Friday, March 5, 2021

Newsflash: Biden actually is governing in a bipartisan way

Newsflash: Biden actually is governing in a bipartisan way

Opinion by Paul Waldman and Greg Sargent

March 5, 2021 at 6:20 a.m. GMT+9


In Thursday’s floor debate on the covid relief bill, Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) — implacable enemy of partisanship that he is — took Democrats to task for failing to cooperate sufficiently with Republicans.


Democrats, said McConnell, are “ramming through their partisan spending spree. … And they’ve told Republicans: Take it or leave it. No openness to meaningful bipartisan input.”


The truth is precisely the opposite. In a way that has eluded many observers, the handling of the covid relief bill by President Biden and Democrats has actually shown genuine efforts at bipartisanship and cross-party cooperation.


Another way to put this: We’re seeing the kind of qualified effort at bipartisanship that we should want and expect in such a polarized, crisis-ridden age.


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While Biden was mocked during the 2020 campaign for insisting he could work with Republicans, he has followed through on his promise to try. Even if the end result is unlikely to be bipartisan support for the relief bill — it already passed the House with zero Republican votes, and it might not get any in the Senate — that doesn’t mean efforts at bipartisanship haven’t been in evidence.


Our point is not that seeking (or achieving) bipartisanship for its own sake is a good unto itself. It’s that, given the realities of today’s GOP and the scale of the challenges the country faces, the right way to strive for bipartisanship is to seek input from Republicans — in good faith — while not letting the quest for bipartisanship set the agenda.


Let’s review what we’ve seen.


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First, Biden has repeatedly expressed openness to listen to Republicans about this bill. He invited GOP moderates to the White House to talk about it. In the end, he didn’t accept their proposal to scale back stimulus checks — but he did move in their direction. And he’s holding more bipartisan meetings on issues such as infrastructure and cancer research.


Some Republicans, of course, say that’s not good enough. Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Tex.) predicts that 50 Republicans will vote no on the relief package, because Democrats were so “partisan” about it.


But Cruz will never vote for anything Biden wants, no matter what it contains. So the administration is concentrating on Republicans who might at least consider voting for the relief proposal or other future bills.


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And those Republicans admit that there has been outreach to them. “I’ve had four calls from the president since my reelection,” Sen. Susan Collins of Maine told the Atlantic.


Meanwhile, Sen. Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska) told The Post that she, too, has been targeted by White House outreach:


Murkowski said she is taking every opportunity — whether it’s sit-downs with nominees who need her support, or conversations with White House officials about the coronavirus relief package — to press Alaska issues.

Biden is also looking beyond Congress, to where Republicans might see it in their interest to cooperate with some of his initiatives:


In his first five weeks in office, Biden is spending as much time — if not more — courting Republican governors as he is wooing the senators he needs to pass legislation.

Governors, of course, have different imperatives than members of Congress do and might lend support for initiatives that might channel resources to their states that they can tout as accomplishments themselves.


In an age when GOP senators and representatives are under intense pressure to maintain unity against Biden’s agenda — and fear the wrath of the right-wing media — reaching out to GOP governors is the sort of bipartisanship that might work.


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All this suggests a formula on future important bills:


Reach out to reasonable members of the other party and invite them to discuss the bill

Take their ideas seriously, but don’t be limited by them

Court Republicans outside Washington who might support you on the bill

Hope you can get some Republicans to vote for it, but be prepared to pass it without them

Make sure it benefits all Americans regardless of where they live or which party they support

We can pine for the days when old Senate bulls from both parties hashed out the details of legislation over cigars and whiskey, but those days are gone. Instead, in this intensely partisan atmosphere, we’re seeing what bipartisanship should look like.


This might work politically as well.


A new poll conducted by the Democratic firm Hart Research for the Center for American Progress finds that large majorities of U.S. voters see acting on popular policies as unifying:


Which of the following do you think should be more important for the President and Congress when it comes to unity and trying to unify the country?

Pushing for policies and solutions that are supported by large majorities of Americans: 64

Pushing for policies and solutions that both Democratic and Republican elected officials in Congress can agree to: 36

The Biden rescue package actually is supported by large majorities. So pushing for such solutions (as opposed to seeking bipartisanship for its own sake) will likely be seen widely as unifying in and of itself.


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The poll, which CAP shared with us and and will be circulated among congressional Democrats, also found:


Which of the following do you think is more important?

Passing a plan that is large enough to do what is necessary to finally put the coronavirus crisis behind us: 68

Passing a plan [that is] bipartisan and has the support of both Republicans and Democrats: 32

To be fair, polls often show support for public officials generally working with the opposition. But it might be that when offered a choice between seeking generic bipartisanship and effecting a specific desired outcome — in this case, government acting ambitiously to defeat the pandemic — large majorities favor the latter.


After all, at a time like this, bills that fail to meet the needs of the moment — because the president sought support from the opposition — won’t be awarded credit from the public as an act of bipartisan statesmanship. It’ll be seen as failure.


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The GOP argument against election reform is even worse than you think

The GOP argument against election reform is even worse than you think

Opinion by Paul Waldman


March 5, 2021 at 3:05 a.m. GMT+9

On Wednesday, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 1, the For the People Act, a package of reforms meant to guarantee voting rights and fight political corruption. Naturally, Republicans are outraged.


The response of most Democrats is to dismiss Republican objections as bad faith and part of their sweeping war on democracy meant to undermine voting rights so they can win and hold power despite having the support of a minority of the public. Which is perfectly true.


But let’s take Republicans’ objection to H.R. 1′s provisions seriously. Because when you do, it makes their opposition look even less defensible.


That objection was summarized by former vice president Mike Pence in a recent column:


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Every single proposed change in HR 1 serves one goal, and one goal only: to give leftists a permanent, unfair, and unconstitutional advantage in our political system.

We hear this from Republicans at all levels; as House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.) said, “It is not designed to protect Americans’ vote — it is designed to put a thumb on the scale in every election in America, so that Democrats can turn a temporary majority into permanent control.”


Here are some of H.R. 1′s key provisions:


Requires automatic voter registration

Requires reasonably generous early voting

Requires no-excuse absentee voting or vote by mail

Mandates independent commissions to draw congressional districts to end partisan gerrymandering

Limits voter purges

Restores voting rights to those with felony convictions

Establishes public financing for federal campaigns in which small donations would be matched

Restricts “dark money”

Requires presidents and presidential candidates to release their tax returns

We could argue about the particulars of each of these, but let’s consider them in light of the Republican objection: that they must not be allowed because they would help Democrats.


What they’re saying is that early voting — which many people find convenient — would help Democrats. Eliminating gerrymandering would help Democrats. Limiting states’ ability to throw thousands of people off the voter rolls en masse would help Democrats. Restricting dark money would help Democrats. If we saw every presidential nominee’s tax returns, it would help Democrats.


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Getting the picture? Republicans are explicitly arguing that if the electoral system were not restrictive, exclusionary and corrupt, then they would be put at an unfair disadvantage. What does that say about their party?


Let’s take a closer look at one provision: automatic voter registration, in which people are registered to vote whenever they do something such as getting a driver’s license, unless they choose to opt out. Today, 20 states and D.C. have AVR. Most of them are run by Democrats, but not all; the heavily Republican states of Alaska and West Virginia have it as well.


The evidence is mixed, but while AVR clearly results in more people getting registered and more people voting, if there’s any advantage for Democrats it’s a small one, produced mostly by the fact that AVR registers many young people who otherwise wouldn’t have bothered.


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But to argue against it, Republicans have to say that registering and voting should be difficult. In a pinch they can come up with some laughable elitist justification (if it’s too easy, uninformed people will vote!), but most of the time they’ll just say forthrightly that making registering and voting easier will help Democrats. Which means that making it harder helps Republicans.


Or take gerrymandering, for which it is impossible to come up with even a remotely plausible justification. It’s just about power: Our party has the power to draw lines that favor us, so we will.


H.R. 1 doesn’t give Democrats a “thumb on the scale” in redistricting; it would mandate that independent, nonpartisan commissions do the job. But Republicans cry that independence and nonpartisanship are unfair to them. They need gerrymandering, or else they’ll be deprived of the advantage that allows them to win even when more voters prefer their opponents.


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So, viewed another way, Republicans are right: The creation of an even playing field would indeed disadvantage them relative to the status quo, because they’ve successfully created an uneven playing field in so many states.


A lawyer for the Arizona GOP basically admitted this at the Supreme Court this week. He was asked why the party was arguing that it’s important to disqualify a legitimate voter’s ballot if they mistakenly cast it in the wrong precinct. He replied that counting that vote would put Republicans “at a competitive disadvantage relative to Democrats,” and added: “Politics is a zero-sum game.”


So the Republican argument comes down to this: Only an unfair system is fair to us. Any attempt to make the system fair must therefore be stopped.


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When you hear Republicans say that any electoral reform that makes voting easier is a plot to help Democrats, remember that that’s what they mean. Nothing makes them more afraid than a well-functioning democracy. They aren’t even pretending otherwise.


Read more:


How the Trump scam could deliver another big GOP victory

How the Trump scam could deliver another big GOP victory

Opinion by Greg Sargent


March 5, 2021 at 12:52 a.m. GMT+9

The Trump scam is alive and well in the GOP. And it’s perfectly plausible that it might keep on delivering for Republicans — perhaps spectacularly so.


All signs are that Democrats are close to passing a massive $1.9 trillion rescue package. Despite last-minute haggling, we’ll soon likely see large stimulus checks for most Americans, extended unemployment insurance and big public expenditures to smooth the reopening of schools and speed vaccination distribution, which is already outpacing expectations.


All signs also are that just about every single Republican in Congress — if not every single one of them — will oppose the whole thing.


In a sense, this opposition represents a repurposing of former president Donald Trump’s playbook — the Trump scam. Even as they’re opposing President Biden’s rescue package — offering little economic assistance to working Americans at a time of crisis, just as Trump failed to do — Republicans are increasingly casting the GOP as the working-class party, in Trump’s empty image.


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It might work. And a great new report in the New York Times captures why.


As the Times notes, Republicans such as Sen. Josh Hawley of Missouri keep saying things like “we are a working class party now.” But the reality is that this is largely cultural posturing:


At a high-profile, high-decibel gathering of conservatives in Florida last weekend, potential 2024 presidential candidates, including Mr. Hawley and Senator Ted Cruz of Texas, scarcely mentioned a blue-collar agenda. They used their turns in the national spotlight to fan grievances about “cancel culture,” to bash the tech industry and to reinforce Mr. Trump’s false claims of a stolen election.

Inside and outside the party, critics see a familiar pattern: Republican officials, following Mr. Trump’s own example, are exploiting the cultural anger and racial resentment of a sizable segment of the white working class, but have not made a concerted effort to help these Americans economically.

Some Republicans worry that this will ultimately fail. As former Congressman Carlos Curbelo told the Times, this “new Republican coalition" will ultimately “abandon” the GOP unless Republicans “take action to improve people’s quality of life.”


And GOP pollster Whit Ayres adds that Republicans must develop “an economic agenda that benefits working people” rather than “relitigating a lost presidential election.”


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One has to hope that is right. But there are reasons to be skeptical.


How the scam might work

First, as the Times piece notes, the GOP base might not actually punish Republican lawmakers for voting against the rescue package, because Republican voters will benefit from it anyway.


Indeed, I would add that after this is over, GOP lawmakers might be seen by their voters as having railed merely about phantom excesses in the bill that were invented for the base’s consumption. As Media Matters documents, right-wing media have wildly hyped such invented excesses.


And so, even as GOP voters pocket stimulus checks and get vaccines more quickly, the story in that information universe will become that GOP lawmakers rightly called out all these crazy socialist schemes brought to you by the Democrats who want to burn down your cities and cancel your children’s books.


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Ryan Cooper calls this the “Republican grievance perpetual motion machine.” And as the Times reports, this might resonate with GOP voters more than the niggling matter of who supported sending that check:


It’s possible that Republicans who are not prioritizing economic issues are accurately reading their base. A survey last month by the G.O.P. pollster Echelon Insights found that the top concerns of Republican voters were mainly cultural ones: illegal immigration, lack of support for the police, high taxes and “liberal bias in mainstream media.”

The question then becomes whether Republicans can win back the House or more largely on these fumes. And what’s often missing from discussions like these is the centrality of the GOP’s increasing reliance on voter suppression and anti-majoritarian tactics to such an outcome.


Voter suppression is the key

New voter-suppression efforts are unfolding in numerous states. Republicans are openly boasting that retaking the House in 2022 — halting Biden’s agenda and positioning the GOP to win the White House in 2024 — will be aided by extreme gerrymanders.


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This is crucial to seeing how the Trump scam, understood in all its manifold depravity, might actually work. Rather than being a mere distraction from the agenda Republicans supposedly must develop to win back power, the lie about the stolen election is itself central to doing that.


In this scenario, the continued devotion to the stolen election mythos, in addition to keeping GOP voters in that state of perpetual grievance, also underpins the voter-suppression and anti-majoritarian tactics that will make this more likely. The Trump scam is many-headed: It combines that grievance-mongering with those escalated tactics, justified by still more grievance ... about Trump.


None of this is to excuse the role of Democrats in what happens. They probably do have to have a difficult conversation about whether certain tendencies in their own base are making it easier for Republicans to turn on that grievance machine or even alienating certain segments of the working class in their own right.


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Similarly, Democrats will have to deliver, which may run aground against their skittish unwillingness to undertake filibuster reform. Indeed, if they do deliver, there’s an optimistic alternative possibility: Demonstrating that government can defeat the pandemic, rebuild infrastructure, juice the economy and lift working people’s fortunes could undermine right-wing grievance appeals.


But if the question is whether Republicans can win back power without developing a genuine working-class agenda, well, it’s hard to answer that question in the negative with a great deal of confidence.


Read more:


Thursday, March 4, 2021

What can we do about vaccine hesitancy?

What can we do about vaccine hesitancy?

By Matthew Yglesias

SlowBoring.com

March 3, 2021

Hello! First off, let me apologize for forgetting to post a discussion thread yesterday. No excuse, I just messed up. I will try to be better in the future.

Second, if you like seeing me yak, check out my BloggingHeads with Bob Wright where we talk about Substack, foreign policy, and everything in between.

Now onto the main event: vaccine hesitancy.

I published a piece in the Washington Post’s Outlook section recently titled “Not All ‘Anti-Racist’ Ideas Are Good Ones.” This piece was kind of wide-ranging, but it contained a passage that prompted some pushback from someone whose opinion I value, and I want to revise and extend my remarks to concede the basic truth of his critique.

The overall theme of the piece is that the post-Kendi move of pointing to every disparity and labeling it “racism” is not a super-useful way to analyze problems. One example I gave was the extent to which in basically every American city, you can see more vaccinations done in white neighborhoods than in non-white neighborhoods. The disparity is a serious issue, but it seems to be more driven by a gap in demand than anything else, and it needs to be addressed through that lens.

I think that’s correct. The main point of this post is to consider what we can do about vaccine hesitancy — which, to be clear in a way that some coverage has not been, is actually mostly a question of white Republicans — but the way I glossed over the roots of that hesitance in the Post piece was wrong.

Here is what I wrote:

For example, maps of various American cities now sail across social media depicting higher vaccination rates in White neighborhoods than in Black ones. A Kendi-type analysis would conclude that gap is racist, full stop. And certainly it is often framed that way, as if city officials were making vaccinations available on a discriminatory basis.

Perhaps that is true, in some cases. But surveys also show that Black Americans are considerably less eager than White Americans to get vaccinated. That’s a serious problem on its own terms. But it’s not a problem of overt discrimination (although the distrust gap may stem from past medical discrimination). Insisting that all gaps reveal racism elides the critical question of what’s actually happening and how to fix it.

My core point here, which I think is valid, is that we need to distinguish between three types of situations:

There is a deliberate discriminatory pattern of steering vaccines away from Black patients in need (a lot of GI Bill mortgage programs were like this).

The vaccine is being rolled out in a way that has a disproportionate impact on a city’s Black residents. For example, if you need a car or a fast broadband connection to get a shot (this happens a lot in America and a lot in big cities — class and race are so closely correlated that it can be tempting to collapse them, especially if disparate-impact legal strategies have a chance of working).

The vaccine is being rolled out in an equitable way, but Black residents are less likely to want it.

The point is not that these aren’t all bad situations, but that they are all different situations, and they imply different remedies. Based on the available evidence, it seems like we are looking at some of (2), and then specifically in big cities where the white people are generally liberals, there’s a good dose of (3). The parenthetical I wrote about “past medical discrimination” was an effort to nod at the idea that the racial trust gap is not a wholly different thing from racism as a subject, even though it still is quite different as a specific diagnosis of the vaccination situation.

That said, “oh it’s the past” can be a comforting way of minimizing what is really a persistent lack of legitimacy in social institutions.

“The past” isn’t really past
April Dembosky from the Bay Area public radio station KQED ran a great story a few days after my piece published titled “No, the Tuskegee Study Is Not the Top Reason Some Black Americans Question the COVID-19 Vaccine.”

To me, it was like a breath of fresh air. Obviously the Tuskegee study is a real thing that happened, and studying it is a good lens on the history of biomedical ethics in the United States. But referencing it as a cause of present-day behavior just sounded way too much like educated people showing off their historical knowledge than a real explanation.

One thing she notes is that Black reluctance to participate in biomedical research is a big issue in biomedical research, so there is actually a fair amount of biomedical research on the subject. A big study by Ralph Katz, Stefanie Russell, Nancy Kressin, Lee Green, Min Qi Wang, Sherman James, and Cristina Claudio concluded that, to quote Demosky, “while Black people were twice as ‘wary’ of participating in research, as compared to white people, they were equally willing to actually participate. And, there was no association between knowledge of Tuskegee and willingness to participate.” Indeed, both Pfizer and Moderna took special steps to ensure adequate non-white representation in their clinical trials and ended up with samples that are very slightly less-Black but more-Hispanic than the aggregate national population, and that gave them enough statistical power to state with confidence that the technology works well in people of all ethnic backgrounds.

But not every trial is like that, and it is not clear to me that the care taken in the COVID-19 vaccine trials is well-known. Inadequate testing leads to a genuine gap in doctors’ ability to treat Black cancer patients as effectively as they treat white ones, because getting patients enrolled in trials is a legitimate method of treating cancers when other options have been exhausted.

Back to Dembowski, the issue is a sense based on current experience that the medical system does not serve Black patients well, and that therefore a high degree of skepticism is warranted.

“It's ‘Oh, Tuskegee, Tuskegee, Tuskegee,’ and it's mentioned every single time,” says Karen Lincoln, a professor of social work at the University of Southern California. “We make these assumptions that it's Tuskegee. We don't ask people.”

When she asks the Black seniors she works with in Los Angeles about the vaccine, Tuskegee rarely comes up. People in the community are more interested in talking about contemporary racism and barriers to health care, she says, while it seems to be mainly academics and officials who are preoccupied with the history of Tuskegee.

“It's a scapegoat,” Lincoln says. “It’s an excuse. If you continue to use it as a way of explaining why many African Americans are hesitant, it almost absolves you of having to learn more, do more, involve other people – admit that racism is actually a thing today.”

Racial disparities in pain treatment, for example, have been well-documented in recent years, in part due to the ironic fact that it may have led to less opioid addiction among African-Americans. A lot of treatments of the racial life expectancy gap focus on socioeconomic factors. But a comprehensive 2002 report from the National Academies of Medicine that didn’t attract much attention back before the Great Awokening concluded that a significant gap remained, even with full socioeconomic controls. They found instead clear statistical evidence of actual (though perhaps unintentional) bias in the quality of treatment offered to Black patients.

If you look back pre-COVID-19, the racial life expectancy gap was actually improving much more rapidly than socioeconomic conditions were converging, so it’s plausible that there was a happy story in there about health care professionals becoming less racist since the NAM report came out.


The point, however, is that we’re not talking about distrust sown in the misty past — we’re talking about people living in a world of biased care and improperly done clinical trials. And it leads to suspicion.

Last but not least, it should be emphasized that the stark racial gap maps are mostly coming from America’s big cities where the white population is mostly well-educated liberals — the most pro-vaccine demographic in the country. If you pull out, of course, most white people are Republicans, and most of the vaccine-hesitant population is white Republicans.

Vaccine resistance is mostly white Republicans
I had sort of been conceptualizing the disproportionate media focus on Black vaccine hesitancy as a consequence of the Great Awokening — white liberals are expressing concern about their Black neighbors. But I think Adam Serwer and Deen Freelon are reading it the other way here: the media is criticizing Black America for being vaccine reluctant while ignoring the quantitatively larger problem of white Republicans’ behavior.

Twitter avatar for @AdamSerwer
Either way you look at it, the data is unmistakable — not only do white Republicans outnumber Black people, but a larger share of that larger population is vaccine skeptical. And to make matters worse, reluctance is declining markedly among the Black population over the course of the rollout, and it is not among Republicans.


This raises the specter of a continuing COVID-19 epidemic that kind of bounces around in different conservative, rural areas indefinitely, perhaps spawning new variants and mutations that cause problems for society at large.

One thing all the experts say about this (see Derek Thompson and German Lopez) is that we should not understand vaccine skepticism as a single phenomenon. It is, instead, multiple different phenomena that occur in different ways in different communities. I do want to complicate that a little bit. Read Perry Bacon and you’ll see that it’s common for Republicans to believe white people and Christians face a great deal of discrimination in the contemporary United States. I think that’s mistaken. But if you’re interested in group psychology, it’s probably worth conceding some similarity here. White Republicans’ subjective understanding of the world is that they are a marginalized community and they don’t trust the media, the medical establishment, etc., who they see as inattentive to their concerns. The fact that this is 80% BS doesn’t change the relevance to selecting messages and messengers.

The good news is that precisely because the white Republican perception that society is rigged against them is false, there are lots of high-profile validators who they trust and who could be recruited to spread the good word.

Let Trump take credit for the vaccine
In particular, the most potent validator of all would be Donald Trump. He at least sometimes likes to take credit for the vaccines’ development and should perhaps be encouraged to do so.

The former president and his wife have both been vaccinated, and while it was hardly the focus of Trump’s CPAC address, he did say there that its development was one of his administration’s accomplishments and that everyone should get it.

Twitter avatar for @maggieNYT
Trump is famously not a super-cooperative person. But there are surely businessmen out there who are friendly with Trump and who have a vested interest in getting things reopened as quickly as possible. It would be smart for anyone in a position of authority to reach out to those folks and see if they can nudge Trump to be more vocal about this, offering assurances that the Biden White House will be chill if Trump wants to brag about Operation Warp Speed.

It seems unlikely that he’ll be a great champion here, but he could do something. It’s also worth reaching out to Mike Pence, who I think has always done a good job of putting forward a more normal face for Trump — it’s easy to imagine him doing some good public whining about how the media and the deep state never give Donald Trump enough credit for Operation Warp Speed which developed three safe and effective vaccines faster than Dr. Fauci thought was possible. Own the libs, says Mike Pence, by getting the vaccine.

Tucker Carlson has occasionally flirted with crankiness about the vaccines as part of his larger anti-expertise schtick, and it would be really useful to try to do some targeted outreach to him. The key, again, would be to present a pro-vaccine message in a manner that’s consistent with cranky right-wing politics. Alex Tabarrok from Mercatus and George Mason University does lots of good stuff about how the FDA is too cautious about the vaccine and he would be a great guest to talk with Tucker about how amazing all the vaccines are — even the AstraZeneca one, which the establishment won’t let us take — and how even just one shot of an mRNA vaccine is actually super-effective. Other conservative media influencers like Sean Hannity and Glenn Beck are really important here, too.

Ultimately, getting conservative America vaccinated is going to require aggressively pro-vax policy measures from red state governors, and that means trying to have a conservative media ecology where it’s understood that vaccinating as many people as quickly as possible is the way to stick it to the public health scolds who want everyone wearing masks forever.

What’s worked with past vaccines
Right now, we’re in a bit of a weird situation where even though vaccine reluctance is high, there are also more people who want a vaccine than can get one.

The normal vaccination situation is different from that. Vaccines provide benefits to the vaccinated, but they also provide significant external benefits to society. Consequently, left to their own devices, people get vaccinated at sub-optimal rates even when there are plenty of doses available. So while we don’t have a huge historical track-record of the exact best way to handle the March 2021 situation, it seems like by May we will be in a more normal situation where the pharmaceutical industry’s capacity to manufacture doses exceeds the number of people who want one.

And this is something that’s been studied quite a bit, primarily in terms of trying to get parents to give their kids the MMR vaccine for measles, mumps, and rubella.

It’s worth emphasizing that the hurdle here is genuinely quite big. Precisely because Americans are widely vaccinated against these diseases, your kid’s odds of contracting any of them if he skips the vaccine are nonetheless very low. As a society, it is very important that we maintain high levels of childhood vaccination. But for an individual, the benefits of vaccination are very low in a way that’s not true with the current COVID-19 vaccines.

So what do we know? Julie Jacob looked at vaccine hesitancy in the United States and found that it was historically widespread in lower-income communities. But the rollout of S-CHIP brought poor parents and their kids into more routine contact with the health care system and greatly increased vaccination rates, leaving the non-vaccinated rump as a group of often affluent parents with weird ideas (these are the “antivaxxers” as we knew them pre-COVID-19).

One implication here is that as we shift into non-emergency conditions, making the Johnson & Johnson vaccine available through normal doctors’ offices could be a potent tool in pushing vaccination rates up further. Practicing MDs are actually not pharmacological experts, but the evidence is very clear that people count on their personal clinician as their main source of advice on this question. Low-income people (and particularly low-income Black men) tend not to have a stable primary care provider, which is going to be a hurdle, but also a case where better overall health care policy can help in the long run. But in the shorter-term, plenty of those vaccine-hesitant Republicans are middle-class people with regular doctors, and making the vaccine available that way will help.

Kaiser’s research also indicates that the one-shot format is appealing to some hesitant people — I think baseline dislike of being stuck by needles may be an underrated issue in vaccine hesitancy, so telling people it’s one and done is useful.

Twitter avatar for @KFF
Some of this is kid-specific stuff (showing parents videos about vaccines, discussing vaccination with pregnant mothers), but some of it isn’t. They find that in communities with low levels of vaccination, it’s helpful to make home visits, for example, and then to set up reminder/recall systems.

They also find that kind of flooding the zone works well:

Community-level approaches are the most challenging to implement, as they require the greatest amount of time, human labor, and financial resources. However, efforts that encourage community buy-in and involvement are often high-impact (i.e. reach a large number of participants). In a study aimed at reducing recognized childhood immunization disparities between inner-city, urban, and suburban children, immunization coverage among inner-city children 24 months old increased by 29 percentage points from 1993 to 1996 as a result of the combined reminder, recall, and outreach (RRO) intervention. More impressively, however, this community-based strategy to improve immunization uptake decreased immunization disparities between suburban and inner-city children from 18% to 4% within 6 years. Collaborations between healthcare organizations and other stakeholders such as pharmacies and daycares also improve rates; a county-wide, school-based vaccination campaign resulted in 26–75% of elementary school children receiving the influenza vaccine. Offering vaccines to eligible children in 2 emergency departments resulted in increases of 8–11%. Finally, one community-based study reported an increase in coverage from 40.6% to 80.5% over 2 years through incorporating immunization promotion activities into pre-established community programs.

I think the important thing to note about this is that the scarcity of “financial resources” reflects the fact that in normal times, the United States is pretty stingy with public health. We currently have trillions of dollars in COVID-19 relief churning out, so the money should be there. The key thing is that to make it work, I think you need Republican governors to want to make it work — both as cheerleaders and facilitators of big, community-level pushes.

The big lesson from non-COVID-19 vaccination campaigns, I would say, is that ease and friction really count.

People aren’t dichotomously pro- or anti-vax, and both assistance and nagging kind of work. When supply is plentiful, we should be setting up vaccination stands in shopping malls, partnering with churches in low-uptake communities, driving vaccine vans up to popular parks, whatever it takes. We should also think about how we are financing vaccination. Right now getting a COVID-19 vaccine is free. But administering a Covid vaccine isn’t necessarily lucrative for the vaccinator. That’s fine for now. But relatively soon, we are going to want to switch to a paradigm where it is highly profitable (as in the government should pay a high unit rate; the vaccine should still be free to consumers) for Walmart or Giant or CVS or whomever to administer a vaccine to a previously non-vaccinated person. If you set a bunch of big national chains against each other in a competitive environment, they are pretty good at marketing.

What all the experts say about the COVID-19 shot, in particular, is that acceptance tends to rise when you know other people who’ve gotten the shot — vaccine demand spreads virally in other words, since there’s no proof like direct, personal confirmation that nothing terrible happens.

Time to consider vaccine mandates?
Where the experts do not yet seem to have gone is the idea of making the vaccine mandatory.

The military has been dealing with stubbornly high levels of vaccine reluctance and keeps saying they would like to make it mandatory, but can’t because it’s currently available under an Emergency Use Authorization.

The variations make it harder for leaders to identify which arguments for the vaccine are most persuasive. The Food and Drug Administration has allowed emergency use of the vaccine, so it’s voluntary. But Defense Department officials say they hope that soon may change.

“We cannot make it mandatory yet,” Vice Adm. Andrew Lewis, commander of the Navy’s 2nd Fleet, said last week. “I can tell you we’re probably going to make it mandatory as soon as we can, just like we do with the flu vaccine.”

As far as I know, every single person working at the FDA, CDC, NIH, DOD, and other relevant agencies thinks the vaccine is safe and people should take it. So does the President of the United States, and so does his defeated rival Donald Trump. So do Mitch McConnell and Nancy Pelosi.

I don’t understand exactly the bureaucratic or legal issue with the EUA vs. regular authorization and military policy. But if there is absolute unanimity among the scientific and public health communities that the vaccine is good, if military officials say vaccination is good for readiness, and if all the political leaders of both parties say people should get vaccinated, then they ought to work out whatever the issue is and move to make it mandatory for service members.

Mandatory vaccination while supplies are scarce feels a little perverse to me, so I can understand not doing it.

But we shouldn’t underestimate the extent to which people make inferences about the science based on the rules. If indoor dining is open, many people infer that eating indoors is safe and socially responsible, even if it isn’t. And if the military normally requires flu vaccines but is saying there’s some FDA issue causing them to not require the COVID-19 vaccine, that implies there’s something dodgy about the COVID-19 vaccine. The military is not a libertarian institution — it orders people to do things all the time. When the country is in a state of ample supply, they should make it mandatory with whatever exemptions they offer for the flu vaccine.

By the same token, the Department of Education should start encouraging universities to require the COVID-19 vaccine along with whatever other immunizations they require. You obviously can’t require kids in K-12 schools to take it if it’s not approved for teens, but you can require it for teachers and staff.

In my view, mandates — again, once supplies are ample — are good not just because they mechanically push up compliance but because they demonstrate confidence. Right now, I think a lot of people look at the “everyone get your vaccine but also keep behaving cautiously once you get it” messaging as kind of shady. Flipping the script to “everything is open and everyone can go do whatever, but we’re going to be making large swathes of the population take this vaccine” as soon as possible is a good way of demonstrating confidence that the vaccine works, and the imperative is just to get it into people’s arms. There are a few known unknowns surrounding the duration of immunity and possible future evolution of the virus, so we should be at least conceptually prepared for a world where there’s a big variant-optimized booster push in 2023 or something. We want to be forceful about it the way we are with the MMR shot rather than dancing around it like vaccine authorization is a delicate flower.

Just how nihilist is American politics right now?

Just how nihilist is American politics right now?

By Daniel W. Drezner

Daniel W. Drezner is a professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a regular contributor to PostEverything.

March 3, 2021 at 9:00 p.m. GMT+9


Like you even care about the answer

Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Tex.) speaks during the Conservative Political Action Conference on Friday in Orlando. (Jabin Botsford/The Washington Post)

What determines a voter’s choice when they cast their ballot? This is a fundamental question in my field. I have taken and taught enough political science classes to know the range of answers. Partisan lean matters a lot. An array of demographic characteristics can also affect voter choice — and might be the underlying cause for partisanship in the first place.


Still, at a gut level, one would assume voters gravitate toward competency: Politicians who govern badly are punished at the ballot box and politicians who govern well are rewarded. Sure, partisan filter helps define what is “good” and “bad,” but at the extremes one would hope voters recognize the truly great and truly awful politicians. Supporters of democracy had better hope there is some rough correlation between doing one’s job well and voters recognizing that fact. Otherwise, charlatans and crooks can get elected and stay popular even while running a country into the ground.


The hard-working staff here at Spoiler Alerts has fretted over the years that this rough rule of thumb is dissolving. Partisanship does not explain all of it. Some issues are so complex that even experts have a hard time comprehending what is going on, much less voters. In this world, electoral politics devolves from policy debates to more basic and understandable questions of identity and political symbolism.


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Consider New York Gov. Andrew M. Cuomo (D). Last year his coronavirus news conferences garnered a lot of media praise. This happened even though he made numerous policy decisions — such as ordering hospitals to discharge infectious nursing-home residents back to their facilities — that exacerbated the pandemic. Still, according to Variety, what mattered was his news conferences: “Cuomo connected with viewers because he instinctively did what a great talk show host must do — make it personal.”


This year has not been as kind to Cuomo, but his two scandals have had a differential impact on his standing. In late January the New York attorney general reported Cuomo had concealed the number of covid-19 nursing home deaths from legislators. This seems pretty bad, but as Slate’s Ben Mathis-Lilley noted a few weeks ago, Cuomo’s standing among New York Democrats was so high and this issue was so arcane that it did not matter: “His press conference performances notwithstanding, the facts and evidence show that Cuomo is not someone who cares much about facts and evidence. But his liberal supporters don’t care: … At this point, Andrew Cuomo could probably shoot someone on Fifth Avenue and get away with it.”


Cuomo’s other scandal, however — a string of sexual harassment accusations from multiple women several decades his junior — might be another story. Veteran Albany reporter Jon Campbell explained to Slate’s Aymann Ismail why this was a bigger problem for Cuomo than his previous policy scandals: “They were, quite frankly, difficult to explain sometimes in a sound bite, or in a way that could keep people interested. This one’s very different. The conduct is easy to describe. It’s post-Me Too, and people have a better understanding of why the conduct that’s alleged is problematic.” Or, as TNR’s Alex Pareene put it, “What is happening now is that fans of Andrew Cuomo the television character are being introduced to Andrew Cuomo the newspaper character.”


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So it would seem as though symbolic politics matter more now than policy missteps. Maybe that is not all bad! Symbolic politics are important, too, as recent debates about statues and flags and the names of military bases make clear. Maybe it is curmudgeonly to judge voters for reacting to easily comprehensible political scandals rather than more complex scandals?


Then we look at Texas, and it turns out even symbolic politics matters less than pure partisanship.


Texas Republicans — who have won every statewide race since 1994 — have had a God-awful month of governing. The winter storms revealed just how badly Texas officials prepared the energy grid for extreme weather. During the worst of it, Gov. Greg Abbott erroneously blamed the power outages exclusively on alternative energy. Former governor and energy secretary Rick Perry blogged that Texans would be willing to go without power for more than three days in return for escaping federal energy regulators. Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton took his wife and jetted to Utah for a dubious official meeting. And Sen. Ted Cruz was Ted Cruz.


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As symbolic politics go, skedaddling to Cancún or Utah while one’s state is literally freezing seems like a textbook case in which voters will retrospectively punish incumbents. And Cruz has seen his polling numbers drop a bit. FiveThirtyEight’s Alex Samuels, however, looks at Texas polling data and pours ice-cold water on this assumption: “at this point, it’s more likely that Cruz and Abbott — or even embattled Attorney General Ken Paxton — will suffer a minor, but recoverable, blip in the polls than Democrats sweep Texas in 2022.” In essence, Texas is still pretty red and the Democrats lack the candidates to run for statewide office.


So, to sum up: in 2021 elected officials in blue states can govern badly but if they cross a symbolic line they might be at risk of downfall (although see Virginia Gov. Ralph Northam). In red states, elected officials can pretty much do what they want without any retribution except for, you know, acknowledging that Joe Biden won the election in November. And in swing states, GOP-controlled legislatures are focused primarily on turning back the clock.


Am I missing anything? Seriously, am I? Because this seems like American politics at its most nihilistic.


A convenient new fiction: There was no ‘attack on the White House’ last year

A convenient new fiction: There was no ‘attack on the White House’ last year

By Philip Bump

March 4, 2021 at 7:33 a.m. GMT+9

Police clear the area around Lafayette Square and the White House as demonstrators gather June 1 to protest the killing of George Floyd. (Alex Brandon/AP)

It would be quite useful for a lot of people if there were a left-wing analogue to the Jan. 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol. That supporters of former president Donald Trump pushed past Capitol police that day to enter the building, injuring more than 100 law enforcement officers in a riot that resulted in five deaths, is a particularly egregious example of politically motivated violence.


It was an attack centered on blocking Trump’s 2020 election loss — after weeks of disinformation on the subject from Trump himself — and precipitated in part on a deliberate effort to do precisely that. People came to Washington on Jan. 6 because Trump asked them to; some of them came with the specific intent of breaching the building to obstruct the transition of power to President Biden.


Since that day, there’s been an effort to broadly compare the incident to last year’s protests centered on concerns about police treatment of Black Americans. It’s a deeply flawed comparison, mixing wild disparities in scale, intent and motivation to try to craft some sort of what-about response to something that was, in reality, an exceptional event.


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This week, the Senate has held briefings aimed at exploring the security failures that allowed the storming of the Capitol to occur. Over the course of two days of questioning, a new effort to draw equivalence to the left has emerged, centered on one particular moment in last year’s protests.


On Tuesday, Sen. Charles E. Grassley (R-Iowa) began a hearing taking testimony from FBI Director Christopher A. Wray by painting a sweeping picture of how the protests at the White House itself unfolded in late May and early June.


“Sixty-seven Secret Service officers were injured during a three-day siege on the White House, which caused then-President Trump to be brought into a secure bunker,” Grassley said. “We also remember on television seeing our colleague from Kentucky having a hard time getting to the White House when he wanted to go there sometime last summer. We also had the church across the street was lit on fire across the street from the White House.”


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This is revisionism. There wasn’t a “siege” on the White House; there were repeated demonstrations outside the White House. Trump was removed to a secure bunker at one point out of an abundance of caution — as leaders were removed during the attack on the Capitol — but as officials later told the New York Times, the president and his family “were never really in danger,” just “rattled” by the loud protests. (The ever-defensive Trump, of course, claimed that he was only in the bunker for an “inspection.”)


Incidentally, the colleague from Kentucky was Sen. Rand Paul (R), who was accosted by protesters more than two months later after he left the White House following Trump’s GOP convention speech.


Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) and others were escorted from the White House by police after President Trump's GOP convention speech on Aug. 27. (Fredrick Kunkle, Justin Wm. Moyer/The Washington Post)

There were certainly clashes with law enforcement at the White House during those protests and acts of vandalism, including the setting of a small fire at a church across the street. (It was quickly extinguished.) But, again, the intent was different (protesting vs. occupation); the scale was different (a handful of violent actors vs. scores or hundreds); and the motivation was different (concerns about police brutality vs. disinformation about Trump’s election loss).


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Still, Grassley’s “siege” is a more defensible term than the one used Wednesday by Sen. Josh Hawley (R-Mo.).


“The events of the spring, which we’re all familiar with — I mean, we had the attack on the White House where 60 Secret Service officers were injured,” Hawley said when questioning Robert Salesses of the Defense Department. “The president had to be evacuated into a bunker. Church across the street from the White House was lit on fire.”


Hawley noted that the overwhelming response from law enforcement became a subject of political controversy, which is true. On June 4, The Washington Post reported that city officials were concerned about the broad deployment and the use of resources like a National Guard helicopter to monitor, contain and intimidate the protesters. This, he proposed, made the National Guard wary of a similarly robust deployment at the Capitol, an assessment with which Salesses agreed.


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But Hawley’s framing is ludicrous. The protesters weren’t seeking to attack the White House, nor did they. In fact, the protesters in Lafayette Square just north of the White House were eventually the target of a violent effort to disperse them by law enforcement at the scene. This wasn’t a function of their behavior; Trump, you’ll recall, wanted to cross the street to have his photo taken outside of the church at which the fire had been set.


The Washington Post reconstructed who did what to clear protesters from Lafayette Square, which sits north of the White House, on June 1. Watch how it unfolded. (Sarah Cahlan, Joyce Lee, Atthar Mirza/The Washington Post)

It is true that the robust deployment of law enforcement at the White House would have prevented any attempt to overrun the building should the protesters have wanted to do so. It’s also true that the more sparse presence of law enforcement at the Capitol allowed the mob to storm inside. The question the Senate hopes to answer is precisely why that disparity existed, particularly given the understanding from some in law enforcement that people were traveling to Washington with the stated intent of storming the building.


There are, of course, few members of the Senate for whom a left-wing equivalent to the Capitol breach would be more useful than Hawley. The senator led the charge to placate Trump supporters who viewed the election as stolen by announcing he would seek to block the counting of electoral votes from Pennsylvania. On the morning of Jan. 6, he walked past protesters outside the Capitol, giving them a fist-pump of support. He’s seen as inextricably tied to the eventual violence, thanks to rhetoric like this — retweeted with approval by Trump.


If left-wing attackers had tried to storm the White House, threatening Trump’s life and seeking to disrupt the functioning of the federal government, Hawley’s own role in encouraging those who eventually stormed the Capitol would gain the context that such actions were the new political normal, not an aberration. If there had been an attack on the executive mansion as there was an attack on the legislature, Hawley might better wave away questions about his decision to oppose the counting of electoral votes.


But that is not what happened.


The uses and abuses of weaponized interdependence in 2021

The uses and abuses of weaponized interdependence in 2021

By Daniel W. Drezner

Daniel W. Drezner is a professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a regular contributor to PostEverything.

March 2, 2021 at 9:00 p.m. GMT+9

Some thoughts about economic statecraft over the next year or so

President Biden holds a semiconductor chip last week before signing an executive order aimed at addressing a global semiconductor chip shortage. (Jonathan Ernst/Reuters)

In 2019 Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman published an article titled “Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion.” The hard-working staff here at Spoiler Alerts were pretty big fans of the paper. Farrell and Newman were not the first to observe that states could exploit interdependence to engage in economic statecraft. That is a tale as old as Albert Hirschman. What was novel about Farrell and Newman’s work was the application of network theory to explain how coercing actors could exploit interdependence and why targeted actors would find it difficult to evade coercion attempts.


The highest compliment I can pay Farrell and Newman is this: I have worked on questions of economic statecraft for more than 20 years and was absolutely furious that they had observed bits and pieces of this idea floating in the scholarly ether, thought about it rigorously, and made it so darn clear and compelling for everyone else.


Rather than pout in a corner, however, I did the smart thing and joined forces with Farrell and Newman! The result is an edited volume, “The Uses and Abuses of Weaponized Interdependence,” that Brookings Institution Press has published today. It features Farrell and Newman’s original article as well as 16 additional chapters from an array of scholars in different disciplines, extending and reacting to their argument.


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You will have to read the whole thing to get the differing perspectives on the phenomenon. Here are a few of mine for readers — and the Biden administration — to chew over.


1) Yeah, there’s going to be more economic coercion in the coming years. I argued in “The Sanctions Paradox” that states would have more success coercing allies than adversaries but would be understandably reluctant to pressure international partners. If Farrell and Newman are correct about the potency of economic networks, great powers will be more willing to exploit weaponized interdependence to threaten allies. The inability of allies to evade such networks means that the costs of doing so for the coercer are minimized.


2) More coercion will not necessarily have any greater likelihood of success. There will be more coercion, but it is far from clear that this will yield successful statecraft. In theory, it is possible that allies will be willing to acquiesce more. In practice, the Trump administration’s record in this regard was not encouraging.


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This is mostly because when great powers discover a new form of coercion, they like to overuse that tool, negating its effectiveness. Furthermore, states are much more eager to coerce rivals. So far, weaponized interdependence has mostly encouraged great powers to try to coerce other great powers — a gambit that is likely to accomplish little regardless of the economic costs.


3) The term “weaponized interdependence” will be abused. As I noted in the introduction to this volume: “There is a clear danger of conceptual stretching. If one were to judge the phenomenon based solely on public commentary, anything and everything has been weaponized. It is all too easy for analysts to deploy the term to describe situations that have little to do with [weaponized interdependence] but use the label to attract attention and inflate threats.”


In other words: Be very, very wary when someone based in a D.C. think tank claims that another country is engaged in this activity. Simply quoting the term does not necessarily make it so.


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4) The United States will need to up its statecraft game. To the extent that weaponized interdependence has existed, the United States has been the hegemonic coercer. Paradoxically, the reason this concept is attracting attention in Washington is because of the recognition that other countries *COUGH* China *COUGH* might possess the capabilities to play this game. This means the United States will have to start playing defense as much as offense. The Biden administration and its boosters seem super-keen on this notion.


To be blunt, the United States is out of practice in dealing with peer competitors, and the first steps we have seen in this area are, um, not great. Read Sarah Bauerle Danzman’s chapter in the book to understand why existing mechanisms like the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) process might not work as well as intended. Or read this Twitter thread by Newman to see how U.S. actions to limit weaponized interdependence can lead to unanticipated blowback that hurts one’s own country as much as the intended target — a point Farrell and Newman have stressed repeatedly.


So there is a lot going on. Check out the book. The highest compliment I can pay the contributors is that co-editing this book was easy — a word one never associates with edited volumes!