Tuesday, July 21, 2020

American Death Cult


American Death Cult
by Jonathan Chait, nymag.com
July 20, 2020 06:00 AM
Last October, the Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security compiled a ranking system to assess the preparedness of 195 countries for the next global pandemic. Twenty-one panel experts across the globe graded each country in 34 categories composed of 140 sub-indices. At the top of the rankings, peering down at 194 countries supposedly less equipped to withstand a pandemic, stood the United States of America.

It has since become horrifyingly clear that the experts missed something. The supposed world leader is in fact a viral petri dish of uncontained infection. By June, after most of the world had beaten back the coronavirus pandemic, the U.S., with 4 percent of the world’s population, accounted for 25 percent of its cases. Florida alone was seeing more new infections a week than China, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Australia, and the European Union combined.

During its long period of decline, the Ottoman Empire was called “the Sick Man of Europe.” The United States is now the sick man of the world, pitied by the same countries that once envied its pandemic preparedness — and, as recently as the 2014 Ebola outbreak, relied on its expertise to organize the global response.

Our former peer nations are now operating in a political context Americans would find unfathomable. Every other wealthy nation in the world has successfully beaten back the disease, at least significantly, and at least for now. New Zealand’s health minister was forced to resign after allowing two people who had tested positive for COVID-19 to attend a funeral. The Italian Parliament heckled Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte when he briefly attempted to remove his mask to deliver a speech. In May — around the time Trump cheered demonstrators into the streets to protest stay-at-home orders — Boris Johnson’s top adviser set off a massive national scandal, complete with multiple calls for his resignation, because he’d been caught driving to visit his parents during lockdown. If a Trump official had done the same, would any newspaper even have bothered to publish the story?

It is difficult for us Americans to imagine living in a country where violations so trivial (by our standards) provoke such an uproar. And if you’re tempted to see for yourself what it looks like, too bad — the E.U. has banned U.S. travelers for health reasons.

The distrust and open dismissal of expertise and authority may seem uniquely contemporary — a phenomenon of the Trump era, or the rise of online misinformation. But the president and his party are the products of a decades-long war against the functioning of good government, a collapse of trust in experts and empiricism, and the spread of a kind of magical thinking that flourishes in a hothouse atmosphere that can seal out reality. While it’s not exactly shocking to see a Republican administration be destroyed by incompetent management — it happened to the last one, after all — the willfulness of it is still mind-boggling, and has led to the unnecessary sickness and death of hundreds of thousands of people and the torpedoing of the reelection prospects of the president himself. Like Stalin’s purge of 30,000 Red Army members right before World War II, the central government has perversely chosen to disable the very asset that was intended to carry it through the crisis. Only this failure of leadership and management took place in a supposedly advanced democracy whose leadership succumbed to a debilitating and ultimately deadly ideological pathology.

How did this happen? In 1973, Republicans trusted science more than religion, while Democrats trusted religion more than science. The reverse now holds true. In the meantime, working-class whites left the Democratic Party, which has increasingly taken on the outlook of the professional class with its trust in institutions and empiricism. The influx of working-class whites (especially religiously observant ones) has pushed Republicans toward increasingly paranoid varieties of populism.

This is the conventional history of right-wing populism — that it was a postwar backlash against the New Deal and the Republican Party’s inability or unwillingness to roll it back. The movement believed the government had been subverted, perhaps consciously, by conspirators seeking to impose some form of socialism, communism, or world government. Its “paranoid style,” so described by historian Richard Hofstadter, became warped with anti-intellectualism, reflecting a “conflict between businessmen of certain types and the New Deal bureaucracy, which has spilled over into a resentment of intellectuals and experts.” Its followers seemed prone to “a disorder in relation to authority, characterized by an inability to find other modes for human relationship than those of more or less complete domination or submission.” Perhaps this sounds like someone you’ve heard of.

But for all the virulence of conservative paranoia in American life, without the sanction of a major party exploiting and profiting from paranoia, and thereby encouraging its growth, the worldview remained relatively fringe. Some of the far right’s more colorful adherents, especially the 100,000 reactionaries who joined the John Birch Society, suspected the (then-novel, now-uncontroversial) practice of adding small amounts of fluoride to water supplies to improve dental health was, in fact, a communist plot intended to weaken the populace. Still, the far right lacked power. Republican leaders held Joe McCarthy at arm’s length; Goldwater captured the nomination but went down in a landslide defeat. In the era of Sputnik, science was hardly a countercultural institution. “In the early Cold War period, science was associated with the military,” says sociologist Timothy O’Brien who, along with Shiri Noy, has studied the transformation. “When people thought about scientists, they thought about the Manhattan Project.” The scientist was calculating, cold, heartless, an authority figure against whom the caring, feeling liberal might rebel. Radicals in the ’60s often directed their protests against the scientists or laboratories that worked with the Pentagon.

But this began to change in the 1960s, along with everything else in American political and cultural life. New issues arose that tended to pit scientists against conservatives. Goldwater’s insouciant attitude toward the prospect of nuclear war with the Soviets provoked scientists to explain the impossibility of surviving atomic fallout and the formation of Scientists and Engineers for Johnson-Humphrey. New research by Rachel Carson about pollution and by Ralph Nader on the dangers of cars and other consumer products made science the linchpin of a vast new regulatory state. Business owners quickly grasped that stopping the advance of big government meant blunting the cultural and political authority of scientists. Expertise came to look like tyranny — or at least it was sold that way.

One tobacco company conceded privately in 1969 that it could not directly challenge the evidence of tobacco’s dangers but could make people wonder how solid the evidence really was. “Doubt,” the memo explained, “is our product.” In 1977, the conservative intellectual Irving Kristol urged business leaders to steer their donations away from public-interest causes and toward the burgeoning network of pro-business foundations. “Corporate philanthropy,” he wrote, “should not be, cannot be, disinterested.” The conservative think-tank scene exploded with reports questioning whether pollution, smoking, driving, and other profitable aspects of American capitalism were really as dangerous as the scientists said.

The Republican Party’s turn against science was slow and jagged, as most party-identity changes tend to be. The Environmental Protection Agency had been created under Richard Nixon, and its former administrator, Russell Train, once recalled President Gerald Ford promising to support whatever auto-emissions guidelines his staff deemed necessary. “I want you to be totally comfortable in the fact that no effort whatsoever will be made to try to change your position in any way,” said Ford — a pledge that would be unimaginable for a contemporary Republican president to make. Not until Ronald Reagan did Republican presidents begin letting business interests overrule experts, as when his EPA used a “hit list” of scientists flagged by industry as hostile. And even Reagan toggled between giving business a free hand and listening to his advisers (as he did when he signed a landmark 1987 agreement to phase out substances that were depleting the ozone layer and a plan the next year to curtail acid rain).

The party’s rightward tilt accelerated in the 1990s. “With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cold Warriors looked for another great threat,” wrote science historians Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway. “They found it in environmentalism,” viewing climate change as a pretext to impose government control over the whole economy. Since the 1990s was also the decade in which scientific consensus solidified that greenhouse-gas emissions were permanently increasing temperatures, the political stakes of environmentalism soared.

The number of books criticizing environmentalism increased fivefold over the previous decade, and more than 90 percent cited evidence produced by right-wing foundations. Many of these tracts coursed with the same lurid paranoia as their McCarthy-era counterparts. This was when the conspiracy theory that is currently conventional wisdom on the right — that scientists across the globe conspired to exaggerate or falsify global warming data in order to increase their own power — first took root.

This is not just a story about elites. About a decade after business leaders launched their attack on science from above, a new front opened from below: Starting in the late 1970s, the religious right mobilized heavily as a lobbying force in American politics. Religious conservatives pressured the party to adopt a series of positions, including creationism, that put the party in conflict with scientists. The George W. Bush era was punctuated by clashes between scientists and social conservatives, who resisted approval of an HPV vaccine to protect against sexually transmitted diseases, any sex education other than abstinence counseling, and federally funded research on stem cells. These came atop the now-customary complaints that the administration was turning environmental regulation over to energy lobbyists and ignoring warnings from scientists. Among the more distressing, and perhaps consequential, aspects of conservatives’ growing skepticism of science as a liberal universe was that, in a certain sense, it was — and becoming more so.

One of the hardened realities of the modern red-blue map is that scientists have assumed a place on the blue team in the minds of both sides. A Pew survey this spring confirmed it again. About three-quarters of Democrats, but only 43 percent of Republicans, agree that scientists should take an active role in science-policy debates. Three-fifths of Democrats, but only one-third of Republicans, believe scientific experts are usually better than others at making policy decisions about scientific issues. A pile of research has found that conservatives are more distrustful than liberals of scientific forms of knowledge and are prone to believe conspiracy theories about scientists. And liberals do dominate the academy and the world of scientific research, alienated by the growing strain of know-nothing-ism in the other party.

The divide is not perfectly clean. One can still find varieties of anti-scientific thinking on the left. Anti-vaccine activists straddle the ideological divide, and distrust of GMOs, which scientists have found to be safe, persists on the grassroots left. But as science writer Arthur Allen has documented, the Democratic Party at the political level has almost uniformly spurned the anti-vaxx movement, while Republican officials in state legislatures have enlisted in its cause.

One consequence of the triumph of anti-science thinking was the creation of an opening for snake-oil peddlers and quacks. Author Rick Perlstein has recounted signing up for conservative publications and then beginning to receive email pitches for products like the “23-Cent Heart Miracle,” which “Washington, the medical industry, and drug companies refuse to tell you about.” Herman Cain has used his platform to promote “The 4 Sneaky Hormones That Are Making You Fat and How to Stop Them Now” and cures for erectile dysfunction. Conservative personalities like Mike Huckabee, Ben Carson, and Alex Jones have all sold quack medical treatments to their supporters, who are ready to believe their trusted heroes have identified cures the authorities refuse to sanction. The subculture that subsisted on secret knowledge suppressed by the authorities, which once existed only in crank pamphlets, had become a mass culture and was now claiming the minds of nearly half the country. Many Americans no longer trusted mainstream sources of knowledge — scientists having joined snooty academics and scheming bureaucrats in the categories of so-called experts to be discounted and defied.

One Republican who paid close attention to the rise in distrust of science among the party’s base was Donald Trump, to whom the language and concepts of anti-scientific thought have come naturally. He has always arrived at his beliefs by intuition, rumor, and anecdote rather than any respect for evidence and study.

During his career as a free-form pundit and huckster, Trump related naturally to the right’s suspicion of scientific authority — not only the concept but the language. Trump has frequently rejected not only the consensus view on scientific matters but also the very idea of expertise. Sometimes his source would be a “report.” (“I saw a report the other day, you may get AIDS by kissing,” he told Howard Stern in 1993.) More often, he would cite unidentified people. “I think the vaccines can be very dangerous,” he said in 2009. “And obviously, you know, a lot of people are talking about vaccines with children with respect to autism. And every report comes out, like, you know, that does not happen. But a lot of people feel that the vaccines are what causes autism in children.” He has denounced wind turbines on the grounds that “they say the noise causes cancer.”

Trump recognized the financial possibilities of exploiting medical illiteracy as early as 2009, when he signed up to be a pitchman for a vitamin business, which was then renamed “the Trump Network.” Vitamins are unregulated by the FDA and are thus a lucrative opportunity for hucksters, who can sell billions of dollars in nutritional supplements to customers who — by and large — don’t need them. (The vast majority of people can get all the vitamins they need from a healthy diet.) The Trump Network took the basic vitamin scam and piled additional scams on top of it. The network sold a kit for $139.95 that would supposedly test customers’ urine, and the Trump Network used the results of the test to tell customers which pills they needed to buy from the Trump Network for another $69.95 a month, plus $99.95 every six months for additional testing.

“They make an outrageous statement, which is that this testing and supplement regimen, this process, are a necessity for anyone who wants to stay healthy,” Dr. Pieter Cohen told Stat news four years ago. “That’s quite insane.” For good measure, the Trump Network created a multilevel-marketing structure — the colloquial term for this arrangement is pyramid scheme — to attract sales-people. “With cutting-edge health-and-wellness formulas and a system where you can develop your own financial independence, the Trump Network offers people the opportunity to achieve their American Dream,” he promised in a videotaped pitch.

Later, Trump fixated on a new medical crisis: The Ebola pandemic, he warned everyone who would listen, posed a terrifying threat to Americans. Trump decried the hapless government response and demanded a complete halt of all travel to and from West Africa. During one of his public appearances, an interviewer played a clip of the director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases warning that such a restriction would worsen the pandemic. Trump shot back, “Well, I think it’s ridiculous.”

When he assumed the presidency just over two years later, Trump probably didn’t remember that the doctor whose expertise he had dismissed on live television, Anthony Fauci, still worked in the federal government.

Trump quickly made enemies of the scientific apparatus he commanded. During the campaign, he had made clear his implacable disdain for the entire field of climate science. But what was more surprising — or at least self-defeating — when he took office was the mixture of indifference and hostility with which he treated the rest of his scientific experts. The federal government has a vast infrastructure of data and science experts in the departments of Energy, Commerce, and Agriculture, as well as many environmental experts who are responsible for preventing and managing low-probability, high-impact disasters that could happen on Trump’s watch. In his 2018 book The Fifth Risk, Michael Lewis chronicles the neglect and suspicion with which Trump treated the people whose entire jobs were focused on preventing a cataclysm, the principal victim of which would be Trump’s own presidency. “Many of them are potentially catastrophic risks — the risk of a pandemic, or the risk of a nuclear accident, or the risk of a terrorist attack — one after another,” Lewis explained two years ago. It could have been anything. It turned out to be a pandemic.

When the coronavirus began spreading in American cities, the Republican Party turned to a trained store of experts whose judgment conservatives trusted implicitly. Unfortunately, their expertise and training lay not in epidemiology but in concocting pseudoscientific rationales to allow conservatives to disregard legitimate scientific conclusions.

The cadres who leapt forth to supply Trump and his allies with answers disproportionately came from the science-skeptic wing of the conservative-think-tank world. Steven Milloy, a climate-science skeptic who runs a think tank funded by tobacco and oil companies and who served on Trump’s environmental transition team, dismissed the virus as less deadly than the flu. Libertarian philosopher Richard Epstein, who had once insisted, “The evidence in favor of the close linkage between carbon dioxide and global warming has not been clearly established,” turned his analytical powers to projected pandemic death tolls. He estimated just 500 American deaths, an analysis that was circulated within the Trump White House before Epstein issued a correction.

It was like watching factories mobilize for war, only instead of automakers refitting their assembly lines to churn out tanks, these were professional manufacturers of scientific doubt scrambling to invent a new form of pedantry. Some skeptics took note of the connection, though they seem to have drawn the wrong conclusion. “While they are occurring on vastly different time scales, the COVID-19 panic and the climate-change panic are remarkably similar,” wrote one of the climate-skeptical Heartland Institute’s pseudo-experts.

The fact that the conservative movement’s finest minds endorsed these paranoid claims attests to the movement’s sincerity. Unlike critiquing climate-science models, which allows skeptics decades to obscure their analytic failures, by denying the coronavirus, “you’re at risk of being shown to be a crackpot in real time,” Jerry Taylor, a former climate-science skeptic in the libertarian-think-tank world, tells me. These people are genuine adherents of their own conspiracy theories. The simplest explanation for the actions Trump and many of his top officials have taken is that they believe that scientific authorities are, at best, grossly negligent and, at worst, scheming to extend government control of the economy by perpetrating hoaxes. His responses follow from that supposition. He has warily treated his scientific advisers as potential saboteurs.

When the first warning signs of the virus appeared, Trump — rather than take advantage of the expertise at his disposal — set out to marginalize and contort it. Before the outbreak, Trump’s administration had reduced the number of CDC officials monitoring virus outbreaks in China by two-thirds. After the pandemic, he cut funding for a lab studying the origins of the outbreak in China. Trump’s repeated public statements that he wants less testing — because less testing means fewer cases! — encapsulates his earnest belief that the accurate measuring of the pandemic is itself the problem. After all, the scientists were advising him to shut down the economy, the prized asset of his reelection campaign. Wasn’t that a little suspicious?

After Dr. Nancy Messonnier, a top CDC official, told reporters in February that the coronavirus would spread in the U.S., Trump threatened to fire her. (Messonnier briefly became a hate figure on conservative talk shows, owing in part to the odd coincidence that her brother is former deputy attorney general Rod Rosenstein.) Messonnier retained her job but stopped speaking publicly. Dr. Rick Bright was not so lucky and was forced out of his role running the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority, which works on vaccines.

Some of these episodes played out clumsily. When CDC director Robert Redfield predicted a second wave of coronavirus infections in the fall, Trump marched him before the cameras. Redfield stood at the pressroom podium, Trump glowering nearby, trying to quibble with the headline his interview had produced. Dr. Deborah Birx has navigated the chasm between the evidence and her boss’s public line. “Doctor, wouldn’t you say there’s a good chance that COVID will not come back?” Trump asked her at one briefing. “We don’t know,” Birx began, before Trump interjected, “And if it comes back, it’s in a very small, confined area that we put out.”

It was as if Trump thought he could bend reality to his will by forcing his advisers to endorse it. “I disagree with @CDCgov on their very tough & expensive guidelines for opening schools,” he tweeted in July. “I will be meeting with them!!!” It doesn’t take a great deal of imagination to predict that such a “meeting” would be unlikely to involve Trump prevailing upon the CDC to alter its guidelines through sheer force of reason and data. The only outcome of such a public threat is the undermining of his own government’s credibility.

Republicans goaded Trump to ramp up his attacks. “Dr. Fauci remains steadfast in his bureaucracy. Dr. Fauci’s a conformist,” announced Rush Limbaugh. “Here’s the difference between a health-professional bureaucrat-expert and Donald Trump.” This line reflects the view of science closest to Trump’s own perspective. He does not dismiss science wholesale as a field of study; he is not the medieval Church persecuting Galileo. Rather, he understands science as a kind of revelation accessible to a lucky genetic elite (naturally including himself, as evidenced by the genius MIT-professor uncle he often cites).

“I really get it,” he boasted during one visit to the CDC. “Every one of these doctors said, ‘How do you know so much about this?’ Maybe I have a natural ability.” That conviction is what gave Trump the confidence to deliver his on-camera brainstorming session, in which he suggested his science experts research the injection of light or disinfectant into the human body. If you don’t understand science as a discipline, you expect some genius will dream up a breakthrough cure. Why couldn’t Trump be that genius?

And this is how Trump became fixated on the belief that he had discovered miraculous effects of hydroxychloroquine that had eluded medical experts. Bypassing his own government’s scientists, Trump cultivated a kitchen cabinet of pseudo-experts. He closely followed the Fox News appearances of Dr. Oz, a celebrity physician, alternative-medicine pitchman, and the subject of a class-action false-medical-claims lawsuit, in which he touted the unproven drug (Oz later walked back his endorsement). Trump lawyer and reported criminal-investigation target Rudy Giuliani lobbied Trump on the subject, though he knows even less about medicine than he does about the law (Giuliani described hydroxychloroquine as “100 percent effective”). In one especially bizarre episode, Trump’s trade adviser, Peter Navarro — whose credibility as an economist has been widely questioned by economists and whose credentials as a medical scientist are nonexistent — confronted Dr. Fauci in a meeting with a pile of what he called evidence of the drug’s effectiveness.

The prospect that hydroxychloroquine might prove useful was plausible at the outset. Early studies showed mixed results, but as scientists performed more rigorous tests, they found the drug had little or no effect. Even Republicans like Trump’s former FDA commissioner Scott Gottlieb acknowledged that the drug would have, at best, a modest benefit.

But these results seemed only to deepen Trump’s conviction that the researchers could not be trusted. Asked what evidence he had for hydroxychloroquine’s effectiveness, he replied, “Are you ready? Here’s my evidence — I get a lot of positive calls about it.” After claiming he had personally used it, he pronounced, “All I can tell you is so far I seem to be okay,” as if an uncontrolled experiment on one person had any value.

Hydroxychloroquine became a totem of Trumpist devotion. Trump urged the Food and Drug Administration, the National Institutes of Health, and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services to import, promote, and pay for his favorite medicine. Exasperated public-health officials complained that it was “mindshare, time, and energy being soaked up by a potential wild-goose chase.” Conservative media published stories about ordinary Americans who had taken the cure and found their symptoms disappear as if by miracle.

Any negative finding proved the scientific body that had conducted it was corrupt. When asked about a Veterans Affairs study that added to the growing evidence against hydroxychloroquine’s efficacy, the president attacked the research as a “Trump-enemy statement.” When Dr. Bright revealed that Trump political allies had pressured him to promote the drug, Trump tweeted accusingly, “So the so-called HHS Whistleblower was against HYDROXYCHLOROQUINE,” as if this were all the proof he needed that his target had it coming.

“We were cruising along until the Chinese Communist Party basically hit us with that deadly virus,” Navarro told Fox News, “and I don’t think it’s any coincidence that the first year that China had a down economy was the same year now that they’re coming after us in all sorts of ways.” Here is a top federal government official suggesting China deliberately unleashed the pandemic in a calculated attempt to gain economic leverage over the U.S. Even aside from assuming China’s government to be shockingly indifferent to the well-being of its own population and economy, Navarro’s theory suggests that Beijing could have known beforehand that China would be able to contain the virus without any warning, and that the U.S., despite several weeks of lead time, would fail.

Trump retweeted a message from the former game-show host turned right-wing gadfly Chuck Woolery, who warned, “Everyone is lying. The CDC, Media, Democrats, our Doctors, not all but most, that we are told to trust.”

The premise of the black comedy Dr. Strangelove is that the rogue U.S. general Jack Ripper starts a nuclear war because he subscribes to conspiracy theories about fluoridation. The joke worked when the movie came out in 1964 because fluoride conspiracy theories were in wide enough circulation to be familiar to audiences but marginal enough for the idea that a top general might believe in them to shock. When the fictional president discovers what has happened, he rails, “When you instituted the human-reliability tests, you assured me there was no possibility of such a thing ever occurring!”

Today the most unrealistic aspect of this exchange is the premise that a process to screen out right-wing conspiracy theorists would even exist. If the movie were remade now, Ripper would have gotten a job in the administration because the president was impressed after watching him rant on Fox News about his precious bodily fluids.

By midsummer, as the coronavirus receded throughout most of the world, Trump’s supporters were engaging in cultlike displays of devotion. Republicans were pointedly holding mask-optional gatherings. “When the good Lord calls you home,” one Republican Senate candidate explained, “a mask ain’t going to stop it.” As masks became symbols of subservience to public health (“COVID burkas,” as former Trump official Sebastian Gorka called them), these people even held rallies to protest them. A county Republican Party chairman in Kansas who owns a weekly newspaper published a cartoon depicting face masks as yellow stars and the people bearing them as Jews forced into cattle cars.

In Scottsdale, Arizona, a Republican city councilmember announced, “I can’t breathe!” before dramatically removing his face covering. A Republican sheriff in Ohio, despite a statewide facial-covering requirement, declared, “I’m not going to be the mask police. Period.” The first day that Oregon governor Kate Brown imposed a requirement that residents wear masks in public, four police officers walked into a coffee shop in Corvallis mask-free, and when asked to comply with the order, they yelled, “Fuck Kate Brown!” In recent weeks, more than 20 county health officials have left their jobs in the face of protests, harassment, and threats. Georgia governor Brian Kemp went so far as to ban local governments from mandating masks.

In late June, Trump staged an indoor rally in Tulsa. His staff removed stickers on seats intended to space out attendees. Announcing his presence, Cain wrote, “Masks will not be mandatory for the event, which will be attended by President Trump. PEOPLE ARE FED UP!” (A few days after the rally, Cain tested positive.)

That many Americans would view public-health instruction with skepticism was understandable. The authorities had hardly covered themselves in glory. In the initial stages of the pandemic, many officials worried more about panic than complacency and insisted the pandemic might not be worse than a normal flu.

Faced with an initial shortage of masks, and fears that hoarders would buy up the supply and deny it to the essential workers who needed it most, public-health officials solemnly instructed people not to bother.

Public-health officials scolded anti-lockdown protesters for risking new outbreaks with their maskless demonstrations, but when anti-racism demonstrators poured into the streets, they emphasized the paramount importance of the cause. Even though Black Lives Matter demonstrators seemed largely to be wearing masks and attempting to practice social distancing, the contradiction rankled conservatives. Public-health officials had one standard for marches against their policies and another for marches they agreed with.

But if these officials were struggling to communicate clearly, it was in large part because clarity was impossible. The conclusions scientists could propose about the novel coronavirus were often both subject to revision and less than absolute: The outdoors is safer than inside but not perfectly safe; masks reduce risk but don’t eliminate it. What’s more, the officials were operating under political pressure from a president who spent weeks insisting the virus would disappear or prove no worse than a normal flu and then attacked every countermeasure as a plot to undermine him.

Public-health officials found themselves in the terrifying position of simultaneously trying to get a handle on a pandemic and being the targets of a political smear. The hybrid role of Kate Winslet’s character in Contagion and Michael Dukakis’s character in the 1988 presidential campaign was as uncomfortable to pull off as it sounds.

Yet public-health officials in almost every economic-peer country managed to overcome scientific uncertainty and missteps. Both here and abroad, they are gazing with a mix of horror and confusion at the helpless, pitiful American scientific giant. One German expert told the Washington Post that Germany had used American studies to design an effective response, which the U.S. somehow couldn’t implement. American “scientists appeared to have reached an adequate assessment of the situation early on, but this didn’t translate into a political action plan,” observed another.

The limiting factor that has done the most to contort the domestic response to the coronavirus is the pathology of the American right. As of late May, only 40 percent of Republicans believed COVID-19 was deadlier than the flu, and half believed the death count was overstated. One research study found that viewers of Fox News, which echoed Trump’s early dismissal of the pandemic, were less likely than the audiences of other cable news channels to engage in social distancing or to purchase masks or sanitizing products.

There has always been some question about the depth of sincerity with which conservatives hold their professed convictions. Did they believe that the Clintons murdered witnesses to their crimes and that Barack Obama faked details of his birth? Or were these statements expressions of partisan enthusiasm not to be taken literally? The coronavirus revealed the deadly earnestness with which the Republican audience accepts the guidance of the conservative alternative-information structure. As early as this spring, tragic stories began to appear of people mourning the deaths of loved ones who had angrily rejected public-health advice as a big-government plot.

The playbook for handling a public-health crisis assumes some baseline level of rationality in the government. The administration is presumed to be working with, not against, its public-health experts; the news media to be informing the public, not actively disinforming it. The ranks of American government, academia, and the nonprofit sector are thick with experts in pandemic response, but very few of them ever trained to deal with a pandemic in Trump’s America.

Trump, of course, will pass from the scene, perhaps by January. But the political culture that produced him isn’t going anywhere. And one dilemma it may present quite soon is what happens when a vaccine arrives.

If Trump pulls out of his polling swoon and wins reelection, he will have to persuade Americans to trust the vaccines his administration has produced, even though many of them distrust either vaccines or Trump. (Of course, if Trump wins reelection, vaccine take-up will be the least of our problems.)

A more likely scenario is that the first vaccine will come along after Trump has lost the election. If this happens before January 20, he’ll have little incentive to encourage his followers to take it or otherwise ensure an orderly distribution. If it happens afterward, Republicans will be engaged in the paranoid anti-government rage they undertake any time a Democrat holds office.

And they will be tapping into a deep vein of paranoia. Polls have shown somewhere between a quarter and a third of the public already does not intend to take a vaccine when it becomes available. In a country with a cult of self-reliance so ingrained that every new mass shooting propels more panicked arms purchases, is an act of collective, mutual security like public vaccination even workable?

The truly remarkable thing about the right-wing revolt against public health is that it has taken place under a president whom conservatives trust and adore. From the standpoint of running the government, these have been awful conditions for handling a pandemic. But from the standpoint of persuading citizens to cooperate, they have been almost optimal. When we look back a year from now at the frenzied, angry revolt against science, the spring and summer of 2020 may seem like halcyon days.

*This article appears in the July 20, 2020, issue of New York Magazine. Subscribe Now!

Monday, July 20, 2020

The crisis that shocked the world: America’s response to the coronavirus

The crisis that shocked the world: America’s response to the coronavirus
Dysfunctional politics, a lack of funding for public health and a rush to reopen the economy ignited the resurgence of the virus
By the Fourth of July, much of the nation had wearied of admonitions to stay home amid the pandemic and instead flooded popular destinations such as the Las Vegas Strip.

By Joel Achenbach, William Wan, Karin Brulliard and Chelsea Janes
July 20, 2020 at 5:00 a.m. GMT+9


Isabelle Papadimitriou, 64, a respiratory therapist in Dallas, had been treating a surge of patients as the Texas economy reopened. She developed covid-19 symptoms June 27 and tested positive two days later. The disease was swift and brutal. She died the morning of the Fourth of July.

The holiday had always been her daughter’s favorite. Fiana Tulip loved the family cookouts, the fireworks, the feeling of America united. Now, she wonders whether she’ll ever be able to celebrate it again. In mourning, she’s furious.

Tulip, 40, had seen her country fail to control the novel coronavirus. She had seen Texas ease restrictions even as case counts and hospitalizations soared. She had seen fellow citizens refuse to wear masks or engage in social distancing.

“I feel like her death was a hundred percent preventable. I’m angry at the Trump administration. I’m angry with the state of our politics. I’m angry at the people who even now refuse to wear masks,” she said.

Six months after the coronavirus appeared in America, the nation has failed spectacularly to contain it. The country’s ineffective response has shocked observers around the planet.

Many countries have rigorously driven infection rates nearly to zero. In the United States, coronavirus transmission is out of control. The national response is fragmented, shot through with political rancor and culture-war divisiveness. Testing shortcomings that revealed themselves in March have become acute in July, with week-long waits for results leaving the country blind to real-time virus spread and rendering contact tracing nearly irrelevant.

The United States may be heading toward a new spasm of wrenching economic shutdowns or to another massive spike in preventable deaths from covid-19 — or both.

How the world’s richest country got into this dismal situation is a complicated tale that exposes the flaws and fissures in a nation long proud of its ability to meet cataclysmic challenges.

The fumbling of the virus was not a fluke: The American coronavirus fiasco has exposed the country’s incoherent leadership, self-defeating political polarization, a lack of investment in public health, and persistent socioeconomic and racial inequities that have left millions of people vulnerable to disease and death.

In this big, sprawling, demographically and culturally diverse nation, the decentralized political structures gave birth to patchwork policies that don’t make sense when applied to a virus that ignores state boundaries and city limits.

While other countries endured some of the same setbacks, few have suffered from all of them simultaneously and catastrophically. If there was a mistake to be made in this pandemic, America has made it.

The single biggest miscalculation was rushing to reopen the economy while the virus was still spreading at high rates through much of the country, experts say. The only way to reopen safely, epidemiologists said as far back as early April, was to “crush the curve” — to drive down the rate of viral transmission to the point that new infections were few and far between.

Many countries did just that. The United States did not follow the expert advice. Now, the curve is crushing America.

“We didn’t have the stick-to-itiveness, the determination, to carry through what we started in March, April and May, and now the virus is taking advantage of that,” National Institutes of Health Director Francis Collins said.

“If we’d had really strong guidance from local, state and national leaders, maybe we could have sustained the determination to get the curve all the way down to zero,” he said. “Now, we’re on the upswing, and I don’t quite see the top of the upswing yet.”

America, the outlier
Other countries have managed to avoid the kind of dramatic viral resurgence that is happening in America. Spain, Italy, Germany and France — all devastated by the virus months ago — drove coronavirus cases and deaths to relatively low levels. The United Kingdom has been an outlier in Europe, with one of the highest per capita death tolls in the world, but after suppressing transmission, it has not seen a major rebound.

And in Asia, the picture is radically different. In Taiwan, baseball fans sit in the stands and watch their teams play. Japan has had fewer than 1,000 deaths from covid-19, the illness caused by the coronavirus. South Korea has had fewer than 300. Vietnam has recorded no deaths from the virus.

The death rate from covid-19 in the United States looks like that of countries with vastly lower wealth, health-care resources and technological infrastructure.

America’s mishandling of the pandemic has defied most experts’ predictions. In October, not long before the novel coronavirus began sickening people in China, a comprehensive review ranked the pandemic preparedness of 195 countries. The project — called the Global Health Security Index and spearheaded by the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security and the Nuclear Threat Initiative — assigned scores to countries as a way to warn them of the rising threat of infectious-disease outbreaks.

With a score of 83.5 out of 100, the United States ranked No. 1.

How did the nation get caught so flat-footed? By not really trying, said Beth Cameron, who helped lead the project for the Nuclear Threat Initiative.

The federal government punted the coronavirus response to the states, counties and cities, said Cameron, who was senior director for global health security and biodefense on the White House National Security Council and helped write a pandemic response plan under President Barack Obama. The team Cameron led was disbanded after Donald Trump took office.

“I just never expected that we would have such a lack of federal leadership, and it’s been deliberate,” she said. “In a national emergency that is a pandemic, spreading between states, federal leadership is essential. And if there was any doubt about that, we ran that experiment from March and April until now. It failed. So we have to run a different experiment.”

A nation of individuals
Somehow, this highly mobile virus keeps sneaking up on communities, seeding itself extensively before people detect the breadth and intensity of the attack. That happened catastrophically in New York City early in the pandemic. The new outbreaks have been largely in the South and West.

This month, Roy Ramos, a reporter for WPLG-TV in Miami, noticed he had a cough. He and his wife, the station’s evening news anchor, Nicole Perez, went to get tested for the coronavirus. Positive — both of them. Soon, another anchor and the station’s chief meteorologist had tested positive, too.

As of July 14, 10 station employees had tested positive, including some who hadn’t even been in the office or in contact with their co-workers. The virus was everywhere in South Florida, which is now reeling from the pathogen’s assault.

“This is not a political message, but a personal one,” Perez’s co-anchor, Calvin Hughes, told viewers. “Please, please wear a mask.”

In the minds of many Americans, the coronavirus crisis that was so alarming in March and April lost its fearsomeness in May and June, when people tried to resume something approximating a normal life. The shutdowns had been miserable, but they’d been effective.

The success of the shutdowns meant that many Americans didn’t know anyone personally sickened by the virus. In places with low transmission, the crisis seemed far away.

“We just let our guard down,” Ohio Gov. Mike DeWine (R) said in an interview Friday. “Some people when they heard, ‘Hey, Ohio’s open,’ what they mentally processed is, ‘It’s safe. We can go out and do whatever we want to. It’s back to normal.’ ”

In the past two months, the virus has been smoldering in his state, the governor said, and “now we start to see some flames.” He fears Ohio could soon have the kind of runaway transmission afflicting Florida.

“Florida a month ago is where Ohio is today. If we don’t want to be Florida, we’ve got to change what we’re doing. Everybody’s got to mask up,” the governor said.

He and others cite human nature as a problem with containing the virus. Human brains simply aren’t wired to emphasize the importance of doing things, like wearing masks, that protect others but offer no immediate payoff, said Paul Slovic, a University of Oregon psychologist.

“You don’t get rewarded for putting on a mask,” Slovic said. “You don’t see who you’ve protected from harm, but you do feel an immediate discomfort.”

Protecting one life — or even one small puppy — generates a major emotional response that can prompt action, Slovic has found. But as the number of individuals involved increases — say, to the 137,000-plus deaths caused by the coronavirus — people grow inured to the loss, less prone to take action.

That makes public messaging especially essential, experts say. But the messaging in the United States has been all over the place. Even the scientists have struggled: They were wobbly on the effectiveness of masks before eventually embracing them.

Kristin Urquiza, 39, said she tried warning her father, Mark — a lifelong Republican — against going out and risking infection. In their home state of Arizona, as leaders including Gov. Doug Ducey (R) sprinted to reopen in May and June, Urquiza could tell she was losing the argument.

“When the president, the governor and people on cable news are all saying one thing, how do you compete with that?” she said. “He would push back. ‘I hear what you’re saying, but why would the governor say it’s safe to go out if it’s not true?’ ”

Her father died of the virus June 30. In the obituary she wrote, she lashed out at government leaders.

“He was a huge supporter of Trump and Arizona governor Ducey. He believed what they said. And they betrayed him,” she said in an interview.

When there’s no cavalry to send
Even before the pandemic hit, local public health agencies had been decimated by years of staffing and budget cuts.

They had lost almost a quarter of their overall workforce since 2008 — a cut of almost 60,000 workers, according to national associations of health officials. The agencies’ main source of federal funding — the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s emergency preparedness budget — had been cut 30 percent since 2003.

Public health is an enterprise with an intrinsic problem: People can’t see sicknesses avoided or deaths averted.

“You don’t see the results. It’s a dog that doesn’t bark,” said David Himmelstein, professor of public health and health policy at the CUNY School of Public Health.

“The question is, does the water come out of your tap clean? Are the sewer systems being inspected? Are restaurants and food being inspected? Those things, you don’t notice until they fail,” he said.

The country’s electronic disease surveillance systems are “archaic and cumbersome,” said Cathy Slemp, who was recently dismissed as West Virginia’s public health commissioner after the governor blamed her for failing to reclassify certain coronavirus cases as recovered.

“We’re driving a Pinto and want to have a Ferrari,” she said.

The public health challenges are keenly felt in Malheur County, a vast swath of mostly federal rangeland in rural eastern Oregon. About a quarter of its 30,000 residents live in poverty. Teen pregnancy rates are double the statewide rate. There’s one school nurse for 10,000 square miles. Drug use is high.

The first coronavirus case hit March 30, and for more than a month, the county averaged just one to two cases a week. There was resistance to a statewide shutdown in the conservative area, but most people were willing to observe temporary restrictions, said Sarah Poe, director of the county health department.

But after a month or so, residents began to complain of government overreach. Many felt they had to resume working to survive, she said.

“People’s response has been to just take care of themselves, take care of your own business, your own family,” Poe said. “That’s not how this virus works.”

Now, the coronavirus is a full-blown crisis in Malheur County. Cases began soaring three weeks ago, to 15 or 16 a day. As of Friday, the county had 477 cases. The cumulative positive rate since the first case is nearly 16 percent — quadruple the state’s rate.

On Wednesday, facing an accelerating caseload, Malheur County commissioners passed a resolution that goes further than the state’s mask order. It recommends gatherings of no more than 10 people indoors and 25 outdoors, and mask-wearing in groups indoors and out.

But resistance in the county remains high. Poe said she regularly gets hate mail and phone calls accusing her of peddling a hoax.

“We’re up against just a ton of misinformation,” she said. “What are we fighting here? We are fighting a virus and our goal is to save lives. Let’s not be distracted into fighting other people.”

A turning point
America, experts say, is approaching a tipping point at which its public health systems could become so overwhelmed they begin to collapse. Already, coronavirus test results take so long to come back they are almost useless for anything except as a historical record.

The delays have a cascading effect. Contact tracing is rendered ineffectual. Containing the virus by isolation becomes impossible. And as hospitals fill, the virus’s fatality rate could inch upward because of overtaxed ICU nurses and doctors struggling to care for so many.

But the most dangerous cascading effect could be despair — a loss of hope, along with the resolve to fight the virus, warned Michael T. Osterholm, director of the University of Minnesota’s Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy.

“When that happens, you lose the ability to act rationally. You lose the commitment to fight. You lose all chance of beating back the virus,” he said.

Adam Fleming Petty, a writer in Grand Rapids, Mich., said he feels that demoralization acutely — as well as “so much rage” at Trump and other political leaders whose measures did not quell the virus enough to allow many schools to open.

“One thing I told myself was, ‘Okay, as long as school starts back up in the fall, I can do this. I can make it through the summer if I have that goal waiting for me.’ Now, that goal isn’t there anymore,” said Petty, 38, who has been the primary supervisor of two daughters, ages 5 and 7, while his wife works from home. For four months, the family has socialized with only a handful of relatives just a few times.

“This is far from the first time that governmental administrative incompetence has been displayed. But I can’t remember the last time that the consequences of that were so personal,” Petty said.

Governors and local officials across the Sun Belt have announced incremental measures in recent days to halt the viral resurgence. California instituted a statewide mask requirement. Arkansas and Colorado did so Thursday. Arizona allowed local jurisdictions to implement mask mandates as they see fit.

Florida’s governor has resisted weeks of calls to implement such a mandate. Georgia Gov. Brian Kemp (R) announced Wednesday that all local mask mandates in his state are void.

Louisiana and Texas recently shut down bars all over again. Alabama Gov. Kay Ivey (R) announced a statewide mask mandate in recent days as an alternative to closing. West Virginia limited gatherings to 25 people or fewer.

In New York, Gov. Andrew M. Cuomo (D) threatened to close restaurants if social distancing is not taken seriously.

“Closing the bars is going to be the equivalent of fixing three of the five screen doors in your submarine,” said Osterholm, who says that places with high levels of transmission need to return to the kind of shutdowns common in March and April.

In a telephone interview, Cuomo said New York officials were caught off guard early in the year because everyone assumed the virus was coming into the West Coast from China. But it had already spread in Europe, and from there to New York.

“We didn’t find out until after the fact. You don’t have the revelation by the academics until mid-March that this was one of the great health blunders of all time,” Cuomo said. “You actually got hit by a bus that came from the other direction.”

He expressed dismay about the national failure to suppress the virus.

“If you could have written a prescription four months ago, a manual — ‘This is what you must do to deal with a virus’ — and if people could just follow the manual, we would be over this, like other countries are over it,” Cuomo said. “I think it exposed a fundamental weakness in this country. We have a divided country.”

New York beat back the virus by closely following the scientific data and being cautious about reopening the economy, Cuomo said. Many places suffering high rates of infections didn’t do that, he said.

“It was science denial meets government incompetence,” he said.

‘The exception and anomaly’
This crisis has been sucked inexorably into the vortex of political polarization.

Trump repeatedly downplayed the viral threat. “You have 15 people, and the 15 within a couple of days is going to be down to close to zero,” he said in late February. On Twitter, he cheered on citizen protests of shutdowns that had been ordered by Democratic governors. He did not wear a mask in public until July 11.

White House spokeswoman Sarah Matthews in a statement defended the administration’s response to the crisis, saying Trump “has led an historic, whole-of-America coronavirus response — resulting in 100,000 ventilators procured, sourcing critical PPE for our frontline heroes, and a robust testing regime resulting in more than double the number of tests than any other country in the world. … This strong leadership will continue as we safely reopen the economy, expedite vaccine and therapeutics developments, and continue to see an encouraging decline in the U.S. mortality rate.”

A White House official on background defended the president’s support for reopening the economy while the virus was still spreading, citing Trump’s belief that the cure cannot be worse than the disease: “There are consequences to staying closed, including but not limited to missed doctors’ appointments, drug or alcohol misuse, and suicide as a result of the pandemic.”

Future historians will not treat kindly Trump’s efforts to divide and confuse, said James Grossman, executive director of the American Historical Association.

“You look at the Great Depression and how Roosevelt made a concerted effort to unite the country — the fireside chats, the New Deal. That is the instinctive reaction of almost every president in crisis. Even if you don’t succeed, you try to convince people that they’re all in this together,” Grossman said. “This presidency is the exception and anomaly.”

Many Americans now believe the pandemic has been exaggerated, or even fabricated, by scientists and the mainstream news media. The rejection of scientific expertise has flowered into a conspiracy theory holding that the experts are lying as part of a political agenda.

“The most outrageous lies are the ones about Covid 19. Everyone is lying. The CDC, Media, Democrats, our Doctors, not all but most, that we are told to trust,” former “Wheel of Fortune” game show host Chuck Woolery tweeted July 12.

Trump retweeted that. Days later, Woolery revealed his son was sick with the virus, and he has since taken down his Twitter account.

To be an American
As she prepares for a three-day drive across the country — from New York to Texas — to bury her mother, Tulip said she has been thinking a lot about what it means to be American.

She was raised like many Texans, unabashedly proud of her roots and her patriotism. “I grew up a Dallas Cowboys fan. All about the stars and stripes. You know that song ‘Proud to Be an American’? We would literally sing that as kids in elementary school and mean every word.”

Now, she said, she feels betrayed by her country and home state. For the past two weeks, she and her husband have been calling funeral homes in Brownsville, unable to get through because the town has been overwhelmed by the virus.

“I desperately want to believe we as a country can change, that we can recover from where we are now,” she said. “I want to believe that America can get back to who we were, a proud country, one where people can thrive and not suffer.”

Isaac Stanley-Becker contributed to this report.

Friday, July 17, 2020

Mary Trump says the U.S. has devolved into a version of her ‘incredibly dysfunctional family’

Mary Trump says the U.S. has devolved into a version of her ‘incredibly dysfunctional family’
Mary L. Trump, President’s Trump’s niece, said that watching the country’s leadership devolve into “a macro version of my incredibly dysfunctional family” was one of the factors that compelled her to write her book, “Too Much and Never Enough: How My Family Created the World’s Most Dangerous Man.”

In an interview Wednesday with The Washington Post, Mary Trump said she blames “almost 100 percent” her grandfather, Fred Trump — the family patriarch whom she describes as a “sociopath” in her 214-page memoir of sorts — for creating the conditions that led to Donald Trump’s rise and, ultimately, what she views as his dangerous presidency.

By Ashley Parker.
Washington Post.
July 16, 2020.

Much like in her extended family, Mary Trump said, a similar dynamic is now playing out on the national stage, with President Trump simultaneously possessing “an unerring instinct for finding people who are weaker than he is,” while also being “eminently usable by people who are stronger and savvier than he is” and eager to exploit him.

This combination photo shows the cover of “Too Much and Never Enough: How My Family Created the World’s Most Dangerous Man” and a portrait of author Mary L. Trump.
This combination photo shows the cover of “Too Much and Never Enough: How My Family Created the World’s Most Dangerous Man” and a portrait of author Mary L. Trump. (Simon & Schuster/Associated Press)
Her book — which was published Tuesday and became an instant bestseller based on advance orders alone — so worried her family that the president’s brother unsuccessfully tried to block its publication in court. Unlike the bevy of other books critical of Trump, this is the only one written by a family member with firsthand knowledge of the Trump clan, and Mary Trump, who earned a doctoral degree in psychology, uses that background to analyze her uncle and his pathologies.

Assessing the current moment, in which Trump has amplified racism and stoked the flames of white grievance and resentment, Mary Trump said that the president is “clearly racist” but that his behavior stems from a combination of upbringing and political cynicism.

“It comes easily to him, and he thinks it’s going to score him points with the only people who are continuing to support him,” she said.

Mary Trump said that growing up in her family, her experience was one of “a knee-jerk anti-Semitism, a knee-jerk racism.”

“Growing up, it was sort of normal to hear them use the n-word or use anti-Semitic expressions,” she said.

Mary Trump, who is gay, added dryly, “Homophobia was never an issue because nobody ever talked about gay people, well, until my grandmother called Elton John” a slur.

Within the Trump family, Fred Trump was the chief enabler. But now in the White House, Mary Trump said, the blame starts with President Trump’s daughter Ivanka and his son-in-law, Jared Kushner — both senior advisers — but expands more broadly to include his “chiefs of staff who went along thinking that they could have some kind of influence, only to find that they didn’t.” Even Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) is “perfectly willing to put up with all sorts of egregious behavior to get his own agenda through,” she said.

Mary Trump, 55, has long been estranged from her family following a dispute over inheritance, among other things, and is hardly a Donald Trump supporter. She was an unabashed supporter of Hillary Clinton in 2016 and said she plans to vote for former vice president Joe Biden in November, although she supported Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) in the Democratic primaries.

“This is a book of falsehoods, plain and simple,” White House press secretary Kayleigh McEnany said Thursday in response to a request for comment.

Mary Trump opens the book recounting a family dinner at the White House in April 2017, ostensibly to celebrate the birthdays of the president’s sisters, and writes of her family’s stunted dynamic unfolding at 1600 Pennsylvania Ave. Trump’s eldest son, Donald Trump Jr., for instance, offered a toast not for his aunts but for his father, “a sort of campaign speech.”

In the interview, Mary Trump said that at the time, she found it striking that Trump Jr. felt the need “to prop up his father.”

“I’m not entirely sure why someone in Donald’s position, certainly at that time, needed propping up, but he got it anyway,” she said.

At the same dinner, Mary Trump recounts the president turning to Lara Trump — his son Eric’s wife, who had been in a relationship with him for almost eight years at the time — and saying, “I barely even knew who the [expletive] she was, honestly” until she gave a campaign speech supporting him in Georgia.

In the interview, Mary Trump said that no one in the family tried to correct the president or defend Lara Trump; instead, she explained, “people laughed. That’s what we do.”

But the moment was revealing of how the president operates, she said. “It’s sort of his way of making the story bigger, more interesting, but also kind of owning you if you don’t correct him, or he’s aware that you’re aware that he’s lying,” she said. “And it’s a game, and that’s how that night felt.”

Asked about the perception by some that Ivanka Trump is in some ways a steadying force on her father, Mary Trump said that was not her assessment of her cousin in the slightest.

“I think she’s the one who disproves that on an almost-daily basis,” Mary Trump said. “She doesn’t do anything. She spouts bromides on social media, but either she tries to have an impact and fails, or just isn’t interested in having an impact. I can’t think of one thing she’s done to show that she’s moderate or a moderating influence.”

In the book, Mary Trump also recounts an anecdote that President Trump enlisted a smart kid named Joe Shapiro to take the SATs for him. Although Trump was friends with a man named Joe Shapiro at the University of Pennsylvania, the two met once Trump was already in college and had transferred to Penn from Fordham. And both Shapiro’s sister and widow told The Post that in addition to the incorrect timing, he never would have taken a test for anybody, including Trump.

Asked about the discrepancy, Mary Trump said she was not referring to the Joe Shapiro whom Trump met in college, but to another “Joe Shapiro from the neighborhood.”

“I am confident in my source, who is somebody close to Donald,” she said.

In the book, Mary Trump paints a grim and even devastating portrait of both her grandfather and uncle, and she said that nothing Trump has done since taking office has shocked her.

When pressed, she said that not even the president’s incendiary — at times racist and misogynistic — language, or even his immigration policy separating children and families at the nation’s southern border has surprised her. “No, the more divisive, the better, the cooler,” she said, explaining what she views as the president’s ethos.

Mary Trump writes that she considered coming forward to try to stop Trump’s election during the summer of 2016 and ultimately decided against doing so — a decision she doesn’t regret, in part because she believes nothing could have prevented his election then.

Now, however, she is hoping the fortuitous timing of her book — which was originally scheduled for release in April — could help impact the November election. And either way, she said, she wants to feel like she did her small part to warn the nation about what she views as the dangers of her uncle.

“I’d seen enough in the last few years to know that no one thing is going to make a bit of difference,” she said. “This is going to be — using the expression loosely — death by a thousand lashes, right, and maybe in this case it’s going take a million lashes, so it’s more about adding to the record of egregious things that have happened and for which there has been no accountability.”

She continued: “But more than that, I also felt a responsibility to make sure that people are as informed as possible when November comes, because I do not believe that was the case in 2016 at all.”

For now, she said she views this book as her small bit of activism and prefers not to focus on the November election — or the possibility that Trump could win reelection.

If that happens, she said with a laugh, “I may be in the Caribbean.”

Demography Is Not Destiny by Ruy Texeira and John Judis

Demography Is Not Destiny
John Judis and I came up with the idea of an emerging Democratic majority. A dangerous misinterpretation of it helped elect Donald Trump.

June 16, 2020

The idea that demographic changes are sure to favor Democrats has done tremendous damage to the party’s electoral prospects over the past decade. In this important longread, Ruy Teixeira, the thinker who is most closely associated with this conventional wisdom, explains why it is based on a dangerous misunderstanding of both the facts and his own theory. I hope you’ll take the time to read it. Yascha

In the months after Barack Obama’s historic victory, the conventional wisdom held that Democrats would now dominate the nation’s politics for decades. “There have been long periods where one party generally has the upper hand,” famous Democratic strategist James Carville remarked at the time. Obama’s victory, the title of Carville’s new book predicted, marked the beginning of just such an epoch: 40 More Years—How Democrats Will Rule the Next Generation.

Carville’s analysis was based on a simple narrative: Groups that favor Democrats are growing. Groups that favor Republicans are shrinking. Demographic change will keep swelling the Democratic ranks until Republicans have little choice but to surrender.

It is a narrative I know well, for it is based on a bowdlerization of my own work. In 2002, John Judis and I published The Emerging Democratic Majority. In our book, we argue that Democrats should take advantage of a set of interrelated social, economic and demographic changes, including the growth of minority communities and cultural shifts among college graduates.

But we also emphasized that building this majority would require a very broad coalition, including many voters drawn from the white working class. This crucial nuance was quickly lost. And so, many Democratic pundits, operatives and elected officials have falsely come to believe that demographics are destiny.

The result has been a decade-long electoral disaster. With the exception of Obama’s victory in 2012, Democrats lost just about every important election for the next eight years. By early 2016, the party was down to 44 seats in the United States Senate, 188 seats in the House of Representatives, 18 governorships and 3,164 seats in state legislatures—the fewest elected offices Democrats have held nationwide since the 1920s. Then came the coup de grace: Donald Trump defeated Hillary Clinton to become the 45th President of the United States.

If Democrats don’t correct their misunderstanding of what it takes for them to win elections, the next decade could turn out to be just as bitter as the last. But even after ten painful years, their most influential operatives continue to believe that demographic changes will inevitably give them a decisive advantage. So it is time for me to set the record straight.

The Real Nature of the Obama Coalition

Demographic changes really do favor Democrats—to an extent.

As John Judis and I wrote in 2002, the number of voters from racial minorities is rapidly growing. The share of American voters who are black, Hispanic, Asian or belong to another minority racial group goes up by about two percentage points every four years. And all of these groups really do prefer Democrats to Republicans by a significant margin.

Democrats can also seize upon other long-term changes. Women are becoming more liberal, and this tendency is especially pronounced among those segments of the female vote that are growing especially quickly: the unmarried and the highly educated. This is part of a broader trend towards the Democratic Party among the growing professional class, with its permissive social values and support for active government.

All these trends, we argued, were coming together in dynamic metropolitan areas rooted in the emerging postindustrial economy. These “ideopolises”—places like the Raleigh-Durham Research Triangle and the suburbs of Washington D.C.—were realigning and putting states formally dominated by Republicans, like North Carolina and Virginia, into play for the Democrats.

In the first years after the book was published, reality seemed to conspire against our thesis. Republicans performed strongly in the 2002 midterms and George W. Bush comfortably won a second term in 2004. But then the political winds began to change. As Bush’s popularity plummeted, and Democrats began to recover a lot of lost ground in the 2006 midterm elections, the idea of the emerging Democratic majority seemed to describe the coalition the junior senator from Illinois was trying to put together in his unlikely run for the White House.

From the beginning, Obama’s coalition was dominated by the groups we identified in our book. According to sophisticated synthetic estimates by the big data firm Catalist, Obama carried black voters by 90 points, Hispanics by 27 points, Asians and those of other races by 26 points. He also won young voters by 29 points, unmarried women by 22 points, college graduates by 7 points and suburban voters by 5 points, with strong turnout across the board. The trends we had described were especially pronounced in key states he moved into the Democratic column: Colorado and Nevada in the Southwest; Virginia, North Carolina and Florida in the South.

After Obama’s historic victory, our theory morphed from provocative projection to sacred gospel. Instead of focusing on the fact that this emerging majority only gave Democrats tremendous potential if they played their cards right, many progressives started to interpret it as a description of an inevitable future. The new Democratic majority, they believed, had already arrived. All they had to do to win election after election was to mobilize the growing segments of the electorate, and the demographic changes that favored them would take care of the rest. Sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly, our thesis turned into the simplistic argument that “demographics are destiny.”

But our argument had been much more complicated than that. We had always envisaged the new Democratic majority as a coalition between growing segments of the population and the party’s traditional electorate. To be sure, this coalition would include a lot of the voters progressives now chose to focus on: minorities, professionals and the young, and unmarried and highly educated women. But in addition to this “rising American electorate,” it would also have to include a significant minority of the white working class, a group that—though its numbers were in decline—would continue to constitute a very large electoral block for the foreseeable future. (In 2008, 51 percent of eligible voters belonged to the white working class; in the 2020 elections, 44 percent will.)

To hold this broad coalition together, we argued, Democrats needed to adopt a form of “progressive centrism.” The party should proudly emphasize the ability of government to improve the lives of ordinary Americans. But its governing ideology could not present itself as standing in radical opposition to the country’s founding values:

[Americans] want government to play an active and responsible role in American life, guaranteeing a reasonable level of economic security to Americans rather than leaving them at the mercy of the market and the business cycle. They want to preserve and strengthen Social Security and Medicare, rather than privatize them. They want to modernize and upgrade public education, not abandon it. They want to exploit new bio-technologies and computer technologies in order to improve the quality of life. They do not want science held hostage to a religious or ideological agenda. And they want the social gains of the sixties consolidated, not rolled back; the wounds of race healed, not inflamed.

Obama seemed to understand all of this. He vowed to bring the country together and fulfill its promise. He pledged to take quick action to repair damage caused by the Great Recession and fix the broken financial system, and he stressed economic fairness. The most important legislative initiative of his first year in office was a move toward universal health care.

Because of his determination to appeal to all sections of the American electorate, Obama not only excelled at mobilizing the vote among growing segments of the population: he also significantly improved Democrats’ performance among white working-class voters. According to Catalist, Obama only lost this group of voters by 10 points nationwide in 2008, a much narrower margin than John Kerry had achieved four years earlier.

But the real nature of Obama’s coalition was quickly forgotten in the celebratory mood following the election of America’s first black President. Over the following years, Democrats came to believe that demographic changes were saving them from the need to appeal to voters beyond the ranks of their most supportive groups.

As future elections revealed, that was a huge mistake. The conviction that demographics are destiny subverted the hard thinking necessary to keep a broad coalition together in the face of the economic damage wrought by the Great Recession and the intense partisan warfare unleashed by the GOP. With the Tea Party movement infusing the right with new energy, and many working-class whites turning against Obama because of worsened economic conditions, the limits of the emerging Democratic majority were quickly revealed. As the President famously put it on the night of a bitter defeat in the 2010 midterms, he took a bad “shellacking” at the polls.

The 2010 elections should have provided a serious warning about how vulnerable the Democratic coalition was to backlash from white non-college voters. Sensing this, Obama crafted a reelection strategy that was focused on shoring up his broad coalition. He retained the fervent support of the “rising American electorate” by defending immigrants and “Dreamers,” stressing his support for the rights of women and gay people, and highlighting his actions against climate change. But he was also careful to appeal to white working-class voters in the Rust Belt states by touting his rescue of the auto industry and portraying Mitt Romney as a rich hedge funder who didn’t care about their well-being.

Obama was reelected—but his deficit among white non-college voters doubled. This deficit, while still low enough to enable Obama’s re-election, should have set off alarm bells in progressive circles. The coalition Obama had built was starting to fracture and the future success of the party depended on cobbling it back together.

Instead, progressives drew the opposite conclusion.

Democrats Double Down on Their Mistake

After 2012, two interlocking developments led to the full embrace of the idea that demographics are destiny.

First, the bowdlerization of the emerging Democratic majority thesis neatly complemented the political predilections of a rising set of people who placed questions of group identity and disadvantage at the heart of their political activism. This approach, which soon came to be known as “identity politics,” privileges mobilization around multiple, intersecting levels of oppression based on group identification over mobilization around universal rights and principles that bind people together across groups. Since most white non-college voters were rightly perceived to be uninterested in—if not outright hostile to—the core tenets of intersectional politics, those who favored this approach had a reason to embrace an electoral strategy that dispensed with them.

Second, the Republican Party was captured by right-wing populism. As its leading politicians began to play on racial and xenophobic fears in an increasingly overt manner, large parts of the left decided that anybody who was at all attracted to this hateful brand of politics could not possibly return to the Democratic tent: the best course of action was simply to ignore such voters.

The rise of Donald Trump understandably turbocharged this tendency. Surely, the conventional wisdom went, the emerging Democratic majority doesn’t need voters who can stomach Trump’s bigotry (even if they had voted for America’s first black president twice over). The apotheosis of this attitude was Hillary Clinton’s infamous statement that half of Trump’s supporters belonged in a “basket of deplorables”—the kind of gaffe that reveals what its speaker really thinks.

The result was Clinton’s shocking and tragic defeat in the 2016 election. Her campaign took a high-stakes bet on the rising American electorate—and lost. Her margin of victory among African-Americans, Latinos, young voters and highly educated women, while significant, was notably lower than that Obama had enjoyed in 2012. Turnout among these groups was markedly worse. But the fatal blow to her presidential ambitions was delivered by the massive shift of white non-college voters toward Trump in the critical states of Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin. Nationally, the Democrats’ white non-college deficit ballooned to 28 points: nearly three times Obama’s deficit in 2008.

As Democrats sorted through the wreckage of the election, the demographics as destiny strategy did not receive the burial it deserved. Instead, progressive activists focused exclusively on Clinton’s lackluster support from young and non-white voters, and argued that she had been paying too much attention to the white working class. As Sally Kohn wrote at the Daily Beast, “the Democratic Party’s fixation on white working-class voters … isn’t just fraught with bias. It’s also dumb.” In the New York Times, Steve Phillips essentially called upon Democrats to give up on the white working class: “The country is under conservative assault because Democrats mistakenly sought support from conservative white working-class voters susceptible to racially charged appeals. Replicating that strategy would be another catastrophic blunder.”

Most of these activists and analysts quickly converged on a different theory: Mobilizing the base, to them, was not a necessary part of the game; it was its be-all and end-all.

The theory of politics as base mobilization was adopted by a large majority of the candidates competing in the 2020 Democratic primary. In the attempt to appeal to their base, candidates endorsed a raft of proposals that are unpopular among a clear majority of Americans, including the elimination of private health insurance, the abolition of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency, the decriminalization of the Mexican border, and the extension of the vote to all prisoners. As core advisors to Bernie Sanders, the candidate who could sell this platform in the most authentic manner, made clear over and over again, the idea was not just to win the primaries by mobilizing the rising American electorate: it was to beat Trump in the general election by generating a “tsunami of turnout” among young and non-white voters.

But despite Sanders’ early successes in Iowa and New Hampshire—states whose electorates are, ironically, dominated by older whites—his momentum came to a screeching halt in the South Carolina primary. Black Democrats, who tend to be more moderate than their white counterparts, overwhelmingly voted for the least woke and radical candidate left in the field: Joe Biden. And so the candidate who had nary a supporter in the press, and had already been written off by many pundits, proceeded to run the table on Super Tuesday. His success was owed to strong support from a broad coalition of voters—including African-Americans, women, suburban moderates, whites with a college education and, yes, rural voters and whites without a college education. Even within the rising American electorate, the appetite for far-left policies was far less strong than the vast majority of Biden’s opponents had come to believe.

Biden Is Putting the Obama Coalition Back Together

How is Biden likely to fare in the general election?

Unlike Obama, Biden is not himself a representative of the rising American electorate. But, perhaps counterintuitively, he could prove an excellent steward of the emerging Democratic majority.

Like Obama, Biden instinctively grasps that building a Democratic majority requires cobbling together a very broad coalition. Like Obama, Biden seeks to be president of the American people as a whole. And like Obama, he very much welcomes white non-college voters into the progressive coalition. Far from writing off all those who voted for Trump in 2016 as irredeemable racists, he recognizes that a huge number of them now feel dismayed and betrayed.

This stance is as evident in Biden’s proposed policies as in his persona. Along with the rest of the Democratic party—and the country as a whole—Biden has moved to the left. The policies he has announced so far are considerably more progressive than those of any previous Democratic candidate. He has pledged to expand Medicare, to create a public health insurance option, to make a massive investment in infrastructure, and to move towards zero carbon emissions. But though they are certainly bold, these policies remain squarely within the ambit of what Judis and I termed “progressive centrism.” Biden has not shied away from rejecting those parts of progressive orthodoxy—like the elimination of private health insurance and the decriminalization of the southern border—that are broadly unpopular.

It is this progressive centrism that has allowed Biden to steer safely through the tumultuous seas of the past months. He has strongly supported the protest movement over the murder of George Floyd, and quickly proposed a slew of serious reforms of policing practices. But at the same time, he swiftly decried the violence associated with some of the protests and declined to sanction the highly unpopular call to “defund the police.” While he has endorsed taking down Confederate statues, he insisted that statues of iconic American figures like George Washington and Thomas Jefferson must be protected.

The fundamental facts of American politics have not, then, changed all that much over the past two decades. Demographic and economic changes are favoring Democrats. But to capitalize on these changes, Democrats need to hew close to the center of public opinion and retain the votes of a significant portion of the white working class.

This is no easy task. But even in the age of Donald Trump, it can be accomplished. Indeed, it is this kind of strategy that delivered huge gains to Democrats in the 2018 midterms, when moderate insurgents hammered Republican incumbents by promising better health care, decrying tax cuts for the rich, and pledging their commitment to economic fairness. And if current polls are to be believed, it is also the reason why Biden has now taken a commanding lead over Donald Trump: As his support among young and non-white voters has firmed up, he is making big gains among white college voters, has halved Clinton’s deficit among white non-college voters, and is shifting millions of seniors to the Democratic column.

The election is still five months away. But now, more than at any point in the past four years, there is reason to believe that Joe Biden may succeed in restoring the soul of America—by reuniting the broad demographic coalition that so many Democrats have been tempted to abandon.

Ruy Teixeira is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress and the co-author, with John Judis, of The Emerging Democratic Majority. His most recent book is The Optimistic Leftist: Why the 21st Century Will Be Better Than You Think.

Wednesday, July 8, 2020

Sabotaging the recovery

Sabotaging the recovery
By Mainly Macro
mainlymacro.blogspot.com
Tuesday, 7 July 2020
5 min
View Original

I wrote last week about how a premature easing of lockdown in the UK would cost many more lives. This post will be about how it is also likely to create a weak recovery where some businesses will go to the wall and many jobs will be lost.

A good starting point in thinking about the kind of recovery we could have is to think about synchronized holidays, like Christmas or the summer holiday in much of France. Most of the economy closes down for a few weeks, but starts up again without any long term harm done. You get a V shaped recovery, which we never notice because it gets seasonally adjusted out of the data.

A few months is not fundamentally different from a few weeks, if the government provides sufficient support to firms, the self employed and individuals? The absence of such support gives us the first reason why a recovery might not be V shaped. Yet the UK government’s support over the last few months has been reasonably good, albeit with some notable exceptions.

After a holiday involving a few weeks, consumers’ preferences will be unchanged. Is the same true of a pandemic? If the virus has disappeared for good, or immunity against the virus is complete (with a vaccine, say), there seems no compelling reason to believe otherwise, although overseas travel will require the virus to have disappeared in other countries as well. Perhaps some consumers might initially not believe the virus has disappeared, but this might be offset by other consumers spending more time on social consumption than normal in celebration that the pandemic has ended. In some sectors this second effect could even lead to a larger recovery than the initial recession.

The main reason a V shaped recovery is not going to happen in the UK is because the virus has not disappeared. Compared to other European countries the number of new infections remains high, and as a result many consumers will be understandably reluctant to resume their normal patterns of social consumption. If the government also withdraws support from social consumption sectors, this inevitably means firm closure and firm downsizing, leading to a large increase in unemployment. Restoring confidence in countries where the virus has largely disappeared will not be easy, but that task is much harder when the risks of catching the virus are non-negligible.

There is a further hurdle in the face of a recovery that this government has created. Whatever the new number of infections are, will consumers trust the government when they are told they should resume social consumption? Almost everything the government has done to combat the virus has been a failure. The latest is withholding until recently Pillar 2 data from local authorities and the public. When people are told it’s their civic duty to resume social consumption, rather than simply being told what the risks of doing so are, they are bound to be suspicious of the government’s motives, and who can blame them.

The continuing high level of infections and lack of trust mean that many consumers will not resume social consumption. This poll shows that people’s perception of the risk from the virus has recently increased. This is the inevitable result of prioritising the economy rather than getting new infection numbers right down.

So what can be done? The government is not going to drive new infections down much lower by opening up pubs! It is not going to get trust back anytime soon. Can the Chancellor encourage reluctant consumers to resume social consumption by some means? A general fiscal stimulus, in the form of a tax cut, is unlikely to do much in this respect, because most of it will be saved. Furthermore what is spent is likely to go into sectors that can make a reasonable recovery, like clothing and consumer durables. Other forms of standard fiscal stimulus, including a VAT cut, are unlikely to avoid large scale redundancies from social consumption sectors.

The Resolution Foundation has a more interesting proposal, which is to give vouchers that are time limited that can be spent in vulnerable social consumption sectors (and which are switched off if a second wave appears and we have to go back into lockdown). This is the kind of sector specific stimulus we need. Another possibility would be a temporary cut in VAT on social consumption goods.

Even with such schemes, we are unlikely to see a full rebound in social consumption for some months to come. In a few specific areas social distancing means venues will inevitably be operating at a loss. Subsidies of various kinds to keep firms going and to avoid as far as possible large scale redundancies will be necessary.

While a general fiscal stimulus will not solve sector specific problems, if interest rates remain at their lower bound there is strong a case for economy wide fiscal support. Aggregate demand may remain low as investment is depressed by Brexit and uncertainty about a second wave. If the Chancellor is looking at ideas for what this stimulus could be, or more generally in how to meet our climate change goals, here is a report from NEF.

However unemployment will inevitably remain too high. As Paul Gregg notes, this prolonged recession will be much more unemployment intensive than the recession after the Global Financial Crisis. But just as fiscal stimulus can be regarded as an opportunity, so job losses can be seen as a chance to reskill the UK workforce, along the lines suggested by Jonathan Portes and Tony Wilson. However some of those working in areas where social consumption is low because of the pandemic may wish to remain in those sectors once demand picks up because new infections decline significantly or a vaccine is developed. It is worth noting that a Job Guarantee, if such a scheme existed, would provide an excellent chance for these people to do something useful in this enforced break in their careers.

These are all policies that will have much more work to do because this government made yet another error in their handling of this pandemic, which was to ease the lockdown while the number of new infections was still quite high. Most experts, and indeed most academic economists, understood it would be an error before it happened. It is an error that could sabotage what might have been something close to a V shaped recovery.


Monday, July 6, 2020

Trump doesn’t know how to run against Joe Biden, a Democrat who is not ‘a nasty woman’ | Will Bunch

Trump doesn’t know how to run against Joe Biden, a Democrat who is not ‘a nasty woman’ | Will Bunch
Will Bunch

9-11 minutes

Posted: July 2, 2020 - 10:35 AM 

In recent days, with cases of the potentially deadly coronavirus spiking across much of the United States and the jobless rate still foundering above 11%, the president was obsessed with what a Washington Post front-page story described as “an urgent task for Trump and his team.” That would be coming up with a new nickname for the political foe Trump had dubbed “Sleepy Joe Biden” — even as he watched Biden sprint past him in many polls by double digits.

In the Oval Office where his predecessors had made life-or-death decisions on dropping the atomic bomb on Japan or how far to push Moscow in the Cuban missile crisis, the 45th president and his top political advisers discussed whether a moniker like “Creepy Joe” or “Swampy Joe” might be just the thing to get voters to forget about their grandma on a ventilator and pull the level for Trump on November 3. POTUS, according to the Post, was leaning toward “Corrupt Joe” — with the details about what makes the former vice president so corrupt presumably to be invented later.

Donald Trump’s June was probably the worst month that any U.S. president has experienced since 1974, maybe since 1861 ... and yet that doesn’t really bother him. What does bother him is that his poll numbers look exactly like what you’d expect they’d resemble for a commander-in-chief who’d had such a lousy 30 days. Currently 56% of Americans disapprove of the job Trump is doing, according to the Real Clear Politics average. He’s losing to Biden in every major battleground state. Voting blocs that went for him in 2016, like non-college white women, are heading for the hills. And Trump really thinks he can turn it around by pinning a scary nickname around Biden’s neck?

It’s funny. Trump once knew exactly how to rise from the morass of business failures and shady scams like Trump U. to leading White House contender, simply by insisting that America’s first Black president must have been born in Kenya. Next, he built a GOP primary lead that he never surrendered after coming down an escalator to call Mexican migrants murderers and rapists. And then fate intervened to offer him a 2016 opponent whom he could brand as “a nasty woman,” while packed arenas chanted “Lock her up!” in an incantation worthy of the Salem witch trials.

Hillary Clinton? Trump could work with that! But an avuncular 77-year-old white-haired straight white dude? Trump and hapless campaign team refuse to admit the reason they can’t come up with a nickname for Joe Biden — let alone a rationale to prevent him from becoming the next president — is because a presidency powered by hate doesn’t exactly know how to hate someone like that. Even worse for the GOP, neither does Trump’s fan base.

Remember Trump’s disastrous attempt at a campaign rally in Tulsa, at the arena that was only one-third full? Washington Post reporter Dave Weigel went there and — while some Trump stans were wearing their crude anti-Hillary T-shirts from 2016 — he found few voters who were particularly terrified by Biden, few vendors who were selling anti-Biden gear, and little evidence that folks were buying any of it. “He [Biden] doesn’t stand out as a strong candidate,” one vendor told Weigel.

In 2016, some Republicans had ambivalent feelings about Trump but felt so strongly about keeping Clinton out of the White House that one right-wing pundit called it a “Flight 93 election,” that GOP voters had to rush the cockpit and maybe crash the plane to prevent what they saw as looming disaster if she’d succeeded in her quest to become America’s first woman president.

“Trump stoked the anti-woman theme with relish,” Larry Sabato, the University of Virginia historian and veteran observer of presidential politics, told me via email, adding: “Things couldn’t be more different with Biden. Trump will viciously attack him, naturally, but he simply doesn’t hate Biden like he did and does Hillary. Trump has even said some good things about him.”

It’s just different in 2020. This week, the New York Times drilled deep into the sliver of Trump-to-Biden voters who appear to be responsible from turning what was supposed to be a nail-biter into a solid lead for the Democrat. It wasn’t hard to find those who could not abide Hillary Clinton but were OK with the man from Delaware.

John Crilly, 55, a retired commercial diver in Reeders, Pa., told the Times he’d pulled the lever for Trump “because the other option was Hillary Clinton.” Flash forward four years, and this Pennsylvania voter who rejected a former U.S. senator and secretary of state seems shocked, shocked that the narcissistic neophyte that he preferred is overwhelmed by COVID-19.

With Americans assaulted this year by crisis after crisis, it’s hard not to live in the moment. The realization that half the country is ready to replace Trump with a man who, for all his imperfections, has the experience and the empathy that the Current Occupant lacks, is something of a feel-good story for many. But there’s a flip side that we need to have a national conversation about.

America is having a long-overdue moment of reckoning around race — and clearly white supremacy is a driving force behind Trumpism. But so is misogyny. Unlike so many other developed nations, the United States has never elected a woman president, and when a super-qualified (but, yes, also imperfect) one was finally nominated by a major party, millions flocked instead to a buffoonish TV-reality star who was incapable of saying “no” to adult film stars or Vladimir Putin ... but who had a Y chromosome.

Not only was that “lock her up” toxic masculinity Trump’s secret sauce on November 8, 2016, but it’s poisoned the way that this president has governed for the last 41 months. CNN’s Carl Bernstein reports that Donald Trump’s dripping contempt for strong women has ruined our relations with key allies such as Germany — he lashed out at Angela Merkel as “stupid” and, ironically, in the pocket of Russia — and the United Kingdom, at least when Theresa May, with whom Trump was “aggressive and bullying,” was its prime minister. Of course, POTUS fawned over “strongmen” like Putin and Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Closer to home, the president has the bare minimum of female cabinet members, no close women advisors (other than his daughter), and has embarked on a project to stock the federal judiciary for the rest of our lifetimes with right-wing zealots who are predominantly white but also predominantly men — 76% male, in an era when a majority of law-school graduates are women. These young white dudes in their black robes will still be placing undue restrictions on women’s reproductive rights on the day that your unborn granddaughter is commuting to her job designing robots, in her flying car.

Biden seems to understand that on some level he owes his easy nomination to the fears of rank-and-file Democrats that dynamic and highly qualified women like Sen. Elizabeth Warren would have been “Hillary’ed” by Trump in the general election. He’s promised a female running mate and that his first appointment to the Supreme Court will be a Black woman. Both moves are praiseworthy, but a Biden presidency must do much more to fight systemic sexism in America.

The lack of affordable daycare options, stone-age policies around sick leave or consistent working hours, the insanely low minimum wage, and the lack of universal health care — America’s lack of leadership in these areas has made it easy for vulture capitalism to put millions of women in low-wage jobs and untenable situations. This summer’s seeming political shift toward the Democrats doesn’t only signal an end to Trumpism but a shot at the most progressive Congress since the 1930s. Whether a President Biden can seize that moment — much more than his vice presidential pick — will determine his legacy.

Yes, the odds are better than ever (if everyone keeps their guard up and votes, no matter what obstacles are thrown up by the GOP) that “Sleepy Joe Biden” will wake up in the White House on January 21, 2021, and not Donald Trump. But we need to stay woke to the fact that tiki-torch-lit mobs chanting “Lock her up!” and the inherent sexist bias that fuels them will still be with us.

The fact that only another white man could dislodge Trump and his woman-hatred from the presidency isn’t so much a cause for celebration as a reminder that removing the twin towers of racism and misogyny from their concrete foundation in American society is the great challenge of our 21st century, and there is so much more work to be done.