Monday, September 1, 2025

More sweltering days forecast for September after hottest summer on record

 

More sweltering days forecast for September after hottest summer on record
By the end of August, 8,341 people had been transported by ambulance for heatstroke in Tokyo alone.
By the end of August, 8,341 people had been transported by ambulance for heatstroke in Tokyo alone. | AFP-JIJI
By Jessica Speed
STAFF WRITER
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Sep 1, 2025

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This summer was Japan’s hottest on record, with average temperatures nationwide more than 2.36 degrees Celsius higher than usual, according to a report released Monday by the Meteorological Agency.
The agency said this summer (June through August) was the hottest since records began, surpassing highs set in 2023 and 2024, when the deviation from the norm was 1.76 C in both years.

The agency attributed the heat to global warming and an unusually strong Pacific high pressure system, bolstered by convective activity in the Indian Ocean and around the Philippines.

Aug. 5 saw the hottest temperature in Japan on record, with the city of Isesaki, Gunma Prefecture, reaching 41.8 C. Of the 153 meteorological stations nationwide, 132 recorded their highest summer temperatures ever. The cumulative number of extremely hot days observed at weather stations nationwide this summer reached 9,385, surpassing the previous record of 8,821 in 2024.

Temperatures reached 38 C or above Monday in the town of Hatoyama in Saitama Prefecture and the cities of Nagoya, Tajimi, Kuki, Kiryu and Toyama in Aichi, Gifu, Saitama, Gunma and Toyama prefectures, respectively.

The extreme heat is expected to continue into September, with a one-month forecast released by the agency Thursday putting the probability of above-average temperatures for the month at 80% nationwide.

According to the report, temperatures are projected to remain high across the country through Friday, with an 80% probability of exceeding seasonal norms. The Tohoku and Hokkaido regions have a 70% chance of higher-than-average temperatures from Sept. 6 to 12, while other regions face an 80% probability. Elevated temperatures are expected to persist into late September and October, although with slightly lower probabilities.

The agency also expects there to be less precipitation and more sunlight across the country, though the western part of the Hokkaido-Tohoku region is expected to be rainier in September.

The most recent three-month outlook issued by the agency predicts above-normal temperatures across the country through November, driven by continued high sea surface temperatures near the Philippines and westerly winds flowing farther north than usual.

The hotter-than-average temperatures are also taking a toll on emergency services. By the end of August, 8,341 people had been transported by ambulance for heatstroke in Tokyo alone, surpassing last year’s record of 7,996, according to the Tokyo Fire Department.

The department is urging residents to take necessary precautions against heat exhaustion and heatstroke, such as using air conditioning, wearing hats or parasols outside to avoid direct sunlight, and drinking small sips of water before beginning to feel thirsty.

Yes, Cash Transfers Work -- by Annie Lowrey

Yes, Cash Transfers Work

The Atlantic by Annie Lowrey / Aug 30


In 2023, the United States produced $28 trillion worth of goods and services. The average family had a net worth of $192,900. Shares in American companies accounted for more than half of global-market capitalization. Yet one in eight Americans lived in poverty, as did one in seven children.


The best way we have to help those people is to give them money. Year in and year out, Social Security lifts more than 20 million Americans above the poverty line; tax credits lift 6 million; and food stamps, housing subsidies, unemployment insurance, and Supplemental Security Income payments lift another 2 million to 4 million each. Expanding these programs would move the poverty rate lower, experts have long argued. Providing families with much-needed cash also tends to have a range of positive knock-on effects, such as keeping kids in school and improving health measures.     


But a new set of cash-transfer programs has had lackluster results. Writing in the new publication The Argument, Kelsey Piper notes that “multiple large, high-quality randomized studies are finding that guaranteed income transfers do not appear to produce sustained improvements in mental health, stress levels, physical health, child development outcomes or employment. Given the sobering results, politicians and policy makers should hesitate before pumping funds into these safety-net initiatives, she argues. If not, “money will be wasted on things that don’t work.”


Having a technocratic debate over how to spend the next marginal safety-net dollar feels a touch absurd at the moment. Republicans are gutting the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program and Medicaid to finance tax cuts for billionaires; Trump-administration officials are sending masked thugs to disappear people off the streets when they are not busy texting war plans to my boss; American democracy is fading; nobody is talking about instituting a universal basic income anytime soon. Still, policy design is important, and the analysis of these new studies seems to have convinced a number of Beltway wonks and denizens of econ Twitter that cash transfers might not be as good of an idea as we once thought.


Yet the argument has tended to overinterpret a limited and novel body of evidence while ignoring decades of sterling research showing that cash—particularly when targeted to infants and children—is near unmatched as a salve for poverty and its horrible consequences.


The new studies focused on programs that were launched over the past eight years. Each worked in a similar way. Researchers found people interested in receiving unconditional cash payments, divided participants into a control group and a treatment group, disbursed the money, and studied the differences between the two groups. The programs varied in the types of people they enrolled (Baby’s First Years targeted infants and mothers; the Denver Basic Income Project, the homeless; the Compton Pledge, low-income households) and the size and duration of transfers (the OpenResearch Unconditional Income Study offered $1,000 a month, Baby’s First Years, one-third that sum).


The results were disappointing in some respects. “Homeless people, new mothers and low-income Americans all over the country received thousands of dollars. And it’s practically invisible in the data,” Piper writes in her summary. Denver’s program did not lead to a material reduction in homelessness. Compton’s did not improve its participants’ psychological well-being or alleviate certain measures of financial distress. The OpenResearch initiative did not bolster health outcomes. Baby’s First Years did not advance child development or spur families to move to better neighborhoods. “On so many important metrics, these people are statistically indistinguishable from those who did not receive this aid.”


But people receiving aid were statistically distinguishable from those not receiving aid: They had more money to use on the things they needed, or wanted. In the OpenResearch pilot, participants spent more on housing, transportation, and food. Mothers who got cash through the Baby’s First Years initiative were less likely to be in poverty than those who did not. In other words, a famed anti-poverty measure reduced poverty.


This intuitive finding is underplayed, perhaps because it is so intuitive. Cash transfers aren’t new. No safety-net policy has ever been as thoroughly examined over the course of decades. Last year alone, initiatives to send cash and cashlike substitutes to American families cut the overall poverty rate in half. Just a few years ago, a massive temporary federal cash transfer to parents slashed the child-poverty rate to a historic low of 5.2 percent; the rate rebounded after the program ended. You give people money; they have money.


That said, I am not surprised that the pilots’ effects were limited, given when they were happening and how they were structured. The initiatives took place during and after the coronavirus pandemic, when Congress flooded families with stimulus checks, $600-a-week bonuses to unemployment-insurance payments, and a $3,600-per-kid child allowance. If the no-strings-attached payments from OpenResearch or Baby’s First Years were the only cash transfers that low-income families were receiving, I imagine that they would have had a stronger impact. (Cash transfers have more bang for the buck in developing countries than the super-wealthy United States for a related reason: The more money people have, the more expensive it is to improve their situation; the more intense the material deprivation, the greater effect a single dollar has in alleviating it.)   


More important, the pilots took place during an acute cost-of-living crisis: a giant surge in inflation combined with a long-simmering run-up in the price for child care, health care, and housing. A few hundred dollars a month was never going to secure a single mom an apartment in Denver or cover the cost of 9-to-5 day care in Queens. Thus it might have had a smaller impact on financial well-being than anticipated, and might explain why transfers did more for people living in low-cost Illinois and Texas than in the witheringly expensive Los Angeles metro area.


There is a real lesson for policy makers here. Cash is no good if you cannot buy the things you need with it, and the brutal cost of day care, elder care, higher education, doctor visits, prescription medication, and rent—especially rent—continues to hammer the working and middle classes. We cannot transfer our way out of this crisis. If you give parents child-care vouchers, prices will go up unless supply expands. If you provide rental assistance, landlords will soak up the cash. Right now, surging energy costs are eating up Social Security payments, jobless benefits, and earned-income tax-credit transfers.   


But the relationship between household income and supply constraints is not the focus of the current debate. Rather, folks are dinging cash-transfer initiatives for failing to bolster breastfeeding rates, cut maternal stress levels, change people’s physical activity, or increase people’s educational attainment. Given these results, a “big ‘give everyone cash’ program” will not “make them measurably healthier or happier, or get them better jobs, or improve their children’s intellectual development,” Piper writes, not “at any detectable scale.”


Hundreds of studies of cash-transfer programs conducted over the past half century, however, have come to the opposite conclusion. Giving people money does have strong ancillary benefits. Cash makes people healthier, eliminates hunger, increases educational attainment, cuts the disability rate, reduces inequality, raises lifetime earnings, and prevents incarceration. The strongest benefits redound to infants and children. But cash is not magic, and these second- and third-order effects take time to show up in the data. Mothers’ pensions, the precedent for today’s welfare program, had muted effects on the women receiving them from the 1910s to the 1930s, but significant effects on the lifetime earnings and educational attainment of their sons, decades later.


Perhaps other interventions would have worked better. Perhaps researchers should have taken the money from the pilots and spent it on, say, workforce training, job coaching, therapy, health counseling, or some other intervention. But such policies do not have a promising track record, and these studies shed no light on their comparative efficacy versus cash. Complicated programs with complicated participation criteria also tend to be expensive for the government to run and difficult for citizens to navigate, meaning fewer people use them. That’s a big reason to just give people money. Folks would rather receive cash than a refundable tax credit to reduce energy costs, or an income-scaled voucher redeemable at a certain location after you fill out a bunch of paperwork.


The point of giving people money right now is to get them out of poverty. The point of giving people money is to give their kids a better chance at a healthy, abundant life. Reading the studies, I kept on thinking about that temporary child allowance. When parents received the cash, they didn’t feel happier. They moved above the poverty line, and bought more groceries. They could afford more formula for their babies and berries for their toddlers. Maybe that’s a disappointment. But as a parent myself, I kept thinking: What a win.

Yglesias - Perfectly Legal and Undeniably Scandalous

Yglesias - Perfectly Legal and Undeniably Scandalous

Unlike his legally dubious attempt to fire a Fed governor, a lot of the president’s most irresponsible decisions are well within his authority.

August 31, 2025 at 12:00 PM UTC


By Matthew Yglesias

Matthew Yglesias is a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion. A co-founder of and former columnist for Vox, he writes the Slow Boring blog and newsletter. He is author of “One Billion Americans.”



One of the defining features of Donald Trump’s second presidency is an endless parade of legally dubious assaults on the foundations of American institutions. His administration’s attempt to destroy the independence of the Federal Reserve, with the director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency rummaging through private mortgage filings to gin up bad-faith charges of misconduct to create a pretext for firing a member of the Fed’s board, is only the latest example.

But there’s a popular aphorism in Washington: The scandal isn’t what’s illegal, the scandal is what’s legal. So it’s important not to let certain pernicious yet permissible Trump moves get lost in the shuffle.

Chief among these is the firing earlier this month of Air Force Lieutenant General Jeffrey Kruse as head of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Kruse was cashiered on a Friday afternoon without so much as an explanation — similar to how the administration handled dismissals of senior military officers earlier this year.

Firing high-ranking military officers is unquestionably a legitimate exercise of presidential power, and there is certainly no legal obligation for the president or his team to explain their reasons. Still, it is highly unusual to fire commanders in this way. Unlike cabinet secretaries and other conventional political appointees who resign as a matter of course when a new president is elected, the long-established custom in the United States is for flag officers to remain in place across administrations.

Kruse appears to have been fired because the White House did not like the DIA’s assessment of the efficacy of US air strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities. Again, the president is legally allowed to punish the head of an intelligence agency for reaching a conclusion that he disagrees with. But absent clear evidence of misconduct, it’s extremely unadvisable.

Intelligence work is difficult. Agencies often disagree about things in good faith. If political decision-makers start making it clear that only certain conclusions are acceptable, the quality of the work product is going to be compromised, and ultimately they will find themselves receiving bad information. And intelligence failures can blow up in spectacular ways.

Trump, of all people, should know this: The story of his rise to power cannot be told without explaining how the US war in Iraq discredited George W. Bush and the Republican Party establishment even while leaving much of the basic appeal of cultural conservatism in place. Bush never did anything quite as clumsy as the outright firing an agency head for saying the wrong thing, but his subtler modes of influence changed things for the worse. Trump’s cruder approach risks even larger disasters.

And he’s applied the same blunt approach to the transparent and staid realm of economic data. The US commissioner of labor statistics is a Senate-confirmed political appointee, so Trump clearly had the authority to fire Erika McEntarfer from the job several weeks ago. In his place, he wants to install a hyper-partisan economist from the right-wing Heritage Foundation.

The propaganda upside to installing a hack at the BLS is clear enough. And it’s unquestionably legal. But this kind of move, to quote another famous saying, is worse than a crime; it’s a mistake.

It is far more important, both substantively and politically, to try to improve economic conditions rather than to try to improve economic numbers. Short of an outright recession, pretty much any situation can be seen as a glass half full or half empty. The White House usually tries to make the case for half full, while the opposition party argues for half empty. Juking the stats could give the White House a leg up — but would also make it easier for the opposition to dismiss any good news as fabrication.

A more serious issue is that reliable economic data is essential for effective economic policy.

At the beginning of former President Barack Obama’s tenure, for example, the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Economic Analysis underestimated the severity of the recession. The data were eventually revised, and it’s possible to argue that the less grim numbers made Obama look better in the moment. But long term, it was a disaster: Neither Congress nor the administration had an accurate read on the state of the US economy, leading to a weaker stimulus, with dire effects for both their own political projects and American workers.


Trump’s tendency to treat disagreement as disrespect — and to conflate agreement with respect, an equally dangerous trait that was flagrantly on display at last week’s three-hour cabinet meeting — blinds both the country and himself to the possibility that things aren’t going as well as he’d like. His firing last week of the director of the Centers for Disease Control, which bodes ill for US public health, calls to mind his hostility early in the Covid-19 pandemic to the idea of widespread testing for the virus. It’s easy to forget, but long before the controversies over mask rules and school closures and vaccines, there was a prolonged period when the administration could have taken preemptive action against a virus that was then limited to China. Instead, it chose to downplay the risks.

A president is certainly within his rights to fire the head of the CDC, the DIA or the BLS. These are simply “normal” bad decisions, not ones that raise constitutional questions. But they are often consequential, and Trump’s impulses are consistently irresponsible.