Saturday, December 30, 2023

Last mailbag of 2023. By Matthew Yglesias


www.slowboring.com

17 - 21 minutes

The stretch between Christmas and New Year’s is always a slow news week, but a few good and noteworthy things have happened. Moderna’s mRNA cancer vaccine turns out to be more effective than previously known. Zepbound is similar to, but even more effective than, Ozempic. And we’ve got a ceasefire in the destructive-but-little-noticed conflict in eastern Congo.

Now to questions!

Marie Kennedy: Thoughts on the “Substackers Against Nazis” debacle? I don’t believe I saw your name on either open letter- is this a post-Harpers letter philosophy to avoid open letters, or no one asked you, or you just don’t have a strong opinion either way?

One lesson I learned from that Harpers experience is that you should be very careful what you sign. But as you can see, I’m not out here demanding that Substack deplatform anybody, which means that I am, on some level, in alignment with Elle Griffin’s “Substack shouldn’t decide what we read” letter, though I don’t endorse 100 percent of what she wrote.

Something that I hope Substack will think seriously about going forward is the very real tension between their desire to be seen as a content-agnostic software vendor and their desire to create useful network effects. Nobody does takes like “Microsoft Word has a Nazi problem” or “Ikea shouldn’t sell office furniture to companies.” There are lots of companies out there selling products that are very generically useful, which includes being useful to bad people. If a company told me proudly that they were the preferred desk provider of Nazis, I’d find that incredibly disturbing and off-putting. But the reality is that Nazis probably buy desks from normal mainstream companies, and it wouldn’t make a lot of sense to try to get America’s furniture companies to try to deplatform Nazis. Substack is mostly like that — a software product that I find useful and so do lots of people who have lots of different political opinions, potentially including Nazi opinions.

But it’s not entirely like that.

Substack does a lot of little things like recommendations and leaderboards to try to make the platform more valuable and lucrative. And I like that, in the sense that I certainly want to maximize the readership of Slow Boring. But it does get you into a conversation in which it’s hard to just plead pure neutrality. What if an overtly white supremacist site were number two on the politics leaderboard? That’s a bad look. So I’m not saying Substack should be trying to deplatform Nazis. But Substack should also constantly be trying to make business and product decisions that are consistent with their desire to be doing minimal content moderation.

Lost Future: What should US-Cuba policy be these days? As I vaguely understand it, relations warmed a bit under Obama, obviously cooled under Trump, and then Biden has loosened things a bit since then but maybe not gone full Obama. They are somehow still a semi-functioning autocratic country, 70+ years after the revolution. Let's assume Biden wins and now no longer has to worry about winning Florida again- how should the US approach our relationship with Cuba?

While the electoral calculus around Cuba has changed, this doesn’t mean the politics are irrelevant.

Any opening to Cuba that Biden could make would likely be reversed under a Republican administration, and because the Cubans are aware of that, they won’t be willing to make any significant concessions — and because the Cubans will be hesitant to make concessions, Biden would have a hard time coming up with a deal that either Congress or the American public would find appealing.

Beyond that, the big problem in US-Cuba relations is that at this point, it’s really a conflict about nothing. If you go way back to the origins of the dispute, it’s about Cold War geopolitics. The American government had a plausible fear that Fidel Castro would align Cuba with the Soviet Union, which led the United States to take anti-Castro actions that only increased Castro’s inclination to align with the Soviet Union. Under the circumstances, while it would have been very difficult to improve US-Cuba relations, it’s also clear what an improvement would have looked like: Cuba would have disavowed the Soviet alliance, and in exchange, the United States would treat Cuba like any other country.

The problem is that the conflict has gone on for so long (outlasting the Soviet Union itself by more than thirty years!) that the United States is now really dug in on the fundamentals of regime change. But while it’s true that the Castro regime is bad, that can’t really be the basis of the policy. The United States has perfectly normal trade and diplomatic relationships with lots of bad regimes. The human rights concerns and so forth aren’t fake, but there’s an element of bad faith to it. What we would like is for the Cuban government to not be anti-American. But what does that mean in concrete terms these days? We want them to say nice things about Israel? To send weapons to Ukraine? That wouldn’t amount to very much. I do think the key, though, is really to drop the pretense that we are arguing about Communism or human rights and try to zero-in on geopolitics. The foundation of America’s steadily improving relationship with Vietnam is a shared understanding that the point of an improving relationship is a mutual interest in checking China.

Just Some Guy: Weird hypothetical: a deadly tropical cyclone is headed for North Sentinel Island. What should the rest of the world do?

Per the discussion in comments, I’m not really sure a cyclone would be so bad for the Sentinelese because they’re not dependent on infrastructure that would be destroyed in a storm.

But the spirit of the exercise, I take it, is to generate something like a Prime Directive dilemma from Star Trek. Suppose we know with our advanced technology that the Sentinel Islands are doomed and we have the ability to save them, but the only way to do so involves breaking their isolation. I guess this doesn’t seem like that hard of a question to me. As things stand, upholding their desire to be left alone seems like the correct choice, but I don’t think there’s any incredible moral weight behind the issue of uncontactedness, per se. If they’re all going to die, you come in and save them.

Sean O: With you being in LA this week, the Rose Parade and Rose Bowl are coming up, and both prominently feature a B2 flyover. Whenever there is a public display of America’s awesome military technology, I see a lot of complaints online that are like “This is why I don't have healthcare.” How true is this? How much, if any, does America's military spending crowd out spending on healthcare? On the flipside, how much does Europe's relatively low military spending allow them to spend more on healthcare?

Specifically with regard to healthcare, it’s completely wrong. European countries’ relatively low military spending doesn’t explain anything about their ability to spend more on healthcare because they don’t spend more on health care. What they do is use price controls to push the unit cost of healthcare services much lower than what we pay in the United States, which makes it more feasible to finance a very large proportion of the spending out of explicit tax revenue.

What’s true is that over and above universal health care, European countries generally have more generous social safety nets, including better Unemployment Insurance and some form of a child allowance. Cutting back on military spending would make it easier for the USA to copy that. Though even so, I think semi-principled resistance to the idea of giving money to non-workers is probably a larger stumbling block than scrounging up the money.

Jeremy K: Your post about the number of period pieces coming out lately got me wondering, what movies set in the past do you think use their setting most effectively? Do they have anything in common in terms of the way they deal with the past? Is there an approach to historical movies that you find generally effective, or is it purely a case-by-case thing?

Since I wrote that piece, I’ve seen three more movies set in the past — “The Holdovers,” “Maestro,” and “Ferrari” — and one thing this clarified for me is that I should have distinguished a little more clearly between fictional stories set in the past and historical stories, which is what a lot of distinguished directors have been churning out lately.

“The Holdovers” frankly just doesn’t have a lot of the problems that have been annoying me about the historical movie trend because it’s something that the filmmakers made up. Alexander Payne decided he wanted to do a movie set in a prep school and he’d read a television pilot about a prep school that David Hemingson had written, so Payne reached out to Hemingson to collaborate and Hemingson reworked his ideas into a feature film. Because it’s made up, you can just invent facts that tell a story. Barton Academy has a bunch of alumni who fought in the world wars, but just one who fought in Vietnam — a poor Black kid who only went there because his mother ran the cafeteria and who had to enlist because he couldn’t afford college tuition and who died overseas. That’s laying it on a bit thick in terms of pounding home the point about the American elite’s shifting relationship to military service, but that’s the power of fiction: You make up the plot points to tell the story that you want to tell. Paul Giamatti’s character has a lazy eye and Fish Odor Syndrome because they wrote him that way. And it’s crafted so that you get the exposition you need about the setting, and the stuff you don’t know isn’t important.

By contrast, a big chunk of the dramatic stakes in “Ferrari” revolves around a business deal they are trying to close but which the movie leaves unresolved in an odd way. The reason it’s not resolved is history — the movie is set in 1957, but in reality, Fiat’s major investment in Ferrari doesn’t happen until 1969. That’s bad writing to have the deal neither be consummated nor definitively collapse. Except it’s not “bad writing,” it’s history. It just happens to be the case that relatively few actual historical events have the level of intentionality and sound plotting of a well-written story. I liked “Tár” a lot better than “Maestro” in part because I appreciated the contemporary setting, but mostly because all the made-up stuff happens happens for a reason.

So I don’t think period pieces are bad. But I do think Hollywood needs to think harder about taking on these specifically historical projects. Why are we telling these stories? Are we illuminating something people don’t know? Are we deliberately mythologizing certain figures to make a point? It’s not that this can’t be done well, but a lot of historical movies I’ve seen recently seemed to me to be leaning on “well, that’s what happened” in lieu of real creative intention.

With all that said, the original point I wanted to make wasn’t that there’s anything bad about period films or fantastical settings. But I do think something is missing when that’s all we get.

I liked “The Holdovers” a lot and don’t have any problem with it. But it’s still true that back in 1999, when Alexander Payne made a movie set in a high school, he made a movie set in a high school in the late 1990s. Now, nearly 25 years later, he’s gone back in time. Which is fine, but I think it’s important to have some skilled people working with real budgets and talent focused on telling some stories set in the present. A friend of mine suggested that people shy away from the present less because they hate smartphones than because they are trying to dodge political criticism of various kinds. You set a movie in Italy in the 1950s and you can have people going on about “he deserves an heir” and bankers conspiring with their clients to keep a mistress secret, and that’s just how it was back in the day. If Michael Mann were to set a movie in the present, then whatever point of view his characters seemed to have about gender roles would displease someone or other and we’d be arguing about it.

That’s a kind of annoyingly plausible theory, but I think it also speaks to why it’s a shame. Part of what’s great about art is it can illustrate human complexity with more nuance than a tweet or a column. And I want to see writers and directors and actors attempt to portray human characters who deal with contemporary realities.

Brian: Thoughts on Mickey Mouse's upcoming release into the public domain.

For context: Congress did several rounds of retroactively extending copyright term length, with Disney heavily involved in the lobbying and a purported desire to prevent “Steamboat Willie” from falling into the public domain an allegedly important motivator for them.

That was really bad public policy, I am glad congress isn’t doing it anymore, and I welcome Steamboat Willie’s arrival. But the actual implications of this, I think, are pretty modest. Mickey Mouse remains under copyright in all his other works, and Disney has lots of lawyers who will try to sue anyone who attempts to commercialize the character outside of some very narrow contexts. Which is all fine — it’s part of the reason the retroactive extensions were such a bad idea.

Charles Ryder: Any thoughts on NYC vs LA? It's a very broad topic, I know, but you are something of an expert on urban America (and you grew up in Manhattan).

The differences between New York and LA are so vast that in a lot of ways it feels pointless to compare. What I’m more struck by is the differences between LA and Chicago, because Chicago is also really large and geographically amorphous but has a totally different form of urban organization.

The key thing about Chicago is the Loop. Of course, most people in Chicagoland don’t live in the City of Chicago, most of them don’t work in the Loop, and most of them probably only rarely even visit. But it’s still true that (at least pre-Covid) there was a very, very large share of the metro area’s total employment within the relatively small confines of the Loop. Which in turn meant that even in a metro area that’s in some ways incredibly sprawling and car oriented, there were lots of people commuting by train specifically to downtown office jobs and supportive retail. And then not only is the Loop small and dense, but key attractions like the Field Museum, the Art Institute, and the Miracle Mile are directly adjacent to it. Spending all this time in Hyde Park at the beginning of the year felt really odd because you are very much not having the canonical Chicago experience.

By contrast, LA doesn’t really have a canonical experience. It has a downtown (where we’ve been staying) that certainly has hotels and office buildings and municipal functions and the Lakers. But the movie business is a really big deal in Los Angeles and the movie studios aren’t here. The beach is a really big deal in Los Angeles, and the beach is really far from here. Unlike in most cities, the fancy neighborhoods aren’t particularly well-located for rich corporate decision-makers to commute to downtown. If anything, it’s the opposite and rich decision-makers have pulled office jobs out of downtown to be accessible to their preferred westside residential locations. There are lots of different LA neighborhoods that have hotels in them (though not the neighborhood my sister-in-law and her wife live in, which is part of how we ended up downtown), and there are lots of different tourist attractions (Griffith Observatory! Expo Park! Walk of Fame!) all around in different places.

The result is a city that I think is a bit less than the sum of its parts, but then compensates for bad logistics by having what’s obviously dramatically nicer weather than Chicago. But it’s a lot of great parts!

John E: In 1995, the Senate came one vote short of passing a balanced budget amendment (would require a 2/3 vote in both house and Senate to run a deficit during the year).

If that had passed, it probably is a bad thing...but maybe not? Every tax cut passed after that probably gets repealed or not passed. There is probably sufficient votes to pass stimulus in 2009 and 2020, but since everyone knows it will be really hard to pass additional stimulus there is a bigger impetus to do one really big push. Matt has mentioned that politics got so weird because budgeting stopped mattering and we just paid for everything with more debt. This would have forced most attention back to the budget and avoided that.

I think you’re really underselling the difficulty here. The US was running substantial budget deficits all during George W. Bush’s term in office, which was often for bad reasons (like invading Iraq) but was reasonably well-suited to an environment in which interest rates were pretty low and the labor market was pretty weak.

Charles Ryder: Should Claudine Gay resign?

On one level, sure. The job of the president of the university is to make the university look good, make donors happy, and make it easier for everyone else to do their jobs, and she is not currently succeeding in that role.

Beyond that, I have no idea what she values or cares about. I guess my advice to her if she wants to hold onto her job would be to forge an alliance with prominent reformist faculty like Steven Pinker and ex-president Larry Summers and pitch herself as the ideal person to help chart a new course.

I will say that it was as a result of this whole controversy that I came to read Gay’s 2013 paper, “Knowledge Matters: Policy cross-pressures and Black Partisanship” which I think previewed a lot of themes that we’ve explored in Slow Boring in posts like “Black Democrats are Moderate,” “The Misinformation Cope,” “Progressives’ Mobilization Delusion,” “Should Democrats Talk More About Their Values,” and elsewhere.

Which is just to say that there her research contains much of the information you’d need to predict that the style of left-on-everything intersectional politics that’s moved from academia into the nonprofit world into electoral politics doesn’t work, including with many of the voters it’s supposed to appeal to.

Friday, December 29, 2023

Matti Friedman: The Wisdom of Hamas


A demonstration against the Israeli bombardment in Gaza on December 23 in Istanbul, Turkey. (lker Eray via Getty Images)
They understand the war they’re fighting. Many in the West still don’t.

JERUSALEM — In the days after Hamas terrorists invaded Israel on October 7, triggering the current war in Gaza, many believed that Hamas had erred. The word “miscalculation” recurred in news analysis and in statements from Israeli leaders. People here in Israel were galvanized into action by the massacre. Western governments responded with shock and revulsion. The civilians of Gaza were staring at a looming catastrophe. Hamas was in for it now! What were they thinking? 

But as I write nearly three months later, with several acquaintances dead in battle and one still held hostage in Gaza, it’s easier to understand what Hamas leaders were thinking. Indeed, it’s increasingly worth considering the possibility that they weren’t wrong. 

In many ways, Hamas understood the world better than we Israelis did. The men who came across the border, and those who sent them, may have grasped the current state of the West better than many Westerners. More than anything, they understood the war they’re fighting when many of us didn’t—and still don’t.

Some aspects of Hamas’s success are easy to see, like the behavior of the Western press. After dealing with reporters through many rounds of violence since coming to power in Gaza in 2007, Hamas understood that most can be co-opted or coerced, and that coverage of Gaza would reliably focus on civilian casualties, obscuring the cause of the war, portraying Israel’s military operations as atrocities, and thus pressuring Israel to stop fighting.

This may have seemed unlikely in the first few days after October 7, when the shock of Hamas’s barbarism was fresh. But it happened, as we’ve seen in a recent rash of stories containing variations on the claim that this war is one of the worst in history and that responsibility lies with Israel. 

Hamas also knew that when faced with heartbreaking images of civilian death, some Western leaders would eventually buckle and blame the Israelis, helping Hamas live to attack another day. It took about five weeks before this happened to Emmanuel Macron of France (“These babies, these ladies, these old people are bombed and killed. So there is no reason for that and no legitimacy”) and Canada’s Justin Trudeau (“The world is witnessing this killing of women, of children, of babies. This has to stop.”)

And Hamas knew that the international organizations that bankroll Gaza, like the United Nations, having mostly turned a blind eye to Hamas’s vast military buildup at their expense (and, in some cases, on their property), would focus their fury at Israel alone and do their best to blunt the consequences of Hamas’s actions. 

All of this shows not a miscalculation by Hamas, but an admirable grasp of reality. 

Getting at Hamas’s understanding of what’s going on, and at our own misunderstanding, means asking what the Hamas war is. It’s this question that will help us begin to solve one of the core mysteries of October 7: namely, why a historic massacre of Jews, even before the Israeli response got underway, triggered a powerful wave of hostility not toward the attackers—but toward Jews.


In press coverage, including countless articles I wrote myself in my years working for the international press, the Palestinians are said to be seeking an independent state and freedom from Israeli rule. The Palestinian Authority, affiliated with Fatah, is portrayed as the more responsible actor in Palestinian politics, but Hamas still appears in the context of the same story and the same shared goal.

But this isn’t what Hamas, an acronym for the Islamic Resistance Movement, says about itself. They don’t portray their war as limited to one of Palestinians against Israelis, and in Arabic don’t necessarily use the term “Israel” or “Israelis.” Hamas explicitly understands itself as part of a war that is religious in nature and global in scope, one in which the enemy is the Jews. In this war, they understand themselves to have many allies across the world. And here, too, it’s quite clear they’re right. 

Reasonable Western people—the kind of people who grew up in friendly cities under the Pax Americana of the late 20th century, as I did—always tended to see fragments of the broader war and not the whole picture. We might have noticed a spray-painted swastika here, an anti-Israel boycott there, a synagogue shooting by a Pennsylvania gunman, a Molotov cocktail hurled at a Montreal school, the odd statement from former leaders of countries like France (“heavy financial domination of the media and the worlds of art and music”) and Malaysia (“Jews are ruling the world by proxy”). But the tendency has been to see these all as unrelated data points, rather than an illustration of the disturbing fact that hundreds of millions of people around the world, perhaps billions, believe themselves to be in conflict in some way with Jews. 

These range from much of the populations of countries like Indonesia (where there are no Jews, but where two-thirds of those polled agreed that “people hate Jews because of the way Jews behave”), to members of British labor unions, socialists in places like Colombia and Venezuela, Russian nationalists and many of their sworn enemies among Ukrainian nationalists, professors and students in the American Ivy League, ideologues and influencers in China, and clerics in mosques from Sana’a to Sydney. 

The October 7 attack and its aftermath have finally brought the disparate elements of this struggle against Jews to the surface, its participants surging into the streets and onto social media—suggesting that Hamas knew something important about the world that many of us didn’t see, or didn’t want to. 


When I was a reporter for an international news agency at the time of the Hamas takeover in Gaza in 2007, I discovered that it was impolitic to mention what Hamas clearly announced in its founding charter from 1988: Namely, that “our struggle against the Jews is very great and very serious,” and the Jews were “behind the French Revolution, the Communist revolution and most of the revolutions we heard and hear about, here and there. With their money they formed secret societies, such as Freemasons, Rotary Clubs, the Lions, and others in different parts of the world for the purpose of sabotaging societies and achieving Zionist interests.” 

This didn’t sound like “Free Palestine.” But as a rule, on the rare occasions that Western news organizations felt compelled to mention the document, they left those parts out. 

The historical examples from the charter suggest that in the war against Judaism, the ideologues of Hamas understand themselves to be operating in a broad coalition and carrying on a long tradition. This is true. “Islam and National Socialism are close to each other in the struggle against Judaism,” Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the mufti of Jerusalem and one of the fathers of the Palestinian national movement, said in 1944. This was in a speech to members of an SS division he helped raise, made up of Bosnian Muslims. “Nearly a third of the Qur’an deals with the Jews. It has demanded that all Muslims watch the Jews and fight them wherever they find them,” he said, an idea that would reappear four decades later in the Hamas charter. When the mufti testified before a British commission of inquiry in 1929, he quoted The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, the Tsarist forgery describing a global Jewish conspiracy, which is also the source for parts of the Hamas charter and remains popular across the Middle East. (I once found the book for sale at a good shop near the American University of Beirut.) The Hamas army, known as the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, is named for one of the mufti’s most famous proteges.

The movement became savvy enough to water down its charter a few years ago, but its leaders have remained honest about their intent. “You have Jews everywhere,” one former Hamas minister, Fathi Hammad, shouted to a crowd in 2019, “and we must attack every Jew on the globe by way of slaughter and killing, with God’s will.” 

In the liberal West, no sane person would own up to believing The Protocols. (At least not yet; things are moving fast.) But an Italian can hold a prominent U.N. job, for example, after saying she believes a “Jewish lobby” controls America, and you can hold a tenured position at the best universities in the West if you believe that the only country on earth that must be eliminated is the Jewish one. 

My experience in the Western press corps was that sympathy for Hamas was not just real but often more substantial than sympathy for Jews. In Europe and North America, as we’ve now seen on the streets and on campuses, many on the progressive left have arrived at an ideology positing that one of the world’s most pressing problems is the State of Israel—a country that has come to be seen as the embodiment of the evils of the racist, capitalist West, if not as the world’s only “apartheid” state, that being a modern synonym for evil. 

Jews could no longer officially be hated because of their ethnicity or religion, but can legitimately be hated as supporters of “apartheid” and as the embodiment of “privilege.” The pretense that this is a critique of Israel’s military tactics, or sincere desire for a two-state solution, has now largely been dropped. 

A recent poll suggested that about two-thirds of Americans between the ages of 18 and 24 believe Jews constitute an “oppressor class.” I take this poll, like all polls, with a grain of salt, but even if it's off by half, we’re still seeing signs that many young Americans, like many people who live in other countries and cite completely different reasons, believe that Jews are a problem they need to confront. In this regard, Hamas has reason for optimism.

Many of the Westerners who work in aid organizations and in the press in the Middle East, in my own experience, hold some variation of these beliefs. This includes many Europeans who are only a generation or two removed from days when other Europeans actively prosecuted a physical war against “international Jewry.” These people, who use different language to explain their problem with the same group of people (terms like “apartheid,” “war crimes,” and “supremacy” being among those now in favor) are the people regularly in contact with Hamas, in the offices of UNRWA or Amnesty International. So it can’t have been hard for Hamas to understand that its ideas have traction beyond the Middle East. 

This explains incidents like the striking moment in 2021 when the Hamas military commander Yahya Sinwar told a VICE reporter, “I want to take this opportunity to remember the racist murder of George Floyd.” Palestinians, he said, suffered “the same type of racism.” Sinwar is a fundamentalist sociopath responsible for the carnage in Israel on October 7 and for the resulting catastrophe in Gaza, as well as the murder of several Africans caught in the attack. His statement was echoed in a call by Representative Rashida Tlaib of Michigan the same year: “What they are doing to the Palestinian people is what they continue to do to our Black brothers and sisters here.” The word “they” was striking at the time. The two of them clearly understood themselves as being part of the same struggle. 

Hamas, like the PLO before it, could always count on fellow travelers from the old left steeped in Soviet propaganda about “Zionist imperialism,” itself a variation on more venerable themes of Jewish control. But important new allies in the West have made themselves apparent with the rise of second-generation immigrants from Muslim countries, some of whom now phrase the war of their parents’ generation in progressive language, and can protest alongside pink-haired kids with “Queers for Palestine” signs, happy to discover they share a common enemy. After the October 7 attack came the jubilant paraglider posters, the applause from Black Lives Matter, and our introduction to a parade of types like the Cornell professor who declared the massacre “exhilarating.” 


From my friends in Jewish communities in North America, I hear about synagogues hiring more armed guards and installing metal detectors, long the reality in what remains of Jewish Europe. There’s a new police post outside my old elementary school in Toronto. In L.A. and London, people I know are hiding their kippot in pockets or under baseball hats. It seems strange to call any of this the “Gaza war.” 

Most of us assumed that whatever one’s approach to Israel, open talk of Jewish villainy and calls for violence were never acceptable. We now know that scores of people, including Ivy League presidents and faculty, believe it depends on the context. Hamas thinks so too, and all of this makes you wonder who really miscalculated on October 7.


CORRECTION: The year of the mufti’s testimony before the British commission was 1929, not 1936, as we originally printed. Apologies for the mistake, which we have corrected.


You can read Matti Friedman’s last piece for The Free Press here and listen to his Honestly episode, about when Leonard Cohen visited Israel during the Yom Kippur War, here.

For more coverage on Israel and the Middle East, become a subscriber to The Free Press.

Friday, December 29, 2023

Wednesday, December 27, 2023

How to detoxify the politics of migration. By The Economist


Doom-mongers on both the left and the right are wrong

Dec 20th 2023

Every day, screens around the world fill with grim pictures from Gaza, where nearly 2m Palestinians have been forced out of their homes. Even larger numbers have been displaced in Congo, Sudan, Syria and Ukraine. Most people feel compassion when they see fellow humans fleeing from bombs, bullets or machetes. But many also experience another emotion: fear.

Seen through a screen, the world can seem violent and scary even to residents of safe, rich places. Many worry that ever-swelling numbers of refugees and other migrants will surge across their borders. Nativist politicians talk of an “invasion”.

Fear has curdled rich-world politics. A man who once advocated banning the Koran could be the next Dutch prime minister. Britain’s Conservative Party is trampling on constitutional norms to try to send asylum-seekers on a one-way trip to Rwanda. Donald Trump tells hollering crowds that unlawful immigrants are “poisoning the blood of our country”.

Some perspective is in order. The vast majority of people who migrate do so voluntarily and without drama. For all the talk of record numbers and unprecedented crisis, the share of the world’s people who live outside their country of birth is just 3.6%; it has barely changed since 1960, when it was 3.1%. The numbers forcibly displaced fluctuate wildly, depending on how many wars are raging, but show no clear long-term upward trend. The total has risen alarmingly in the past decade or so, from 0.6% in 2012 to 1.4% in 2022. But this is only a sixth of what it was in the aftermath of the second world war.

The notion that refugees pose a serious threat to rich countries is also far-fetched. Most fugitives from danger do not go far. Of the 110m people whom the un classified as forcibly displaced as of mid-2023, more than half remained in their own countries. Barely 10% had made it to the rich world—slightly more than the population of London. This is not a trivial number, but it is plainly manageable if governments co-operate. Overall, poorer countries host nine times more displaced people with skimpier resources and less hysteria.

The populist right drums up fears of overwhelming numbers in order to win votes. Some on the left inflame the issue in different ways. Lavishing benefits on asylum-seekers while making it hard for them to work guarantees that they will be a burden, which is why Sweden’s anti-immigrant party now has a slice of power. Calling for the abolition of border controls, as some American radicals do, terrifies the median voter. Insisting that everyone should be defined by race and given a pecking order with the majority group ranked last, and then demanding that America admit millions more members of minority groups, is a recipe for ensuring Mr Trump’s re-election.

A wiser approach to migration would bear in mind two things. First, moving tends to make people much better off than they would have been, had they stayed put. Those who flee from danger find safety. Those who seek a new start find opportunity. Migrants from poor countries to rich ones vastly raise their own wages and have little or no effect on those of the native-born. Mobility also allows families to spread risks. Many pool cash to send a relative to a city or a richer country, so they have at least one income that doesn’t depend on the local weather.

Second, recipient countries can benefit from immigration, especially if they manage it well. The most desirable destinations can attract the world’s most talented and enterprising people. Immigrants in America are nearly twice as likely to start a company as the native-born and four times likelier to win a Nobel science prize. Less-skilled migrants fill gaps in ageing labour forces and free up locals for more productive tasks (for example, when a foreign nanny enables two parents to work full-time).

A more mobile planet would be richer: by one estimate, completely free movement would double global gdp. These colossal gains remain unrealised because they would accrue mostly to the migrants, who cannot vote in the countries they want to move to. Still, rather than leaving all these trillions of dollars on the floor, wise governments should find ways to share some of them. That means persuading voters that migration can be orderly and legal, and proving that immigrants not only pay their way but enhance the collective good.

So border security should be tight, while the slow process of denying or granting entry is streamlined. A realistic number of workers should be admitted—and selected primarily by market forces, such as visa auctions. Immigrants should be free to work—and pay taxes—but not to draw the same welfare benefits as citizens, at least for a while. Some day, the creaking global asylum system should be modernised and the task of offering sanctuary should be shared more fairly. A provisional eu deal announced on December 20th is a small step in the right direction.

Pessimists on the right argue that more migration will breed disorder, since people from alien cultures will not assimilate. Yet studies find no solid evidence that diverse countries are less stable—contrast homogeneous Somalia with many-hued Australia.

Pessimists on the left say the West will never let in many people or treat newcomers fairly because it is incorrigibly racist. Yet though racism persists, it has dwindled more than many people realise. When Barack Obama was born, mixed-race marriages were illegal in much of America, and many Brits still thought they had a right and a duty to rule other nations. Now a fifth of new American marriages are mixed, and Brits find it unremarkable that a descendant of colonial subjects is their prime minister. British Indians, Chinese-Canadians and Nigerian-Americans all earn more than their white compatriots, suggesting racism is not the main determinant of their life chances.

Westward leading, still proceeding

In the future, climate change may spur people to move more. But this will be gradual, and two forces may have the opposite effect. The shift from farms to cities—a much bigger mass movement than cross-border migration—will slow, as most of the world is already urban. And humanity will grow less mobile as it ages. Today, rich countries have a wonderful opportunity to import youth, brains and dynamism. It may not last for ever. ■7

This article appeared in the Leaders section of the print edition under the headline "How to detoxify migration politics"


Monday, December 25, 2023

AMA Thursday. By Brian Beutler

Read time: 2 minutes


AMA Thursday

Our last chat of 2023



(Photo by Carol Yepes)

Hello readers! Before we get to everything on my mind, I have a request: If you have a question that isn’t terribly timely, can you send it to me by email instead of dropping it in the thread or asking me in the chat? I’d like to put a mailbag together for all subscribers this holiday week, but it only works if enough people participate. Now to the business at hand:


Consumer confidence spiked in December, along with other economic-sentiment indicators, outpacing market expectations which were flat. What has been flat (steady might be a better word) is economic performance itself, chugging along as it has been for years now, suggesting that SoMeThiNg eLsE1 contributes to people’s impressions of the economy.


Donald Trump is still a specter haunting America, though, so it’s hard to imagine vibes improving that much…


On some level I think liberal resistance to vibes theory (vibeology?) is a little weird since liberals all seem to agree that Republicans are relentless about working media refs, and this often pays off for them in the realm of public opinion. That’s just commandeering the vibes machine! And given the revolution in news media over the past decade-plus, why wouldn’t we expect certain ideas (even false ones) about politics to become common knowledge?


If forced, I wouldn’t bet money on the Supreme Court doing the right thing and disqualifying Trump from federal office. But I do think the justices more cross-pressured than most observers realize, and anti-Trump forces should emphasize the upsides (for both GOP-appointed justices and the judiciary in general) of bringing the hammer down on him.


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I loved this rumination on the connection between Greg Abbott’s vile, cynical immigration crackdown and the founding, and the weak points in the founding that gave rise to the nullification crisis and Civil War. Powerful forces of reaction in this country have nearly brought us full circle.


Relatedly, Joe Biden has really stepped up his frontal attacks on Donald Trump in the past week or so, for engaging in insurrection and for his fun new fixation with Nazi language about immigrants poisoning the national blood.


Now that it’s a live question, and much turns on Trump’s culpability for January 6, a segment of the commentariat encompassing Trump supporters, anti-anti-Trump writers, and squeamish liberals has found utility in the idea that maybe January 6 wasn’t an insurrection after all! Problem solved! Take it up with Mitch McConnell and, well, people who have eyes.


Probably shouldn’t have put so many eggs in this basket.


This update from the U.N. is a bit frustrating to read; perhaps Biden should listen to the most high-profile Jewish politician in the U.S.?


Turns out Clarence Thomas may have set his bribery arrangement in motion near the end of the Clinton presidency by threatening to retire so he could get rich, prompting GOP officeholders (who feared an Al Gore presidency) to arrange for right-wing billionaires to open their wallets for him.


Mark Meadows's loss could embolden right-wing prosecutors. By Liz Dye

Read time: 8 minutes


Mark Meadows's loss could embolden right-wing prosecutors

If you think Ken Paxton won't run wild with this ...



Texas AG Ken Payton speaks at a Trump rally in October. (Brandon Bell/Getty)

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On Monday, the Eleventh Circuit crushed Mark Meadows’s hopes of getting his criminal case in Georgia transferred to federal court.


But a little-noticed concurrence serves as a warning that state prosecutors might target former federal officials — including ones working for President Biden — if Congress doesn’t fix the law which allows federal officials to remove their cases from state court. And considering the state of Congress these days, that fix seems vanishingly unlikely.


The trial court

On August 14, Fulton County District Attorney Fani Willis indicted Meadows, who worked as Trump’s former chief of staff, and charged him with participating in a RICO conspiracy and soliciting a public officer to violate his oath. The very next day, Meadows filed a notice of removal, seeking to have his case transferred to federal court on the theory that he was acting as a federal official for purposes of the charged conduct.


US District Judge Steve Jones held a hearing where Meadows testified that he was acting as an agent of the president when he did the following: attempted to observe a restricted ballot audit in Cobb County, texted an election official "is there way to speed up Fulton county signature verification in order to have results before Jan if the trump campaign assist financially,” and participated in the infamous call where Trump pressured Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger to “find 11,780 votes, which is one more than we have.” When pressed to name something that would be outside his official duties, the best Meadows could come up with was giving a campaign speech — something specifically prohibited under the Hatch Act.


Judge Jones disagreed.


“The Court finds that the color of the Office of the White House Chief of Staff did not include working with or working for the Trump campaign, except for simply coordinating the President’s schedule, traveling with the President to his campaign events, and redirecting communications to the campaign,” he wrote. “Thus, consistent with his testimony and the federal statutes and regulations, engaging in political activities exceeds the outer limits of the Office of the White House Chief of Staff.”


Meadows appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, which expedited its review. But it also instructed the parties — that is, Meadows and the state of Georgia — to brief the court on an unanticipated issue.


The federal criminal removal statute

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1442, federal officials can get state cases transferred to federal court in very specific circumstances.


The statute was enacted in two parts: one after the War of 1812, and the other after the Civil War. The purpose of both parts was the same, however. Congress sought to protect federal officials from being hauled into state courts for simply enforcing federal law. Legislators reasoned that government agents were more likely to get a fair trial from Judge Senate R. Confirmed than from Judge Good O. Boy in the Podunk County courthouse.


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The problem is that the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1442(b), which deals with civil suits against non-resident government agents, explicitly allows a former federal official to remove to federal court. And the language of § 1442(a), which deals with civil or criminal cases generally, does not.


So with that in mind, here’s what the Eleventh Circuit asked:


In certain circumstances, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) permits “any officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States or of any agency thereof, in an official or individual capacity,” to remove a civil action or criminal prosecution from state court to federal court. Does that statute permit former federal officers to remove state actions to federal court or does it permit only current federal officers to remove? Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), with 28 U.S.C. § 1442(b) (permitting removal of “[a] personal action commenced in any State court by an alien against any citizen of a State who is, or at the time the alleged action accrued was, a civil officer of the United States and is a nonresident of such State . . .”).


In plain English, the appellate panel wanted to know why Meadows, as a former federal official, was entitled to remove his case under this statute. And the question came out of left field, because most people who’d given the matter any thought had assumed that it simply had to. 


For instance, US District Judge Alvin Hellerstein took that as a given when he rejected Trump’s effort to get his New York criminal case out of New York state court.


“It would make little sense if this were not the rule, for the very purpose of the Removal Statute is to allow federal courts to adjudicate challenges to acts done under color of federal authority,” the judge wrote.


Bad drafting, bad laws

On Monday, the appellate court unanimously agreed with the trial judge that Meadows’s conduct was outside of his official duties. 


“Electioneering on behalf of a political campaign is incontrovertibly political activity prohibited by the Hatch Act … Indeed, the political branches themselves recognize that electioneering is not an official federal function,” Judge William Pryor wrote for the three-judge panel.


But in a surprising twist, they all agreed that the plain language of the statute itself excludes former federal officials from using it to get their cases out of state court. So, even if Meadows had been doing official White House business back in 2020, he’d still have no way to get out of Fulton County Superior Court because he’s no longer a federal employee.


Congress is presumed to mean what it says. Also, this law has been on the books since 1948, and Congress modified the relevant section of code in 1996, 2011, and 2013 without amending the language in question.


“Our precedents establish that the decision to preserve grandfathered language despite a ‘clear ability’ to modify it is significant,” Judge Pryor wrote.


Pryor, a conservative icon whom Trump considered for a seat on the Supreme Court, seemed largely unbothered by the fact that his interpretation would subject former officials to potential prosecution in politically hostile locales. He reasoned that the main purpose of the law was to ensure that state officials don’t interfere with federal government business, not to protect individuals. He breezily waved away concerns about partisan local prosecutors by noting that former officials can still assert federal immunity in state court for official acts and can even seek Supreme Court review if they don’t like the result.


This is perhaps an unsurprising take from the former attorney general from Alabama, who moves through the world as a white man with the force of law behind him. But his fellow panelists, Judges Robin Rosenbaum and Nancy Abudu, suffered from no such lack of imagination.


In a concurrence joined by Judge Abudu, Judge Rosenbaum wrote:


Imagine that the day the President of the United States leaves office, sixteen states where his policies were unpopular indict him and all his Cabinet members, simply for carrying out their constitutionally authorized duties. Is it possible that state courts in those sixteen jurisdictions would fairly, correctly, and promptly resolve any federal defenses the former President and Cabinet members might have? Of course, it is. It may well even be likely. But given the local sentiment that led to the indictments in this hypothetical scenario, it's also possible they would not. 


They note that the Supreme Court hears just a handful of cases every year, and that forcing “formers” to duke it out in state court and then pin their hopes of salvation on the high court is functionally no relief at all and will potentially “allow a rogue state's weaponization of the prosecution power to go unchecked and fester.”


“This nightmare scenario keeps me up at night,” Judge Rosenbaum continued, urging Congress to amend the law to protect formers and ward off “a potential threat to our republic's stability.”


And in a functioning democracy, the legislature would get right on that. But we don’t live in a functioning democracy. We live in a country where the House of Representatives held 724 votes and passed a grand total of 27 bills in 2023. (To be fair, like 100 of those votes were to pick a House speaker.) So the odds of Congress amending § 1442 in the near future are functionally nil — particularly when it might insulate former members of the Biden administration from the depredations of local prosecutors.


Two words: Ken Paxton

Today, the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of § 1442 is the law in Alabama, Florida, and Georgia. If Florida Attorney General Ashley Moody ever takes a break from harassing Disney, she now has the ability to indict former Biden administration officials in state court. But compared to Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton, Moody is a mere piker.


The Texas AG has used his office to attack everyone from parents of trans kids, to vaccine makers, to the state bar, which had the temerity to investigate him. He filed a ridiculous lawsuit seeking to overturn the 2020 election. He threatened to go after Twitter for forcing Elon Musk to go through with the purchase of the company, and then threatened the website Media Matters for publishing mean articles about X. The man loves nothing more than to sue the Biden administration.


If the Fifth Circuit adopts the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of § 1442, Paxton will immediately go after half of President Biden’s cabinet the second they are out of office and threaten them with criminal indictments. Imagine prosecutions of DHS Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas for human trafficking? Or HHS Secretary Xavier Becerra for allowing service members to travel out of state to receive abortion care? Or of Attorney General Merrick Garland for kidnapping January 6 rioters and holding them hostage? Or President Biden for all of the above.


This is nightmare stuff indeed, and yet entirely plausible. And while Paxton is uniquely lawless, he’s hardly the only Republican state law enforcement official who might be expected to launch revenge prosecutions of former Democratic officials. In short, we need to take this threat seriously now before banana republic AGs start flexing their evil, creative muscles.


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We’ll be back with more next Wednesday, as there will be no edition Monday in observance of Christmas. From the Public Notice team to you and your family, we hope you have a Merry Christmas (if you celebrate it) and happy holidays.

Sam Altman’s Knack for Dodging Bullets—With a Little Help From Bigshot Friends

Sam Altman’s Knack for Dodging Bullets—With a Little Help From Bigshot Friends

The OpenAI CEO lost the confidence of top leaders in the three organizations he has directed, yet each time he’s rebounded to greater heights

Minutes after the board of OpenAI fired CEO Sam Altman, saying he failed to be truthful, he exchanged texts with Brian Chesky, the billionaire chief executive of Airbnb.

“So brutal,” Altman wrote to his friend. Later that day, Chesky told ’s CEO Satya Nadella, OpenAI’s biggest partner, “Sam has the support of the Valley.” It was no exaggeration.

Over the weekend, Altman rallied some of Silicon Valley’s most influential CEOs and investors to his side, including Vinod Khosla, co-founder of Sun Microsystems and the founder of Khosla Ventures, OpenAI’s first venture-capital investor; Ron Conway, an early investor in Google and ; and Nadella. Days later, Altman returned as OpenAI’s chief executive.

Altman’s firing and swift reversal of fortune followed a pattern in his career, which began when he dropped out of Stanford University in 2005 and gained the reputation as a Silicon Valley visionary. Over the past two decades, Altman has lost the confidence of several top leaders in the three organizations he has directed. At every crisis point, Altman, 38 years old, not only rebounded but climbed to more powerful roles with the help of an expanding network of powerful allies. 


A group of senior employees at Altman’s first startup, Loopt—a location-based social-media network started in the flip-phone era—twice urged board members to fire him as CEO over what they described as deceptive and chaotic behavior, said people familiar with the matter. But the board, with support from investors at venture-capital firm Sequoia, kept Altman until Loopt was sold in 2012. 

Two years later, Altman was a surprise pick to head Y Combinator, the startup incubator that helped launch Airbnb and , by its co-founder Paul Graham. Graham had once compared Altman with Steve Jobs and said he was one of the “few people with such force of will that they’re going to get what they want.”

Altman’s job as president of the incubator put him at the center of power in Silicon Valley. It was there he counseled Chesky through Airbnb’s spectacular ascent and helped make grand sums for tech moguls by pointing out promising startups.

In 2019, Altman was asked to resign from Y Combinator after partners alleged he had put personal projects, including OpenAI, ahead of his duties as president, said people familiar with the matter. 

This fall, Altman also faced a crisis of trust at OpenAI, the company he navigated to the front of the artificial-intelligence field. In early October, OpenAI’s chief scientist approached some fellow board members to recommend Altman be fired, citing roughly 20 examples of when he believed Altman misled OpenAI executives over the years. That set off weeks of closed-door talks, ending with Altman’s surprise ouster days before Thanksgiving.

Altman’s gifts as a deal-maker, talent scout and pitchman helped turn OpenAI into a business some investors now value at $86 billion. The loyalty he engendered through his success mobilized high-profile supporters after his firing and inspired employees to threaten a mass exit.

“A big secret is that you can bend the world to your will a surprising percentage of the time,” Altman wrote in his personal blog two months before his exit from Y Combinator. 

Over his career, Altman has shown skill in bending circumstances to his favor. His ability to bounce back will be tested once again. Scrutiny of his management is expected in coming months. OpenAI’s two new board members have commissioned an outside investigation into the causes of the company’s recent turmoil, conducted by Washington law firm WilmerHale, including Altman’s performance as CEO and the board’s reasons for firing him.

“The senior leadership team was unanimous in asking for Sam’s return as CEO and for the board’s resignation, actions backed by an open letter signed by over 95% of our employees. The strong support from his team underscores that he is an effective CEO,” said an OpenAI spokeswoman.

This article is based on interviews with dozens of executives, engineers, current and former employees and friend’s of Altman’s, as well as investors.  

Center stage

Altman was a 19-year-old Stanford sophomore studying computer science when he stepped into the limelight at a campus entrepreneur event in 2005. He stood onstage, held up a flip phone and said he had just learned all cellphones would soon have a Global Positioning System, now commonly known as GPS.

Altman asked anyone interested to join him to figure out how best to pair the technologies. He and his co-founders decided on a flip-phone app that would let people track their friends on a map, which Altman would later pitch as a remedy for loneliness.



During a later entrepreneurship competition, Altman impressed Patrick Chung, who had just joined New Enterprise Associates, a venture-capital firm, and was one of the event’s judges. NEA teamed up with Sequoia and offered Altman and his team $5 million to pursue their idea.

Altman dropped out of school and Loopt was born. An early investor was Y Combinator, a startup incubator founded by Paul Graham and his-then girlfriend now-wife, Jessica Livingston. Altman soon became a favorite of Graham’s.

A few years after the company’s launch, some Loopt executives voiced frustration with Altman’s management. There were complaints about Altman pursuing side projects, at one point diverting engineers to work on a gay dating app, which they felt came at the expense of the company’s main work. 

Senior executives approached the board with concerns that Altman at times failed to tell the truth—sometimes about matters so insignificant one person described them as paper cuts. At one point, they threatened to leave the company if he wasn’t removed as CEO, according to people familiar with the matter. The board backed Altman.

“If he imagines something to be true, it sort of becomes true in his head,” said Mark Jacobstein, co-founder of Jimini Health who served as Loopt’s chief operating officer. “That is an extraordinary trait for entrepreneurs who want to do super ambitious things. It may or may not lead one to stretch, and that can make people uncomfortable.”

Altman doesn’t recall employee complaints beyond the normal annual CEO review process, according to people familiar with his thinking.

Among the most important relationships that Altman made at Loopt was with Sequoia, whose partner, Greg McAdoo, served on Loopt’s board and led the firm’s investment in Y Combinator around that time. Altman also became a scout for Sequoia while at Loopt, and helped the firm make its first investment in the payments firm Stripe—now one of the most valuable U.S. startups. 

Michael Moritz, who led Sequoia, personally advised Altman. When Loopt struggled to find buyers, Moritz helped engineer an acquisition by another Sequoia-backed company, the financial technology firm .

“I saw in a 19-year-old Sam Altman the same thing that I see now: an intensely focused and brilliant person whom I was willing to bet big on,” said Chung, now managing general partner of Xfund, a venture-capital firm. 

Man versus machine

Graham’s selection of Altman to lead Y Combinator in 2014 surprised many in Silicon Valley, given that Altman had never run a successful startup. Altman nonetheless set a high goal—to expand the family run operation into a business empire. 


Sam Altman, left, and OpenAI chief scientist Ilya Sutskever speaking in Tel Aviv in June. Photo: jack guez/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

He made as many as 20 introductions a day, helping connect people in Y Combinator’s orbit. He helped Greg Brockman, the former chief technology officer of Stripe, make a mint selling his shares in the successful payments company to buyers including Y Combinator. Brockman co-founded OpenAI in 2015 and became its president. 

Altman turned Y Combinator into an investing powerhouse. While serving as the president, he kept his own venture-capital firm, Hydrazine, which he launched in 2012. He caused tensions after barring other partners at Y Combinator from running their own funds, including the current chief executive, Garry Tan, and Reddit co-founder Alexis Ohanian. Tan and Ohanian didn’t respond to requests for comment 

Altman also expanded Y Combinator through a nonprofit he created called YC Research, which served as an incubator for Altman’s own projects, including OpenAI. From its founding in 2015, YC Research operated without the involvement of the firm’s longtime partners, fueling their concern that Altman was straying too far from running the firm’s core business. 

Altman believed OpenAI was primed for AI breakthroughs, including artificial general intelligence—an AI system capable of performing intellectual tasks as well as or better than humans. Altman helped recruit Ilya Sutskever from Google to OpenAI in 2015, which attracted many of the world’s best AI researchers.

By early 2018, Altman was barely present at Y Combinator’s headquarters in Mountain View, Calif., spending more time at OpenAI, at the time a small research nonprofit, according to people familiar with the matter.

The increasing amount of time Altman spent at OpenAI riled longtime partners at Y Combinator, who began losing faith in him as a leader. The firm’s leaders asked him to resign, and he left as president in March 2019.

Graham said it was his wife’s doing. “If anyone ‘fired’ Sam, it was Jessica, not me,” he said. “But it would be wrong to use the word ‘fired’ because he agreed immediately.” 

Jessica Livingston said her husband was correct.

To smooth his exit, Altman proposed he move from president to chairman. He pre-emptively published a blog post on the firm’s website announcing the change. But the firm’s partnership had never agreed, and the announcement was later scrubbed from the post.

For years, even some of Altman’s closest associates—including Peter Thiel, Altman’s first backer for Hydrazine—didn’t know the circumstances behind Altman’s departure. 

Resurrection

At OpenAI, Altman recruited talent, oversaw major research advances and secured $13 billion in funding from Microsoft. Sutskever, the company’s chief scientist, directed advances in large language models that helped form the technological foundation for ChatGPT—the phenomenally successful AI chatbot. Sequoia was one of OpenAI’s investors. 


Sam Altman, left, and Microsoft CEO Satya Nadella during introductions at an event in San Francisco last month. Photo: Justin Sullivan/Getty Images

As the company grew, management complaints about Altman surfaced. 

In early fall this year, Sutskever, also a board member, was upset because Altman had elevated another AI researcher, Jakub Pachocki, to director of research, according to people familiar with the matter. 

Sutskever told his board colleagues that the episode reflected a long-running pattern of Altman’s tendency to pit employees against one another or promise resources and responsibilities to two different executives at the same time, yielding conflicts, according to people familiar with the matter.

“Ilya has taken responsibility for his participation in the Board’s actions, and has made clear that he believes Sam is the right person to lead OpenAI,” Alex Weingarten, a lawyer representing Sutskever, said in a statement. He described as inaccurate some accounts given by people familiar with Sutskever’s actions but didn’t identify any alleged inaccuracies. 

Altman has said he runs OpenAI in a “dynamic” fashion, at times giving people temporary leadership roles and later hiring others for the job. He also reallocates computing resources between teams with little warning, according to people familiar with the matter.

Other board members already had concerns about Altman’s management. Tasha McCauley, an adjunct senior management scientist at Rand Corp., tried to cultivate relationships with employees as a board member. Past board members chatted regularly with OpenAI executives without informing Altman. Yet during the pandemic, Altman told McCauley he needed to be told if the board spoke to employees, a request that some on the board viewed as Altman limiting the board’s power, people familiar with the matter said. 

Around the time Sutskever aired his complaints, the independent board members heard similar concerns from some senior OpenAI executives, people familiar with the discussions said. Some considered leaving the company over Altman’s leadership, the people said.

Altman also misled board members, leaving the impression with one board member that another wanted board member Helen Toner removed, even though it wasn’t true, according to people familiar with the matter, The Wall Street Journal reported.

The board also felt nervous about Altman’s ability to use his Silicon Valley influence, so when members decided to fire him, they kept it a secret until the end. They gave only minutes notice to Microsoft, OpenAI’s most important partner. The board in a statement said Altman had failed to be “consistently candid” and lost their trust without giving specific details.

Altman retreated to his 9,500 square-foot house, which overlooks San Francisco in the city’s Russian Hill neighborhood.


One of his key allies was Chesky. Shortly after Altman was fired, Chesky hopped on a video call with Altman and Brockman, who had been removed from the board that day and quit the company in solidarity with Altman. Chesky asked why it happened. Altman theorized it might have been about the dust-up with Toner or Sutskever’s complaints. 

Satisfied that it wasn’t a criminal matter, Chesky phoned Nadella, the Microsoft CEO. 

A small group of Silicon Valley power brokers, including Chesky and Conway, advised Altman and worked the phones, trying to negotiate with the board.  

The board named Emmett Shear, an OpenAI outsider, as interim CEO, drawing threats to resign by most of the company’s employees. In another lucky turn of fortune for Altman, Shear was an ally and a mentor of Chesky’s.

Together, Chesky and Shear helped clear a path for Altman’s return.

—Jim Oberman, Rolfe Winkler and Tom Dotan contributed to this article.


Trump Gets One Thing Right About Obamacare. By Bloomberg editorial board

The program is too costly for many Americans, but replacing it isn’t the answer.

December 19, 2023 at 1:00 PM UTC

The Editorial Board publishes the views of the editors across a range of national and global affairs.

Credit where due.

Photographer: Scott Olson/Getty Images

Last month, Donald Trump (yet again) said he wanted to ditch Obamacare, saying costs are “out of control.” President Joe Biden, in response, has vowed to protect and expand the law that’s extended health coverage to millions of Americans. While Trump and his fellow Republicans don’t have much credibility on this issue, it would be a mistake to dismiss his comments out of hand. Obamacare is, by design, too expensive for many Americans.

The Affordable Care Act, passed in 2010, made sweeping changes to the US health-care system. It included measures to prevent insurers from denying coverage based on pre-existing conditions and enabled children to stay on their parents’ plans until age 26. It also required most health plans to include free preventive care — such as colonoscopies, mammograms and well-child visits — and expanded Medicaid coverage to include more low-income families.

From the start, though, Obamacare has been divisive. Many Americans worried that increased government involvement in the health-insurance market would inflate costs. Republicans spent years trying to repeal the law and succeeded in eliminating the parts they found most objectionable, including the provision to penalize people who don’t have insurance (the so-called individual mandate). Some of those measures were designed to keep prices in check.

Consider one of the law’s most popular provisions: protections for those with pre-existing conditions. Obamacare established a rule that prevents insurers from setting premiums based on health status, among other factors. The measure ushered millions of sick Americans into the insurance pool who were previously denied coverage or stuck with exorbitant premiums. But, absent the individual mandate, doing so also raised costs for the young and healthy. As a result, many decided to forgo insurance until they got sick; insurers lost money and exited the market; and costs soared even higher. The exchanges likely would’ve collapsed altogether were they not so heavily subsidized.

With so many Americans now dependent on subsidies, renewing them would be prudent. However, lawmakers should use the looming deadline as an opportunity to explore more sustainable reforms that bring premiums down, such as incentives for people to enroll before they get sick. Private plans in Australia, for example, offer discounted premiums for those under 30 who stay enrolled. Extending or shifting the enrollment window and simplifying the confounding sign-up process would help, too. Going forward, Biden’s administration should also acknowledge that industry-wide consolidation — accelerated by the ACA’s mission to “coordinate care” between hospitals and providers — has driven prices higher and worsened patient outcomes. Updating the regulatory tools that assess market concentration, some of which use decades-old data, would encourage competition and keep prices in check.

Trump’s right to recognize that the Affordable Care Act isn’t all that affordable. But given its overwhelming benefits, lawmakers would be wise to use the next year to reform rather than replace it. Americans deserve a health-care system that lives up to its name.

 

Five Big Political Questions for 2024. By Jonathan Bernstein

While our attention is focused on the presidential election, a possible government shutdown and other disruptions loom.

December 24, 2023 at 1:00 PM UTC


Jonathan Bernstein is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering politics. A former professor of political science at the University of Texas at San Antonio, he wrote A Plain Blog About Politics.

It isn't clear whether House Speaker Mike Johnson will steer Congress away from a government shutdown. 

Photographer: Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images 

The political stakes couldn’t be higher in the coming year, with both the presidency and control of Congress up in the air. And the courts will be involved more than usual, with former President Donald Trump under four separate indictments, at least some of which could head to trial in 2024. If that isn’t enough, the Supreme Court could rule on whether Trump is even eligible for the 2024 ballot.

But there are a number of political matters that have received less attention, even though they, too, could influence the nation’s trajectory. Here are five I’ll be watching..

Will House Republicans finally get their government shutdown(s)?

No, the threat hasn’t gone away, and just because the House of Representatives backed down and allowed temporary spending extensions to go through twice doesn’t mean they’ll do it again when those temporary bills expire, some on January 19 and the remainder on February 2.

The first short-term spending fix was the event that produced a successful revolt against then-Speaker Kevin McCarthy, and the second one has sparked quite a bit of criticism of for-the-moment Speaker Mike Johnson. It isn’t clear how Johnson will handle the upcoming deadlines, especially since the House has failed to make any progress since the last one. Right now Johnson’s public stance is that there will be no more short-term extensions, while Senate Democrats and Republicans are ruling out putting all spending on autopilot for the rest of the year. Something will have to give or we’re headed for a shutdown.

And that’s not all! The current fight is over fiscal 2024, which started back on October 1. But even if that is resolved, fiscal 2025 begins next October 1 — five weeks before Election Day. In the past, that’s never been a real problem because if Congress hadn’t negotiated full-year spending bills it would just punt with a short-term measure. But those Congresses didn’t have the strikingly dysfunctional House that this one has.

How much pressure will be put on Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor to retire?

I was wrong; I thought this would be a big story in 2023, but it was not. But with Sotomayor turning 70 in June, President Joe Biden’s re-election chances widely perceived to be 50/50 at best and Republicans probably favored to gain a Senate majority, I expect more Democrats to speak up and urge the oldest Democrat on the court to step down based on a fear that if she dies in office she would be replaced by a Republican.

Judges from both parties have retired strategically, but at the Supreme Court level Democrats have not been as rigorous about it as Republicans such as Sandra Day O’Connor and Anthony Kennedy were. Most notably, Ruth Bader Ginsburg decided to remain in office beyond Barack Obama’s presidency. When she died in 2020 Donald Trump nominated Amy Coney Barrett to replace her — giving Republicans a key vote to undo much of what Ginsburg had accomplished on the court. Sotomayor is much younger than Ginsburg was (83) when Trump became president, but there is no way of knowing how long the next run of Republican presidents (and Senate majorities) would last. Indeed, there already has been some pressure on liberals on lower courts to leave while Biden could replace them, and I wouldn’t be surprised if some think Justice Elena Kagan, who is only 63, also should retire.

And of course if Sotomayor does retire at the end of this Supreme Court term in June, her replacement’s confirmation will be a major story this summer just as the general election is approaching.

Where is the Republican Party headed?

Election observers will focus this spring and summer on key Republican primaries in contested Senate seats such as Ohio, Montana and Michigan; they know that Republicans over the last decade have cost themselves seats in the Senate and elsewhere by nominating terrible candidates, so whether they will do that again is an obvious big story.

But somewhat under the radar are the rest of the party’s primaries — especially in safe Republican seats. After all, that’s where most of a party’s elected officials come from. And it makes a huge difference, as we’ve seen in the US House this year, who the party nominates and what they care about. Extremists such as Texas’s Chip Roy and Georgia’s Marjorie Taylor Greene don’t usually cost their party an election if they are nominated. They win, and change what the party does in office.

Of course, the same is true in the Democratic Party, where the “progressive” faction squares off against mainstream liberals in many primaries. But because the progressives have been more pragmatic in office than the radical Republicans, it’s not quite as big a deal if they win a handful of seats.

What’s happening lower on the ballot?

As important as federal elections always are, there are thousands of other elections scheduled in the US for 2024, and those are important, both for their direct effects and on how they can set the agenda for the political parties. Two types are worth paying special attention to. School board elections, always important, have captured much more attention recently with aggressive attempts by Republicans to change policy at that level and also to use school-based controversies to win broader support; Democrats responded in 2023 with fairly effective counter-mobilization. Since school board elections happen all year, what happens in the first half of 2024 will influence whether some education hot-button issues will be prominent in November elections.

The same is true for criminal justice issues. Both police reformers and hard-line sheriffs and district attorneys elected in the wake of the Black Lives Matter movement in the summer of 2020 are back on the ballot this year, as are attorneys general in 10 states. It’s too early to know yet what ballot measures might be added, but we can expect at least some of those, too. In both cases, these local and statewide elections may mean far more to the day-to-day lives of Americans than whatever happens in the federal government.

Will violence disrupt elections in 2024?

The good news is that off-year elections in 2022 and 2023 generally went very smoothly. The bad news is that Donald Trump may be back on the ballot in 2024, and we’re already seeing the effects. There was violence around the fringes of his campaign in 2020 — recall that Trump supporters forced a Biden campaign bus off a Texas highway, for example — and there were quite a few threats of violence. And of course all of that only increased after the election, culminating in the Jan. 6 attack on the Capitol, which Trump and other Republicans still celebrate even now.

Former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani has been ordered to pay nearly $150 million to two election workers he falsely accused of rigging the election against Trump, but it’s hard to say whether the punishment will deter others from spreading lies. Threats directed against election workers could disrupt the fair administration of elections. Threats against candidates, campaigns and voters raise the costs of participation, and the reality of violence is worse. Although violence is hardly unprecedented in US election history, it’s a sad state of affairs. It’s always possible that 2020 will turn out to have been the peak of the problem, but so far the evidence points in the other direction.


Sunday, December 24, 2023

Disqualifying Trump From The Ballot Is Required. By Brian Beutler


www.offmessage.net

5 - 6 minutes
(Photo by Leah Millis-Pool/Getty Images)

The Colorado Supreme Court has ruled that Donald Trump must be omitted from the state’s 2024 election ballots for engaging in insurrection against the United States, partially overturning a lower court judge who—out of fear or excessive deference—held that the Constitution exempted Trump from the disqualification clause of the 14th amendment. 

Other courts in other states may now feel unencumbered and follow suit, because the U.S. Supreme Court will pretty much have to settle the question at this point. In anticipation of Trump’s appeal, the Colorado justices stayed their own ruling until January 4, one day before the state’s deadline to certify the presidential primary ballot.

I have not read every word of the 200-page decision yet. (We journalists get to the gist quickly using closely guarded secret tricks like “read the beginning,” and “read the end.”) But I wanted to home in on one passing admonition, because I think it’s actually profound, and rests at the heart of a significant debate over how to protect the country from fascism.  

“We do not reach these conclusions lightly,” the four-justice majority wrote. “We are mindful of the magnitude and weight of the questions now before us. We are likewise mindful of our solemn duty to apply the law, without fear or favor, and without being swayed by public reaction to the decisions that the law mandates we reach.”

I do not believe this is judicial boilerplate, though it reads that way. I believe the justices are confirming that they and their colleagues face a level of threat and menace from Trump supporters that’s incompatible with the rule of law. Applying the law faithfully is a recipe for death threats and rioting, and some judges, thus, grant Trump impunity. They bend to mob pressure (or are “swayed by” it) and convince themselves that some larger civic or prudential good is served by giving in to extortion. 

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Unfortunately this weak-kneeism isn’t limited to judges. And that’s especially regrettable because the Supreme Court itself is plainly swayed by public pressure and elite signaling. There is a way to think about this question that is both correct on the merits and would increase the chances, however slight, that SCOTUS will do the right thing. But if even Trump’s opposition won’t frame the stakes that way, the odds drop to zero.

Jonathan Chait reacted to the news by tweeting, “the politics and civics of this move are awful. Hope/expect SCOTUS to overturn,” then elaborated in an odd way. The prudential concerns, he argues, are so serious that any adverse ruling must be “unassailable”—a standard that effectively exempts MAGA, which exists to assail even sky-is-blue truths—then glosses over all the work the Colorado courts did to meet that standard anyhow. 

“I am not a lawyer and I won’t comment on the legal merits of the case,” he added, but, “the weak point in this argument is the finding that Trump’s behavior constitutes ‘insurrection.’”

Set aside for a moment the fact that even leaders of the Republican Party called January 6 an “insurrection” and blamed Trump for it. Chait’s claim isn’t adjacent to the legal merits of the case at all—it cuts right to the heart of them. Both the Colorado Supreme Court and the lower court judge agree on the legal merits that Trump engaged in insurrection as proscribed by the Constitution. That much was established after a week-long trial. 

The judges disagree only insofar as there’s textual ambiguity over whether the 14th amendment applies to presidents. Even the dissenting justices don’t seek to exonerate Trump of engaging in insurrection.

Perhaps there is some smoking-gun scenario—an email from Trump saying “let’s engage in insurrection”—that would address Chait’s objections. But I see the same forces the Colorado justices warned against at work. Only under the most outlandish circumstances would a seditious candidate like Trump be unable to point to some ambiguity around whether he’d actually “engaged in insurrection.” And if that’s the standard, the disqualification clause would serve little purpose. 

Let’s stipulate (because it’s true) that Donald Trump did engage in insurrection, but that U.S. Supreme Court justices won’t simply apply the Constitution in a straightforward way. Political and civic considerations will seep into their decision-making process, because the stakes are so very high. If so, they need to think expansively about the consequences of their actions beyond simply assessing that Trump supporters will react in destabilizing ways. 

Saturday, December 23, 2023

Where the Peace Movement Went Wrong. By Nathan Newman

NathanNewman.org

April 10, 2003

Where the Peace Movement Went Wrong

This is a long one, laying out some of my assessment of what went wrong with the peace movement. It's what I've been saying to friends in the movement-- conservatives can chortle as they listen in since it's a harsh assessment, but the way forward to a better strategy in the future is tough criticism when it's needed to make a change in tactics and strategy.


I am actually glad to see the pictures of Iraqis celebrating freedom from Saddam's dictatorship. Not because it changes my view that this war was the wrong decision, but at least it means that for some Iraqis the death and devastation of their cities is offset by their immediate freedom from Saddam's yoke.


The problem for the peace movement is that they failed to argue persuasively that death and war was not the best option to achieve this goal, instead leaving a lot of the US population with the sense that the choice was between the war and inaction, which ended up tilting many moderates reluctantly to the war camp.


For many Americans, the war involves fighting a brutal regime that abuses its own people and has a history of invading neighbors. Whether the Bush leadership have other nastier intentions is separate from that obvious issue, which many people can separate from even concious misgivings about the Bush administration.


The antiwar argument had to be about whether there was an alternative way to achieve the goal of a freer and more democratic Iraq (and questioning the good faith of war proponents to achieve that result).


The antiwar movement lost the argument on timing and on the efficacy of alternative means of addressing peoples broad concerns on Iraq. And I attribute that partly to their simplistic focus on "no war" unity over developing a more sophisticated positive message that also would have required more outreach to non-rallygoers (and probably less focus on rallies).


And I continue to argue with a range of activist friends that when we allowed groups that defended the Hussein regime in the past to lead some of the rallies, many folks who don't like Hussein rightly could think that such a movement has no real plan for an alternative challenge to Hussein's regime.


For some of the left, they've retreated to almost isolationist pacificism as all the argument they need, without any need to address strategy and why THIS PARTICULAR WAR is the wrong direction.


The left in this country has an honorable history of leading the fight internationally for human rights, from challenges to Belgium's mass murder in the Congo at the end of the 19th century (led by among others Mark Twain) to denunciations of the fascist regimes in Europe in the 1930s to attacks on colonialism in the 1950s to denunciations of death squads in El Salvador and Apartheid in South Africa, the left has always called for challenges to bad regimes.


Progressives have usually supported non-violent means as a way to do so, usually arguing that it was misguided support for such regimes early on that get them to the point of becoming so dangerous that war is the only answer. This point is obvious in the case of US support for both Bin Laden and Hussein in the 1980s.


But to merely point out past US complicity is not enough. If we oppose war, we need a far clearer roadmap for the public on how we would support those who resist oppression. Mouthing lines about national sovereignty in cases like Iraq is as stupid as the Bull Connors or Pat Buchanans who cited states rights rhetoric to justify national abstention from challenging racism in the South.


There is absolutely nothing wrong with humanitarian interventionism in principle-- the left has believed in it for centuries. What is opposed is its use on behalf of corporate interests in a violent form, when non-violent solidarity is both more likely to lead to a just result and imposes less costs on the population.


But in the case of Iraq, the lack of organizing of that global solidarity and plan on how to help those resisting Hussein is exactly what strengthened the warhawks in arguing that their method was the only way to "liberate Iraq." In practice and in message, there was little or no message by the antiwar movement on how they were acting in solidarity with the oppressed folks within Iraq.


And that was the fatal flaw of antiwar organizing.


And the left cannot plead lack of time, since they had all the time necessary between the first and second Gulf Wars to build a cohesive public education message in defense of Kurdish and Shia human rights and pressure for non-violent strategies that would have been seen as an effective alternative to war. It was the first Bush administration that sold out both the Kurds and the Shias when they rose up in the aftermath of that first war, yet the left failed to rally to support their cause strongly against that sellout.


So over the years and even in recent months, the peace movement failed to engage that issue substantially and mostly said nothing.


And that was a substantial reason that large chunks of even liberal opinion moved into supporting the war. You can excuse it by saying they were all misinformed by the media and such, but it's worth understanding and emphasizing that two months ago, only about one-third of the public supported war without significant global support, as signified by UN endorsement, and now an additional 40% of the public now supports this unilateral intervention. It is the failure of the antiwar forces to hold that 40% of the public that needs to be analyzed.


The "Win Without War" folks somewhat took on this challenge but it was by the time it was organized a bit too little too late. The neoconservative warhawks had been doing their intellectual outreach for years, publishing books, holding policy conferences, organizing at their grassroots, to solidify a, yes, moral basis for their position (even if its a disingenuous position), while the left was largely throwing its critique together on the fly.


The Left was flatly outorganized on this issue and not because they had fewer resources but because they just didn't even do the organizing necessary or engage in serious intellectual engagement. Which is why it was claimed that the only "unity" position possible was the simplistic "no war" message and thus anyone, including pro-Hussein propagandists like the WWP, could speak in the name of that antiwar message. It was too thin a message and failed.


I opposed this war for a whole range of reasons, moral, realpolitick and geopolitical. On the moral side, I thought that there was a non-war alternative through continuing to press for change on behalf of the Iraqi people through the United Nations or other methods, such as support for internal resistance (and critique the first Bush and Clinton administration for failing in that). On the realpolitick side, this war is unlikely to lead to a real democratic alternative, both because of Bush's disingenuous motives and precisely because it was unilateral, Iraqi nationalism is more likely to be channelled in response into authoritarian counter-responses over time. And geopolitically, the war in Iraq endangers both us as US residents and others around the world by stoking hatred and strengthening authoritarian movements that will find ideological sustenance denouncing our actions.


Bits and pieces of this response were scattered across antiwar analysis, but it was marginal to the simplistic "no war" legalisms and "unity" rhetoric with forces that excluded such analysis. Speeches at rallies I went to were preaching to the converted, not speaking to those less convinced of Bush's complete perfidy and for whom an actual argument was necessary. A few on February 15th in New York attempted this, but they were such the exception, and so unreinforced by broader public outreach to that unconverted group, that I'm hardly surprised that it was ineffective.


While I am personally convinced of Bush's cynicism and bad motives, merely repeating or worse assuming it will not convince many people who needed to have actual arguments and alternatives presented.


The antiwar movement was a failure. Many of my left friends will point to the "success" of the large rallies organized, but what's the achievement? Tactical successes such as a few big rallies? Rallies are means, not achievements. Why should we praise tactics that coincided with AN INCREASE in support for uniltateral war? The February global rallies seemed to make a small untick in opposition but it was pretty ephemeral.


While I did work supporting the mass rallies, I've written that the energy put into them could have better been put into broader outreach to the unconverted middle, whether door-to-door, going to community meetings, or just talking on street corners to those who would listen. I started my political life going to door-to-door, talking to new people about consumer and enviro issues. Most serious union organizing is based on door-knocking as well at potential members doors.


The deemphasis on door knocking and the attached organizing is the exact problem I see with too much of the antiwar left that preferred to talk to itself at rallies or in its existing media circle rather than reach out to new people.


That needs to change and quickly. And it can start by the peace movement concentrating now on what we can do to guarantee that the Iraqi people get the democracy they have been promised and keep control of the oil resources and escape their country's debt which largely went to the Western governments and companies that armed the military we just fought. I'll write more about that in coming days, but I'll leave on that note as a start.


[NOTE since comments are broken on this post, anyone wanting to put up a comment should go here.]


Posted by Nathan at April 10, 2003 06:48 PM


It’s Almost 2024 And Doctors Are Still Misleading The Public About Youth Gender Medicine. By Jesse Singal

Read time: 11 minutes


It’s Almost 2024 And Doctors Are Still Misleading The Public About Youth Gender Medicine

A sloppy article in ‘Pediatrics’ shows, once again, that major medical institutions have failed the public on this issue

Generated by DALL·E

(Happy holidays, everyone! If you’re in the market for a last-minute gift, my podcast is running a giveaway contest with some arguably worthwhile prizes.)


I’ve written many Singal-Minded posts highlighting deficiencies in both left-of-center journalism and peer-reviewed literature on the use of puberty blockers and hormones as a treatment for gender dysphoria (also known as youth gender medicine). 


Each case of lackluster journalism or science is different, but the most common theme is omission. Peer-reviewed articles on this subject regularly omit key information about their data (such as this very important federally funded paper in which multiple important variables simply disappear) and fail to explain very basic facts like why dropout rates were so high or why some kids in a sample went on youth gender medicine and others didn’t, while articles and segments produced for popular audiences by both journalists and academics in this space routinely ignore the fact that a number of countries in Europe have found, via systematic evidence reviews, that the evidence base for youth gender medicine is lacking. 


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Pediatrics just published a “Perspectives” article on youth gender medicine (an opinion piece, more or less) by Emily Georges, Emily C.B. Brown, and Rachel Silliman Cohen that is one of the worst offenders I’ve come across. Despite clocking in at a brisk two-and-a-half pages, not counting endnotes and a “Ways to Advocate for TGD [transgender and gender diverse youth] Youth” chart that takes up a whole page of its own, the article contains a remarkable amount of misleading information, including a disheartening number of claims that point, via endnote, to resources that don’t come close to supporting them. The fact that Pediatrics would publish this article in its current form — and I’m getting déjà vu typing these sorts of sentences over and over and over — is a really bad sign about the collapse of institutional credibility in this area. 


Now, Georges and her coauthors are clearly concerned with overly draconian reactions to the youth gender medicine controversy, some of which go as far as attempting to remove trans children from their parents’ home. But these are separate questions from whether the evidence base for youth gender medicine is good. It can both be true that all those European countries are correct that the evidence base is shoddy and that banning the treatments outright (which has not been the response in Europe) is the wrong reaction to this medical uncertainty.


Naturally, the authors don’t mention the highest quality evidence in question, which is — say it with me — the European evidence reviews. It is, and again I feel that déjà vu coming on, a shocking omission on the part of doctors writing in perhaps the most important journal of pediatrics in the world. 


Let’s get into a few examples of how misleading this paper is, because so many of the specific claims are questionable at best and clearly false at worst. For example, Georges and her colleagues argue that GOP laws seeking to restrict access to youth gender medicine “deny children access to routine health care that has been shown to decrease dramatically high rates of suicide and depression for TGD youth.” There are two footnotes at the end of the sentence.


This sentence contains two claims: one is that TGD youth have “dramatically high rates of suicide and depression.” You see this claim constantly: transgender youth have terrifying rates of completed suicide, and youth gender medicine can protect them from it. I don’t want to reiterate the argument I’ve already made that transgender youth do not, in fact, appear to have a terrifying rate of completed suicide, so click that link and search down to “The article then notes” if you’re curious about that.


As for the claim that youth gender medicine constitutes “routine health care that has been shown to decrease” these symptoms, the first citation points to the WPATH Standards of Care Version 8. This is a big document, and it’s usually a sign of less-than-tight reasoning when an academic makes a strong causal claim and then asks you to pore through a big document to find the justification for that claim. Here and there the WPATH SoC does contain claims about the supposedly salutary effects of blockers and hormones on youth gender medicine, but these claims generally reference papers like Jack Turban and his colleagues’ 2020 analysis of the 2015 United States Transgender Survey — papers that are extremely weak, methodologically speaking (click here and search down for “mental and social health” to read more about Turban’s 2020 study). But the SoC also notes that “Despite the slowly growing body of evidence supporting the effectiveness of early medical intervention, the number of studies is still low, and there are few outcome studies that follow youth into adulthood. Therefore, a systematic review regarding outcomes of treatment in adolescents is not possible.” Methodologists disagree with this — you can still do a systematic review if there aren’t a lot of studies. But either way, if according to the WPATH SoC there aren’t enough studies to do a proper review, how can the WPATH SoC support the claim that youth gender medicine has been “shown to decrease” depression and anxiety?


The second citation points to Jason Rafferty’s policy statement for the American Academy of Pediatrics, which is a very strange document that certainly does not provide evidence that youth gender medicine has been “shown to decrease” depression and anxiety.


A bit later Georges and her coauthors write, “Although some individuals make it seem that GAC [gender-affirming care] is a new, experimental area of medicine, GAC is evidence-based.” Here there is some slippage between youth gender medicine and gender medicine more generally. Whether or not that’s intentional, it’s a serious stretch — arguably a misleading one — to call this area of medicine “evidence-based.” While definitions of that term can vary, we already know what the Europeans found about youth gender medicine, and a systematic review of adult care commissioned by WPATH itself found that, well, let me borrow from myself, writing in UnHerd:


The results, published in the Journal of the Endocrine Society in 2021, revealed that there is almost no high-quality evidence in this field of medicine. After they summarised every study they could find that met certain quality criteria, and applied Cochrane guidelines to evaluate their quality, the authors could find only low-strength evidence to support the idea that hormones improve quality of life, depression, and anxiety for trans people. Low means, here, that the authors “have limited confidence that the estimate of effect lies close to the true effect for this outcome. The body of evidence has major or numerous deficiencies (or both).” Meanwhile, there wasn’t enough evidence to render any verdict on the quality of the evidence supporting the idea that hormones reduce the risk of death by suicide, which is an exceptionally common claim.


Right after that, the authors explain that “When indicated, TGD youth may start gonadotropin-releasing hormone analogs, which have been used in pediatrics since the 1980s. They also may go on to receive gender-affirming hormones or surgical interventions, all of which are supported by a wealth of research on their safety and effectiveness.” First, “used in pediatrics since the 1980s” is exceptionally misleading, because the context there was (generally) precocious puberty, meaning that after the kids ceased blockers their natal puberty (presumably) kicked in, whereas research shows that the vast majority of kids who go on puberty blockers to treat gender dysphoria subsequently proceed to cross-sex hormones. That’s a very different use case, and one for which we have almost no high-quality evidence, so the “decades of use” argument really is a canard. Second, there is no footnote on “wealth of research on their safety and effectiveness,” which makes sense given that there isn’t a wealth of research on their safety and effectiveness in a youth gender medicine context.


Later, the authors write that youth gender medicine “decreases many negative health outcomes, including rates of depression, and improves well-being for children and adolescents.” The footnote points to this letter Texas Governor Greg Abbott wrote to another state official attempting to institute a policy of investigating instances of youth gender medicine performed in that state. This is clearly an error on the part of the authors, who definitely didn’t mean to cite this here. Next sentence: “GAC has not been shown to lead to short- or long-term negative health effects, and in fact, the benefits of GAC have been shown to far outweigh the risks.” Another strong claim, and this time the footnote points back to the SoC 8. I do not believe that document contains any language stating, conclusively, that all gender medicine is this safe and has such a lopsided benefit:risk ratio, but I could potentially be wrong. Either way, again, if someone makes a strong claim and then asks you to find the evidence for it in a haystack of a document, you should be skeptical.


A bit later on, the authors argue that youth gender medicine is not “medical child abuse,” as some conservatives have argued. I agree: for myriad reasons, that’s a really extreme claim, and the sort of overheated language that doesn’t really help get this conversation back on track. 


But again, the specifics of the authors’ argument are quite strange and ill-founded:


GAC is not MCA. Although caregivers are vital supports in a child’s gender journey, the provision of gender-affirming medical and surgical care necessitates an alignment of the child’s goals with the evidence-based treatment plan determined most appropriate by the medical team. As a testament to GAC being patient driven, studies have found that the vast majority of youth who initiated medication intervention continue these treatments when followed in adulthood.


Setting aside how odd it is to see “child’s goals” used so breezily in this context, let’s once again check the footnote. It points to this study out of the Netherlands, which indeed showed a high continuation rate. But under that protocol — and this is very well-known to anyone who studies this issue — youth seeking blockers or hormones could be excluded for a wide variety of reasons, including mental health comorbidities, insufficiently severe symptoms, unsupportive parents, and so on. It’s really not “patient driven.” This is a misdemeanor compared to some of the misleading statements and miscitations in this paper, but it’s another sign of sloppiness and what might be genuine unfamiliarity with the contours of this debate on the part of the authors.


A bit later on the authors repeat that “The benefits of GAC, most notably on mental health,


self-esteem, and development, outweigh the risks in the majority of circumstances.” No footnote at all this time, although I guess, to be fair, we’ve already been told to read the 260-page SoC to find out where this claim is supported. Then an even stronger claim: “GAC is, for many, lifesaving.” No citation. This is the top journal Pediatrics! How can such a claim be allowed with no evidence?


This next part tips over from sloppy into genuine medical misinformation:


Research highlights how transgender youth disproportionately experience negative mental health outcomes, including anxiety, depression, and suicidality.12 However, when children are supported in their gender identities and have access to GAC, they have better mental health outcomes.12,13 Some studies demonstrate that appropriate GAC, in the context of caregiver support, entirely mitigates the increased risk of depression and suicidal ideation for TGD youth.12


Footnote 12 points to “Baseline Physiologic and Psychosocial Characteristics of Transgender Youth Seeking Care for Gender Dysphoria,” a paper published by Joanna Olson (now Olson-Kennedy) and her colleagues in 2015. As the title suggests, it simply captures the baseline characteristics of kids who showed up to their clinic. Therefore, it definitionally can’t tell us that “when children are supported in their gender identities and have access to GAC, they have better mental health outcomes,” and it definitely can’t tell us that “appropriate GAC, in the context of caregiver support, entirely mitigates the increased risk of depression and suicidal ideation for TGD youth.” The authors have severe problems getting their citations straight throughout the paper, but this is a particularly galling instance because this miscitation communicates such a strong claim about adolescent suicide.


Footnote 13 points to Diana Tordoff and her colleagues’ 2022 study of outcomes at the Seattle Children’s Hospital gender clinic, which readers of this newsletter might remember because I wrote about it twice.


Tordoff and her colleagues at the clinic and the University of Washington–Seattle (Seattle Children’s is the teaching hospital of the UW School of Medicine’s pediatrics department) watched as a group of kids at their clinic were given blockers and/or hormones and showed no meaningful mental health improvement over the course of a year. Then, by torturing various statistics so severely it’s a miracle they weren’t dragged to The Hague, they published a study basically claiming the opposite. It was one of the more noteworthy examples of genuinely pernicious medical misinformation being published by youth gender medicine clinicians in recent years — a complete breakdown of the important barrier between researcher and activist. You can read my posts for more details, but the fact that a doctor at Seattle Children’s Hospital, Emily Georges, would lead-author a Pediatrics Perspectives piece that treats this research as solid evidence represents a serious mortgaging of trust on her and the institution’s part. It’s 2023. She must be aware of the critiques of this study and how little evidence it provides for the efficacy of youth gender medicine. 


This is not going to be an exhausting look at every claim in this piece. But I’ll leave you with one last example of how sloppy it all is:


Denying GAC not only represents medical neglect, but it is also state-sanctioned emotional abuse. In addition to the basic physical needs all people require for survival, humans have vital psychological needs. The degree to which these needs are met during childhood impact a child’s identity, capacities, and behaviors into adulthood.14 Emotional abuse involves actions, either as a repeated pattern or an extreme single incident, that thwart a child’s basic psychological needs.14 This form of abuse can be especially damaging because it undermines a child’s self-worth and psychological development.14 Policies that prohibit or limit a caregiver or physician’s ability to provide necessary GAC force caregivers and providers to perpetuate psychological distress.


The footnote points to a study that does not mention the word child or its variants, and which has nothing to do with the matter under discussion. The authors didn’t even give their paper a rudimentary proofreading to ensure the footnotes were correct before publishing it.


Of course, it isn’t just their fault. It would be quite easy for Pediatrics not to publish a Perspective this wildly off-base and disconnected from the real-world debate over youth gender medicine. It would be similarly easy for Pediatrics to insist on the rudimentary proofreading of citations. Pediatrics chose not to take these steps. This is a pattern.


Questions? Comments? Footnotes pointing to random drawings of cats? I’m at singalminded@gmail.com or on Twitter at @jessesingal. The image is one of ChatGPT 4’s responses to my prompt requesting “an abstract image representing the debates over gender identity.”