strong supporter of Sanders’s 2016 and 2020 presidential campaigns.
Onetime Bill Clinton adviser James Carville is the informal leader of a group of more moderate Democrats who are publicly attacking those in the party they view as too “woke.” The party’s centrist wing declared the victory of the more moderate Eric Adams in the New York City mayoral race a decisive defeat for the left, even as more left-wing candidates won several major races this year, including in New York City. Establishment Democrats in Buffalo are now trying to strip power from the office of the mayor after the left-wing candidate India Walton won the Democratic primary there.
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Some of the conflict with the Democratic Party falls along familiar generational and ideological lines, with a bloc of younger and more progressive Democrats fighting an older guard. And there is a real debate over electoral strategy, in terms of how far left the party can go and still win elections. But it’s not all about electability, age or ideology. After all, both Turner and her leading rival in the Democratic primary, Shontel Brown, are fairly progressive, and either would be a huge favorite to win the general election. And the more left-wing Turner is actually older, at 53, than both Brown (46) and Jeffries (50).
Two other elements at play — institutions and icons — better explain some of the conflicts in the party. The more centrist wing is much more comfortable with established institutions, from corporations to churches to the official Democratic Party. It generally believes that such institutions are serving the country well — and where they are falling short, they can be reformed. In contrast, the left wing is much more skeptical of such institutions, and that includes the party itself, which it views as too tied to the status quo and resistant to change. You can see these themes reflected in how the factions attack each other: More centrist Democrats say progressives are trying to tear down the Democratic Party, while critics of more centrist figures cast them as “corporate Democrats.”
The left is also more skeptical of the policy and electoral records of the people who have led the party for much of the past three decades, such as the Clintons, Clyburn, Barack Obama and Pelosi. Many in the party’s left see a lot of shortcomings in the Affordable Care Act, one of the prized achievements of the establishment wing. The Democrats have lost more House elections (five) with Pelosi and Clyburn at the helm than they have won (four), so the left questions their electoral chops, too. But figures such as the Clintons are icons in the party, and taking them on can be fraught. Turner, while aligning with Sanders, has sharply criticized both Clyburn and Hillary Clinton — which likely explains why they are trying to block her from getting to Congress now.
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The Democratic establishment can proceed with the confidence that it is likely to win many of these intraparty fights. Casting the left as insufficiently concerned with winning elections, overly concerned with racial and identity issues, and too critical of Democratic luminaries will be persuasive to lots of Democratic voters. And the party establishment can also raise money from big donors who are wary of the left’s policy ideas.
But such victories will be pyrrhic. More recently elected Democrats such as Rep. Ayanna Pressley (Mass.), Ocasio-Cortez and others have brought energy, fresh ideas and diversity to the party, so the establishment’s obsession with blunting such candidates is very misguided.
Raising money from big donors specifically to defeat left-wing candidates in primaries makes this approach even worse — it fundamentally contradicts the Democratic Party’s broader goal of reducing the influence of the wealthy in politics. Just as problematic are establishment attacks on progressive Democrats for pushing too hard to achieve racial and economic inequality. Isn’t the entire point of the Democratic Party to push for greater equality?
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Finally, the Democratic Party will make better electoral and policy decisions in the future if it can honestly look at its past — which means good-faith criticisms of Obama, Pelosi and other party icons should be encouraged, not informally banned.
Instead of fighting with its left flank, there’s a better path for the party establishment — the Biden-Schumer path. Biden (78) and Schumer (70) have long records as more center-left, establishment figures. But both seem to recognize that the left has good ideas and that it’s counterproductive to constantly attack the younger and more progressive faction of their party. So sometimes they adopt ideas that it’s hard to imagine either man supporting a decade ago (for Schumer, mass student loan forgiveness; for Biden, trillions in new spending on domestic initiatives). Both are also cultivating strong relationships with progressives (Schumer with Warren, Biden with Sanders). And neither spends a lot of time interjecting themselves into Democratic primaries in safe districts or states.
Biden and Schumer are showing that people in the party establishment can stay in power, push their own ideas, and also be open to the ideas and influence of those to their left. More center-left Democrats should follow their lead.
Olympic medals no longer show off nations’ cultural power. That’s good.
Olympic medals no longer show off nations’ cultural power. That’s good.
Athletes watch as Fireworks go off during the Opening Ceremony for the Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games at Tokyo Olympic Stadium on Friday, July 23. 2021. (Toni L. Sandys/The Washington Post)
Image without a caption
The modern Olympics movement enshrines a paradox: It promotes competition among nations as a means toward international peace. The explicit idea behind the 1896 revival of the ancient Greek tradition of quadrennial games was to replace war with other forms of international rivalry. It never succeeded by that measure — the 1916, 1940 and 1944 Games were canceled on account of world wars, for instance, while the 1972 Olympics witnessed the killing of members of the Israeli team.
But the idea that international competition can be channeled through athletic prowess continues to resonate, thanks to the simple, if naive, intuition that a country can prove its worth by winning medals — an easily quantifiable metric of national achievement. This is the premise that inspires less-prominent nations to celebrate when they win a single medal, even in a minor sport. But it also leaves Americans anxious if our inevitably massive pile of gold, silver and bronze doesn’t grow fast enough; we’re convinced that it portends something bad, even if we’re not quite sure what.
That sentiment isn’t entirely misguided: There is a fuzzy link between podium position and success on the international stage. States care about Olympic prestige in part because their leaders believe that higher status will help them get their way in world politics. The Harvard professor Joseph Nye popularized an influential version of this concept, calling it “soft power.” Unlike hard power, such as wealth or military strength, soft power derives from “the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.”
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The 2021 Tokyo Olympics, however, show that the relationship between what a country’s elites want from the Games and what their athletes are willing to provide is far from straightforward. The nature of power in international relations has more to do with setting the terms of debate rather than piling up gold medals — and sometimes that means a system that allows dominant competitors to withdraw can be more exemplary than one that forces them into the arena.
It hasn’t always been that way. Far from quelling international rivalry, the Games have long placed it at center stage. Cold War antipathy between the Soviet Union and the United States extended to the balance beams and beyond, eventually leading to dueling boycotts of the 1980 Moscow Games and the 1984 Los Angeles Games. Other struggles more directly reflected international tensions. When the Hungarian water polo team played against the Soviet Union at the 1956 Games, just weeks after Soviet troops crushed Hungary’s anti-U.S.S.R. revolution, the match turned literally bloody.
More recently, even hosting the Olympics has emerged as a way for countries to showcase their status, as with the 2008 Beijing or 2016 Rio Games. As scholars of sport competition Mike Dennis and Jonathan Grix write, a country’s decision to stage such a “mega-event” is “very much a political decision, with the sporting aspect a distant second,” trumped by “the perceived international prestige and credibility that can be gained.” With the cost of hosting a modern Olympics running into the tens of billions of dollars, the price tag for this form of soft power rivals that of an aircraft carrier.
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For Nye, soft power is evident in the influence of U.S.-inspired institutions like the World Bank and the United Nations. Along with the spread of American culture more generally, they supposedly persuade other countries to want what the United States wants, helping U.S. leaders achieve their goals without having to revert to more direct but less legitimate forms of hard power. Chinese leaders who sent their children to Stanford or Harvard, Nye conjectured, would have more realistic views of the United States. He identified arrogant or calamitous foreign policy decisions, like the invasion of Iraq, as liabilities for soft power. Yet soft power could also be harmed by domestic issues, such as gun violence or racial segregation (although Nye, writing in 2004, identified that as a problem of the past).
The era of U.S. hegemony at the Summer Olympics maps neatly onto the era of Nye-style soft power. From the 1992 Barcelona Games (with the NBA-led “Dream Team”) to the 2016 Rio Games of the Final Five and Michael Phelps, the United States dominated the competition — not taking first in every event, to be sure, but far outstripping its performance in earlier Olympics in which the Soviets took part. (In the 1976 and 1988 summer games, the United States won fewer gold medals than either the Soviet Union or East Germany.)
Leaders hope that the prestige accumulated through athletic prowess can reap them greater support at home and more legitimacy internationally. Aspiring powers can use excellence to demonstrate their independence and standing. For East Germany, Dennis and Grix write, athletic superiority enabled the country to carve out an identity separate from both West Germany and the Soviet Union. Nations at the top of the international system, by contrast, may view such competitions less as opportunities than as threats to their dominance — and will spend lavishly to defend their position.
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Even if the United States tops the medal count this year again, though, it seems unlikely to do so in a way that will allow the Biden administration to secure its policy goals as easily as the traditional notion of soft power would suggest. Many of the most dramatic stories from this Olympics have less to do with victories and more to do with the context of the competition. The disqualification of Sha’Carri Richardson from the U.S. track and field team because of marijuana use sparked a vigorous debate over the racialized nature of anti-drug laws. Then, of course, there was Simone Biles’s withdrawal from the women’s gymnastics team final. If measuring soft power is a simple question of counting medals, then Biles’s decision was a blow to U.S. prestige — not least because it may have allowed the Russian Olympic Committee to win gold in the team event. (Notably, Russia’s own soft power doesn’t seem to have been meaningfully affected by its strange classification in recent Olympics, since everyone knows whom the “Russian Olympic Committee” athletes really represent.)
Yet reducing Biles’s calculations to whether they hurt the medal count seems wrong from the standpoint of international politics (much less in terms of compassion for an athlete who was victimized by the organizations overseeing U.S. women’s gymnastics, which failed to protect her and others from a serial sexual abuser). The fact that Biles was free to put her health first rather than jeopardizing it in pursuit of prestige also says something about the nation she represents at the Games — as does the vitriol trained on her by American conservatives and others for her choice.
These examples show that soft power is not as easily directed as D.C. wonks like to think. Presidents and other officials can’t just aim soft power at a problem the way they might order an airstrike. Those who produce soft power — from athletes to actors to activists — can also wield it on their own. And they will not always want to advance the interests of the U.S. government when they do so. Justice and official interests will conflict, and as free people, rather than spokespeople, prominent figures can speak even inconvenient truths. As Foreign Policy’s Allison Meakem pointed out, the voices of figures like Biles and Naomi Osaka are heard far more clearly in debates than those of official Olympic organizations. Indeed, these athletes might be heard most clearly when they don’t win the accolades we expect of them — whether by choice, accident or institutional fiat.
If their actions don’t advance official interests, they still might aid the national interest. Just as last summer’s Black Lives Matter demonstrations helped catalyze protests around the world (much as the #MeToo movement had done before), these incidents and their accompanying debates set the global conversation. The ability to initiate and drive international dialogue has been best described by Chinese thinkers as “discourse power” — a soft-power spinoff defined by a recent Atlantic Council report as the “power to set agendas in the international arena by influencing the political order and realigning other countries’ ethics and values.”
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Where discourse power remains aspirational for Beijing, the vast, sprawling, competitive nature of open societies constantly sets new debates. That bottom-up process of raising tough questions may not fully jibe with Nye’s vision of soft power as a resource for officials, who often prefer to paper over differences rather than air them. Yet it is how open societies pose their toughest challenge to closed societies and their message that security and prosperity require stability — and silence — above all. Indeed, pushing beyond simplistic narratives of competition can do more to enhance soft power. As the historian Teasel Muir-Harmony shows in her book “Operation Moonglow,” the Apollo project reaped its greatest value for the United States when it was reframed from a nationalistic contest to an endeavor “for all mankind.”
The Olympics, then, are most valuable for open societies not when their teams win the most medals, but simply because they provide a forum for open competition in the first place. The Games are far from perfect, as anyone familiar with the history of Olympic corruption and appeasement of dictators would recognize. Nor is it guaranteed that the resolution of every debate will be to the tastes of Western-style liberals. Still, allowing for competition means that politics — like the Olympics — remains full of surprises, and thus on the side of those who are used to competing in the first place. The ultimate soft-power move is to let influence speak for itself.
Twiiter: @profmusgrave
The GOP scamming of rural Trump voters continues. A new study shows the latest.
The GOP scamming of rural Trump voters continues. A new study shows the latest.
It has long been central to Republican mythology that Democrats have nothing but seething contempt for the rural and small-town inhabitants of the Real American Heartland. Republicans sometimes pair this with vile lies about Democratic proposals that would deliver economic benefits to those regions, turning their residents against them.
An important new study of the distribution of benefits from a major new policy from President Biden and Democrats — the expanded child tax credit — illuminates the repulsiveness of this scam with unusual clarity.
The new analysis from the Niskanen Center finds that the expanded child allowance — which has started delivering up to $300 per child per month to most U.S. households with children — will shower outsize benefits on residents of rural and less populous states and will deliver a disproportionately large relative boost to their local economies.
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Every congressional Republican voted against the covid-19 rescue bill, which created the current child allowance by temporarily expanding the previously existing child tax credit to poorer and working-class families, making it much more like a universal program.
And every Republican will likely oppose extending the expanded child allowance. It’s now set to expire next year, and Democrats hope to extend it until 2025 in the $3.5 trillion “human infrastructure” bill they want to pass through the Senate via reconciliation.
While just about all Republicans supported the previous version of the child tax credit, and the policy has a bipartisan history, the rub here is that the expansion of it to poorer families — which Republicans oppose — will itself have an outsize impact on rural residents and red states.
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The study quantifies this in a useful way. It analyzed the new policy’s state-by-state impact by looking at the net amount added by the expansion to the total each state gains under the previous policy.
Its key finding: Although more populous states with more families with children stand to get more in total overall funding than smaller and sparser states do, the latter states still stand to get more in new benefits per capita.
About 35 million families have started receiving their first monthly payout from the U.S. government in an expanded income-support program. (Reuters)
That’s because the smaller and less populous states tend to have more poor residents as a percentage of overall population, and have larger average family sizes, Niskanen finds. The result: The total amount added by the expansion, relative to population size, is higher in those states.
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As it is, the fact that more populous states will get more overall money also benefits red America: Niskanen finds that two of the three states that will get the most in funds are Texas and Florida (along with California).
This gets even more interesting when you break the funding down per capita in each state. The study finds that the first nine states that will gain the most per capita from the expanded child allowance are all red states.
And, because red states tend to have lower economic output, they will receive a larger injection of funds as a share of their GDP as well:
As the report concludes: “The CTC provides the largest relative benefit to rural states with lower economic output.”
This dynamic is also starkly illustrated by the study’s breakdown of benefits received in metropolitan vs. non-metropolitan regions, as a share of their GDP:
Because poor and working-class families will use much of the money to “increase household consumption on goods and services,” it will crank money into non-metro economies at a higher percentage of overall GDP in them, the report concludes.
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“This suggests the CTC expansion will deliver a substantial boost to rural economies across the country,” the report says.
Samuel Hammond, a Niskanen policy analyst, illustrates the point with a thought experiment. Because the GOP base is made up of so many older voters, he notes, Social Security is a government program that provides a huge boost to rural and red America.
“If Social Security were abolished, no one doubts that rural America’s economy would collapse,” Hammond told me. “The expanded child tax credit runs that thought experiment in reverse.”
That has big implications for our perennial debate over the divergence between metropolitan and non-metro America. Conservative populist senators love to valorize non-metro America as the “great American middle” while bashing “cosmopolitan elites,” and Republicans denounce Democrats as elitists for pointing out that non-metro regions are stagnating economically.
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Meanwhile, Republicans are busily rebranding themselves as the “party of the working class” by contrasting Trump’s supposed “economic populism” with the Democratic Party’s alleged “cultural and economic elitism," all to keep Trump voters engaged.
But it’s the party of elitist coastal cosmopolitanism that supports a new policy that would inject a big economic boost into rural and non-metro regions. Republicans, by contrast, have insisted it will lead to “fraudulent” payments and even denounced it as a “government handout.”
In this, Republicans are reverting to a decades-old approach — pushing canards about the safety net that appear designed to play on fear and loathing of the urban underclass to help advance a plutocratic agenda. Whatever happened to Trump’s “working-class” GOP makeover?
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“The perception that these programs mostly benefit the urban poor is very outdated,” Hammond told me. “The modern Republican coalition has a lot of working-class voters and families in rural America.”
“The child tax credit expansion is going to be huge for rural working-class communities,” Hammond continued. “It’s strange to see Republicans oppose spending money even when it goes to their own constituents.”