Dec. 3. 73歳運転の車がゴミ収集車と衝突 銀行に突っ込む(2016/12/03 11:55)

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東京・渋谷区で、73歳の女性の運転する乗用車がごみ収集車と衝突し、近くの銀行に突っ込んで女性3人がけがをしました。

乗用車、じょうようしゃ。passenger vehicle;; ゴミ収集者、ゴミしゅうしゅう。rubbish collection truck;; 衝突（する）、しょうとつ（する）。collision; crash;; 突っ込む、つっこむ。to thrust into (as in a car crashing into a wall); to poke;;

警視庁によりますと、（3日）午前6時半ごろ、渋谷区幡ケ谷の交差点で、右折しようとした73歳の女性の運転する乗用車と直進してきたごみ収集車が衝突しました。

警視庁、けいしちょう。(Tokyo) Metropolitan Police;; 幡ヶ谷、はたがや。Hatagaya (an area in Shibuya);; 右折する、うせつする。making a right turn;; 直進する、ちょくしんする。going straight ahead;;

その衝撃で2台は歩道に乗り上げ、乗用車は近くの銀行に突っ込みました。

衝撃する、しょうげきする。shock, crash;; 乗り上げる、のりあげる。to run aground;;

乗用車を運転していた73歳の女性と一緒に乗っていた20代と40代の女性がいずれも軽いけがをしました。

何れも、いずれも。both; either; any; all; neither or none (with neg., verb);;

ごみ収集車の運転手らにけがはありませんでした。

運転手ら、うんてんしゅら。drivers (NB: the ら makes it plural);;

事故当時は早朝で交通量は少なく、警視庁が事故の原因を調べています。

早朝、そうちょう。early morning;; 交通量、こうつうりょう。volume of traffic;;

現場は甲州街道で、首都高速道路の降り口が近くにあることなどから見通しはあまり良くないということです。

現場、げんば。scene of the crime or incident;; 甲州街道、こうしゅかいどう。A road;; 首都、しゅと。capital city;; 高速道路、こうそくどうろ。highway; freeway; expressway; motorway;; 降り口、おりぐち。top of a flight of stairs; exit involving a descent (e.g. from a bus);; 見通し、みとおし。unobstructed view; visibility;;

December 13, 2016

The Defense of Liberty Can’t Do Without Identity Politics

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by Jacob T. Levy

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In his post introducing the Niskanen Center’s project to revitalize liberalism, Will Wilkinson called for both restating old liberal truths and for updating them for our own era, in light of what we have learned, echoing F.A. Hayek’s articulating of his own task in his era. My first essay was a restatement of the “old truth” of, well, truth, recalling arguments from Hayek’s own era of the struggle against totalitarianism. This one will be more of an updating, a defense of an important evolution in liberal ideas. Since Hayek’s time, liberalism has become more, and more self-consciously, amenable to what’s sometimes (and usually derisively) called “identity politics.” This is progress to hold onto, not a mistake to be abandoned.
There’s a hypothesis afoot that identity politics or “political correctness,” particularly on the left, generated a backlash that elected Trump. This backlash is sometimes understood as a self-conscious turn to white identity politics, and sometimes as just sheer middle-[white-]American irritation with cultural elites and an attraction to Trump’s willingness to ignore their taboos and pieties. Part of the claim about identity politics is that it is self-undermining and so needs to be discarded, regardless of its substantive merits. In the language of political philosophy, the claim is that attention to the concerns of minorities violates a requirement  that  norms or ideals demonstrate stability when acted upon. Given the prominence of this idea in post-election commentary, I think it’s important to show that it’s wrong before turning to the actual merits of identity politics.
Throughout I’ll be using the contemporary language of “identity politics,” but building on arguments I developed using the different language of “multiculturalism” in The Multiculturalism of Fear and of “intermediate group pluralism” in Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom.
Electoral backlash
The politicians and commentators who have talked about the election as a backlash against identity politics and political correctness range from the Bernie Sanders left to the George Will right. Some of the most prominent voices have been libertarians or centrist-liberals like Reason’s Robby Soave or historian of political thought (and my former colleague) Mark Lilla. What they all share, as far as I can tell, is an irritation with identity politics that predates the election.
Soave is a fixture on the “political correctness” beat and his post-election commentary openly acknowledged that its purpose was to tell us that he told us so.
Lilla’s book The Shipwrecked Mind: On Political Reaction had already approvingly cited the idea that “left-wing activists [in France] made a disastrous mistake in the 1970s by abandoning the traditional working class and turning toward identity politics. Deserted, the workers turned toward the National Front and adopted its xenophobia…”
Not everyone who has been sounding alarm bells about identity politics and political correctness has written a post-election commentary blaming them for Trump’s victory; longtime critic Jonathan Chait has been conspicuous by his refusal to indulge the genre. But those post-election blamings have all come from such pre-existing critics. This alone should tell us to be on the lookout for the so-called “pundit’s fallacy,” the idea that one’s own normative commitments just happen to also be the best political strategy. The pundit’s fallacy when applied to losses takes the form of a morality play: because you fools did the thing I don’t like, the voters punished you. Lilla solemnly noted that “those who play the identity game should be prepared to lose it.” The headline on Soave’s article was less subtle still: “Donald Trump won because leftist political correctness inspired a terrifying backlash: What every liberal who didn’t see this coming needs to understand.”
The 2016 election is bringing forth especially strange versions of pundits’ fallacies and morality plays. Donald Trump received a smaller share of the popular vote than Mitt Romney did in 2012, but his Electoral College victory was so unexpected that it seems to call forth explanation after explanation. The result is almost certainly over-explanation: theories get offered that, if they were true, would seem to imply that Trump should have done much better than he did, and much better than Romney did. But there is a powerful temptation to attribute the surprising and dramatic fact of Trump’s win to some issue about which one had some preexisting ax to grind.
The backlash hypothesis is of this sort. Trump got a lower share of the white vote than Romney did (58% vs 59%). There was some change in both directions within the white vote: college-educated whites shifted toward the Democratic column by a few points (though a plurality still voted for Trump), but non-college-educated whites moved in larger numbers toward Trump (he got 67% of their votes, versus 62% for Romney). White men shifted toward Trump by 1% relative to 2012, white women in the other direction by 3%. This back-and-forth of course meant that Trump eked out victories in Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin, and therefore the presidency, by a combined 80,000 or so votes across the three states. But fundamentally, voting patterns didn’t change enough between 2012 and 2016 to justify big claims about new national moods or about Trump’s distinctive appeal. I believe the consequences of this election will be deeply abnormal. But the voting behavior that brought it about was, in the end, very normal.
An 80,000 vote margin in a 137 million vote election, about .05%, is susceptible of almost endless plausible explanations. The number of different factors that might well have moved that many votes is very large. So there are a lot of different true but-for explanations: but for Clinton’s failure to campaign in Wisconsin, but for the Comey letter, but for stricter voter ID laws and reductions in the numbers of polling places, but for Jill Stein, and so on, ad infinitum. A Democratic party strategist has good reason to take lots of them very seriously. But anyone trying to generalize about popular beliefs or the electorate’s mood should be very wary of any of them. Grabbing a plausibly-true but-for explanation of 80,000 votes, as if it says something big and true about the whole electorate, will over-explain the outcome. An explanation that is one of the many valid ones for those 80,000 votes, and thus for the Electoral College outcome, but that implies some large shift in opinion or mood toward Trump, is a bad explanation overall.
So too is any explanation that is incompatible with the observed variation in the polls over the course of the campaign. The worst moments for Trump’s campaign focused on egregious episodes of political incorrectness.  These included his sustained attack on Judge Gonzalo Curiel as being unfit to judge a lawsuit against him because of his “Mexican heritage”; his feud with the Khizr and Ghalaza Khan after the Democratic National Convention, prominently including his suggestion that Ms. Khan wasn’t allowed to speak on camera because she is Muslim; the week when he kept attention on the Alicia Machado story and thus on his history of sexist remarks; and the days after the release of the Billy Bush video in which he bragged about kissing and sexually grabbing women without their consent. In other words, the more the electorate focused on his proud political incorrectness, the more they recoiled from him. The narrative about some broad celebration of his political incorrectness can’t account for this in any sensible way. Ultimately Trump’s racism, misogyny, Islamophobia, and willingness to give a platform to online anti-Semitism didn’t stop a normal level of white voters from voting for him. But the poll evidence suggests that they were most reluctant to support him at the moments when these things were most vividly on their minds.
Even among explanations that are unpersuasive because they overpredict Trump’s support, some are worse than others—for example, any that depend on implausible claims about voter knowledge. The kinds of pet explanations that appeal to professional pundits are very likely to be of that sort. Take Soave, who has been complaining about “political correctness” on university campuses for years. The day after the election, he wrote:

But there’s another major piece of the puzzle, and it would be a profound mistake to overlook it. Overlooking it was largely the problem, in the first place. Trump won because of a cultural issue that flies under the radar and remains stubbornly difficult to define, but is nevertheless hugely important to a great number of Americans: political correctness. More specifically, Trump won because he convinced a great number of Americans that he would destroy political correctness.

Soave covers disputes about political correctness for a living. Other media professionals, as well as academics, might read this and nod worriedly; they follow the flare-ups about cultural politics and freedom of speech on university campuses, or disputes about which celebrity has said or done something “problematic,” routinely. But these remain obscure to the vast majority of voters. And the important thing to know about voters who are still undecided a week or two before a presidential election is that they know exceptionally little about politics. To a first approximation, we should guess that they know nothing about any particular political dispute that isn’t on national television that day. Journalists and academics constantly overestimate how much other people follow political news (as well as overestimating what proportion of important and relevant political information we ourselves have, a separate problem). This is one of the sources of the pundit’s fallacy. And it absolutely applies here.
I should be clear that I’ve got my own list of wacky, ridiculous, and sometimes quite wicked excesses of identity politics and political correctness. I suspect that most people who spend much time on university campuses, and aren’t themselves very far on the left, do. It turns out that 18-year-olds seized of the conviction of their own righteousness are prone to immoderation and simplistic views. (Who knew?) And the last several years have absolutely seen a new level of identity-politics policing of popular culture. This has certainly not come only from the left: witness GamerGate and the preemptive online fury against the new women-led Ghostbusters movie. But there have been cases on the left I would identify as excesses.
What I can’t see any excuse for doing is mapping my list of excesses onto the voting behavior of 80,000 very-low-information voters in three states, and then ignoring either Trump’s unpopularity at the moments of his own political incorrectness, or the absence of any general (or white) swing in Trump’s direction relative to the baseline of ordinary partisanship. A lot of butterflies flapped their wings to bring about the November 8 result, but we have particularly little reason to think that this was one of them.
What this means is that identity politics hasn’t somehow been shown to be self-undermining by this election. It doesn’t violate what’s sometimes referred to as the stability condition of a normative project. If we had reason to endorse identity politics on November 7, we didn’t lose it on November 8. Of course, Soave, Lilla, and company all would have denied that we had good reason to support it on November 7. I now turn to the argument that we did.
Identity politics and political action
Let’s begin by making clear that identity politics isn’t really the name of a new phenomenon. Relative to an Old Left expectation that economic classes are the fundamental lines of political division, the New Left of the 1960s and 1970s associated with the civil rights movement, with American Indian politics, and with women’s and gay liberation seemed anomalous. But there was never any reason to believe the Old Left’s story in the first place, least of all in the United States where a large proportion of the country had almost always been governed by a political coalition defined by white identity politics.
There is something particularly absurd in the post-election morality plays that say “whites [or white Christians, or white Christian men] have now learned how to do identity politics and how to vote like an aggrieved ethnic group, because that’s what other groups have been doing all these years.” White identity politics is a constitutive fact of American politics, and if an election in which the Republican got the normal share of the white vote counts as white identity politics in action, well, that suggests a deep problem, but it doesn’t suggest a new problem.
White identity politics has moreover been a constitutive fact of the illiberal expansion of state power. The effect of some of the oldest instances of this are still with us, as is seen in the recent struggle over placing the Dakota Access Pipeline on lands that were reserved to the Sioux nation in an 1851 treaty that was subsequently violated but never voided. The effects of the decades-long white welfare state and the redistributive subsidizing of white wealth accumulation through housing policy are very much still with us in the wealth gap between whites and blacks, to say nothing of the enduring effects of racially discriminatory housing and urban policy on the shape of American cities. But the most currently politically salient effect of white identity politics as a source of state power is the combination of policing, imprisonment, crime policy, and drug policy.
If you think—as I think any liberal who cares about liberty, whether classical, market, neo-, welfarist, Rawlsian, or whatever, must—that the combination of mass incarceration and aggressive policing amounts to a grave injustice, then you need to be able to think in race-conscious terms. What brought about this crisis? The war on drugs and police militarization, some readers will say. Okay, but what brought about the war on drugs and police militarization? The answer isn’t some simple intellectual mistake. The answer is deeply tied up in American racial politics.
The disproportionate impact of mass incarceration and aggressive policing on African-Americans isn’t some unfortunate side-effect of well-intentioned policies. The politics of drug prohibition, the war on drugs, and the subsequent expansions of police power and imprisonment were never racially innocent to begin with, and it is no accident that Nixon launched the War on Drugs when the ink was barely dry on the formal end of Jim Crow segregation and disenfranchisement.
As has so often happened in American history, state power expanded in order to persuade white voters that blacks were being kept under control. The appropriation of the language of freedom and anti-statism by those seeking to defend state-level racial tyrannies in the south fools more people than it should, but illiberal state power has far more often been caused by white racism than resisted by it. To think otherwise, one has to think that police and prisons don’t count as instances of state power at all.
Let’s return to Lilla:

The moral energy surrounding identity has, of course, had many good effects. Affirmative action has reshaped and improved corporate life. Black Lives Matter has delivered a wake-up call to every American with a conscience. Hollywood’s efforts to normalize homosexuality in our popular culture helped to normalize it in American families and public life.

On the other side of the scale, he puts… the demands on college campuses to allow students to identify the gendered or non-gendered pronouns by which they wish to be addressed. Treating these as comparable in magnitude suggests a deep failure of perspective.
Black Lives Matter has provided the first truly large-scale political mobilization against police violence and mass incarceration since the War on Drugs began. It’s perfectly true that many liberal (very much including libertarian) scholars and analysts have been calling for reform of police practices, an end to police militarization and civil forfeiture abuse, respect for civil liberties, and drug decriminalization or legalization for a long time. It’s true that it’s possible to offer those analyses in a race-neutral way. But given that the policies aren’t race-neutral, it shouldn’t surprise us that opposition to them isn’t either, and that the real political energy for mobilizing against them would be race-conscious energy.
If Black Lives Matter is “identity politics,” then identity politics has provided one of the most significant political mobilizations in defense of freedom in the United States in my lifetime. That doesn’t belong on the “to be sure” exception side of a rule that is driven by the politics of gender pronouns. It’s precisely the other way around.
If there is any feature of identity politics that has triggered a political backlash, I think it is far less likely to be gendered pronouns or the more exotic extremes of campus politics that Soave covers on a regular basis, and far more likely to be the high-profile Black Lives Matter. But on any plausible account of political action and political change—something liberals have sometimes lacked—the political energy provided by BLM is sure to be vital to any effective long-term solutions to the policing and incarceration crises.
The point generalizes. Until 2003, many states criminalized a variety of forms of sexual behavior between consenting adults. There were identity-neutral ways of describing the illiberal wrong of this. But the laws weren’t identity neutral in intent, and often weren’t even formally identity-neutral; they were criminal prohibitions on homosexual sexual activity that legitimized routine police harassment even when they weren’t enforced. The laws were unjust according to liberal principle, but would never have been repealed (in many states) and struck down (in the rest) without the identity-conscious political mobilization of gay and lesbian activism.
Identity politics at its best, in other words, isn’t just a matter of being on some group’s side. It’s about fighting for political justice by drawing on the commitment that arises out of targeted injustice, and about having the intellectual resources to let us diagnose that targeted injustice. It lets us spot the majority group’s identity politics rather than treating it as the normal background state of affairs, and to recognize the oppression and injustice that it generates.
By all means, we should criticize identity politics when it goes wrong, as it often does in moments of symbolic, cultural, and campus politics. But there’s no source of political energy and ideas that doesn’t sometimes go wrong; goodness knows that a commitment to abstract philosophical principles often does. But a revitalized liberalism must be a vital liberalism, one with energy and enthusiasm. The defense of liberal principles—freedom of speech and religion, the rule of law and due process, commerce and markets, and so on—has to happen at least in part in the political arena. In that arena, in liberal politics, we’ll always depend on the passionate and self-conscious mobilization of those who are the victims of state power and domination.
Lilla insists that liberalism is founded on principles that all could share, and that liberal politics should “speak to the nation as a nation of citizens who are in this together and must help one another,” then appeals to FDR, one of the architects of the white welfare state and the imprisoner of Japanese-Americans, to drive the point home.
As political scientist Ira Katznelson has documented, Roosevelt’s ability to bring the New Deal into existence depended on active complicity with southern white identity politics—an easy and tempting thing to do for those who are too convinced that their political goals represent neutral and universal political truth.
Political fights aren’t won with universal principled arguments alone, and pretending that they are is often a mask for the identity politics of the staatvolk. As citizens of a liberal state trying to preserve it, we need to be able to hear each other talking about particularized injustices, and to cheer each other on when we seek to overturn them. Members of disadvantaged minorities standing up for themselves aren’t to blame for the turn to populist authoritarianism; and their energy and commitment is a resource that free societies can’t do without in resisting it.
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Jacob T. Levy is Tomlinson Professor of Political Theory at McGill University, author of Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, and a Niskanen Center Adjunct Fellow and Advisory Board Member

Testing, testing, one, two, three

This is a test for the If This Then That automation process ...

NISJ 205 Japanese that has become English

NISJ 205 Japanese that has become English

英語になった日本語

日本の文化や食文化が海外に広まり、日本語のままでも海外で通じる単語が増えてきています。例えば、枝豆、旨味、ラーメン、漫画、折り紙などの単語は日本語ですが、海外でも通じます。日本人として嬉しく思います。
このような日本語が英語になった単語の中に、過労死と言った単語があります。過労死とは、長時間の残業や休みなしに仕事をさせられ、精神的、肉体的の負担で労働者が突然死んでしまう事を言います。
過労死は、２００２年にオックスフォードの辞書に英語として登録されました。世界には、あまり広まって欲しくない単語です。

日本語	English	ひらがな
英語になった日本語	Japanese that has Become English	えいご　に　なった　にほんご
日本の文化や食文化が海外に広まり	Japanese culture and food culture spreads to overseas	にほん　の　ぶんか　や　しょくぶんか　が　かいがい　に　ひろまり
日本語のままでも海外で通じる単語	words that convey their meaning even in their original Japanese	にほんご　の　ままでも　かいがい　で　つうじる　たんご　が　ふえてきています
増えてきています	are increasing	ふえてきています
例えば	for example	たとえば
枝豆	edamame	えだまめ
旨味	umami	うまみ
漫画	manga	まんが
折り紙	origami	おりがみ
海外でも通じます	communicate their meaning even oversease	かいがいでも　つうじます
日本人として嬉しく思います	I feel happy as a Japanese	にほんじんとして　うれしく　おもいます
このような	like these	このような
日本語が英語になった単語の中に	among the Japanese words that have become English	にほんご　が　えいご　に　なった　たんご　の　なか　に
過労死（Karoshi)と言った単語があります	there is the word ‘koroshi’　(death by overwork)	かろうし　と　いった　たんご　が　あります
長時間の残業	long hours of overtime	ちょうじかん　の　ざんぎょう
休みなしに仕事をさせられ	being made to work without time off	やすみ　なし　に　しごと　を　させられ
精神的、肉体的の負担	a mental and physical burden	せいしんてき、にくたいてき　の　ふたん
労働者が突然死んでしまう事	the worker ending up suddenly dying	ろうどうしゃ　が　とつぜん　しんでしまう　こと
オックスフォードの辞書に英語として登録されました	has been listed as English in the Oxford Dictionary	オックスフォード　の　じしょ　に　えいご　として　とうろく　されました
世界には、あまり広まって欲しくない単語	a word that I don’t really want to spread around the world	あまり　ひろまって　ほしくない　たんご

160822 強い台風9号上陸へ 道路冠水や川の増水など警戒(2016/08/22 05:50)

強い台風9号上陸へ　道路冠水や川の増水など警戒(2016/08/22 05:50)

台風 が 直撃 です 。 関東 で は 雨 や 風 が 強まり 、 大荒れの 天気 と なる 恐れ が あり ます 。

日本 付近 に は 3 つ の 台風 が あり ました が 、 台風 11 号 は 先ほど （22 日 午前 に ） 温帯 低 気圧 に 変わり ました 。 ただ 、 台風 9 号 が 強い 勢力 で 北上 を 続け 、 列島 に 接近 して い ます 。 この後 、 昼 前後 に 関東 から 東海 に 上陸 する 見込み で 、 関東 各地 で は 朝 から 大荒れの ピーク を 迎え そうです 。 雨 の 予想 を 見る と 、 朝 から 南部 に 活発な 雨雲 が 広がり 、 広い 範囲 で 大雨 と なる 恐れ が あり ます 。 明日 （ あす ）（23 日 ） 朝 まで の 雨 の 量 は 最大 で 東海 で 400 ミリ 、 関東 甲 信 は 300 ミリ など が 予想 さ れ 、 瞬間 的に 45 メートル の 突風 が 吹き そうです 。 道路 の 冠水 や 川 の 増水 、 氾濫 など に 警戒 して 下さい 。 また 、 交通 機関 の 乱れ に も 注意 が 必要です 。

160815 71歳女性から500万円“だまし取った”男の映像公開(16_08_15)

東京 ・ 葛飾 区 の 71 歳 の 女性 から 現金 500万 円 を だまし 取った と して 、 警視 庁 は 現金 受け取り 役 の 男 の 映像 を 公開 し ました 。

大きな バッグ を 左 肩 に 掛けて 電話 を し ながら 歩く 男 。 警視 庁 が 公開 した 振り込め 詐欺 事件 の 現金 の 受け取り 役 の 男 の 映像 です 。 先月 14 日 、 葛飾 区 に 住む 71 歳 の 女性 に 、 息子 を 名乗る 男 から 「 かばん を 盗ま れて お 金 が 下ろせ ない 」 と 嘘 の 電話 が あり ました 。 カメラ に 映った 男 は 息子 の 仕事 仲間 の 役 で 、 この後 、 東京 ・ 荒川 区 の 路上 で 女性 から 現金 500万 円 を だまし 取り 、 逃走 した と いう こと です 。 男 は 40 代 くらい 、 小 太り 、 黒い 短髪 で 、 警視 庁 が 情報 提供 を 求めて い ます 。

保育園の看板 Week from Aug 8 (160808)

LingQ Course: 周一の教育

Lesson Name: 保育園の看板 week beginning 160808 Aug. 8

8月8日（月） 曇りのち晴れ

久しぶりに庭に出て遊びました。小鹿組さんやキリン組さんを一緒にしゃばん玉をしました。はじめは加減が難しそうでしたが、慣れてくるとしゃばん玉がたくさんできて、「みて～！」と大喜びでした。

小鹿組で一緒にご飯も食べました。

8月9日（火）晴れ

今日はプールは４・５歳児クラスで使うのでリス組は園庭で水遊びをしました。朝から水遊びと思っていましたが、子どもたちはお部屋でも遊びたいようで後半、外に出ました。水鉄砲が上手になり、ずいぶん遠くまでとばしていました。ひしゃくやバケツでこじんまりと遊ぶのも楽しかったようです。

8月10日（水）はれ

今日も朝から暑い一日でした。子ども達も元気いっぱいで「先生～今日はお水入る？」と楽しみしていてプールがとても気持ちよさそうでした。沢山遊んだ。あとはおなかもすくようで「ごはん何かな？早く食べたいな」などの声もきこえ健康的な姿に笑ってしまいました。

NISJ 204 Male geishas

204 Male Geishas 

芸者さんや舞妓さんとのお座敷遊びは、多くの日本人にとっても縁遠い世界です。お客さんは格式の高い料亭で、芸者さんたちとゲームなどをして楽しい時間を過ごします。
芸者や舞妓は女性の仕事として知られていますが、男性の芸者もいます。岐阜県には、喜久次（きくじ）さんという男性芸者がいます。喜久次さんは全国に８人しかいない男性芸者の一人です。
男性の芸者は「幇間（ほうかん）」と呼ばれます。幇間とは、間をたすけるという意味で、お客さんと舞妓さんの間を取り持つ役目だそうです。
貴重な男性の芸者さんに、これからも日本の伝統文化を多くの人に広めていって欲しいです。

日本語

	English	ひらがな
男性の芸者さん	Male Geishas	だんせい　の　げいしゃさん
芸者さんや舞妓さん	geishas and apprentice geishas	げいしゃさん　や　まいこさん
お座敷遊び	geisha games　♦︎zashiki = sitting room	おざしきあそび
多くの日本人にとっても縁遠い世界です	For many Japanese it is a very unrelated world	おおく　の　にほんじんに　とっても　えんとおい　せかい　です
格式の高い料亭	an extremely formal restaurant	おきゃくさん　は　かくしき　の　たかい　りょうてい
ゲームなどをして楽しい時間を過ごします	have a fun time playing games, etc.	ゲーム　など　を　して　たのしい　じかん　を　すごします
女性の仕事として知られています	is known as a job for women	じょせいの　しごと　として　しられています
男性の芸者もいます	there are also male gaishas	だんせい　の　げいしゃ　も　います
喜久次（きくじ）さんという男性芸者がいます	there is a male geisha called Kikuji	きくじ（きくじ）さん　という　だんせい　げいしゃ　が　います
全国に８人しかいない男性芸者の一人	he is one of only 8 male geishas in the whole country	ぜんこく　に　８にん　しかいない　だんせい　げいしゃ　の　ひとり
「幇間（ほうかん）」と呼ばれます	are called ‘houkan’ ♦ houkan = a flatterer	「ほうかん（ほうかん）」　と　よばれます
間をたすけるという意味	means to bridge the gap ♦referring to the gap between people or between drinks	ま　を　たすける　という　いみ
お客さんと舞妓さんの間を取り持つ役目	have the role of bringing the customer and the maiko together	おきゃくさん　と　まいこさん　の　あいだ　を　とりもつ　やくめ
貴重な男性の芸者さん	valuable male geishas	きちょう　な　だんせい　の　げいしゃさん
日本の伝統文化	Japanese traditional culture	にほん　の　でんとう　ぶんか
多くの人に広めていって欲しいです	I want it to spread to many people	おおく　の　ひと　に　ひろめていって　ほしいです

NiSJ 203: Sushi donuts

海外ではカリフォルニア巻のように、海外の人たちが食べやすいように少しアレンジされたお寿司があります。アレンジされたカリフォルニア巻きなどはとても美味しく、今では日本に逆輸入されて 日本でも食べることが出来ます。

現在海外では、新しいスタイルのお寿司がインスタグラムなどを通して 注目を集めています。それは、寿司ドーナツです。ドーナツ型のシャリの上に サーモンやアボカドなどで綺麗に飾り付けされていて、美味しそうなドーナツ型のお寿司がこれから話題になりそうです。

今後寿司ドーナツも日本に逆輸入されて、日本のレンストランでもメニューに寿司ドーナツが出てくる ことがあるかもしれません。

日本語	English	ひらがな
寿司ドーナツ	Sushi Donuts	すしドーナツ
海外ではカリフォルニア巻のように	overseas, as with California Rolls	かいがい　では　カリフォルニアまき　のように
海外の人たち	people overseas	かいがい　の　ひとたち
食べやすいように少しアレンジされたお寿司があります	there is sushi that is arranged so that it is easier to eat	たべやすいように　すこし　アレンジ　された　おすし　が　あります
とても美味しく	very delicious and …	とても　おいしく
今では日本に逆輸入されて	now being imported back into Japan	いまでは　にほん　に　ぎゃく　ゆにゅう　されて
日本でも食べることが出来ます	you can eat it in Japan too	ひほん　でも　たべること　が　できます
現在海外では	currently overseas	げんざい　かいがい　では
新しいスタイルのお寿司	a new style of sushi	あたらしい　スタイル　の　おすし
インスタグラムなどを通して	through Instagram, etc.	インスタグラム　など　を　とおして
注目を集めています	is receiving attention	ちゅうもく　を　あつめています
ドーナツ型のシャリの上に	on top of sushi rice in the shape of a donut	ドーナツがた　の　シャリ　の　うえ　に
サーモンやアボカドなどで綺麗に飾り付けされていて	is decorated beautifully with salmon, avocado, etc.	サーモン　や　アボカド　など　で　きれい　に　かざりづけ　されていて
ドーナツ型のお寿司	donut-shaped sushi	ドーナツがた　の　おすし
これから話題になりそうです	it appears it will be a hot topic from now	これから　わだい　に　なりそうです
今後	hereafter	こんご
メニューに寿司ドーナツが出てくる	sushi donuts will appear on the menu	メニュー　に　すしドーナツ　が　でてくる
ことがあるかもしれません	perhaps there are cases where	ことがあるかもしれません