Saturday, March 30, 2024

Rethinking the opening with China. By Matthew Yglesias

Read time: 11 minutes


Rethinking the opening with China

Mistakes were made! W was the worst!!


I’m sort of over cold weather at this point and looking forward to some proper spring, and I’m not even someone who minds the cold all that much!


Some good news this week includes an ambitious rezoning in Burlington, VT; Elon Musk endorsing One Billion Americans, congestion pricing is (finally) happening in New York, and the Biden administration is going to re-open a nuclear plant in Michigan.


My post earlier this week on state-level climate targets wasn’t really about backup power for data centers — the point was objectors were using them as a pretext. But this comment from Eric on the actual subject of backup power as interesting. I love to learn from readers!


It's worth noting that modern data center don't actually need backup generators as often as one might think. The multinational companies that host them have now gotten so big that, if one particular data center loses power, they can simply route traffic to another data center somewhere else. The likelihood of dozens of data centers in different geographical areas, connected to different power grids, all losing power at the same time is essentially zero. And, for the few minutes it takes to shut down the servers cleanly to avoid data loss, they can just run everything off batteries (such batteries cannot be replaced by backup generators anyway, as large generators take several minutes to start up, compared to battery response time, which is almost instant).


On to the main event:


Lost Future: Was the US opening China up to trade a huge mistake? If you could go back in time to the 90s and the Clinton Administration would heed your wise council, would you tell them not to let China join the WTO, grant MFN status to them, etc.? There was a lot of optimism that increased trade & capitalism in general would sand the rough edges off of the CCP, obviously that looks very naive now. Would leaving them in poverty be a good or wise US policy? Would it even have worked? Maybe Europe would've simply traded with China sans America.


On one level, I think obviously yes, mistakes were made.


For starters, it’s pretty clear that policymakers underestimated how big of a deal China’s entry into the WTO was going to be. That doesn’t, on its own, mean that it was a mistake. But an important component of the analysis was wrong, and other things followed downstream from that. Beyond that, I think the early proponents of deeper engagement with China sincerely believed that commercial ties would lead to political liberalization in China and a more peaceful relationship with the United States. Or more to the point, they believed that if those optimistic forecasts didn’t come to fruition, it would probably be because the commercial ties themselves ended up not being that deep. The analysis was, in retrospect, riddled with errors, and clearly if everyone had understood the situation better, they would have made different choices.


That said, taking the question literally and traveling back in time 25 years, I’m not sure that convincing Bill Clinton that Permanent Normal Trade Relations was a mistake would have accomplished very much.


The anti-PNTR argument was already being made at the time, mostly by protectionism-oriented labor union groups, and most Democrats in congress voted against Clinton on that issue. It’s easy to imagine a world where you bring him a vision from the future that convinces him to side with the unions, but then George W. Bush comes along and signs the PNTR bill in February 2001 instead of September 2000. That hardly alters the trajectory of world history.


To my way of thinking, the really big mistakes come not when Clinton signs the PNTR bill, but a year later when al-Qaeda knocks down the Twin Towers.


That set the United States off on more than a decade of Middle Eastern adventures that left the country much worse off and largely stopped us from updating on whether the Clinton-era assumptions about the geopolitical implications of trade with China were correct. But I would also note that while, under Donald Trump and Joe Biden, we’ve largely ditched those incorrect assumptions in favor of a more skeptical view of China, what we’ve actually done on the trade front is toss the economics textbook out the window and open the door to totally unprincipled protectionism. Trump raising taxes on Korean washing machines was not a smart strategic move against China. Biden has been more restrained than Trump, but similarly, when he set out to impose tariffs on metal used to make food cans, he hit Canada, Germany, and South Korea along with China.


Conversely, in his second term, Obama got really serious about the challenge of China and started pushing ambitious initiatives like the Trans-Pacific Partnership that were meant to address it. But the real shift in congress that happened between Clinton and Obama wasn’t a new view of China, it was a new view of trade, so suddenly people didn’t want to deepen commercial ties with Australia and Japan.


All of which is to say that rather than one mistake — we opened up trade with China and we shouldn’t have — I think there has been a rolling series of mistakes that continue to this day.


The China shock

Something that I think is underrated in this debate is that many analysts who looked at the China trade issue in the 1990s didn’t think that World Trade Organization accession would make a huge different to American manufacturing. The basic reality was that American tariffs on Chinese imports were generally low already. The legislation under consideration was to give them “most-favored nation” status or “Permanent Normal Trade Relations” (PNTR), which would smooth the way for Chinese entry into the WTO. But on the US side, this overwhelmingly meant ratifying the trade status quo as a stable diplomatic commitment. There was no lowering of gigantic American tariff walls, because no gigantic American tariff walls were in place.


In fact, because the United States played such a large role in shaping the WTO, membership largely amounted to China needing to align its policies in areas like intellectual property protection and pharmaceuticals more closely with American policy.


So it’s not that the Clinton administration didn’t realize Chinese import competition was a thing. But they didn’t think PNTR would have an especially large quantitative impact on it, especially not relative to its impact on American exports.


A lot of people cite David Autor’s research on the China shock as having changed their minds about US-China trade. But what really shifted my mind was work from Justin Pierce and Peter Schott on this question of how big a difference PNTR made. They show that the switch to PNTR did make a big difference, that the rise in Chinese exports wasn’t just due to improving Chinese policy and productivity. And they say that’s probably because the permanence really did matter for investment flows. Prior to PNTR, yes, companies would buy stuff that was made in China because it was cheap. But after PNTR, companies would deliberately invest in shifting their supply chains to China, and they didn’t just wait to see if a Chinese option became available. If you think about Apple’s Chinese sourcing, for example, they’re not just buying stuff off the shelf that Chinese companies come up with. They are constantly working to push the envelope on components and materials, and they are working with Chinese suppliers to do so. And so were tons of other companies across tons of other industries. The permanence was game-changing.


Then you get to Autor’s research with David Dorn and Gordon Hanson.


Everyone always said that trade creates “winners and losers.” But the standard pattern of post-WWII trade relationships had been very small wins for the winner and very small numbers of losers. But China is really, really big. So instead of one or two industries shrinking in a way that allowed a few other industries to grow, a huge share of manufacturing industries underwent simultaneous decline. As a result, American manufacturing shifted from long-term stagnation since the mid-1960s into sudden precipitous decline.



They do confirm in the same paper that the flip side of the China Shock being large is that the benefits of trade with China were also large. If you happened to live in a metro area that was highly exposed to import competition from China, the consequences for you were quite bad. But if you lived in a rural area with a farming or natural resource economy, you got a lot of upside. Same if you lived in a high-tech, finance, entertainment, or energy hub. The shock was really bad for Ohio, but good for Boston and Dallas and San Francisco. It was just surprisingly big.


Things fall apart

The fact that “trade has winners and losers” was not new information. “Trade has big winners and big losers” means that trade is a bigger deal than you might think, but it’s not on its own a game-changer for how I think about the issue. In pure economic terms, the problem with the opening to China isn’t that the consequences were surprisingly large — Autor, Dorn, and Hanson confirm that the consequences were positive on average. The fact that the magnitude of the changes was bigger than expected doesn’t mean it was a mistake.


But then there’s the question of what do you do about it.


US-China trade in the Bush years created the opportunity for the federal government to increase the budget deficit significantly, without creating big problems in terms of inflation and interest rates. That could have been an opportunity to create a federal child allowance that boosted fertility while dramatically cutting child poverty, plus investing in a huge infrastructure program to re-employ blue collar workers and hopefully create some useful things of lasting value. Instead, we got $8 trillion in regressive tax cuts and a very expensive Global War on Terror.



The really striking thing about that GWOT spending, is we now see that it’s left the United States with very limited ability to manufacture ammunition or warships. It managed to be extravagant defense outlays without a meaningful buildup of military capabilities.


I sometimes feel a little cringe about my big idea about American politics being “George W Bush was a really bad president.” But he really was bad. Not because he’s a uniquely awful person, per se, but because the circumstances of 9/11 gave him some unusually large degrees of freedom in terms of how to use his authority, and he mostly1 used it badly.


Because this is my thing, I would also note that this is the period when the bad land use trends that started in the 1970s and 1980s really started to be macroeconomically significant. A lot of the metro areas that benefitted from the China shock were metro areas with tight zoning, so instead of experiencing rapid population growth and broad-based prosperity, they experienced a run-up in housing prices. So tech growth in the Bay Area wound up being great for tech workers and great for legacy landowners, but it didn’t generate the kind of soaring number of jobs in construction (and construction-related manufacturing) or rising wages for service workers that it should have. This piece of the puzzle was not Bush’s fault, but it didn’t help.


Chinese democracy

Beyond the economics of trade with China, the other thing that happened during the Bush years was the success of the “Golden Shield Project.” Nineties policymakers had hoped that China (and other countries) would need to choose between prosperity and authoritarianism, because prosperity required modern information technology and modern information technology meant embracing the open internet. As early as 2002-2003, China was showing that this was wrong as a technical matter, and there was nothing stopping them from creating a heavily censored but highly functional internet.


There’s no great shame in making an erroneous forecast, but the Clinton-era optimism about commerce and liberalization showed signs of trouble really early.


The Bush administration didn’t really update based on this new information, and the Obama administration didn’t either at first. But the issue here was actually quite profound. China was, obviously, growing very rapidly — enjoying the kind of “catch-up” growth that we’d seen previously in Asian countries like Japan, Korea, and Singapore. But unlike Japan and Korea, China was not adopting a congenial set of politics and values. And unlike Singapore, China isn’t tiny. Very rapid economic growth in a country of one billion people governed by a hostile ideological system is cause for alarm, and I think American policy is still under-alarmed by it.


A lot of people credit Trump with turning around the bipartisan consensus on this, but I think Trump’s policymaking was actually incredibly scattered and dangerous.


The president who did the best job of taking the China problem seriously was, for my money, second-term Obama. If you put together the whole picture of the nuclear deal with Iran, the diplomatic opening to Cuba, the (failed) reset with Russia, the (semi-successful) effort to stay out of the Syrian Civil War, and the Trans Pacific Partnership, you had an administration that was trying to set aside irrelevant old beefs and focus on the big new challenge of the day. In the case of Russia, the problem was that it takes two parties to quash a beef and Moscow fundamentally turned out not to be interested. But with Cuba and Iran, the problems were more on the American side — key domestic constituencies did not accept the idea that their specific hangups should be set aside in order to pursue a more strategic foreign policy. And the same thing happened on TPP. The critical domestic constituency for getting tough on China, trade-wise, just favored generalized protectionism. The idea of forming an anti-Chinese trade bloc had zero appeal to them.


And that’s really where we were under Trump and even more so with his proposals for a second term. The plan is blanket tariffs to partially offset the cost of a regressive tax hike, not any kind of strategic trade policy. Biden is much better than Trump in terms of thinking things through in a sane way, but still, I think, worse than Obama — a consequence of his fondness for everything bagels and mild skepticism of conventional economics.


So while I think most people today believe the opening to China was a mistake and that we’ve learned our lessons, my view is that we are basically still making the same mistake, just in new and different ways.


Tuesday, March 26, 2024

Russian Exceptionalism. By Gary Saul Morson

Russian Exceptionalism. By Gary Saul Morson

After the fall of the USSR, liberalism, considered foreign, was overwhelmed by various types of nationalism, one of which, Eurasianism, seems to have achieved the status of a semiofficial ideology.

translated from the Russian and edited by Jafe Arnold and John Stachelski

Prav, 2 volumes, 538 pp., $59.98; $47.98 (paper)

Cornell University Press, 380 pp., $125.00; $22.95 (paper)

Moscow: Arktogeia, 600 pp. (1997)

Eurasian Mission: An Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism

London: Arktos, 179 pp., $23.95 (paper)

London: Arktos, 211 pp., $29.50 (paper)

Yale University Press, 360 pp., $18.00 (paper)

When Russian troops seized Crimea in 2014, German chancellor Angela Merkel, reporting on her conversation with Vladimir Putin, told President Obama that the Russian president seemed to dwell “in another world.” In a sense she was right: Russians and Westerners see the world quite differently, and our failure to understand Russia’s perspective made its actions seem surprising in 2014 and still more so when it invaded Ukraine in 2022.

How do Russians think about what their country is doing in Ukraine? If we are to grasp why so many have supported the attack on Georgia in 2008, the seizure of Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014, and the present war, we need to recognize that their fundamental assumptions differ from ours. Americans, for example, typically take for granted that the state exists to promote the welfare of its citizens, but Russians often believe the opposite. After all, individuals come and go, but Russia remains. And Russia is not just a nation; it is also an idea.

The “Russian idea,” throughout its many changes, has typically been messianic. It explains the world and gives life purpose; it shapes domestic and foreign policy and, more importantly, gives Russians a sense of their “Russianness”—which includes the ability to save the world. In his famous book The Russian Idea (1946), the philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev argued that Bolshevism owes as much to Russian messianism as to Marx. Medieval Russians, he and many others emphasize, often considered themselves the only true Christians. The Byzantines had, at the Council of Florence in 1439, recognized the pope to secure Western aid against the Turks, thereby betraying the Orthodox faith, which is supposedly why they succumbed to the Ottomans in 1453. From that point on, Moscow, the capital of the only independent Orthodox country until the nineteenth century, became the “Third Rome,” the heir to both Rome and Byzantium as the seat of Christendom. Russians were destined to save the world because, as the monk Philotheus explained, “a fourth Rome there will not be.”

Bolshevism inherited this messianic spirit. The Soviet Union would liberate the workers of the world and create the final utopia. It took Stalin to fuse Marxist internationalism with traditional Russian pride: internationalism would be the work of Russia, the savior nation. Stalin drew on a tradition of Russianness defined as a sort of super-nationality. Every nation manifests a special quality, but Russia, as Dostoevsky argued, displays the unique ability to absorb and perfectly express the qualities of all others. Because of this “receptivity” (ozyvchivost’), Dostoevsky concluded, Russians “may have a greater capacity than other nations to embrace the idea of the universal fellowship of humans, of brotherly love.” As proof, he adduces the Spaniards and Englishmen portrayed in Pushkin’s poems, who, he imagines, differ not a whit from actual Spaniards and Englishmen. I am reminded of the witticism that the linguist Roman Jakobson could speak Russian fluently in six languages.

After the fall of the USSR, ideologies competed to replace communism. Liberalism, considered foreign, was overwhelmed by various types of nationalism, one of which, Eurasianism, seems to have achieved the status of a semiofficial ideology. Putin uses Eurasianist phrases, the army’s general staff academy assigns a Eurasianist textbook, and popular culture has embraced its ideas and vocabulary. The better to build an empire, Eurasianism, like Stalinism, carries the banner of anti-imperialism, claiming to unite the world under Russian leadership in order to liberate it from Western cultural colonialism. It could be no other way. As Aleksandr Dugin, the movement’s current leader, explained, “Outside of empire, Russians lose their identity and disappear as a nation.”

Eurasianism began a little over a century ago. Unlike most of its rivals today, it has engaged some truly creative minds. Russian intellectual history, in fact, offers several movements in which powerful thinkers arrive at absurd and often repulsive conclusions. To understand them is to grasp how intelligent people anywhere can accept preposterous beliefs and claim “scientific” certainty for ideas counter to the very spirit of science.

Finding themselves in exile after the revolution and civil war, a group of Russian intellectuals, mostly from the nobility, regarded recent events as a catastrophe unrivaled in history. They experienced profound alienation from both their homeland and the European world in which they found themselves. In his essay “Two Worlds,” Pyotr Savitsky, the movement’s first leader, observed, “Russian exiles are like immigrants ‘from another world,’ like inhabitants of other planets.” Like earlier Russian émigrés, they found a home in the ideology they created.

“Two Worlds” is included in Foundations of Eurasianism, a collection of important texts from the movement, many of which appear in English for the first time. The Bolshevik coup, Savitsky and his fellow émigrés reasoned, simply accelerated the disastrous policy of Westernization pursued by Romanov tsars since Peter the Great. Russia must at last realize that it does not belong to European civilization. It belongs instead to the entirely separate world of “Eurasia.” Culturally, historically, and psychologically, Russians are a steppe people who resemble the Turkic and Mongolian (or “Turanian”) peoples of Central Asia. Far from being a calamity, the Mongol conquest of Russia (roughly 1240–1480) constituted a blessing precisely because it isolated Russia from Europe. It was in this period that the modern Russian character was formed, as a synthesis of the Slavic and the Turanian.

Absolutism, the only rule suitable for steppe peoples dispersed over a vast territory, came to Russia from Genghis Khan and his successors. When the Mongol Empire disintegrated, Russia became its heir. “And hovering over all Russia is the shade of the great Genghis Khan,” wrote the Eurasianist Nikolai Trubetskoy in The Legacy of Genghis Khan (1925). “Whether Russia wants it or not, she remains forever the guardian of this legacy.”

The Eurasianists included two great linguists, Trubetskoy and Jakobson, who discovered the phoneme and are often regarded as the founders of modern structuralism. They devised a theory justifying Eurasianism linguistically. What really matters, they reasoned, is not the common origin of languages, as other linguists and earlier philologists claimed, but their shared destiny. The Pan-Slavists of the nineteenth century had mistakenly proposed that Russians most resembled speakers of other Slavic languages, many of whom had been corrupted by Western culture. Russia’s destiny was to be found elsewhere, in the East. Or as Jakobson observed, “The question ‘to where’ has become more important than ‘from where.’”

Trubetskoy and Jakobson attributed linguistic change to the dynamics of a self-enclosed system. That system is heading somewhere, or, as Trubetskoy explained, “the evolution of a phonemic system at any given moment is directed by the tendency towards a goal.” Balkan languages, they pointed out, were highly diverse in origin. They include not only languages from different branches of Indo-European (Romanian is a Romance language, Serbian is Slavic, Albanian constitutes a branch of its own), but also Turkish, which is not Indo-European at all. And yet the interaction of speakers has led to a number of shared features. In much the same way, they maintained, Russian and Turanian languages form a “language union” bound to draw ever closer. And if that was so, Jakobson and Trubetskoy concluded in a leap of logic, the same must be true of everything else in Russian and Turanian cultures.

Unlike European colonial empire-building, therefore, the Russian conquest of Siberian, Caucasian, and Central Asian peoples was entirely “friendly”—an argument so preposterous it occasioned some of the Eurasianists’ most imaginative historiography. Ukraine proved an obvious sticking point because, from the beginning, Eurasianists had to confront Ukrainian nationalists in the diaspora. From their perspective, all the Eurasianists had demonstrated was that Ukrainians, who share European culture, do not belong with Russians.

What exactly ensured a common destiny for a group of people? The answer was geography, what Savitsky called mestorazvitie—“topogenesis” or, more literally, “place-development.” Geographical environment shapes culture, he argued, so the peoples of the Eurasian Steppe, which extends from Hungary to Manchuria, are bound to display common psychology and therefore to have harmonious relations. By the same token, Savitsky reasoned, an unbridgeable chasm must always divide “oceanic” and “continental” cultures. The former embrace risk, entrepreneurship, and individualism—think of Renaissance Italy or republican Holland or imperial Britain—while the latter prefer tradition, conservatism, and collectivism. The continental world favors centralized authoritarian rule, which is why “geography itself” has preordained Russian rule over the vast territory extending from Poland to the Pacific. “Continentality” dictates isolation from alien influence through economic and social “autarky,” or self-sufficiency.

Above all, this “Russian world” must acknowledge that its greatest enemy is and always will be Western liberalism. The Bolsheviks mistakenly adopted Western, atheistic Marxism, but they correctly established total control over individual lives in the name of a higher ideal. “Modern democracy must give way to ideocracy,” Trubetskoy argued, referring to rule based on abstract ideals. Pluralist democracy entails no all-encompassing and uniform philosophy of life, but ideocracy does. Therefore, “ideocracy presupposes the selection of the ruling echelon according to its faithfulness to a single common governing idea…united in a single ideological state organization” that will “control all aspects of life.” This collectivism ensures that the “last traces of individualism will disappear” and that a common outlook will “become the inalienable ingredient” of everyone’s psyche. From the start, Eurasianism was not an alternative to totalitarianism but a different form of it.

Western liberals, Trubetskoy explained, affirm putatively universal values like human rights, progress, and cosmopolitanism. Viewing people as individuals, they scorn national cultures and consider respect for tradition to be retrograde. The superiority of Western civilization, they presume, lies in its discovery of universals, which are supposedly as free from local prejudice as logic and mathematics. And so Westerners present distinctively European values as objective. Those non-Europeans who accept this claim, as many in Russia and other modernizing cultures have, aspire to become more “civilized” by thoroughly Westernizing, an impossible task necessarily leading to self-contempt.

The book that catalyzed the Eurasianist movement, Trubetskoy’s Europe and Mankind (1920)—selected excerpts of which appear in the first volume of Foundations of Eurasianism—maintains “the equivalence and qualitative incommensurability of all cultures and all peoples of the globe…. There are no higher and lower cultures, there are only similar and dissimilar.” European arguments to the contrary are but “a means of deceiving people and justifying the imperialistic and colonial policies…of the ‘great powers’”—that is, all the great powers but Russia.

Remarkably enough, Trubetskoy’s relativism leads him to the conclusion that because cultures are equal, Europeans, who suppose otherwise, are worse than all others. All are equal, but some are less equal than others. The non-Western world must therefore unite against Europeans, because for relativists “the consequences of Europeanization” are “an absolute evil.” All countries must recognize that “there is only one true confrontation: that between the Romano-Germanics and all other peoples of the world, between Europe and Mankind.”

Lev Gumilev, who corresponded with Savitsky, developed Eurasianist ideas in imaginative and at times ridiculous ways. The son of two great poets, Nikolai Gumilev and Anna Akhmatova, Gumilev boasted a pedigree that commanded attention. In a country where literature enjoyed immense prestige, the persecution of his parents—his father was shot and his mother became the target of nationwide denunciation—only added to Gumilev’s inherited charisma, enhanced still more by two terms in the Gulag. (One “for papa” and one “for mama,” he liked to say.) Born in 1912, Gumilev became a specialist in the Mongols, Turks, and other peoples of Central Asia. His engagingly written books, some of which could be published only during glasnost, challenged traditional accounts of Russian history and developed his own form of ethnology, which he called a new hard science.

As Mark Bassin points out in his illuminating book The Gumilev Mystique, it would be hard to overstate Gumilev’s influence. He eventually enjoyed support at high levels of the Communist Party, the General Staff of the Armed Forces, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1995 the State Duma awarded one of his books on Russian history a prestigious prize. Approved by the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation as a high school textbook, it was reissued in a print run of 100,000. Gumilev’s celebration of Central Asian peoples also made him a hero of Kazakhstan’s former autocratic president Nursultan Nazarbaev. In the Kazakh capital, Astana, students attend Gumilev Eurasian National University. On the hundredth anniversary of Gumilev’s birth, Nazarbaev named a mountain for him (Gumilev Peak). In Russia, Gumilev’s ideas penetrate everywhere, and his central terms—“passionarity,” “complementary,” “chimaera,” and others—have entered common usage.

Gumilev arrived at his core idea in the Gulag, where, without paper, he somehow (the story goes) contrived to write a book on the paper used to wrap food supplies. His theories represent a fantastic excursion into pseudoscience, which thrives in Russia even among serious scholars and scientists. In Gumilev’s view, an ethnic group, which he calls an “ethnos” (“ethnoi” in the plural), is not a social but a biological phenomenon, analogous to a herd or flock among animals. Developing according to biochemical laws, an ethnos constitutes “a biophysical reality…. Ethnic belonging, which manifests itself in the human consciousness, is not a product of…consciousness.”

Gumilev argues that ethnoi, because they are rooted in biology, reflect the human instinct to divide people into “us” and “them.” It followed that, Enlightenment thinkers notwithstanding, the sense of belonging cannot be extended to humanity as a whole, because then there would be no “them” to give “us” meaning. In much the same spirit, Trubetskoy had maintained, by dubious analogy, that just as phonemes are meaningful only by opposition to other phonemes, so “humanity” cannot be a meaningful group, because there would be nothing to which it could be opposed.

Gumilev reasoned that ethnogenesis (the formation of ethnoi) requires enormous

work (in the physical sense)…. And to do that work, energy is needed, very ordinary energy measurable in kilogram-meters or calories…. Let me explain. The stone blocks at the top of a pyramid were not raised by [conscious] ethnic self-awareness but by the muscle power of Egyptian workers on the principle of heave-ho!

That energy must come from somewhere. It cannot come from the consciousness of individuals or their immediate surroundings; such a view, according to Gumilev, “infringes the law of the conservation of energy.” It followed for him that the energy must come from outer space. Otherwise, “entropy…would have smoothed out all ethnic differences and converted the diversity of the human race into a featureless anthroposphere.” The earth receives “more energy from outer space than is needed to maintain equilibrium of the biosphere,” and it is that surplus energy on which ethnogenesis draws.

The process works like this: during some periods of the solar cycle, “the defensive qualities of the ionosphere are reduced, allowing individual quants or bundles of energy to approach near to the earth’s surface.” This energy causes genetic mutations, giving rise to a few people endowed with great “passionarity.” People with passionarity display the ability to absorb large amounts of energy from their surroundings. As lemmings or swarms of locusts sometimes expend great energy in self-destruction, so “passionaries” overcome the survival instinct. They take risks to accomplish great deeds for no reason except to accomplish them. Why did Alexander the Great and his army march all the way to India when they could not hope to bring their booty home to Macedonia? They must have done so out of passionarity. Gumilev regarded passionarity as his greatest discovery, since it explains what no social theory ever could. Heroism, self-sacrifice, supreme devotion to an ideal regardless of the consequence to oneself, loved ones, or friends: these actions, which shape the world in lasting ways, cannot be explained by rational, social-scientific theories because they are not rational, and their origin is biological rather than social.

Using “induction,” passionaries attract others, who attract still others, until an ethnic group forms. Anyone, regardless of race, may be drawn to a passionary, and so ethnoi are rarely homogeneous in origin. (This is how Gumilev refutes accusations of racism.) It is not race that links people into an ethnos; it is “behavioral stereotype.” A certain behavioral repertoire seems natural to members of one ethnos but odd to members of others. Bassin mentions Gumilev’s example of a Russian, a Tatar, a German, and someone from the Caucasus on a train who encounter a drunken youth harassing a woman: “I know, and we all know, that the Russian will say to him, ‘hey you, pal, you’re going to get caught. Look, get off at the next stop’”; the German will use the emergency brake and call the police; the Caucasian will “simply lose control and hit the offender in the face”; and the Tatar will just “turn away in silence.” Behavioral stereotypes develop as responses to the natural environment, and so steppe people are bound to differ from sea people. Gumilev here adapts Savitsky’s idea of topogenesis.

Entropy, Gumilev claims, ensures that passionary energy diminishes at a mathematically calculable rate. That is why all ethnoi pass through a series of precisely defined stages until, after about 1,500 years, they become mere “relicts,” as happened to the ancient Khazars of Central Asia and the Yakuts of Siberia.

If an ethnos lives among other ethnoi, relations may be either friendly or hostile, depending on their behavioral stereotypes and according to natural laws. Groups well adapted to each other enjoy “complementarity.” That, Gumilev says, is emphatically the case with Russians and other steppe peoples.

Most earlier historians considered Russia’s Mongol rulers (“the Golden Horde”) a barbaric and hostile force, an error Gumilev calls the “Black Legend.” It was fabricated, like almost everything else Gumilev needs to explain away, by evil Westerners intent on dividing Slavic and Turkic peoples. To begin with, in Gumilev’s account Russians were not conquered by the Mongols (whose armies destroyed entire cities) but submitted voluntarily. If not for the Mongols, Russia, like Western Slavs, would have succumbed to the domination of Westerners intent on destroying their culture.

Gumilev claims that the Russian ethnos was formed at the Battle of Kulikovo in 1380, traditionally represented as Russia’s first great victory over the Mongols. Gumilev offers an entirely different account of the battle. The Russians fought a mere faction of the Horde, ruled by the “illegitimate” military commander Mamai, who enjoyed support from Genoese merchants. By defeating Mamai, the Russians demonstrated their loyalty to the Horde’s legitimate ruler, Tokhtamysh. To be sure, Tokhtamysh went on to burn Moscow, but Gumilev proves creative enough to explain away this inconvenient fact as well.

If ethnoi are biological phenomena, then it is essential to maintain their gene pool, and so exogamy must be avoided. Sometimes crossbreeding creates a new ethnos, but usually it deforms or destroys an existing one. “But it never happens without a trace,” Gumilev writes. “That is why neglect of ethnology, be it on the scale of state or country, tribal union, or monogamous family, must be qualified as irresponsibility, criminal in regard to the offspring.”

The worst thing that can happen to an ethnos is transformation into a “chimaera,” by which Gumilev meant not a mirage but a monster—“a combination of elements not organically united,” like a beast with lion’s head, goat’s body, and serpent’s tail. “An example of a chimeric relationship in zoology,” he explains,

is that which forms when tapeworms are present inside an animal’s organs…. By necessitating an increased inflow of nutrition and introducing its hormones into the blood and bile of its host organism, the parasite alters its host’s biochemistry.

In much the same way, a parasite ethnos “sucks its sustenance out of the indigenous ethnos.” Jews are Gumilev’s prime example, and his hatred of them amounts to an obsession.

The Babylonian Empire fell, Gumilev supposes, because the king’s advisers were Jews who, divorced from geography, neglected to maintain Babylon’s irrigation networks, which led to crop failures and civilizational collapse. What’s more, Jews married off their women to produce generations of “‘métis’ or ‘bastard’ offspring,” who eventually seized power in the name of the intruder.

Whether Jewish or not, chimeric intruders typically reject the material world, as the various gnostic groups—including Manichaeans, Zoroastrian Mazdaists, and Albigensians—have done. Embracing “vampire concepts that embody a deep and diabolical sense of purpose,” they subscribe to a life-denying worldview detached from the soil, fetishize the written word, adopt lies on principle, and maintain a different morality for themselves than for outsiders. Gumilev claims that the Talmud and Kabbalah, which he evidently knows only from the accounts of Russian antisemites, state that the Jewish God who spoke with Moses was really a demon, Satan’s best friend. He also claims that the Talmud instructs Jews to “kill the best of the goyim.” It is a remarkable feature of Russian thought that creative minds keep inventing new theories demonizing Jews.

During the Yeltsin years, which many called Russia’s “Weimar Era,” the young, bohemian Aleksandr Dugin flirted with occultist and extreme rightist ideas. He seems to have been especially fond of Nazis and adopted the nom de plume Hans Sievers, an allusion to Wolfram Sievers, whom Himmler made director of a group studying the paranormal. Eventually Dugin found his way to Eurasianism, which he synthesized with the work of practitioners of geopolitics from Halford Mackinder on, along with structuralists, postmodernists (Jean-François Lyotard, Gilles Deleuze), French “traditionalists” (René Guénon and Alain de Benoist), and various Nazis or ex-Nazis, including Julius Evola, Carl Schmitt, and, of course, Martin Heidegger.

It is routine to refer to Dugin as “well-read,” but it would be more accurate to say “well-skimmed.” He is one of those pseudoprofound commentators who love to call things “ontological” and “metaphysical” while endlessly dropping the names of thinkers, with many of whom he has a flyleaf acquaintance. If there are fashionable terms to deploy—“rhizome,” “bricolage,” “Dasein”—he is sure to pile them one on another. He speaks of the “hermeneutic circle”—the paradox that we interpret a whole work in reference to the parts and the parts in reference to the whole—as if it meant a worldview. He baffles with what might be called the emperor’s new prose:

The new age of modernity, with its linear vectors of progress and with its postmodern contortions,…are taking us away into the labyrinths of the disintegration of individual reality and to the rhizomatic subject or post-subject.

Real, if wacko, thinkers like Trubetskoy, who identified the phoneme and helped found structuralism, and Gumilev, who was a genuine scholar of the Mongols and peoples of Central Asia, would probably be embarrassed that Dugin is their successor.

Dugin’s most influential book, The Foundations of Geopolitics, began as a lecture series at the General Staff Academy and continues to be assigned at military universities. As the historian John Dunlop observed, “There has probably not been another book published in Russia during the post-Communist period which has exerted a comparable influence on Russian military, police, and statist foreign policy elites.” And not just elites: Dugin’s ideas—cited, recycled, adapted, and plagiarized—fill bookstores and saturate mass media. In the late 1990s the Duma formed a geopolitics committee, and Dugin became an adviser to the Duma’s speaker, Gennady Seleznev.

Dugin stresses Eurasianism’s apocalyptic element. Russians face a final battle of good and evil, a “cultural, philosophical, ontological, and eschatological struggle.” Evil is variously identified as Atlanticism (opposed to Eurasianism “in everything”), modernity (“an absolute evil”), America (“a country of absolute evil”), and above all liberalism, which he says is powerful today because evil is strongest at the end of days. Gumilev imagined he was doing science, but Dugin expresses animus toward “materialistic physics,” Francis Bacon, and “the supremacy of quantitative concepts and secular theories.” In his introduction to Eurasian Mission he also rejects “homogenous space,” “linear time,” and “progress.”

Logic is not his strong point. Progress, he explains, is a form of racism because the assertion that the present is superior to the past constitutes

humiliation of all those who lived in the past, an insult to the honor and dignity of our ancestors…and a violation of the rights of the dead…. The ideology of progress represents the moral genocide of past generations—in other words, real racism.

In Dugin’s view, Eurasianism, suitably adapted, provides the best ideology of resistance to liberalism. Russia must lead not only other steppe peoples but everyone oppressed by the West; in this sense, Eurasia is everywhere. Dugin calls this updated Eurasianism “the fourth political theory,” which he elaborates in his book of that name. Totally rejecting the first theory, liberalism, Eurasianism borrows generously from the other two, communism and fascism. Like Lenin and Stalin, Dugin advocates using any means whatsoever in the struggle against “blood-sucking American, oligarchic, liberal scum.” And we must get over making Hitler into a bogeyman, because apart from its antisemitism, Nazism was no worse, and maybe better, than liberalism.

Like earlier Eurasianists, Dugin argues that all cultures are equal and incommensurable, but he makes an exception for Americans, who possess no “deep identity” because they lack “a pre-modern legacy.” With similar disregard for contradiction, Dugin demands that no country should dominate others while arguing that Russia must wield total power in the fight against America. If Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan don’t want to be united with Russia, that is only “to exploit their recently achieved national sovereignty for their own gain”—which, one might think, is what nations are supposed to do.

Dugin expresses special hostility to independent Ukraine because, despite its cultural and linguistic closeness to Russia, it has treasonously betrayed its proper role as part of the Russian world. In 2014 he called for the conquest of eastern Ukraine months before it happened and even revived the eighteenth-century term for the region, Novorossiya, before the Kremlin started using it. He told one reporter, “Kill! Kill! Kill! There can be no other discussion.” He now demands that Putin wage war more ruthlessly.

Far from distorting earlier Eurasianism, Dugin’s bloodthirstiness represents its predictable development. As has happened so often in its history, Russia demonstrates the consequence of defining oneself with an idea. In the name of justice, one creates an ideocracy and divides the world into absolute good and evil. Immediate neighbors suffer first.

To an extent Westerners have not appreciated, concern with national identity has shaped Russia’s foreign policy over the past decade and accounts for the dramatic shift in its behavior from peaceful concern with economic development to aggressive efforts to dominate its neighbors. Since Putin resumed the presidency in 2012, Eurasianist vocabulary has populated his speeches, newspaper articles, and television appearances. Russia’s elites have embraced Eurasianist concepts defining Russia as a distinct “civilization.” The West has become the liberal “Atlantic” intent on destroying Russian culture, while Russian patriotism is now a matter of “passionarity.”

In Black Wind, White Snow, Charles Clover astutely points out that Putin has been content to let the Baltic states go, even though they have large Russian populations, but not Georgia, Kazakhstan, or especially Ukraine. The dividing line Putin has drawn between “ours” and “not ours,” Clover points out, follows “a strategic and cultural logic strikingly in tune with the theories of the Eurasianists.” The Baltic states are part of European civilization, but Ukraine belongs to Eurasia.

Time and again, Putin has stressed that Eurasian cultures belong together in a single polity under Russian leadership. He has regarded his new “Eurasian Union” with Kazakhstan not just as a trade agreement but also, and more importantly, as the union of peoples who belong together as a single “civilization.” The identity of that civilization, he explained, is based not on ethnicity but on culture—“on the preservation of the Russian cultural dominance, the carriers of which are not only ethnic Russian, but all carriers of such identity regardless of Russian nationality.” This concept of a broader civilizational identity that transcends nationality but still entails Russian dominance is a core idea of Eurasianism.

More often than not, Putin has defined Eurasian civilization negatively, as the opposite of decadent liberalism. In a 2019 interview with the Financial Times, he explained that “the liberal idea” had “outlived its purpose” and “become obsolete.” But it is still dangerous because Western leaders presume that their values are the only rational ones. Expanding NATO to the Russian border and seeking to incorporate traditionally Russian territory, they equate their interests with humanity’s and take for granted that they can “simply dictate anything to anyone just like they have been attempting to do over the recent decades.” On May 9, 2023—Russia’s most important holiday, celebrating the defeat of Nazi Germany—Putin appealed to Russian patriotism in its current fight against liberalism and the West in Ukraine. The West hates Russia, he said, precisely because it represents different civilizational values. “Western globalist elites,” Putin insisted, resent having their supposedly universal values challenged and in response have provoked “bloody conflicts, hatred, Russophobia.”

In 2016 Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, in an article citing Gumilev, claimed Russia’s actions in Ukraine were about resisting Western attempts “to deprive Russian lands of their identity.” Contrary to the worldview Merkel and other enlightened Westerners take for granted, existential civilizational conflict, from the Eurasianist perspective, is regarded as inevitable. In that conflict, Russia is the victim of arrogant Westerners seeking to impose their alien, “satanic” values on the rest of humanity. Its struggle, in this view, is not about conquest but the preservation of its very identity. Ultimately, it is also the fight of all non-Western powers who want to maintain their own distinct civilizations. “We will protect the diversity of the world,” Putin explained in a tone that demonstrates that, now as in the remote past, Russian messianism still thrives.

Gary Saul Morson

Gary Saul Morson is the Lawrence B. Dumas Professor of the Arts and Humanities and a Professor of Slavic Languages and Literatures at Northwestern. His latest book, Wonder Confronts Certainty: Russian Writers on the Timeless Questions and Why Their Answers Matter, was published last year. (February 2024)


State-level climate targets don't make sense. By Matthew Yglesias

Read time: 8 minutes


State-level climate targets don't make sense

State policy matters, state-specific emissions don't


Data centers use a lot of electricity, and it’s very important to their customers to avoid service outages. As a result, the facilities are normally built with backup power generators that might burn natural gas or more frequently diesel, which is dirtier. This is not a unique attribute of data centers — a hospital has exactly the same issue — but data center construction is booming in a way that hospital construction is not.


Which brings us to Maryland, where Governor Wes Moore’s administration is supporting legislation to streamline permitting of high-energy facilities that require backup generators.


The consensus seems to be that the primary intended beneficiaries of this legislation are would-be builders of data centers, a market that Maryland hopes will bolster its high wage economy. For this, Moore has attracted the ire of the state’s environmental groups, who raise a host of concerns that are largely focused on the implications for Maryland’s state-level greenhouse gas emission targets. Notably, according to Inside Climate News’ account of the groups’ objections, they are not primarily focused on the idea that the backup generators are too polluting. The governor’s position is that the existing review process for the generators is essentially just a pretextual barrier to construction, and he wants to eliminate it. But the groups say pretextual barriers to data center construction are good, because data centers use a lot of electricity:


In their testimonies, the environmental groups reminded committee members that data center concentration in Maryland will put enormous strain on the state’s energy demand and grid capacity, which will have consequences for Maryland’s ability to meet its statutory climate and clean energy targets. 


To the groups’ credit, what they are saying here is literally true: It is much easier for Maryland to meet Maryland’s statutory climate and clean energy targets if nobody builds any data centers in Maryland.


But who cares?


Climate change isn’t mitigated in the slightest if a data center is built in West Virginia or Pennsylvania rather than Maryland. The murder rate in Baltimore fell pretty dramatically last year, which on its face is good news. While suburban Maryland is tightly constrained by bad land use rules, Baltimore City has room to grow. If crime keeps falling, more people may want to live there. And if they live there rather than in Philadelphia or Phoenix, they will want to have electricity and home heat. And just like having a data center in Maryland rather than some other state makes it harder to hit Maryland’s statutory climate and clean energy targets, having people live in Baltimore rather than Boise makes it harder to hit Maryland’s statutory climate and clean energy targets.


Again, though: This has no implications for global atmospheric CO2 concentrations or global climate change.


I don’t have any particular brief for the data center industry, but the critiques of Moore’s position just show that the idea of state-level emissions targets is poorly conceived. Some states are more progressive than others, so it makes a lot of sense to push states like Maryland to pass more aggressive climate policies than would fly in Michigan or in the United States congress. But precisely because there are unique opportunities for blue states to lead on critical progressive issues, it’s important to lead in ways that make sense.


State-level aggregates aren’t what matters

According to the US Energy Information Agency, across the United States we created 50.2 kilograms of carbon dioxide for every million BTUs of energy in 2021.


That’s a 20 percent decline since 1970, but obviously still well above zero and well above our ability to cost-effectively remove CO2 from the atmosphere. Maryland was almost exactly average at 50.8 tons, and the lowest emissions states are mostly ones with a lot of hydropower (Oregon, Washington) — including hydro power imported from Canada (Vermont) — but also South Carolina, where a majority of electricity comes from nuclear plants.1


Because electricity is bought and sold across state lines, but many decisions related to the citing of electricity generation are made at a state or local level, state policy can influence the national energy mix.


Maryland, for example, saw an offshore wind production deal collapse in January, but leaders in the state legislature are working to get that back on track. Generating more zero-emission energy would be useful, both because energy is useful and because pollution is bad. The fact that this project would be physically located in Maryland is not important for climate outcomes, but it is important in the sense that the Maryland state legislature has authority over it and they care about climate change, so they can do something useful by boosting wind. Similarly, this project to turn a former coal mine into a solar farm seems great. What’s less great is that a bunch of Maryland local government entities have enacted rules to block the construction of solar farms — a potent reminder that there’s nothing NIMBYs can’t ruin.


Right now, of course, Maryland also gets a lot of electricity from burning natural gas.


And the reality is that if you want to minimize state-level emissions in a world where renewables growth faces various constraints, the easiest way to achieve that is to just push activity out of your state. New York State has had incredibly slow population growth for the past 25 years. That slow population growth has helped keep aggregate emissions low. But it’s made national emissions higher, since New York has (by far) the country’s lowest per capita emissions level. The most useful thing New York could do for climate change would be to dramatically upzone everywhere there is spare subway capacity and around every LIRR and MetroNorth station. The state’s aggregate emissions would go up, since even low-emissions New Yorkers have nonzero emissions. But American emissions would go down. And crucially, they’d go down in a way that boosts economic growth.


The specter of degrowth

The Maryland environmental groups who want the state to prevent new data centers from being built aren’t stupid. They are aware that the climate doesn’t care about the geographical location of the data centers. It turns out, per the Inside Climate News article, that they just don’t like the whole idea of a data center industry because it uses a lot of electricity:


Currently, data centers use around 9.7 gigawatts of power nationally and their energy demand is expected to increase threefold, to 27 GW, within the next few years, according to a 2023 analysis. That would outpace the entire amount of offshore wind generation the Biden Administration currently aims to install nationally. Energy demand for data centers in Virginia is projected to grow from about 2.67 GW in 2022 to 10 GW by 2035, Dominion Energy has estimated. 


“Maryland should establish and affirm clear regulatory safeguards to regulate the growth and impact of this rapidly growing industry,” the Sierra Club said in its testimony. “Maryland has the chance to get it right from the start, rather than playing catchup like neighboring Virginia, which is facing the prospect of skyrocketing electricity rates, new power plants, and massive public unrest.” 


This is a reminder that the whole notion of degrowth occupies an odd status in American politics. It’s not something that Joe Biden supports. Nor is it something that Wes Moore supports. It’s not something that any of the big umbrella organizations formulating major progressive agenda items support. You can read the big ideas people of the progressive movement writing their big-think articles about middle-out economics and the return of industrial policy, and none of them are saying that we shouldn’t have economic growth.


But the environmental movement and its major groups are important elements in the progressive coalition; good Democrats and fellow members of the coalition are supposed to incorporate environmentalist movement priorities into their big tent. And the environmental movement itself is deeply ambivalent at best about the whole idea of growth.


When you put the choice squarely, mainstream Democrats say that they do want economic growth — thus Governor Moore working to remove impediments to the data center industry. The Sierra Club isn’t wrong that trying to grow the industry is inconsistent with Moore’s state-level climate pledges. But the correct way to resolve that is for Moore to note that those pledges aren’t consistent with his own ideas about politics and government. He wants to take the scientific understanding of pollution and climate change seriously and make policy choices that account for the downsides of industrial activity. But just pushing activity out of Maryland and into other states and vaguely hoping that maybe some day all states will decide they don’t care about growth isn’t that.


I am, personally, not that fired up by the data center aspect of this. But the same basic logic about state-level targets applies to housing, to immigration, and to infrastructure. If your focus is on emissions in some particular geographical area, the easiest way to achieve targets is just to minimize activity inside the area. But there’s no scientific basis for caring about that.


State policy can make a difference

To be clear, I am not saying that state-level policy can’t make a difference on the climate issue.


In the case of New York, for example, a more growth-friendly housing policy would raise America’s GDP per capita, while reducing our per capita emissions. The same is true of other relatively low-emissions jurisdictions like DC and the entire west coast. The point isn’t that state policy doesn’t matter, and it’s not that state-level targets are imperfect guides. The state-level targets can be genuinely harmful precisely because state policy does matter.


On the flip side, even though New York’s per capita emissions are low by American standards, they’re higher than they used to be because the state closed a nuclear plant a few years ago at the behest of RFK Jr. and a bunch of local environmental groups. By the same token, back when Martin O’Malley was governor of Maryland, there was a proposal to add an additional reactor to the Calvert Cliffs nuclear plant. This was, of course, opposed by the Sierra Club. They eventually got their way because American regulators decided that a reactor project wholly owned by a foreign company (in this case France’s EDF) was a national security risk. That seems really dumb on its face (the US and France are in a military alliance), and I’m not sure if it was purely pretextual. But the point is, those things make a difference.


Maryland can do more or less to generate wind, solar, and nuclear power at home, and because electricity is sold across state lines, that makes a difference to the big picture. Maryland has lower gasoline taxes than Virginia or Pennsylvania and could raise them and use the revenue to finance an offsetting cut in some other tax. Maryland (and any other state) could do a bunch of stuff that’s aimed at either reducing per capita consumption of fossil fuels or else at generating more emissions-free energy. But state-level emissions targets aren’t only beside the point for achieving that, they are often counterproductive. Anchoring yourself to them as a policy goal is going to lead to bad outcomes.


Update your profile

Only paid subscribers can comment on this post


Monday, March 25, 2024

Raising the Retirement Age Won’t Help Anyone. By Matthew Yglesias

The most obvious (and most difficult) way to avert the Social Security crisis is with smart benefit cuts and modest tax increases.  

March 24, 2024 at 12:00 PM UTC


Matthew Yglesias is a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion. A co-founder of and former columnist for Vox, he writes the Slow Boring blog and newsletter. He is author of “One Billion Americans.”

The crisis looms.

Photographer: Kevin Dietsch/Getty Images North America

It’s budget season in Washington, which means the politicians are delivering their annual warnings about the looming Social Security crisis. How big of a crisis — and how close it looms — is largely within their control, and there are basically three proposals to address it: one from House Republicans, one from President Joe Biden, and one from former President Donald Trump.

Trump’s plan is so bad that Republicans decided to attribute it to Biden instead. The budget proposal from the House’s Republican Study Committee, released last week, points out that if no changes are made, the Social Security trust fund will be exhausted by 2032. “Ignoring this fact, as the Biden Administration and Congressional Democrats have, will lead to the largest across-the-board cuts to current Social Security retirement beneficiaries in history,” its report reads.

This is a valid point. But “do nothing and let massive automatic benefit cuts occur” is in fact Trump’s position on Social Security, not Biden’s. The Biden administration released a Social Security plan earlier this month that would restore solvency to the trust fund by raising taxes on people who earn more than $400,000 a year.

As for House Republicans? Their plan calls for raising the retirement age “to account for increases in life expectancy.” They realize this is risky — the Biden administration has already pounced on it — which may explain their attempt to sow confusion by pretending their nominee’s plan is actually the other guy’s.

Nonetheless, the plan from the Republican Study Committee, which represents almost 80% of the party’s House membership, is worth taking seriously. And in the universe of possible benefit cuts, the GOP preference for a higher retirement age is one of the worst possible options. It’s essentially a benefit cut that targets people with below-average life expectancy. Social Security needs painful changes, but it’s a strangely regressive choice to make them at such a cost to a group that’s poorer than average.

Progress on life expectancy has been very uneven across US society. Educated Americans are living much longer than we used to, but those without bachelor’s degrees are not. Contemporary Republicans like to cast themselves as champions of the working class, but they haven’t updated their policy playbook on major issues accordingly.

Beyond the specific class skew, meanwhile, there’s just something peculiar and cruel about singling out people in poor health for benefit cuts.

On average, the rich are in better shape than the poor. But there are exceptions. And almost everyone would trade money for better health and longer life if they had the opportunity. Increasing the retirement age essentially singles out the very worse-off class of elderly people — and makes them worse off.

Then there is the already-regressive nature of Social Security: The richer you are, the larger your monthly benefit check. Liberals generally admire Social Security for being a “universal” program rather than a means-tested one, providing a guarantee of dignified retirement to all Americans without a lot of elaborate administrative rigamarole. But most people’s understanding of a universal program is something like a public library or a bus — a service available on equal terms to everyone. Social Security is not like that. It pays larger benefit checks to higher-income people who paid more taxes during their working life.

The theoretical rationale here is that Social Security is supposed to be a kind of mandatory insurance program with a pension-like structure of payments and payouts.

In reality, though, Social Security is redistributive — those who pay higher taxes receive higher benefits, but not in proportion to what they pay. The point of the Democrats’ tax-raising plan is to make the program more redistributive.

But precisely because the existing benefit structure is skewed to the rich, you can achieve the Democratic goal of making the program more redistributive — and the Republican goal of cutting spending — by simply making the program flatter. Take the current 80th percentile of benefits (or 60th or 40th or whatever number you want to compromise on), and make it the maximum benefit. That creates a spending cut that targets not exactly rich people, but at least non-poor people. And because more affluent people live longer, reducing an affluent person’s monthly check does more for the Treasury than cutting spending on the poor.

All this said, the idea of raising the retirement age is not completely without merit. In fact, the research shows that retirement itself is something of a mixed blessing.

There are clearly people who, due to their physical condition or the nature of their work, benefit from the opportunity to retire earlier rather than later. On average, however, retiring seems to lead to worse physical and mental health due to a reduction in activity and social connectedness. Beyond the narrow budgetary questions of retirement programs, there is clearly a large economic benefit to having able-bodied people work rather than not even if they are in their 60s or 70s. Rather than cut benefits for those who want to retire, America might consider cutting taxes on people who choose to continue working past retirement age. At the very least, the government shouldn’t actively discourage the elderly from participating in the labor market.

The main health benefits of continued work seem to accrue with part-time hours — it’s avoiding total inactivity, in other words — and for many people that may be the ideal situation. Part-time work gives the able-bodied elderly a continued connection to coworkers and a role in the national economy, while also generating additional free time to spend with grandchildren or on hobbies. The US should consider creating an active labor market program oriented toward connecting sixty- and seventy-something people with part-time job opportunities.

It may be boring to say that Republicans want to cut benefits and Democrats want to raise taxes, and that the best solution is some kind of bipartisan compromise that does a mix of the two. But realistically, the optimal policy probably involves tax increases smaller than Biden proposes paired with spending cuts more careful than Republicans suggest. At least both parties agree — one explicitly, one implicitly — that there is no place in this debate for Trump’s reckless indifference.


Friday, March 22, 2024

Donald Trump Isn't Running A Presidential Campaign. By Brian Beutler

It's a campaign for immunity from the law, and Democrats aren't doing nearly enough to counter it.



BRIAN BEUTLER

MAR 20, 2024

∙ PAID

(Photo by JIM WATSON/AFP via Getty Images)

Every now and again it’s fun to hold the unfiltered public comments of normal politicians up against the Donald Trump’s ravings on social media. “Merry Christmas” vs “Haters and Losers” etc.  


If you try that this week, you’ll find Trump completely unmoored from the calendar or any national circumstance. No good tidings for St. Patrick’s Day, no particular interest in federal policy. Trump’s mind has been neatly divided between his hallmark agitprop and unrelenting obsession with evading the nearly half-billion fine he owes the state of New York for serial business fraud. 


When you pan out even further it becomes clear: Trump is scarcely running a presidential campaign. He might become president in spite of this, but his efforts are overwhelmingly fixed on evading justice or mooting judgments he’s already lost by any means necessary. He’d ideally like to prevail in these efforts before the election, but the task will become much easier if he’s able to win or steal the presidency despite the legal peril.  


Take the biggest threats to him one by one, and a pattern quickly emerges: 


Trump is dedicating immense time and resources to rewriting the history of his lawbreaking. It’s reminiscent of his more successful bid to rewrite the findings of the Mueller report as “NO OBSTRUCTION! NO COLLUSION!” except now the legal process is much farther along, and he has no Bill Barr to do his dirty work for him. The approach is, thus, often clumsier. 


In Atlanta, where he faces a lengthy prison sentence for trying to steal Georgia’s electoral votes in 2020, he sent one of his co-conspirators rifling through the bedroom of Fulton County District Attorney Fani Willis. All the evidence of Trump’s crime remains, but he managed to derail the proceedings with a lengthy detour into Willis’s romantic relationship with a fellow prosecutor, who has since been dismissed from his role. On right-wing and social media the case has ceased to reflect any connection to Trump’s failed coup and has become synonymous instead with her sex life and her exasperated defense of her privacy and integrity. Here the damage to the rule of law may be real: The case has not reached jury selection yet, and the pool is now thoroughly tainted. 


Trump was set to begin trial in the New York hush money case this month, but was just awarded a delay of at least 30 days by the judge in the case after federal authorities in the Southern District of New York belatedly produced documents stemming from their own hush-money investigation to Trump’s defense team. At the very least, this hiccup is a product of Trump’s own dilatory tactics, according to the Manhattan district attorney’s office. But there may be more to the story—the judge has requested records of communications between Trump’s team and the notoriously Trumpy SDNY to investigate whether he colluded with his allies in law enforcement to delay this trial outside the bounds of legal process. 


In Florida, Trump barely has to exert himself at all. The judge in his classified-document theft case, Aileen Cannon, is one of his own appointees, and keeps doing undisguised favors for the defense. She may even be teeing up a plan to dismiss the charges against him (presumably in a conveniently-timed manner) before the trial even begins. Trump seldom comments on this case because his agent is overseeing it. 


Refer a friend


His other agents on the Supreme Court have delayed his federal January 6 trial until at least the summer, but Trump still brays about his claim to dictatorial immunity, because that’s his ticket to getting the case dismissed. Unlikely as that is, there’s a back up plan: He suspects that if the five most MAGA-aligned justices validate any sliver of his appeal, it’ll add another layer of delay to this trial, presumably until after the election.


Trump is already liable for assaulting and defaming E. Jean Carroll. But as he appeals the immense damages he owes her, he’s also filed a defamation suit against ABC News and This Week host George Stephanopoulos for asserting he’d been found liable of “rape” when under New York state law the term for what he did to Carroll is “sexual abuse.” This is Trump’s clunkiest effort of all, because his suit is probably unwinnable even if Trump draws a MAGA judge. Lewis Kaplan, the judge who presided over the Carroll trial, has explained repeatedly in official documents that the terms are synonymous. By fixating on Stephanopoulos, Trump will only draw further attention to the prior verdict. But winning a defamation case may be less important to Trump than intimidating other journalists out of describing him as a rapist, or using any variation on the word “rape” to describe his liability to Carroll. 


His current fixation on the civil-fraud judgment stems from the fact that he has been unable to post a surety bond from a legitimate financial institution to forestall Attorney General Letitia James from seizing his assets. He’s asked a New York appeals court for special treatment under the law, so that he might block James from collecting the fine while he appeals the verdict. But by Monday, he’ll be out of time. That explains the lashing out. It also strongly suggests Trump and people close to him are madly soliciting bribes—trading away campaign promises to shadowy U.S. billionaires or foreign nationals, so that he doesn’t lose Trump Tower. 


This is what the Trump campaign is. There’s scarcely room in his schedule for anything else. 


The problem is it could all work, particularly because his political opposition (not the judges and prosecutors he accuses of partisanship, but actual Democrats) aren’t drawing negative attention to his schemes in any systematic fashion. We could easily wake up in November to find the Fulton County trial hasn’t happened, the hush-money case delayed or on appeal, the document-theft case dismissed, the January 6 trial on hold, Trump’s history of rape sanded down, his private businesses secretly bailed out, and little public awareness of how he abused his wealth and power to escape or defer justice. 


This is where Democrats should come in. In all but the first of these cases—the Fulton County case—there’s a clear nexus to federal law or federal oversight, and thus an alternate means for Democrats to draw attention to Trump’s corruption even if he’s able to delay official legal proceedings. 


Senate Democrats and/or Attorney General Merrick Garland could pick up where the hush-money judge left off and mount a thorough inquiry of the MAGAfication of SDNY.  


Special Counsel Jack Smith has been both shrewd and patient with Cannon, and may be able to outmaneuver any play she might run to falsely exculpate Trump before November. But senators have a role here, too. They could make it clear to her that she won’t be getting a Supreme Court appointment if Trump loses—far from it, they can begin scrutinizing her background thoroughly now and reminding her judges can be impeached. They can bring Brian Butler, the Smith witness who just came forward with damning depictions of Trump’s obstruction and endangerment of state secrets, before a Senate committee of relevant jurisdiction. 


Leave a comment


They could (and should all along) have mounted a pressure campaign to define what the Supreme Court is doing to the January 6 case as partisan meddling on Trump’s behalf. They can also (and should also) hold hearings on legislation to establish the absence of dictatorial immunity—replete with reminders of all the violence Trump has already incited—and force Republicans to vote on it.


E. Jean Carroll (if she were willing) could testify before a Senate committee about Trump’s assault on her, why it matches the plain meaning of rape, and thus, why under federal law, what Stephanopoulos said wasn’t false at all, let alone defamatory.


If Trump posts a shady bond to save his New York properties, the Senate can and should dedicate enormous resources to figuring out who gave him the money and what they were promised. 


I applauded last week for offering a specific theory of why Joe Biden is trailing Donald Trump in the polls and when Biden supporters can expect him to pull ahead. 


Today, I really want to applaud him for breaking the campaign against Trump down economically into this easily digestible recitation.


Democrats place serene faith in the power of paid advertising to convey information like this, so much so that they devote almost no strategic thought into generating free media around these disqualifying liabilities. Meanwhile, everything Trump’s doing can be viewed as an effort to dodge the free-media penalty of being a criminal, a rapist, and a fraud. 


Perhaps Democrats think news coverage of these proceedings is enough free media to do the trick. If so, they should take notice: Trump was held liable for rape (sorry, sexual abuse) and most people do not know! His lawyers, trying to get him off the hook for January 6 said his dictatorial immunity would allow him to assassinate his political opponents without risk of criminal prosecution, and most people have no idea that this is the power he seeks. 


These questions are ripe for congressional input. Invoking Article I power would draw attention to Trump’s degeneracy in a more organic fashion than any TV ad or stump speech, because it’d be woven into the legislative agenda, instead of the four corners of the presidential campaign—the kinds of definitionally partisan communications that reporters are loathe to cover credulously for fear of conveying favoritism.


Or they can let Trump have all the agency here, then stomp their feet when he gets his way and wins the election without a thorough airing of his crimes. 


Thursday, March 21, 2024

Nothing Biden Does Can Remove Netanyahu. BY Anshel Pfeffer

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is incapable of taking responsibility for October 7 and has no intention of ever resigning. Until his rivals in the Knesset get their act together, no outside pressure will get him out of office


US President Joe Biden meets Israeli Prime Minster Benjamin Netanyahu in Tel Aviv in October.

US President Joe Biden meets Israeli Prime Minster Benjamin Netanyahu in Tel Aviv in October.Credit: EyePress Newsvia Reuters Connect

Anshel Pfeffer

Joe Biden is rightly frustrated with Benjamin Netanyahu. The American president has supported Israel to the hilt since October 7 and in return Netanyahu has turned down all of Biden's requests that Israel take more care in avoiding civilian casualties in Gaza, allow more humanitarian aid in, and work towards at least a temporary ceasefire.

Despite all that, Biden's support for Israel remains solid. Instead of cutting off arms supplies or ending the U.S. veto on UN Security Council resolutions imposing a ceasefire on Israel, he is trying to target Netanyahu, just Netanyahu. So far, he has openly encouraged senior Democratic figures like Chuck Schumer and Nancy Pelosi, known for their support for Israel, to openly criticize the prime minister and urge Israelis to replace him.

This may be an outlet for the president's frustrations, but it will not help end Netanyahu's premiership any sooner. The only realistic way to get rid of Netanyahu is by dissolving the Knesset and holding early elections, and the Biden administration has no influence over the internal parliamentary machinations that can make that happen.

Foreign observers, even those who are close allies, like Biden, who know a bit about Israel, are still surprised that Netanyahu is hanging on. It should indeed beggar belief that a man who is not only responsible for the strategy that led Israel into the worst and most tragic debacle of its history, is still in office, exacerbated by the fact that according to every poll, an overwhelming majority of Israelis, including most of those who voted for the parties of his coalition just sixteen months ago see him as responsible. But it is totally believable when that man is Netanyahu.

Netanyahu is incapable of either feeling shame or taking responsibility. He sees himself as the ultimate victim of October 7, the strong and righteous leader let down by idiots and traitors. He has no intention of ever resigning on his own accord.

Even though many in his coalition of fascists and fundamentalists will tell you in private that Netanyahu is responsible, they also know that they will never again have a prime minister prepared to award them massive chunks of power and billions of shekels in taxpayers money simply to be prime minister. They read the polls as well and know that this is not an opportunity that will recur in their political careers, and they aren't about to end their time in a government where they can dictate their terms to a beleaguered prime minister even a day earlier than they need to.

פותחת 

And as long as the coalition's majority remains intact, the Knesset can't be dissolved and early elections can't be held. The Biden administration has no control over that.

That doesn't mean that there is no chance of dissolving the Knesset and bringing the elections forward. It isn't inconceivable that the five rebels necessary to bring down the government can be found from among the original coalition of 64, or that one of the parties of the coalition will break away, perhaps over the terms of the hostage agreement or due to the Supreme Court forcing the government to start drafting Haredi students and cutting funds to their yeshivot.

Those scenarios are plausible, but Netanyahu, who has dealt with more coalition crises than anyone, will find his way to delay and prevaricate, with the help of his patsy Knesset Speaker Amir Ohana, who will certainly block any no confidence votes during the Passover recess. Any serious move to dissolve the Knesset is unlikely before late May, when the Knesset reconvenes, at the earliest.

And even when that happens, for a dissolution vote to succeed, there has to be a serious parliamentary strategist handling it. Someone who can take on Netanyahu's machine.

Netanyahu's self-inflated image as a serial election winner is, of course, a myth. He may have won more Israeli elections than any other party leader, but that is only because he's fought many more elections than anyone else. He's had more than his fair share of losses and ties as well. What the losses he's suffered all have in common that they were engineered by parliamentarians who could anticipate his moves and build alternative majorities.

Three of those – Ehud Barak who ended Netanyahu's first term in 1999, Ariel Sharon who kept him out of the prime minister's office in the early 2000s and Ehud Olmert, who served Netanyahu his worst electoral defeat in 2006 – are now retired, dead or disgraced.

The two other men who bested Netanyahu are Avigdor Lieberman who pulled out of Netanyahu's prospective coalition at the last moment in 2019, denying him a majority and forcing a series of tied elections, and Yair Lapid who, in 2021, formed the "government of change" coalition by coming up with the master-stroke of offering Naftali Bennett the job of prime minister, prizing him away from the Netanyahu camp.

But Lapid now, despite being officially the Leader of the Opposition, has no control over the other opposition parties, especially with his party Yesh Atid languishing in the polls and Lieberman, whose Yisrael Beitenu party is actually going up in the polls, is biding his time. His official position is that this isn't yet the moment to hold an election, with the war still ongoing.

Another top political operator, Gideon Sa'ar, who in the past orchestrated the downfall of governments when he was still Netanyahu's lieutenant, was until last week in an uneasy alliance with Benny Gantz. This week he finally broke the partnership, and is now the leader of his own tiny party of four MKs. He is waiting for his moment as well, but it has yet to come.

Gantz, the man who would be prime minister if an election were held right now, is no political strategist. His success in the polls is due to his image now as being both an opposition to Netanyahu and at the same time willing to serve under him in the emergency war cabinet. He embodies the impossible Israeli aspiration for a feeling of national unity at wartime, despite Netanyahu not suspending his own divisive and poisonous smear campaigns for a minute.

But Gantz, and the senior administration officials he met recently in Washington who have only started to understand this, has got neither the stomach for another bruising political fight with Netanyahu nor the strategic smarts to outmaneuver him. Gantz may become the next prime minister of Israel, but he won't engineer the birth of the elections that will make that happen. Someone else will have to do that for him.

Lapid, Lieberman and Sa'ar could together topple Netanyahu. They know how to marshal MKs from disparate parties into voting together, how to sniff out defectors and bring them over to their side. And most crucially, they know Netanyahu, how he thinks and operates.

But since they all have their own parties' interests in mind and are in no rush to make Gantz, whom none of them rate very highly, the next prime minister, they have yet to choose their moment. When they do, and only then, can we start speaking seriously about an early election taking place.

Until then, Biden is not only wasting his time by targeting Netanyahu, he's probably helping him to portray himself as the brave leader standing up for Israel against the entire hostile world.


Tuesday, March 19, 2024

The police are in the wrong places. Matthew Yglesias

 

The police are in the wrong places

We should send the cops to where the crimes are

A standard progressive complaint about K-12 education policy is that reliance on local property tax revenue creates an inequitable situation where the poorest communities have the smallest budget to hire teachers. This is, in practice, pretty outdated. States have changed their funding formulas significantly, so the biggest gaps these days are between high-spending and low-spending states, not between rich communities and poor communities within a particular state.

One area where things really do work that way, though, is policing.

Criminal law is mostly written by state legislatures, who decide which activities are crimes and what the rules of procedure in their court system will be. States set sentencing guidelines, and states run prisons. But actually enforcing the law is left up to county sheriff’s departments and the local police departments of incorporated towns or cities. This setup even allows for things like private police departments, often run by universities, which can have full powers of arrest. There are strengths and weaknesses to this model of localism, but the upshot is that policing resources are allocated largely by ability to pay rather than by any effort to assess actual policing needs. This raises fairness concerns, but also real questions of crowding out.

The Los Angeles Police Department, like many police departments these days, is falling short of its recruiting goals. Raises and signing bonuses have helped close the gap, but there are limited funds available for that kind of thing. Even if zero additional dollars were allocated to Los Angeles, if the police departments in Santa Monica and Beverly Hills and other rich suburban towns were to cut the size of their forces, that would mechanically make it easier for the LAPD to hire officers.

As I wrote last spring, even looking at the District of Columbia, where there are no questions about local funding, it seems like there are too many police officers working in low-crime rich neighborhoods and too few working in high-crime areas. If the topic at hand were anything other than policing, this would be seen as a clear social and economic injustice. And what I want to observe here is that precisely because the people who like to talk about inequality tend not acknowledge the impact of policing on crime, they’ve actually allowed a dramatically more inequitable situation to arise with regard to the distribution of law enforcement resources than we would put up with in almost any other area.

Baltimore is underpoliced

As I have complained on many occasions, the state of crime and law enforcement data in the United States is deplorable. If you want to know the answer to a question like “how many people were murdered in Maryland last year,” you can’t find out on a reasonable timeframe.

But if you go back to 2021, the last year for which the full FBI dataset is available, there were 709 homicides in the state of Maryland. Of those 709, nearly half happened in the City of Baltimore. The good news is Baltimore had a huge murder drop in 2023, but there’s no statewide numbers from 2023, so we’re stuck with the outdated data. The point is that back in 2021, a city with fewer than 600,000 residents (out of a state population of over six million) had a huge share of the murders. It’s harder to get reliable information on total shootings and other crimes. But I think it’s safe to say that murder volumes generally track with the overall volume of gun-related crimes, and that use of deadly force is almost always a symptom of other kinds of crime problems.

That’s all just statistical confirmation of what we all know from broad stereotypes: Maryland is a very rich, predominantly suburban state, and Baltimore is a low-income, high-crime city.

So what about police resources in the state of Maryland? Well, using BLS figures, the Baltimore Police Department employs about 30 percent of the state’s cops.

That’s a bit of an understatement of the real numbers, since some state police officers do work in Baltimore and there are some Maryland Transit Authority cops in the city, too. But it’s as close as we can come to a good estimate, and it can’t be off by nearly enough to account for the gap between Baltimore’s share of cops and Baltimore’s share of shootings.

If policing were a purely state-run function, it would be a no-brainer to reallocate personnel to the places where they’re most needed. You’d have more beat cops in Charm City crime hotspots and more detectives to keep working on unclosed murders before new cases force them off the docket. In exchange, response times for mostly not-that-important calls in the suburbs would go up. This would be a more fair result, and it would also lead to substantive improvements across the state. The downside is crime would probably go up in the jurisdictions with fewer cops. But you’d be trading a decline from a high base rate of crime against an increase from a low base rate, generating less overall crime. The state of Maryland as a whole, meanwhile, has a housing affordability problem. But Baltimore itself is cheaper. And beyond being cheaper, Baltimore has a lot of buildable land. Across much of Maryland, demand for housing is high, but it’s difficult or impossible to get permission to build. But in Baltimore, the city is planning to spend millions of dollars to try to deal with tens of thousands of vacant buildings and vacant lots. A large, sustained decline in crime would make the private sector eager to take those lots and buildings and invest in them — generating economic growth and tax revenue for the whole state.

Meanwhile, though cities and suburbs do face short-term tradeoffs, in the longer run it’s better to be a suburb of a thriving city than of a dying one. Reducing Baltimore crime, raising Baltimore housing demand, and snapping the cycle of population flight and economic decline would benefit everyone.

Lots of states are like this

Unfortunately, the relevant data in this space is fragmentary, outdated, and a little annoying to work with, so it’s hard to do the analysis for every state. Instead, we picked five states — Maryland, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, and Georgia — that contain one-and-only-one large city. For those states we did a simplified comparison: What share of the state’s cops work in the one big city, and what share of the state’s murders happen in the one big city? We’ve got two blue states on the list, a red one, and two purple ones.

And we see the same pattern everywhere.

Obviously, characterizing the situation in a state like Texas, California, or Florida with multiple large cities would be more complicated. And then you have states like South Dakota with no big cities. Or states like Massachusetts where the one big city is unusually safe. So there are plenty of complications. But I think that what we see in those five states is a good rule of thumb for understanding the distribution of law enforcement resources in the United States. It’s pretty typical to have a central city that is relatively large, but poorer than its suburbs and with below-average income for the state. That city typically suffers from high crime and employs more cops per capita than the average jurisdiction, creating a large burden on taxpayers. But despite the burden of paying for all those cops, the large city is underpoliced compared to other jurisdictions in the state.

To an extent, that’s just a distributive tug of war — of course voters in the suburbs don’t want to pay for policing in Chicago and Detroit.

But there’s a real efficiency cost here. According to Aaron Chalfin and Justin McCrary, there’s an elasticity of murder with respect to police department size of -0.27 — in other words, you would expect a 10% increase in the size of a city’s policy force to generate a 2.7% decline in the number of murders. That means that especially in places like Louisiana where the distribution of officers is wildly unequal, you could generate a decrease in the total number of murders without spending any money by reallocating officers to where the crime is.

The larger dynamic, though, is that in most of these cases, I think quality of life issues in the central city are an important drag on the overall statewide economy. Most people don’t particularly want to live in central cities, but they usually do want to live near central cities, which aren’t just destinations for commuters but anchors for regional institutions like airports, hospitals, sports teams, and museums. I don’t think it’s a total coincidence that Georgia as a whole is growing more rapidly than the other four states, with the City of Atlanta growing as its suburbs also grow.

A “normal” inequality

This all seems pretty banal to me.

There are, unfortunately, many cases in which the structure of local government leads to underinvestment in services that benefit low-income communities — especially when the communities in question are largely African-American. Part of the reason that the inequality is unusually bad when it comes to law enforcement services is that the tradition of hyper-localism is much more deeply entrenched than it is even in areas like education and land use. If policing in Louisiana were a state function, I think it would strike almost everyone as immediately obvious that allocating officers the way they do doesn’t make sense. But it’s not a state function, so in a place with stark partisan sorting and racial polarization, you get the mentality that the job of policing is to contain crime in New Orleans rather than improve statewide public safety. This leaves Louisiana as a persistently very high-crime state with a very high incarceration rate, because they are massively underinvesting in prevention.

But the flip side is that while it’s not shocking to find public services under-provided to marginalized communities, you don’t have the typical patterns of objection to this typical pattern of inequality.

One reason for that is that on both the right and the left, we see persistent confusion between the case for proactive policing and the case for racial profiling. White conservatives push, both explicitly and implicitly, to have more racial discrimination in police conduct, which they try to justify as addressing valid conservatives. Black people respond negatively to that idea, as I think anyone would. But “police shouldn’t do racial discrimination” and “police shouldn’t do anything” are different ideas. When I was a kid in New York, my friends and I got picked up by the cops for drinking beer on a park bench, and then we got stopped by truant officers while we were cutting school to show up for our court appointment. The officers in both cases probably could have correctly guessed based on racial stereotyping that we were not carrying concealed handguns and didn’t have outstanding warrants for violent crimes. But the right way to implement a “quality of life” policing surge is to enforce the rules evenhandedly, not to racially discriminate.

The other thing, though, is that criminal justice reform groups got it into their heads at some point that policing drives “mass incarceration,” which they oppose. This is an analytic error that has driven a lot of bad policy. When you increase the odds of detection, people commit fewer crimes, and you end up incarcerating fewer people. There are privacy rights arguments against things like surveillance cameras, DNA databases, and other things that make it easier to catch people who’ve committed crimes, but this stuff reduces incarceration. Chalfin and Jacob Kaplan have a paper showing this specifically with regard to police staffing, but it’s a pretty general point.

One way to think about the case for reallocation, in fact, is that it sets a virtuous cycle in motion. In Period I, the more efficient allocation of policing resources drives overall crime down (even though it does go up in some places), which reduces incarceration and saves money. Then in Period II, those fiscal savings can be put into additional policing to compensate places that lost officers in Period I. You end up with less crime everywhere, more police officers and fewer prison guards, less incarceration, and a larger legitimate labor force.