Friday, January 17, 2025

Donald Trump will upend 80 years of American foreign policy

Jan 16th 2025


Donald Trump will upend 80 years of American foreign policy — The Economist

Read time: 5 minutes


DONALD TRUMP’S critics have often accused him of buffoonery and isolationism. Yet even before taking office on January 20th he has shown how much those words fall short of what his second term is likely to bring. As the inauguration approaches, he has helped secure a ceasefire and hostage deal in Gaza. Busting taboos, he has bid for control over Greenland, with its minerals and strategic position in the Arctic. Mr Trump’s second term will not only be more disruptive than his first; it will also supplant a vision of foreign policy that has dominated America since the second world war.


For decades American leaders have argued that their power comes with the responsibility to be the indispensable defender of a world made more stable and benign by democracy, settled borders and universal values. Mr Trump will ditch the values and focus on amassing and exploiting power. His approach will be tested and defined in three conflicts: the Middle East, Ukraine and America’s cold war with China. Each shows how Mr Trump is impelled to break with recent decades: in his unorthodox methods, his accumulation and opportunistic use of influence, and his belief that power alone creates peace.


The Middle East illustrates his talent for unpredictability. The Israelis and Palestinians eventually agreed to a deal over Gaza because he created a deadline by threatening that “all hell would break loose” if they failed. He will need to keep pressing them if the deal is to progress to its later phases. Not since Richard Nixon has a president looked to behaving like a “madman” as a source of advantage.


Caprice is bolstered by pragmatism. Unlike most peacemakers, Mr Trump is blithely uninterested in the tortured history of the Middle East. The Abraham accords, signed in his first term, suggest that he will use the hostage release to promote a deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia, which he sees as the route to prosperity—and a Nobel peace prize. Iran’s allies have been crushed in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria. It may be ready to deal, too.


Yet the home of the three monotheistic religions will be a stern test of whether people really are willing to put aside their beliefs and their grievances for a shot at prosperity. Time and again, extremists on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides have vetoed peace plans by using violence to discredit the pragmatic centre. The Israeli right wants to annex Palestinian land. Iran is teetering between engagement with America and dashing for a nuclear bomb. What if the zealots and the mullahs get in Mr Trump’s way?


His answer will be to increase pressure using sanctions or the threat of force, or to walk away. That is also the choice he faces in Ukraine, where he has pledged to stop the fighting. Because he has more leverage over America’s allies than Vladimir Putin, the easier route is to walk away by ending support and so force concessions on the government in Kyiv—especially if, as his critics fear, he is flattered when Mr Putin deals with him as one alpha male to another. But that would undermine his other goals. Abandonment would court comparisons to Mr Biden and his hapless departure from Afghanistan. Mindful of comparisons with Taiwan, China might conclude he is a pushover. He may yet decide that being seen as ready to back Ukraine will strengthen his hand against Mr Putin.


An opportunistic use of power has some benefits. Mr Trump will continue to badger NATO members to spend more defending themselves against Russia, which is good. But it also has costs. NATO can probably survive Mr Trump’s threats to walk out, squabble over trade, support insurgent national conservative parties and bully Denmark over Greenland’s sovereignty. However, alliances thrive on trust. Putin-sympathising national conservatives will act as a poison. Allowing for its size, Denmark lost as many soldiers in Afghanistan as America did. Being arm-wrestled over Greenland is the sort of treatment that casts America as a threat, not a protector.


Despots will take comfort from a retreat from universal values. If Mr Trump asserts a sphere of American influence that embraces Canada, Greenland and Panama, they will claim it as an endorsement of their own principle that international relations have in reality always been a trial of strength—handy when Russia covets Georgia or China claims the South China Sea. If Mr Trump scorns institutions like the UN, which embody universal values, China and Russia will dominate them instead, and exploit them as conduits for their own interests.


The Trump camp argues that what counts is America’s strength, and that this will lead to peace with China. They warn of the need to prevent a third world war, observing that Xi Jinping wants to be capable of taking Taiwan by force by 2027. China is also rapidly building nuclear weapons and is systematically mastering strategic technologies. America, they say, needs to re-establish deterrence; and the panoply of “madman” diplomacy, pragmatism and the accumulation of economic and military strength is the way to do it.


Alas, when it comes to Taiwan, there is a contradiction. If the source of America’s strength is to be ruthlessly pragmatic about values, tough with allies and open to deals with opponents, then those are exactly the conditions for Mr Trump to trade Taiwan to China. Although the many China hawks in his administration would fight that, the very possibility points to a weakness at the heart of Mr Trump’s approach.


Pax Trumpiana

When the use of power is untethered by values, the result can be chaos on a global scale. If ultra-loyal, out-of-their-depth would-be disruptors like Pete Hegseth and Tulsi Gabbard are confirmed to head the Pentagon and intelligence, the chaos will spread on the inside, too. Mr Trump is ill-suited to separate his own interests from his country’s, especially if his and his associates’ money is at stake, as Elon Musk’s will be in China. By turning away from the values that made postwar America, Mr Trump will be surrendering the single greatest strength that his despotic opponents do not possess. ■



Tuesday, January 14, 2025

Paul Crider - Liberalism versus Reaction in Ayn Rand

Paul Crider - Liberalism versus Reaction in Ayn Rand

Paul Crider — Read time: 26 minutes

4 May 2022 — 23 min read


Liberalism versus Reaction in Ayn Rand

We are as gods and might as well get good at it. – Stewart Brand, Whole Earth Catalog


Ayn Rand was a brilliant, inventive thinker whose contributions go largely unsung outside libertarian circles. Rand developed a secular eudaimonist ethics decades before the 20th century revival of virtue ethics ignited. She pioneered a thick ethical and aesthetic defense of capitalism that celebrated business and innovation as heroic; her frontal assault on altruism represented a fundamental shift away from defending economic freedom under the pall of suspicion of the profit motive. She erected a philosophical permission structure for rational self-interest, achievement, and the pursuit of happiness.


Rand forged a synthesis of possessive and expressive individualism and fashioned a perfectionist political doctrine of truly human flourishing, sweeping away the Marxist monopoly on such rhetoric and anticipating its reemergence in the capabilities approach by several decades. She promised a vision of human possibility, progress, and triumph over limitations that boldly assumed that we are indeed as gods, and that the greatest threats to our future are philosophies prioritizing impossibility, failure, and weakness. 


Rand achieved all this as a refugee from Soviet Russia by way of a couple of gripping, wildly successful philosophical novels that cast rail networks and steel production in romantic glory. She launched a movement that rocked conservative politics, shaped the nascent libertarian movement, and is still going strong some four decades after her death.


I’ll have several sharply critical things to say about Rand in this essay, which explores how her philosophy of Objectivism relates to the liberal tradition. Indeed I’ll question whether Rand really belongs within the liberal tradition at all, as several aspects of her thought reveal an illiberal, even reactionary hue. For whatever harsh words follow, I maintain that Rand was an ingenious thinker and a talented novelist who deserves respect and sympathy. Despite the doubt I will cast on Rand qua liberal and indeed qua social thinker, I will conclude by sketching what a liberal and genuinely emancipatory Objectivism might look like.


Rand and the politics of liberalism

Rand is usually seen as one of the pillars of the modern classical liberal tradition. For libertarians, famously, “it usually begins with Ayn Rand.” Yet at a time when some major political parties in the world’s liberal democracies, once so comfortingly colonized by liberal habits, are flirting with or openly endorsing antiliberal values, it’s worth reevaluating foundational assumptions. It is in that spirit that I explore points of tension between Rand’s philosophy and the liberal tradition, and argue that she is better understood as a heterodox conservative.


I’ll set the stage by specifying what I mean by liberalism and its alternatives. Liberalism is an approach to politics that seeks to defuse, redirect, or even harness conflict in a society of reasonable individuals who differ in beliefs, backgrounds, and concerns. At minimum, liberalism holds to some level of representative government with genuinely open elections, basic freedoms of religion, speech, assembly, and commerce, and a tolerance for internal pluralism and diversity. Liberalism stands explicitly against absolutist power, in the form either of monarchies or totalitarian communist regimes, among other possibilities. Its closer (and overlapping) neighbors are socialism—which weakens or opposes the sanctity of commerce and in its extreme forms undermines the other liberal desiderata in order to empower the working class—and conservatism—which tends to weaken pluralism and the freedoms of minorities and in its extreme forms compromises representative government and the rule of law to favor a preferred racial or religious group.


Rand advances a comprehensive doctrine, Objectivism, that sits uneasily with the political liberalism of democratic authority. Rand’s idealist views of the history and meritocracy of capitalism naturalized traditional hierarchies and justified contempt for the poor and marginalized. While Rand despised religious faith and thus the traditional religious authority much of conservatism appeals to, in her own life she thought of herself as on the political right, focused most of her rhetorical fire against the left, and exemplified a kind of reactionary anti-leftism. Rand’s illiberal conservatism—however heterodox—is showcased with particularly stark clarity in her epic masterpiece, Atlas Shrugged, in which a vanguard party engineers a total social and economic collapse to pave the way for a society ordered according to Objectivist values.


The role of comprehensive worldviews in a pluralist society is one of the perennial sources of tension in liberal thought. So-called liberal neutrality requires that a government favor no comprehensive doctrine over any other. But some comprehensive doctrines (like Catholic integralism) require that society be reshaped in their favored mold; some doctrines simply don’t play well with others. Rand insisted, even in her nonfiction, that there can be no conflicts of interest between individuals whose interests are rational. This idea first appears in Atlas Shrugged at steel industrialist Hank Rearden’s trial for violating regulations on the use of Rearden Metal.


“Are we to understand,” asked the judge, “that you hold your own interests above the interests of the public?” 


“I hold that such a question can never arise except in a society of cannibals.” 


“What . . . what do you mean?” 


“I hold that there is no clash of interests among men who do not demand the unearned and do not practice human sacrifices.”


Rand, represented here by Rearden, goes beyond the belief that people may be mistaken or taken in by erroneous ideologies. She instead introduces the idea that a clash of interests must involve error or evil. Where bog standard political liberalism assumes innocent conflicts of interests and a boisterous polity of worldviews in tension with each other that must be managed for the sake of peace—or in a stronger vein, this diversity actually provides greater resources for solving social problems—in Rand’s Objectivism some party must be illegitimate. If, as Rand insists, any compromise of good with evil only profits evil and some party of every social conflict is evil then the idea that disagreement should be settled by elections is abominable. Democracy is by necessity a handmaiden to evil.


In Atlas Shrugged democracy is entirely sidelined. The plot follows the quickening erosion of economic freedom and its replacement with an economy of political threats and favors. All of the politics in the novel takes the form of corrupt, backroom deals between dishonest businessmen, lobbyists, political hacks, and ultimately economic czars of one kind or another. Rand’s virtuous heroes stay above this fray, and struggle valiantly to conduct ordinary business in an increasingly hostile environment. Importantly, Rand’s heroes really are virtuous: incorruptibly honest, just, hard-working, dependable, and even benevolent. The novel explores how such virtue is punished in statist economic regimes, those that fall short of laissez-faire capitalism.


While there is a legislature, an executive, and legal courts, there’s no mention of democratic elections or formal political parties (though there are factions). In So Who Is John Galt, Anyway? Objectivist commentator Robert Tracinski suggests this absence of the expected democratic institutions is because they had already been swept away in political turmoil prior to the main events of the novel. But this is unsatisfying. Such a cataclysm would surely leave marks on the main characters who would have ample reason to reference it. And if Rand’s heroes simply ignored the political world—wholly engaged as they were in their productive toil—until the looters’ government bore down on them, then this would reveal culpable negligence. 


Rand conveniently includes a perfect being in Atlas Shrugged, John Galt, whose philosophical determinations and emotional reactions are beyond reproach. In the momentous scene at the heart of the novel that sets in motion Galt’s strike of the “men of the mind” there is no mention of prior or present political activism. Voting is rarely mentioned throughout the novel, and when it is it’s usually denigratory, as in Galt’s speech where he accuses his misguided audience of “[voting politicians] into jobs of total power over arts you have never seen, over sciences you have never studied, over achievements of which you have no knowledge, over the gigantic industries ….”


Objectivists may think that honest business people shouldn’t have to be bothered with politics, but this reveals the problem with Rand’s conception of no rational or innocent conflict of interest. Good, rational people simply do see the world from different angles and come to different conclusions, and democratic politics is in part about managing these differences peacefully. When this essential vice of disagreement is coupled with the extreme conclusions of Rand’s political philosophy—such as that taxation is theft and all regulation of business violates the prohibition on the initiation of force—the entire range of normal democratic politics is rendered illegitimate, vicious, and evil. This weakens any hold normal liberal democratic politics has on the Objectivist and frees them from any restraint of perspective.


This antidemocratic element in Rand’s thinking finds its fully antiliberal expression in Galt’s Gulch, where Galt’s strikers—Rand’s heroes—decamp to withdraw their productive capacity from society, watch it collapse, and prepare to reenter society on their own terms. Rand scholar Chris Matthews Sciabarra notes in Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical that Galt’s Gulch is effectively organized as an ideological commune, with every person adhering to the same belief system, obviating both politics and government. But this misses the planned hostile takeover of the outside world. The strikers are not passive communitarians engaging in some kind of Benedict Option, but vanguardists specifically seeking to overthrow the current regime. Ostensibly, this vanguardism is nonviolent, but the strike is effective only in Rand’s fantasy worldbuilding, wherein the removal of a thousand or so of the most talented industrialists, engineers, and capable people of all kinds would reduce society to a state of total dysfunction, literally unable to keep the lights on.


I must note here that in her actual life, Rand participated avidly in democratic politics, campaigning for (Republican) candidates and encouraging her followers to vote in certain ways. So Rand’s no-compromise-with-evil position never took the antidemocratic, anti-voting turn popular among some Marxist-Leninists and anarcho-capitalists. So it’s certainly possible to be an Objectivist and still be a small-d democrat. My purpose here is to explore the tensions between Objectivism and liberalism, which sometimes but not always result in illiberal politics. 


Ayn Rand: the unknown ideal theorist

Rand sits uneasily with the liberal idea of inescapable political conflict and democratic politics. But how could Rand be a conservative when she opposed the religious right, fiercely defended the right to abortion, and was an outspoken atheist who condemned religious faith? Rand’s philosophy is on the surface quite liberal. Her own vision of capitalism was one of progress, openness to new ideas, and an openness to strivers from all backgrounds to test their mettle in the market and strike it rich. 


Rand’s critics who assume she merely shilled for the rich and business interests face an awkward set of facts. Most of Rand’s villains in Atlas Shrugged were wealthy businessmen, her heroes all discard or destroy their worldly riches, and her ideal man, John Galt, was a manual rail laborer. 


At times Rand goes out of her way to admire the quiet, modest dignity and competence of the regular laborer. Track workers saluting Dagny Taggart, Rand’s rail heiress protagonist, and cheering the initial run of the John Galt Line is a notable example of this, and it’s paralleled by the good relations both Rearden and Francisco, Rand’s ultra-capable and flamboyant copper industrialist, have with their respective employees.


The first main character we meet is Eddie Willers, a decent man and ally of Dagny and unwitting confidant of Galt, but no übermensch. Cheryl Taggart, Dagny’s sister-in-law and a victim of Jim Taggart’s psychopathic need for warrantless love and praise, provides an example of a simple store clerk discovering the values of Rand’s heroes. Rand gives at least two redemption arcs, in the railroad tramp Jeff Allen who Dagny deputizes in an emergency, and in the “Wet Nurse” sent by the government to spy on Rearden who is converted to Rearden’s cause and values.


Rearden rose from unskilled, dangerous work in ore mines as a teenager to owning his own steel mills and even inventing a lighter, stronger alloy. Such rags-to-riches stories are to be expected in Rand’s capitalism. But so is the obverse. In his famous money speech, Francisco argues that those who are born rich must eventually fritter away their wealth if they are incompetent. This is the morality of capitalism: ability and hard work are rewarded and sloth and venality are punished. To the extent capitalism fails to match Rand’s vision, it’s because we mix capitalism with socialism in a mixed economy. Rand associates the explosive innovation and productivity of the 19th century with the relatively purer capitalism of that era.


In its ideal form, Rand’s capitalism embraces liberal equality and universalism. It is color-blind, recognizes equal rights for women, and is open to ambitious, freedom-seeking immigrants (like Rand herself). Dagny is a capable, confident woman thriving by her own lights in a man’s world. In what might be viewed as an early manifestation of sex-positivity, Dagny knows what she wants in love and sex and is undeterred in pursuing her sexual ends on her own terms, which incidentally never involves marriage.


Reaction by sleight of hand

Rand in practice differs markedly from her ideal theory. In the end she does endorse many traditional values. But her conservatism assumes the form of an orientation toward upholding extant social hierarchies. Rand’s capitalism is free and equal in the ideal, but by a rhetorical sleight of hand Rand in practice naturalizes and romanticizes hierarchy in a way that neatly maps onto existing social strata. 


In tension with the respect she sometimes shows for workers, Rand’s heroes frequently show contempt for the poor. An early example of this is when Dagny measures herself against both her peers and the adults around her and notes the “regrettable accident” that she is “imprisoned among people who were dull.” Later she contrasts normal people with her fellow superlative, Rearden.


Watching him in the crowd, she realized the contrast for the first time. The faces of the others looked like aggregates of interchangeable features, every face oozing to blend into the anonymity of resembling all, and all looking as if they were melting. Rearden’s face, with the sharp planes, the pale blue eyes, the ash-blond hair, had the firmness of ice; the uncompromising clarity of its lines made it look, among the others, as if he were moving through a fog, hit by a ray of light. (Emphases added)


Note the physical differences between Rearden and others under Dagny’s gaze. Rand persistently associates physical attractiveness with superior capability and moral uprightness throughout Atlas Shrugged. Capability for Rand is a singular value; in what might be considered a tension with another liberal tenet—the division of labor—Rand’s heroes are good at anything and everything they do. Where ordinary people are often portrayed as untalented and unmotivated about whatever job they find themselves in, Rand’s superlatives can farm and sew with the same elite skill they apply to their chosen profession.


By strongly associating—if not exactly equating—attractiveness, capability, and morality, Rand naturalizes hierarchy. This association becomes all the more alarming when we consider that all of Rand’s heroes are white, most of them blond. There is something essential within heroic individuals that fundamentally sets them apart from normal folks, just as Dagny surmised at age nine. Of course there are some rags-to-riches cases in actual capitalism. But this is far from the norm, and contra Francisco’s faith that fools and their money are soon parted, phenomenally venal and incompetent people—think Donald Trump—are born to wealth and live their lives in luxury and power as their wealth maintains itself on autopilot.


While ordinary folks are not always contemptible, they are always expendable in Atlas Shrugged. The non-superlative but ethical characters discussed above—Eddie, Cheryl, and the Wet Nurse—all meet grisly fates. The strike of the “men of the mind” is itself the prime example of the expendability of the mediocre, as millions die or are brutally impoverished (though it’s worth considering how many children are victimized by the strike who may have grown into superlative adults). It was part of Rand’s romantic vision that none of the denizens of Galt’s Gulch ever died or suffered serious misfortune. Rand insisted that pain, fear, and guilt should not be taken as primary. But lesser characters, like real world mortals, don’t have this plot armor, and have plenty of reason for fear. 


Rand insists that real capitalism has never been tried, and capitalism à la Rand really never has existed, but this doesn’t stop Rand from appealing to the meritocratic and productive properties of ideal capitalism to defend actually existing capitalism. This creates a perilous discursive situation in which Objectivists can with suspicious convenience attribute all the good results of modern mixed economies to capitalism and all the bad results to the failure to adhere to Rand’s precise specifications. 


In practice this constitutes a justificatory algorithm for defending the esteem of anyone who is rich—and the legitimacy of their wealth whether it was acquired by inheritance, implicit or explicit government transfers, or Herculean effort and Promethean innovation—and blaming the poor, regardless of their circumstances. Rand thus defended the upper classes from incursions by the lower orders in both theory and in practice, and Objectivists have followed her lead.


Despite Dagny, Rand affirms patriarchal values. Rand believed it was a woman’s purpose to worship a man who embodied her greatest values. She believed there would be something sinister about a woman ever being President because such a woman would be betraying her feminine nature. For all Dagny’s assertiveness and capability, she is the only female titan of industry, and even in Galt’s Gulch there appear to be few women, most of whom remain unnamed and have come to join their menfolk. Dagny’s sex-positivity must be understood alongside Rand’s persistent slut-shaming, as when Francisco lectures Rearden that he can tell everything about a man’s values just by seeing the woman he sleeps with.


Rand is untroubled by sexism and misogyny. In an early throwaway exposition Dagny dismisses sexual prejudice and casually resolves not to consider it again. Perhaps Rand envisaged a world without misogyny. Indeed Dagny receives no abuse, denigration, or lowered expectations from men in a book littered with scenes of otherwise all-male board rooms. Yet if that’s the case, we’re left with the troubling question of why Rand’s fiction isn’t peopled with more women like Dagny. The ready answer is that women aren’t natural leaders or innovators.


In real life women cannot shrug off sexual and domestic violence, discrimination and harassment in the workplace, objectification, and non-remuneration of reproductive and domestic labor as easily as Dagny can. In her nonfiction and her public comments, Rand loathed feminists, even referring to herself as a male chauvinist. Firmly supporting the right to abortion on grounds of bodily autonomy, though laudable, doesn’t absolve her of her traditionalist views about women’s roles or her reaction against social movements to liberate women from those roles. 


Rand averred that homosexuality was immoral, the result of psychological disorder, even “disgusting.” Needless to say there’s no distinction between sex and gender for Rand, and these are strictly binary. The government has no role in enforcing sexual values, but gender and sexuality are a site of judgment, with nary a presumption of innocent difference or respecting human diversity. In Atlas Shrugged Rand evades the problem of gays, lesbians, and transexuals by—blank-out—simply leaving them out of her world-building. In the real world, homophobic and transphobic rhetoric supports narratives of non-Objectivist rightwing parties that do not so scrupulously refrain from force and fraud. This matters. Young Objectivists tend to think Rand was wrong about homosexuality but Objectivists generally endorse anti-trans talking points.


An epistemology of ignorance

Another tool Rand deploys for justifying hierarchy is an epistemic vice she decried in her adversaries: what the great liberal philosopher Charles Mills would dub the “epistemology of ignorance” but Rand named “blanking out.”


Thinking is man’s only basic virtue, from which all the others proceed. And his basic vice, the source of all his evils, is that nameless act which all of you practice, but struggle never to admit: the act of blanking out, the willful suspension of one’s consciousness, the refusal to think—not blindness, but the refusal to see; not ignorance, but the refusal to know. It is the act of unfocusing your mind and inducing an inner fog to escape the responsibility of judgment—on the unstated premise that a thing will not exist if only you refuse to identify it, that A will not be A so long as you do not pronounce the verdict “It is.”


Rand doesn’t discuss race at all in Atlas Shrugged, but omission speaks volumes. Slavery for Rand is usually a histrionic metaphor for the oppression of the industrialist. When she refers to genuine slavery in history, it’s the non-racialized slavery of antiquity, and it’s followed by an apparent denial of the racialized slavery of antebellum America.


That phrase about the evil of money … comes from a time when wealth was produced by the labor of slaves—slaves who repeated the motions once discovered by somebody’s mind and left unimproved for centuries. So long as production was ruled by force, and wealth was obtained by conquest, there was little to conquer. 


[…]


To the glory of mankind, there was, for the first and only time in history, a country of money—and I have no higher, more reverent tribute to pay to America, for this means: a country of reason, justice, freedom, production, achievement. For the first time, man’s mind and money were set free, and there were no fortunes-by-conquest, but only fortunes-by-work, and instead of swordsmen and slaves, there appeared the real maker of wealth, the greatest worker, the highest type of human being—the self-made man—the American industrialist.


Rand blanks out slavery itself in a stunning hagiography of America, notes that she knows real slavery has existed in history and studiously blanks out race throughout the rest of the novel except when describing the white features of her heroes.


Rand’s history is no better when she engages race in her nonfiction, where she argues that “racism was strongest in the more controlled economies, such as Russia and Germany—and weakest in England, the then freest country of Europe.” There might be some truth to this if Rand judged 19th century America as unfree, but for Rand “in its great era of capitalism, the United States was the freest country on earth—and the best refutation of racist theories.” Rand continues,


It is capitalism that broke through national and racial barriers, by means of free trade. It is capitalism that abolished serfdom and slavery in all the civilized countries of the world. It is the capitalist North that destroyed the slavery of the agrarian-feudal South in the United States.


Such was the trend of mankind for the brief span of some hundred and fifty years.


Rand explicitly rejects the notion that some races have greater “incidence of men of potentially superior brain power” but her historical analysis reveals she viewed slavery and the oppression of Jim Crow as minor deviations from a system of full individual freedom.


In her essay on racism, Rand goes on to condemn Black leaders as racist for supporting affirmative action, compulsory school integration, and anti-discrimination laws on private establishments. Like today’s anti-anti-racists, Rand projects the notion of “collective racial guilt” onto whites for “the sins of their ancestors” for policies aimed at repairing racial inequities despite no significant Black thinker using such concepts, certainly not the specific activist Rand quotes in her essay. Such inequalities obtained, Rand recognized, on account of government policies, but Rand ignored or didn’t understand the extent to which the government continued to support racial inequality with policies like redlining, segregation, relative deprivation of public funds for Black communities, and a long laissez-faire approach to anti-Black terrorism. But even if, as Rand imagined, direct government racism had ended, a vast difference in life prospects would have remained for Black and white individuals. Rand’s just-so story in which racism is a minor problem and the graver threat comes from the redistributionist policies of anti-racists functions as an ideological bulwark against policies to promote racial equality, once again reinforcing the status quo socio-economic hierarchy.


In all these cases Rand instinctively defends the relatively advantaged and inveighs against the claims of the disadvantaged. Rand and her followers would claim that she merely defends individual rights, especially those of property, and does so in accordance with equality before the law. But this reactionary—a word Rand self-applied—kind of nominal liberalism erodes the rule of law in fact while upholding it in name. Liberalism cannot be collapsed into rights alone; there must be a dimension of political contestation. A highly hierarchical society that jealously guards property rights without real political contestation is not any kind of liberalism, but feudalism.


Consider the disproportionate violence inflicted on Black men by police. On its face this is a failure to uphold equality before the law, but if the resulting protests are successfully framed in terms of alleged looting of private property, then Objectivists will flock to the defense of the rights-violating police. In contrast to Rand’s version of the “great era of capitalism,” real people who are not wealthy white men have not enjoyed equality under the law. By aggressively objecting to alleged excesses of any appeal to social justice, blanking out historical evidence of oppression, and insisting the most legally and institutionally coddled classes are really the most oppressed, Rand undermines the civic equality of all persons. 


Blanking out inconvenient truths combines with the antidemocratic elements of Rand’s political philosophy to brutal effects. The illegitimacy of actually existing governments renders the supposedly “objective” political theory subjective in practice. This enabled Rand to endorse deeply illiberal ideas, such as the right to invade “dictatorships”—what does this mean when all actual governments are illegitimate by her lights?—and the lands inhabited by “savages” who don’t share Rand’s concept of property rights (neither has America, ever). Yaron Brook, the erstwhile Executive Director of the Ayn Rand Institute, would take this reasoning further to condone torture and preemptive nuclear strikes. Rand adopted a kind of American exceptionalist outlook based not on the actual proximity of American governance to Objectivist doctrine, but to her biased views of America’s founding ideals and her largely imagined history of early American capitalism. Rand pitted America in theory against the rest of the world in practice.


Randian reaction today is expressed by befuddlement in the face of genuinely antiliberal, antidemocratic authoritarianism. I have no doubt that Rand would have condemned Donald Trump—he really is like one of her villains, only less believable—but it’s not at all clear she could have held her nose enough to support Democrats. The mere presence of democratic socialists like Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez in the wings would likely have spooked Rand into a “pox on both houses” stance. Some prominent Objectivists today exhibit such both-sidesism, and even invite Trumpist figures like Peter Thiel to their galas.


Varieties of Randian liberalism

To recap, Ayn Rand is more fruitfully understood as a heterodox conservative than as a liberal, and is at best a rightwing liberal with illiberal tendencies. Rand advanced a politics of the good that viewed its ideological adversaries as fundamentally illegitimate. Her totalizing vision of the political order—however easily stated on one foot as strict laissez-faire capitalism—allowed her to be a kind of nationalist, an American chauvinist. Rand defended the rule of law in principle, but undermined civic equality in practice by promoting hierarchy and reaction. 


To touch grass for a moment, of course Rand was a conservative, or at least a rightwinger. Rand saw herself as on the political right, was active in rightwing political campaigns throughout her entire life until the rise of Reagan, and is embraced almost exclusively by the political right. These claims aren’t controversial. My controversial claim is that Rand’s heterodox conservatism—especially as expressed in her magnum opus—has underappreciated tensions with liberalism (even of the classical variety) that sometimes slips into illiberalism.


It is not so hard for admirers of Rand to stay on the side of liberalism. It means firmly supporting democratic institutions and practices. Some Rand enthusiasts remain firmly liberal. Robert Tracinski is admirable in this. In academic philosophy, Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl have fleshed out a Randian liberalism that plausibly manages the tension between political liberalism and Rand’s perfectionism. Neera Badhwar lessens the tendency for Objectivism to view other ideologies as basically illegitimate. 


Gestalt-shifting Rand

It’s no accident that Rand has many fans in gay and queer communities. It’s not unheard of even for some prominent progressives to signal appreciation for Rand, a recent case being Stacey Abrams. I attribute this to Rand’s celebration of individualism against the crowd, of triumph over adversity, and of joy in one’s own projects and self-directed life. These sentiments have cross-political appeal. The fact is, people will continue reading and finding inspiration in Rand because she was a fascinating and inspiring figure. It is thus worthwhile both for those dismissive of Rand to see what is valuable in Rand and for her enthusiasts to identify and jettison the illiberal elements of her philosophy. I end by offering an under-explored left Randian liberalism that I hope can serve as a bridge over the apparently impassable chasm separating Rand from social liberalism.


Rand’s exaltation of the innovative and productive powers of capitalism is shared by Marx and other socialists. Marx associated productive labor with the essence of human nature. The dimension of Rand that evokes the unfolding of human potential mirrors both Marxism and the expressivist left liberal branch of the liberal tradition stretching from Adam Smith through J.S. Mill and T.H. Green to the capabilities approach of Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen. Sciabarra recounts,


Peikoff … argues that at the core of Objectivism is a belief in the actualization of human potentialities. In this regard, Objectivism follows the Aristotelian conception of eudaemonia as the human entelechy. For Aristotle, the proper end of human action is the achievement of “a state of rich, ripe, fulfilling earthly happiness.” [Branden] argues that human life involves the expansion of “the boundaries of the self to embrace all of our potentialities, as well as those parts that have been denied, disowned, repressed.” The actualization of human potential is a form of transcendence, an ability “to rise above a limited context or perspective—to a wider field of vision.” This wider field does not negate the previous moments; it is a struggle “from one stage of development to a higher one, emotionally, cognitively, morally, and so forth …”


This provides the basis for a Randian left liberalism: securing the conditions for the free development of capabilities for all persons. This requires a reevaluation of certain empirics and a gestalt shift in how the demands of social justice are perceived. A move away from Rand’s categorical prohibition on the initiation of force to a more complicated limitation of coercion within the rule of law is also needed. A categorical non-aggression principle is a floating abstraction in a world characterized by pervasive historical injustice and complex social relations and institutions that persist over generations. Redistribution toward some base level of relational equality for all and effective capability to pursue one’s own flourishing is more akin to Rand’s philosopher pirate Ragnar Danneskjold’s liberatory antics than it is to kleptocratic predation.


Rand gets a number of facts about the world simply wrong. The reality of global warming is one of the least controversial examples. Objectivists deny global warming in defiance of a broad scientific consensus, perhaps because it is seen as a threat to capitalism. But the fossil fuel industry has feasted on subsidies, has an entrenched lobby for political pull, enjoys implicit advantages like the government embrace of suburbs and car culture. The fossil fuel industry hardly embodies laissez-faire capitalism. Pollution causes real harm and is best tackled not by courts and litigation, as Rand preferred, but by legislation and regulation, preferably by pricing in externalities. 


There’s no intrinsic reason to glamorize Big Oil and its tycoons instead of Big Renewables and their own heroic scientists, engineers, and business leaders. Environmentalism is not, as Rand maintained, inherently anti-human or anti-development. The gestalt shift here is to see fossil fuel companies as villains clamoring for handouts (by not paying the full cost of greenhouse gases) and solar, wind, and nuclear companies as heroic innovators struggling against the odds to usher forth an era of energy abundance. Stewart Brand, whose epigraph opens this essay, combines just such a Randian vision for human potential with no-nonsense environmentalism.


Even orthodox Objectivists should accept this revision. But social justice issues are thornier because they directly challenge Rand’s reactionary tendencies. The extent, contours, and social and economic impact of sexual harassment and sexual violence is matter for objective study, one where perhaps feminists know whereof they speak. There’s little reason for Objectivists to categorically dismiss these concerns other than by slavish adherence to Rand’s prejudices.


Rand loathed feminists for making demands on the government, but the gestalt shift here is that the domestic and reproductive labor typically performed—unpaid—by women is socially necessary (wait til you see what a strike of the womb can do) and men feel entitled to the fruits of that labor. Patriarchy is rule by the moochers and looters of sex, care, and reproduction. Institutions to reward feminine-coded labor like subsidized child care and paid parental leave would engender a more consistent capitalist order, even if they are built upon a platform of social provision.


Philosopher Kate Manne persuasively describes patriarchy as a set of entitlements, and one of these entitlements is for women (and men in a roundabout way) to conform to a normative image and set of functions. The backlash against trans and nonbinary persons owes to the failure or refusal to conform to the patriarchal model. That’s it; there’s not even a significant demand for redistribution in the struggle for trans rights and dignity. But a Randian feminist sees trans liberation as a heroic refusal to perform gender on anyone’s terms but one’s own.


I already discussed above that Rand’s understanding of the history and legal reality of race in America is largely a fabrication. Objectivists who want to take individual liberty seriously should reckon not only with the profound unfreedom of slavery but with the persistent resistance to policies conducive to Black equality and Black flourishing. Objectivists imagine that the impediments of racism have largely been removed. The racial disparities in policing and incarceration suggest this is overstated. But the entanglement of race in American policies and institutions makes merely removing superficial impediments a deceptive goal. White Americans have been showered with political advantages, legal privileges, and asset-building handouts like the G.I. Bill, land grants, and preferential home loans that have enabled them to accumulate intergenerational wealth and disproportionate political power. Banning only public discrimination and doing nothing to repair the damages caused and permitted by the state constitutes a failure of the state to secure equality before the law. Rand’s idea that this is about collective racial guilt is defensive histrionics. 


The gestalt shift here is that policies of Black flourishing are not special pleading for collectivist redistribution. They reverse more than two centuries worth of white collectivism and upward redistribution of wealth and esteem to whites. The white plantation owner should be seen as the most profound of Randian villains, along with the white legislator, the white prison warden, and the white NIMBY. 


Securing the conditions for all persons to fully participate in capitalist enterprise is the lodestar of Randian left liberalism. To do this requires understanding that social justice is not collectivism but the appropriate, targeted response to the collectivism of white supremacist patriarchy. Just as Galt’s sense of benevolence and his desire to live in a free world prompted him to liberate his fellow heroes from an unfree system, we should likewise foster the conditions of freedom and abundance in which more heroic innovators will emerge. Though Rand may not have approved, this vision retains a distinctively Randian sense of life by celebrating achievement, damning genuine collectivism, and affirming the rational joy of the world where the rail lines merge. 

Chait - Why Biden’s Economic Populism Didn’t Make Him Popular - The Atlantic

Chait - Why Biden’s Economic Populism Didn’t Make Him Popular - The Atlantic

By Jonathan Chait — Read time: 12 minutes


Maybe It Was Never About the Factory Jobs

The theory that populist economic policies can win back the working class for Democrats has been tried, and it has failed.


January 13, 2025, 7 AM ET

If there was any place in America where President Joe Biden’s economic agenda ought to have won him votes, it would have been Lordstown, Ohio. A September CNN article noted that, thanks to Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act, “a gleaming new 2.8 million-square-foot manufacturing plant symbolizes something that has been fleeting in recent years: hope.” Biden was bringing well-paid union jobs in the cutting-edge battery industry to a struggling region long written off as the Rust Belt.


But if Biden was expecting the community to reward his efforts, he was sorely disappointed. In 2024, the county in which Lordstown is located shifted toward Trump by six percentage points compared with 2020, the second-highest swing to Trump of any county in the state.


Lordstown offers a test case of a political theory that has not only guided the Biden administration’s economic policy but also sought to explain the past several decades of American politics. The theory holds that Donald Trump’s 2016 election represented a voter backlash against “neoliberal” economic policies that had impoverished people in the heartland, who in their desperation turned to a populist outsider promising to smash the system that had betrayed them.


From this analysis, it naturally followed that if Democrats abandoned neoliberalism, they could win back the working class and become competitive in more of the country. A post-neoliberal party would curtail free trade, ratchet up enforcement of antitrust and other regulations, run a high-pressure economy with rising wages even at the risk of higher inflation, support labor unions categorically, and subsidize manufacturing employment to reindustrialize hollowed-out areas left behind by globalization—all of which Biden ended up doing.


On the substance, Biden’s economic agenda has registered some meaningful successes. The hot labor market raised wages; union organizers at a handful of companies, such as Starbucks and Amazon, have made breakthroughs; and the administration’s public investments in chip production and green energy have built up strategic domestic industries. As a political strategy, however, post-neoliberalism has clearly failed. Biden’s popularity dropped to catastrophic levels in his first year and never recovered, leaving his successor, Vice President Kamala Harris, unable to escape his gravitational pull. If rejecting neoliberalism for four years did nothing to pull working-class voters away from Trump, perhaps Trumpism was never a revolt against neoliberalism in the first place.


Some Democrats have responded to the disaster of 2024 by insisting that the way forward for the party is to keep doing what Biden did, but louder and more insistently. In fact, Trump’s reelection ought to call into question the whole foundation upon which the strategy was constructed.


People tend to believe that events with profound consequences must have profound sources. The shock of Trump’s 2016 victory led many Democrats to search for an origin story that matched the scope of such a traumatic outcome. A belief took hold, especially on the party’s economic left wing, that working-class voters had revolted against an economic order perpetuated by Democrats and Republicans alike. In this telling, every president since at least Ronald Reagan had governed in the service of corporations and wealthy elites, at the expense of ordinary Americans and “left behind” places. After all, Trump had pulled off his surprise Rust Belt sweep while denouncing free-trade deals and intermittently posing as an enemy of Wall Street. Defeating him would consequently require reestablishing a full-fledged populist program rather than the warmed-over variety of the Clinton and Obama years.


This theory always contained fatal flaws. The Democrats had maintained a coalition divided between business and labor since Franklin D. Roosevelt—who also established the modern free-trade order. The recent versions of the two parties did narrowly agree on a handful of policies, including the virtues of globalization, but starting with the Reagan era, they had grown more divided, not more united, on economics. Barack Obama had bailed out the auto industry, regulated Wall Street, and redistributed hundreds of billions of dollars from the rich to the poor. Even Bill Clinton had engaged in bitter showdowns over taxes and spending. The notion that Clinton and Newt Gingrich, or Obama and Paul Ryan, were partners with a shared ideology that could be usefully defined by a single term ignores almost everything that happened during these years. It is a measure of the incoherence of “neoliberalism” that the term can be, and has been, applied as an epithet to almost anything: Paul Krugman, Ta-Nehisi Coates, public-employee unions, Beatles fandom.


What’s more, the 2016 election’s shocking outcome can be adequately explained by any one of a number of perfectly mundane causes: Hillary Clinton’s drawbacks as a politician, Democrats’ leftward moves on social policy, the difficulty that incumbent parties have winning a third straight term, the mainstream media’s fixation with the email scandal, James Comey’s last-minute intervention to reopen the FBI investigation into it.


Still, the narrative that neoliberalism was to blame took hold widely—including, most fatefully, during the Biden administration. Even though Biden had served as Obama’s vice president, and won the nomination in large part because Democratic voters looked back on that partnership with fondness, he filled his administration with staffers who believed that Obama and Bill Clinton had failed the working class. The administration’s policies accordingly departed in ways that those post-neoliberal theorists deemed especially important. Biden supported organized labor almost unconditionally, even in policy areas that conflicted with other liberal priorities; pulled back on unfettered free trade; gave policy-making roles to lawyers over economists; and appointed crusading reformers to the top antitrust-enforcement positions. Perhaps most important, the administration saw its subsidies for green energy and chip manufacturing not merely as targeted responses to market failures but as the core of a new industrial policy that would restore prosperity to large swaths of America.


Triumphant headlines such as “Biden Is Getting Ready to Bury Neoliberalism” and “Why Neoliberalism Is Finally on the Way Out” celebrated the populist left’s newfound influence. “The Biden administration has explicitly disavowed all aspects of neoliberalism, including the assumptions about free trade and the alleged efficiency of outsourcing, the lack of support for trade unions, and the bipartisan contempt for industrial policy,” Robert Kuttner wrote in The American Prospect in 2023.


As recently as this past fall, the Biden administration and many of its supporters continued to insist that his post-neoliberal policies constituted a genuine revolution in American politics and economic life—a return to the Democratic Party’s New Deal–era identity as the champion of the working class.


That conviction helps explain why Biden felt entitled to a second term and why, once he finally abandoned his candidacy, he chose to pass the baton to his vice president rather than an outsider who could more credibly distance themselves from his politically toxic record. “I think one of the arguments that get made, you have the most successful presidency of any president in modern history, maybe since Franklin Roosevelt,” he said last July, by way of explaining his reluctance to drop out of the race after his disastrous debate performance.


This belief also explains why much of the party’s left wing—including Bernie Sanders, Ilhan Omar, and Ro Khanna—lined up behind him, even as members of the party’s centrist wing fought to replace him as the candidate. “He’s been the best president of my lifetime, and we have his back,” Omar told The Washington Post. One of Biden’s final gambits to retain the nomination was a vow, apparently influenced by Sanders, to expand Social Security benefits and eliminate medical debt during the first 100 days of his second term—as if pushing the “Populist” button even harder would finally cause the public to wake up and realize all the positive change that Biden had wrought.


In reality, Biden presided over the most unpopular Democratic presidency since Jimmy Carter’s. In November, working-class voters of all races, the very constituency that Biden’s anti-neoliberal turn was supposed to court, deserted the party. Perhaps hoping for Roosevelt-size majorities was a bit ambitious, but Biden’s sweeping, historic changes ought to have had at least some positive directional impact for the party. Unless, that is, the post-neoliberal theory of politics was wrong all along.


Rather than considering that possibility, however, many of the post-neoliberals have strained to explain why the theory is still sound despite its apparent real-world failure. These explanations fall into a few main categories. Some leftists have tried to pin the blame for the election result on Harris’s decision to run toward the center once she became the nominee. Harris did embrace a more overtly moderate message than Biden, and gave less attention to his populist economic themes. But Harris performed better in swing states, where voters were inundated with her campaign messages, than she did in the rest of the country. This strongly suggests that Biden’s record was pulling her down, and that her centrist campaign themes made her more popular, not less.


Another defense holds that Biden’s successful policies simply haven’t produced political rewards yet. “The 40-year damage of neoliberalism to the living standards and life horizons of working Americans was so profound that three years of modest improvement was far from FDR-style transformation,” Kuttner argued in a postelection Prospect essay. “Many of Biden’s initiatives will take many years to bear fruit.” The outgoing president has sounded a similar note. “It will take years to see the full effects in terms of new jobs and new investments all around the country, but we have planted the seeds that are making this happen,” he recently argued in a Prospect essay under his name.


It’s true that most of the spending in Biden’s major infrastructure laws is still in the pipeline. But these delays are themselves a result of Biden’s post-neoliberal ideology, which insisted on attaching a long list of social criteria to its projects, while failing to enact legislation to speed up the permitting process. In any case, industrial policy is just one piece of Biden’s allegedly transformational agenda. Other elements—including on trade, labor, and fiscal policy—have taken immediate effect. None of these actions has shown any sign of helping Biden politically. The president’s stream of actions to forgive student debt did not produce higher support among young voters, his unwavering deference to labor unions did not yield more support among union members, and so on.


And although many of the administration’s infrastructure investments remain stuck in the planning stage, some of them, such as the new Lordstown factory, have come online, bringing jobs with them. These projects offer localized mini tests of the hypothesis that delivering concrete benefits will lead to political support.


In an October story for The New Yorker, Nicholas Lemann described visits to five places on the receiving end of Biden-enabled investment: Fort Valley, Georgia; Menominee, Michigan; Kokomo; Indiana, and Manitowoc and Milwaukee, in Wisconsin. “If you squint, you can see the outlines of a new post-neoliberal Democratic coalition,” he wrote. “Fast-growing clean-energy industries—wind, solar, batteries, hydrogen, electric vehicles—could join Hollywood and Silicon Valley in supporting the Democratic Party.”


In fact, every one of the counties Lemann visited wound up voting for Trump at a higher level in 2024 than it had four years earlier.


The pro-Trump swings were small, ranging from 0.1 percent to 3.5 percent—well below the national average. One could spin this as evidence that Biden’s domestic build-out had brought some marginal benefits—fractional gains concentrated in areas that were chosen as the staging grounds for gigantic national expenditures. But we are talking about small local shifts, obtained via many billions of dollars of federal investment. That is not a scalable national strategy.


Biden’s defenders also insist that his otherwise winning policies were simply overwhelmed by the headwinds of inflation, which felled incumbent parties around the world last year. But letting down your guard against inflation is, in fact, a key tenet of post-neoliberal doctrine. A 2020 strategy memo from the Hewlett Foundation, a major proponent and funder of post-neoliberal thinking, argued, “If economic developments over the past decade show anything, it is that there is greater headroom for spending without causing undue inflation,” and that the task was to focus on bringing down unemployment “without worrying about inflation quite so frantically.”


Supporters of Biden’s ambitious spending—I was one of them—were clear that events would prove out this doctrine’s soundness, or lack thereof. “If there were any doubt that Joe Biden’s economic proposals represent a big break with the policies of the Obama and Clinton Administrations, the debate about Biden’s $1.9 trillion COVID-19 relief plan dispelled it,” The New Yorker’s John Cassidy wrote in February 2021. “The only definitive way to find out whether the inflation threat is real or chimerical is to pass the $1.9 trillion package and see what happens.”


Inflation was always going to be a problem that Biden had to deal with. He dealt with it less effectively because the post-neoliberal argument that inflation either wouldn’t rise, wouldn’t last, or wouldn’t matter politically carried the day. Ignoring fears about inflation was a sound policy choice before the pandemic-induced price spike, but a dogmatic one after it. Biden’s inability to alter his course was a direct consequence of the ideological rigidity that his advisers embraced.


Finally, there’s the excuse that Biden’s policies would have been popular if only he hadn’t been too old and inarticulate to sell them properly to the public. “Biden wasn’t up to the kind of explanatory duties that the presidency requires—much less a presidency that was advancing landmark economic policies to benefit workers and consumers,” The American Prospect’s Harold Meyerson wrote. Democratic Senator Chris Murphy has made a similar argument. “One of my frustrations is that President Biden and Vice-President Harris didn’t lead their economic messaging by talking about their break with neoliberalism,” he told New York magazine shortly after the election. “So the policy was really good. I just don’t think the rhetoric always matched the policy.”


A great deal of evidence from political science suggests that presidential rhetoric has little ability to change public opinion, so the expectation that better speeches would have led to dramatically different outcomes is far-fetched. Even if that were not the case, the emphasis from post-neoliberals on rhetoric as a driving force of history is deeply strange. The whole point of their theory was to explain Trump’s rise as a proletarian revolt against neoliberal immiseration. Now that neoliberalism has supposedly been overthrown, we’re told that the crucial dialectical stage was for the president to deliver West Wing–quality inspirational speeches? What kind of materialism is this?


The theory that Trump’s popularity was a reaction against neoliberalism had an irresistible attraction to progressive elites. For the labor movement and other parts of the economic left, it supplied a political rationale for policies they’d long supported. For social-issue progressives, it implied that they had no need to compromise with the socially conservative positions held by working-class voters; all Democrats needed to do was address people’s “real” material concerns.


Public policy, of course, is not just about winning elections; it’s about improving people’s lives. Some of the policies Biden implemented are worth preserving on the merits. The blue-collar workers of Lordstown may well be in a better position than they were four years ago. But the electorate’s diffidence in the face of these measures is bracing. The notion that there is a populist economic formula to reversing the rightward drift of the working class has been tried, and, as clearly as these things can be proved by real-world experimentation, it has failed. It turns out there’s more to popularity than populism.


About the Author

Yglesias - Trump and Republicans Avoid Hard Questions on Taxes, Immigration - Bloomberg

Yglesias - Trump and Republicans Avoid Hard Questions on Taxes, Immigration - Bloomberg

Matthew Yglesias — Read time: 4 minutes


One bill or two? That’s the question currently obsessing Washington as President-elect Donald Trump fails to decisively resolve a tactical disagreement between House and Senate Republicans.


John Thune, the new Senate majority leader, wants the party to pass two bills through the filibuster-dodging budget reconciliation process: The first would involve spending additional money on defense and immigration enforcement, offset by revenue derived from issuing more permits for oil and gas exploration. That would allow for a second bill focused on extending Trump’s 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act and offsetting the cost with spending cuts. House Speaker Mike Johnson, by contrast, wants to cram all these issues together in one “mega-MAGA” legislative package.


The most important thing to know about this archetypal inside-the-Beltway dispute is that it doesn’t really matter — and is papering over several more significant disagreements.


The biggest one of these, by far, is whether to make the Trump tax cuts permanent or merely extend them by a few years. Under budget reconciliation rules, permanent tax cuts need to be offset by permanent spending cuts. For the TCJA, this will be challenging. Repealing all of the Inflation Reduction Act’s clean-energy spending, for example, would save more than $800 billion, which is a lot. But it doesn’t come close to covering the full $4 trillion cost of making TCJA permanent.


What’s more, to secure the support of critical House Republicans from New York and California, Trump has promised additional tax cuts in the form of a more generous state and local tax deduction. And during the campaign, he made big promises to eliminate taxes on tips, overtime pay and Social Security benefits, as well as occasionally suggesting he wanted even steeper cuts in the corporate income tax. Any of that would add trillions to the overall price tag, which would require huge offsetting spending cuts.


So how does Trump make good on all these promises? Let me offer you another nugget of inside-the-Beltway insight: He doesn’t. Some of the promised tax cuts aren’t going to happen. And of the ones that do, most will not be made permanent, so they won’t have to be offset with spending cuts.


The questions, of course, are which tax cuts and how much they amount to. We are talking about literally trillions of dollars of ambiguity here. And yet, beyond energy, the only thing Republicans have discussed in concrete ways is trying to save money through expanded work requirements for Medicaid.


Research indicates that such requirements do not increase labor force participation. But work requirements do reduce enrollment, both by cutting off some genuinely unemployed people and, more important, because the complexity of verifying eligibility causes some people to disenroll. So while this would save some money — at the cost of denying some people health care they need — it’s a relatively modest cut in the scheme of things.


Are Republicans interested in another attempt, like in 2017, at cutting health care programs? They’ve spent the past several years not answering that question. This whole “one bill or two” debate seems engineered in part to help them avoid it further.


Beyond the issue of how to offset the tax cuts, there is another not-insignificant question: What are the actual policies — about immigration, defense or energy — that Republicans would like to enact into law?


Part of the interest in the two-bill strategy is that Senator Lindsey Graham, who chairs the Budget Committee, supports a large increase in military spending. Senator Roger Wicker, who leads the Armed Services Committee, wants to boost defense spending to an eye-watering 5% of GDP. Meanwhile, a small (but not trivial) minority of Republicans spending hawks has been complaining that current levels of military spending are too high.


A similar dynamic is playing out on immigration policy. It’s easy for Republicans to agree on more funding for border security. But the more detailed the discussion gets, the more consensus tends to break down.


There’s already been significant intra-MAGA infighting over H-1B visas. There is also the Republican schizophrenia over the federal E-verify system, which is designed to make it harder for employers to hire workers without proper visas. In practice, red states that have already adopted such laws tend to enforce them pretty weakly, since they pit Republican antipathy toward immigration against Republican fondness for business. On the federal level, every time House Republicans have gotten close to passing a sweeping E-verify mandate, they end up removing it at the behest of agricultural interests, which rely on illegal workers to keep the food system running.


Most of these issues can (and presumably will) be addressed by simply scaling back conservative ambitions. But there is an important conceptual question — do tax cuts need to be offset with spending reductions? — that cannot be waved away. Trump decided against offsetting his tax cuts in 2017, and so did George W. Bush in 2001 and 2003. So it’s not difficult to predict where Republicans will end up in 2025. Still, more than one bill or two, Republicans need to decide where they stand on this question.


Monday, January 6, 2025

The numbers that will define 2025 - Natalie Jackson

The numbers that will define 2025
Here’s how to judge Trump’s first year back in office.

By Natalie Jackson
Adobe Stock
Dec. 31, 2024, 2:21 p.m.
The calendar is turning to 2025, signaling the end of a long, strange election year. But the country is still in a mood—a bad mood. We learned in November that voters are overwhelmingly cranky —but we knew that all along, as it turned out.

The five measures below told us what would happen in 2024, and those same five numbers will tell the story of 2025.

The first number is public opinion on the country as a whole. I’m not the biggest fan of questions like, “Do you think the country is going in the right direction or the wrong direction?” because they are so broad that we have no idea what people are thinking about when they answer. It’s also true that Republicans answer more positively when there is a Republican president, and vice versa with Democrats.

Republicans and Democrats mostly cancel each other out, though, leaving independents driving the trend lines—which is useful as a general vibes check. The mood has been pessimistic since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. In Gallup’s latest measure, only 19 percent of the country (20 percent of independents) think the country is moving in the right direction. If we start to see some improvement on this metric, it will be a positive sign for the Trump administration.

The second number more directly measures opinion on the Trump administration—the presidential approval rating. There has been some debate in recent years over how well presidential approval predicts election outcomes, but dissatisfaction with the Biden administration was clearly part of the picture of the 2024 election. Trump’s approval rating might start off above 50 percent, but expect it to fall off during the first year as it does with most presidents. How much it drops will tell us a lot about Republicans’ potential losses heading into the 2026 midterm election year.

We turn to Congress for the third number: the number of times that Republicans will have to rely on Democrats to help pass legislation due to defections in their narrow majority. We’re coming off the least productive Congress in a few decades, and as the recent continuing-resolution debacle made clear, this one could be just as inefficient despite the Republican trifecta.

We’ll have a strong indicator soon enough: how many votes it takes to elect a speaker of the House. If Republicans can stay unified enough to reelect Speaker Mike Johnson on the first ballot, it may bode well for the party’s ambitious legislative agenda. If it takes multiple votes—despite President-elect Trump endorsing Johnson—or requires help from Democrats, expect trouble all year.

For the last two numbers, we turn to the major issues that drove the election: the cost of living and immigration.

Consumer sentiment and most macro indicators like jobs growth and unemployment show a good and growing economy. Even inflation has been at a normal level for a while. But we know Americans have been very negative about the economy due to increased prices, so we need a measure that captures that sentiment. For that, we should use measures of real costs that all families face: groceries, gas, rent, utilities, and health care. The Consumer Price Index tracks this sort of inflation—Trump needs to keep it consistently low throughout the year. He campaigned on lowering these costs—but since the election he has admitted it will be difficult. If basic costs continue rising without substantial wage growth, it spells trouble for the new administration.

Progress on immigration is a bit easier to measure. The number of illegal border crossings is a decent metric. But there is still a catch: Border-crossing arrests have been down since the Biden administration clamped down on enforcement in June, and current levels are roughly similar to what we saw during Trump’s first term.

Trump will need to keep that level low and make progress on deporting illegal immigrants with criminal records in order to deliver on his campaign promises. A wild card here could be a debate over legal immigration, but for now, my number to watch is net illegal immigration: border crossings minus deportations. The lower that figure stays, the better it is for Trump.

If the administration keeps these five numbers in good shape throughout 2025—maximizing positive sentiment, being able to move legislation in Congress, and making progress on the two big issues that got Trump elected—voters are likely to get more sanguine, especially about Republican leadership.

If these numbers don’t move or get worse by the end of 2025, we will be looking at a tough midterm year for the Republican Congress. Democrats are already chomping at the bit to take advantage of any signs of weakness in 2026.

Contributing editor Natalie Jackson is a vice president at GQR Research.

Sunday, November 24, 2024

The Right Has a Bluesky Problem, by Ari Breland

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The Right Has a Bluesky Problem
The X exodus is weakening a way for conservatives to speak to the masses.

By Ali Breland


Since Elon Musk bought Twitter in 2022 and subsequently turned it into X, disaffected users have talked about leaving once and for all. Maybe they’d post some about how X has gotten worse to use, how it harbors white supremacists, how it pushes right-wing posts into their feed, or how distasteful they find the fact that Musk has cozied up to Donald Trump. Then they’d leave. Or at least some of them did. For the most part, X has held up as the closest thing to a central platform for political and cultural discourse.


But that may have changed. After Trump’s election victory, more people appear to have gotten serious about leaving. According to Similarweb, a social-media analytics company, the week after the election corresponded with the biggest spike in account deactivations on X since Musk’s takeover of the site. Many of these users have fled to Bluesky: The Twitter-like microblogging platform has added about 10 million new accounts since October.

X has millions of users and can afford to shed some here and there. Many liberal celebrities, journalists, writers, athletes, and artists still use it—but that they’ll continue to do so is not guaranteed. In a sense, this is a victory for conservatives: As the left flees and X loses broader relevance, it becomes a more overtly right-wing site. But the right needs liberals on X. If the platform becomes akin to “alt-tech platforms” such as Gab or Truth Social, this shift would be good for people on the right who want their politics to be affirmed. It may not be as good for persuading people to join their political movement.


The number of people departing X indicates that something is shifting, but raw user numbers have never fully captured the point of what the site was. Twitter’s value proposition was that relatively influential people talked to each other on it. In theory, you could log on to Twitter and see a country singer rib a cable-news anchor, billionaires bloviate, artists talk about media theory, historians get into vicious arguments, and celebrities share vaguely interesting minutiae about their lives. More so than anywhere else, you could see the unvarnished thoughts of the relatively powerful and influential. And anyone, even you, could maybe strike up a conversation with such people. As each wave departs X, the site gradually becomes less valuable to those who stay, prompting a cycle that slowly but surely diminishes X’s relevance.


This is how you get something approaching Gab or Truth Social. They are both platforms with modest but persistent usership that can be useful for conservatives to send messages to their base: Trump owns Truth Social, and has announced many of his Cabinet picks on the site. (As Doug Burgum, his nominee for interior secretary, said earlier this month: “Nothing’s true until you read it on Truth Social.”) But the platforms have little utility to the general public. Gab and Truth Social are rare examples of actual echo chambers, where conservatives can congregate to energize themselves and reinforce their ideology. These are not spaces that mean much to anyone who is not just conservative, but extremely conservative. Normal people do not log on to Gab and Truth Social. These places are for political obsessives whose appetites are not satiated by talk radio and Fox News. They are for open anti-Semites, unabashed swastika-posting neo-Nazis, transphobes, and people who say they want to kill Democrats.

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Of course, if X becomes more explicitly right wing, it will be a far bigger conservative echo chamber than either Gab or Truth Social. Truth Social reportedly had just 70,000 users as of May, and a 2022 study found just 1 percent of American adults get their news from Gab. Still, the right successfully completing a Gab-ification of X doesn’t mean that moderates and everyone to the left of them would have to live on a platform dominated by the right and mainline conservative perspectives. It would just mean that even more people with moderate and liberal sympathies will get disgusted and leave the platform, and that the right will lose the ability to shape wider discourse.

The conservative activist Christopher Rufo, who has successfully seeded moral panics around critical race theory and DEI hiring practices, has directly pointed to X as a tool that has let him reach a general audience. The reason right-wing politicians and influencers such as Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene, Nick Fuentes, and Candace Owens keep posting on it instead of on conservative platforms is because they want what Rufo wants: a chance to push their perspectives into the mainstream. This utility becomes diminished when most of the people looking at X are just other right-wingers who already agree with them. The fringier, vanguard segments of the online right seem to understand this and are trying to follow the libs to Bluesky.

Liberals and the left do not need the right to be online in the way that the right needs liberals and the left. The nature of reactionary politics demands constant confrontations—literal reactions—to the left. People like Rufo would have a substantially harder time trying to influence opinions on a platform without liberals. “Triggering the libs” sounds like a joke, but it is often essential for segments of the right. This explains the popularity of some X accounts with millions of followers, such as Libs of TikTok, whose purpose is to troll liberals.

The more liberals leave X, the less value it offers to the right, both in terms of cultural relevance and in opportunities for trolling. The X exodus won’t happen overnight. Some users might be reluctant to leave because it’s hard to reestablish an audience built up over the years, and network effects will keep X relevant. But it’s not a given that a platform has to last. Old habits die hard, but they can die.


About the Author
Ali Breland is a staff writer at The Atlantic.



Tuesday, November 12, 2024

Trump Signals That He’s Serious About Mass Deportation. by David A. Graham

Trump Signals That He’s Serious About Mass Deportation. by David A. Graham 

Nov 12, 2024 at 7:54 AM


Was Donald Trump serious about his most draconian plans for a second term? That question shadowed his whole campaign, as commentators questioned whether he’d really attempt to deport millions of immigrants or impose tariffs above 60 percent.


If personnel is policy, as the Ronald Reagan–era maxim states, then the president-elect is deadly serious. Last night, he announced that Tom Homan, who was the acting head of Immigration and Customs Enforcement during the first Trump administration, will serve as a “border czar.” And CNN reports that Stephen Miller, the leading immigration hawk in Trump’s circle, will be appointed White House deputy chief of staff for policy.


These two moves, and the fact that they are among the first to emerge from the transition, are an indication of Trump’s intent to pursue a very aggressive policy and assign it a high priority. Miller, who served as a Trump speechwriter and top adviser previously, has been a hard-liner on immigration for his entire career. He has spent the past four years building America First Legal, a nonprofit devoted to fighting for conservative causes, and was a contributor to Project 2025, the Heritage Foundation blueprint for a second Trump term.



One year ago, in an interview with The New York Times, Miller laid out a set of plans for immigration. Among other things, he said, Trump would use the military to help enforce laws, using the Insurrection Act as license. Trump has also promised to use a 1798 law, the Alien Enemies Act, to facilitate deportation without due process under the law. Miller said ICE would focus on rounding up groups of people at job sites and other public places rather than seeking to arrest specific individuals. And he said the federal government would establish detention camps in Texas to hold people swept up in these raids.


“Any activists who doubt President Trump’s resolve in the slightest are making a drastic error: Trump will unleash the vast arsenal of federal powers to implement the most spectacular migration crackdown,” Miller told the Times. “The immigration legal activists won’t know what’s happening.”


If Miller is the architect of mass deportation, Homan will be the builder. “There is nobody better at policing and controlling our Borders,” Trump wrote on Truth Social last night. “Tom Homan will be in charge of all Deportation of Illegal Aliens back to their Country of Origin.” (The idiosyncratic capitalization is, perhaps needless to say, his.)



Homan was a career law-enforcement and border official, but his profile changed under Trump as he became a prominent figure, praising Trump for “taking the shackles off” ICE officers. He became the acting director of ICE at the start of Trump’s presidency and remained in that role for about a year and a half, including during the peak of Trump’s policy of family separation at the border. But Homan retired around the time Trump was forced to end that policy, frustrated that the Senate would not confirm him. As border czar, he will likely not require confirmation—though the new Republican Senate majority is expected to be more accommodating to Trump.


During the presidential campaign, Trump vowed to remove not only undocumented immigrants but also some legal ones. Only 40 percent of respondents in NBC News’s 2024 exit poll said they wanted deportation for most undocumented immigrants, but there was no reason to believe he was bluffing. During his first administration, Trump tried—persistently, though often ineffectively—to institute his priorities, especially on immigration. Trump was often stymied by courts. By the end of his first term, however, he had appointed three friendly justices to the Supreme Court—which has already granted him wide latitude with a decision on presidential immunity—and 231 judges to the lower courts, which should smooth his way now.


How Trump will proceed on tariffs is less immediately clear, in part because he never spoke about them with nearly the same specificity, but many corporations have already begun taking action to try to insulate themselves from any effects.


Nearly as telling as whom Trump has appointed is whom he has ruled out. On Saturday, he posted that neither Nikki Haley, the former United Nations ambassador, nor Mike Pompeo, the former CIA director and secretary of state, would serve in his administration. Haley criticized Trump after the January 6 riot, while Pompeo reportedly discussed removing Trump from office via the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Both ran for the Republican presidential nomination in 2024. Pompeo’s campaign ended quickly; Haley ended up being Trump’s final rival standing. Both later endorsed him.


Neither of them, especially Pompeo, is a moderate—they are genuine conservatives. But they are also veteran policy makers who were in politics before Trump, and who hold some allegiance to institutions and government processes. Their exclusion is a sign not only of Trump’s long memory for a grudge but likely also of how he will seek to blast through the institutional structures and processes that have guided past presidents.


He wasn’t just offering idle promises.