Friday, December 31, 2021

It's the end of the year as we know it

It's the end of the year as we know it

Matthew Yglesias — Read time: 4 minutes


It's the end of the year as we know it

A look back and a look ahead

You’re supposed to say, “Happy New Year!” on New Year’s Day, but I always think of New Year’s Eve as the real holiday because that’s when the parties are, so Happy New Year, Slow Boring readers!


After yesterday’s embarrassing look back at my year of bad predictions, I wanted to close the year out by thanking everyone who has subscribed and supported the site. I’m hoping to do more events next year, circumstances permitting, and to make membership a better and better bundle as the site grows. If you’ve enjoyed the free posts (or my tweets), I hope you’ll consider subscribing, and if you’re a happy subscriber and know others who might enjoy it, consider a gift.


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Shilling aside, Slow Boring is mostly taking today off, but I thought it would be a good time to look back on the year and share some Slow Boring content that (unlike my predictions) has held up well.


I think a considerable share of progressive angst these days is caused by the fact that they’ve succeeded in getting the Democratic Party to reposition itself to the left. This claim is distinct from the one often advanced by mainstream Democrats that “the left” has undermined them electorally through cross-contamination. My view is that the leaders of the Democratic Party are to the left of where they were on key issues during Obama’s first term, even though they are by and large the same group of people. That includes everything from the stigmatization of immigration enforcement (which Biden walked back soon after taking office, too late to help him in the campaign) to re-embracing gun control in a way that loses votes but hasn’t moved policy to the embrace of counterproductive shunning tactics as an approach to trans rights. But it also includes a total failure to prioritize such that $1.75 trillion in new spending comes out as somehow not enough to make a big difference in people’s lives.


I’m starting to find this argument tedious and hope to engage in somewhat less of it next year, but I still believe it. In particular, I think online discourse tends to get the relationship between popularism and “Donald Trump is bad” backward.


Ignoring public opinion in favor of shoot-the-moon schemes makes sense if you think that losing is not so bad. The effect sizes of everything you do in politics are still really small, so if you’re pretty indifferent to losing you could see adopting lots of left-wing views as having a positive expected value, even if it makes you lose less. But to the extent that you take seriously this stuff about fascism and the looming end of democracy, then you want a big tent party, not one that tells people that positions Obama took in 2008 or 2012 are beyond the pale.


But in terms of what really matters for America, I think one of the biggest issues is housing. Last year I did three posts making the case that homelessness is about housing, not about drugs and mental health or vacant houses. What I want to do in 2021 is make the argument for the larger relevance of housing regulation as a key driver of overall economic growth and prosperity. If you care about raising American living standards in concrete ways, better housing policy is far and away the lowest-hanging fruit.


Yet the war on bad permitting rules is so much larger than housing!


Energy and climate policy are another key issue area, and I’ve become increasingly convinced that energy abundance is underrated. And relatedly, I think both moderate and left-wing Democrats tend to understate the barriers to deployment of clean energy relative to the need for R&D or subsidy. Whether we’re talking about interregional transmission lines for renewables or advanced nuclear plants, we need to make it easier to actually build the things.


Another big one that’s politically tricky is immigration. Immigration doesn’t reduce wages and, in an inflationary environment, we should see it as a very useful supply-side reform. There are some promising ideas for expanding legal immigration lurking in Build Back Better, and we desperately need an immigration politics that’s more focused on the potential benefits of broader channels of legal migration and less on fighting about ICE and CBP.


Last but by no means least, I enjoyed doing a post on human history in the very long run for the beginning of the holiday season. I’m hoping to do more “weird” posts in 2022 because I think it’s a good idea to try to make a more highly differentiated product and run stories that even a really good op-ed page wouldn’t take.


See you in the New Year!

Predictions are hard

Predictions are hard

By Matthew Yglesias

I started running a couple of months ago and it turns out that doing something new is really hard. I couldn’t go for more than five minutes or so without needing to stop and walk for a bit to catch my breath. But I listened to all the internet advice and kept at it, so I could do one mile straight and then three and then four. And even though it still took me more than 30 minutes to do three miles, I could reliably get the first one done in under 10. Earlier this week, I ran 3 miles in 29 minutes and 30 seconds. I am hoping that if I keep working at it I will keep improving.

But I have to admit that doing things you’re not good at kind of sucks. One thing you see when you’re out running is lots of other people who run, and 99% of them are faster than me and in better shape. It’s a little embarrassing and I frequently have the sense that it would be better to just give up.

Here are the stats:

Predictions I made with 25% confidence — 0% correct.

60% confidence — 40% correct.

70% confidence — 29% correct (oof).

80% confidence — 67% correct.

90% confidence — 50% correct (oof again).

95% confidence — 100% correct.


This is a bad record. So bad in fact that I want to curl up in a ball and give up rather than try again. But I do think trying to keep this exercise in mind all year did lead me to be a little more restrained about tossing off wild, overconfident predictions than the average political pundit. So I’m going to try to keep working at it, do another round, and improve my predicting skills.

But first, an in-depth look at the forecasts.

What I predicted and why I was wrong (and sometimes right)
Jon Ossoff and Raphael Warnock win the Georgia Senate races (60%) YES

My forecasting principle here was “the candidate leading the polls will probably win.” This was a contrarian call at the time based on the history of Georgia runoffs, but my principle is better than history. For all the flaws of horse race polling, “the polls are probably right” is a good bet.

The same party wins both Senate races in Georgia (95%) YES

This one was obvious.

Joe Biden ends the year with his approval rating higher than his disapproval rating (70%) NO

I was predicting strong economic growth (which happened) and assumed it would lift Biden’s rating, which it did not — I think largely due to inflation.

Joe Biden ends the year with his approval rating above 50% (60%) NO

See above.

U.S. GDP growth in 2021 is the fastest of any year of the 21st century (80%) YES

See above

The year-end unemployment rate is below 5% (80%) YES

See above.

The year-end unemployment rate is above 4% (80%) YES

I avoided being overly optimistic here.

Lakers win the NBA championship (25%) NO

Underrated how weird and disruptive the Covid-19 seasons would be.

Joe Biden ends the year as president (95%) YES

Not a particularly tough call.

Nancy Pelosi sets a definitive retirement schedule (60%) NO

A vacancy arises on the Supreme Court (70%) NO

I was mildly too optimistic about the Democratic Party’s geriatric leadership making responsible choices for the country.

The EU ends the year with more confirmed Covid-19 deaths than the US (60%) YES

The more stringent NPIs in Europe are just not that effective; I think American liberals get this now that Biden has been in office for a year, but there was some denial last winter.

Substack will still be around (95%) YES

People will still be writing takes asking if Substack is really sustainable (80%) YES

I was new at this and still found this chatter interesting.

Apple releases new iMacs powered by Apple silicon (90%) YES

Apple does not release a new Mac Pro powered by Apple silicon (70%) YES

In my real life, Apple gadgets news is my passion.

Monthly year-on-year core CPI growth does not go above 2% (70%) NO

Monthly year-on-year core CPI growth does not go above 3% (90%) NO

These forecasts were worse than I remembered, which is part of the value of explicit accountability. In my head, I remembered that I had misforecasted inflation. And I remembered that was in large part because I was implicitly assuming we wouldn’t get a stimulus nearly as large as ARP. But my real forecast was so low and so definitive that I’m pretty sure it would have been wrong even had ARP passed with $0 in stimulus. I was just not anticipating at all the bottlenecks in global commodity production, that the 2020 supply chain issues could get worse rather than better, and basically just had this totally wrong.

Realistically, I had just lived through so much undershooting of inflation targets that the idea of overshooting seemed more implausible to me than it should have.

Lloyd Austin not confirmed as Defense Secretary (60%) NO

This was a closer-run thing than people remember.

No federal tax increases are enacted (95%) YES

In retrospect, probably overconfident but I was right.

Biden administration unilaterally relieves some but not all student debt (80%) NO

I’m kind of surprised this didn’t happen months ago.

United States rejoins JCPOA and Iran resumes compliance (80%) NO

The negotiators on both sides here took surprisingly long to even get serious about talking.

Israel and Saudi Arabia establish official diplomatic relations (70%) NO

This is very much in the mix on the Saudi end, but as you can see I was just generally overestimating how much stuff would happen. I think governments around the world continue to be spending a lot of time sweating about Covid-19, and so a bunch of stuff that is loosely in the works is just not happening particularly quickly.

U.S. and China reach an agreement to lift Trump-era tariffs (70%) NO

This is another one where I actually wish I had a better understanding of why I was wrong. Mechanically, the explanation is that China is falling wildly short of the most basic commitments they made to the Trump administration in terms of increasing Chinese purchases of U.S. exports. If China was upholding that end of the deal, then you could fudge the other items on the agenda and have a nice photo op for everyone. But under the circumstances, I think Biden would look ridiculous cutting a deal, so he’s not. But why is China reneging on its promises to buy American manufactured goods?

I have no idea, and even though Chad Brown’s rundown of the numbers is very helpful, there’s no real explanation of Beijing’s thinking. Some of it is they fell short of their 2020 targets because of the pandemic, so fair enough. But into 2021 when economies are strong, they’re not even vaguely in the ballpark.

Slow Boring will exceed 10,000 paid members (70%) YES

The site’s been a big success despite my terrible track record of predicting things!

Predictions for next year
I’ve decided I should keep this more specifically focused on my main areas of coverage and not throw in any “fun” predictions or just random stuff I’m interested in.

Democrats lose both houses of Congress (90%)

Democrats lose at least two Senate seats (80%)

Democrats lose fewer than six Senate seats (80%)

Nancy Pelosi announces retirement plans (70%)

Stephen Breyer does not retire (60%)

Some version of Build Back Better passes (60%)

Joe Biden is still president (90%)

At least one Biden cabinet-rank official resigns (70%)

No military conflict between the PRC and Taiwan (a worryingly low 90%)

New U.S. sanctions on Russia (70%)

Saudi Arabia and Israel establish diplomatic relations (60%)

Fewer U.S. Covid deaths in 2022 than in 2021 (80%)

Emmanuel Macron re-elected (60%)

Traffic light coalition exploits loopholes to get around the constitutional debt brake (70%)

No recession in 2021 (90%)

Liz Cheney loses primary (80%)

Some version of USICA passes Congress (70%)

Lula elected president of Brazil (60%)

China officially abandons Covid Zero (70%)

Fewer U.S. Covid-19 deaths in 2022 than in 2020 (80%)

Additional booster shots of mRNA vaccines authorized for seniors (80%)

November 2022 year-on-year CPI growth is below 6% (70%)

November 2022 year-on-year CPI growth is above 4% (70%)

The Fed ends up doing more than its currently forecast three interest rate hikes (60%)

Russia does not invade Ukraine (60%)

Viktor Orbán loses power in Hungary (60%)

Sinn Fein becomes the largest party in the Northern Ireland assembly (60%)

The U.S. and Canada reach an agreement on softwood lumber (70%)

Democrats go down at least one governor on net (60%)

The unemployment rate stays between 4 and 5% (70%)

Here’s hoping I do better this year!

‘An American Tradition’: Lessons from a year covering conspiracy theories

‘An American Tradition’: Lessons from a year covering conspiracy theories
A reporter reflects on conflicts over truth, trust and belonging in America
The night sky from Lookout Mountain in Colorado.
The night sky from Lookout Mountain in Colorado. (David Williams for The Washington Post)
— Reporting from Dealey Plaza in Dallas

The night sky from Lookout Mountain in Colorado. (David Williams for The Washington Post)
By Jose A. Del Real
December 29, 2021 at 7:00 a.m. EST


— Reporting from Dealey Plaza in Dallas


The old textbook depository at 411 Elm St. isn’t especially eye-catching, but for nearly 60 years its awful past has loomed over downtown Dallas and, perhaps, all of American public life. “On November 22, 1963,” notes a modest historical marker fixed to its red-brick facade, “the building gained national notoriety when Lee Harvey Oswald allegedly shot and killed president John F. Kennedy from a sixth floor window as the presidential motorcade passed the site.”

Every few minutes, visitors pause to read the engraving — by the Texas Historical Commission, a government agency — and then point to an emphatic etch around “allegedly” that someone has scratched into the plate, in case the point was too subtle.

“They did that because they know it’s not true,” a man tells a companion one November afternoon, and then it happens again, and again, but no one is interested in sharing these private thoughts with a reporter, at least not on the record. Nobody wants to risk being called “a conspiracy theorist,” a “truther,” and they especially do not want to have their names lumped together with those other people, the ones with the Trump-Kennedy signs down the street.

Yet nearly six decades after JFK’s assassination, a significant majority of Americans believe that what really happened here was covered up or at least very seriously distorted by … someone.

Among the conspirators listed in limitless unsubstantiated theories are the mafia, international communists, segregationists, the Central Intelligence Agency, various other factions within the federal government or some combination thereof. No answers have come from decades of questions posed by a not-so-niche JFK conspiracy theory industry. But along the way, the questions themselves congealed into kinds of answers for about 60 percent of the public, who doubt “the official narrative.”

I have spent this year thinking and writing about the draw to conspiracy theories, the perverse comfort they provide and the damage they can cause. Today in the United States, we are living in an era of segregated belief, of divergent realities, at a time when social media has brought us nearer to one another than ever before. It is not just that there is disagreement. Certified and recertified elections are in dispute. Viruses and their lifesaving vaccines are in dispute. So often, facts themselves are in dispute. My focus has been on telling intimate stories about people navigating these conflicts within their families and communities.

Now I see a grander lesson about truth in Dealey Plaza, one I have been circling for years. That The Truth is not something merely to be found and disclosed, but rather that, in the broader sense, it is something that is negotiated, something that is mediated over time through credibility and trust. That, in the absence of those things, evidence can be so very easily overtaken by fantasy, and stay that way.

Then there’s the QAnon movement, an extremist ideology that has ripped apart families and whose followers were a prominent part of the U.S. Capitol riot on Jan. 6.

QAnon followers believe that former president Donald Trump spent his time as president battling a cabal of Satan-worshiping “deep state” Democrats who traffic children for sex, a paranoia that has often led to valuable resources being diverted away from real missing children cases. Since the 2020 election, they have also come to believe that Trump’s loss was the result of massive fraud, a disproved conspiracy theory that has in turn created a real threat to our democracy and elections. Going further than the 7 in 10 Republican voters who believe the same election conspiracy, Q followers also assure with prophetic zeal that Trump will be reinstated imminently. Mass arrests of the country’s corrupt elite and a “Great Awakening” will follow, they say.

That’s actually why I came here.

A few months ago, just a few feet away from the place where Oswald shot JFK, several dozen demonstrators began to gather to proselytize another conspiracy theory that sprang from QAnon message boards. This one — bordering on messianic and based in part on numerology — involved the slain president’s son, who himself died in a plane crash in 1999. Here on the grassy knoll, they believed, John F. Kennedy Jr. would soon reemerge more than two decades after having faked his own death, or would perhaps be reincarnated outright. The resurrected son of the assassinated father, they assured, would become Trump’s vice president.

With such public hallucinations in the headlines, it has become common to hear that we are living in an age of conspiracy theories, a symptom of our “post-truth” society. That’s what I believed, too, when I first started this project at the end of 2020.

And yet researchers who track such suspicions with polling say there is no evidence that more people in America believe in conspiracy theories today than in previous eras. That is in part because they have always been quite common among the American public and throughout U.S. history. Virtually everyone believes in a conspiracy theory or two, experts say, and most of the time it causes no problems at all.

So what is going on in our country?

What is new about this, and what is old?

Is it sustainable?

If we can conceive of truth as a process, then consider how the Internet has changed the ways we barter over it. It is not only more visible than before because of social media, but, in fact, the search for truth is also messier than it used to be now that everyone has a video production studio in their pockets. Today, it is harder to avoid other people’s delusions, and yet also easier to seclude ourselves away online with people who share our own. It is possible to do it all relatively anonymously.

Across screens and servers, it has also become easier for opportunists to mobilize conspiratorial thinking for political strength and influence.

More questions unfold from there.

What eases the slide from harmless skepticism, to mainstream doubt, to militant conspiracism?

Where is the line?

Who is most susceptible to crossing it?

I have come to understand that conspiracy theories are about certainty, about belonging and about power. They do not function like spells; they do not lull people into a trance. They are only as widespread as they are resonant. And I have also learned that the facts of people’s lives can make them more susceptible to embracing conspiratorial fallacies.

To understand the lure of conspiracy theories and alternate realities, you have to interrogate what people get out of believing such things.

You have to understand the human emotions — fear, estrangement, resentment — that underlie them.

And you need to appreciate the whole story: We are not living in the age of conspiracy theories in America. We are living in America, a country with a deep tradition of them.

* * *

A river of conspiracy theories flows through the wild lands of American history, always ferrying possibility and peril, its water marks rising and falling through time and bend.

Look closely and you will see such thinking in the witch hunts of the colonial era. In the anti-monarchical mobilization of the Revolutionary War. Consider the conspiracy theories used to justify white-supremacist terrorism leading to the Civil War, and long after it. Consider the misdirected and racist national security paranoia after Pearl Harbor that was used to justify Japanese American internment. Look at trends in migration, the economy, the size of the federal government, then contemplate the rise of violent anti-Semitic, or anti-Catholic, or anti-communist fantasies that surged in response.

Trace that line straight to the conspiracy theory about the birthplace of Barack Obama, our first Black president, and through the conspiratorial moral panic over sharia law that seemingly vanished once there was another White man in office after him.

Conspiracy theories are “an American tradition,” in the words of historian Robert A. Goldberg, who wrote the gold standard in historical scholarship on the topic, “Enemies Within.” Finished just before the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, Goldberg’s careful genealogy of American conspiracism remains deeply relevant two decades since its publication, even presciently so.

The point is not that mass delusions, disinformation and conspiracy mongering are unique to America.

But here in the United States, conspiracy theories have always been exacerbated by our unique racial, ethnic and religious pluralism, according to Goldberg and other historians. As populist myths, conspiracy theories allow their believers to feel part of a “true” American community, as special defenders of it. They thrive, the historical record shows, amid the mistrust that exists between people and communities.

Americans have often embraced conspiratorial stories and lies with particular vigor during moments of pronounced uncertainty wrought by social and technological change. And conspiracy theory opportunists throughout U.S. history have found myriad ways to exploit these particular American fissures.

Of course, real government conspiracies, coverups and blunders have provided ample disillusionment and distrust, particularly since the second half of the 20th century, which brought the expansion of the U.S. government and the country’s ascension to global superpower.

The official federal investigation into JFK’s murder in 1964, known as the Warren Commission report, left itself open to endless criticism with too-tidy and heavy-handed conclusions that many felt went beyond what available evidence could support. Even high-level officials, including President Lyndon B. Johnson and members of the Kennedy family, expressed private doubts about aspects of the commission’s work. That skepticism became canonized when, 14 years later, a damning congressional probe concluded that there was a high probability that two gunmen shot at the president, instead of Oswald alone, which the Justice Department again rejected years later.

To the minds of conspiracy theorists, this did not amount to government incompetence; it was all proof of a malevolent cabal orchestrating a coverup, a suspicious propensity historian Richard Hofstadter referred to in the 1960s as the “paranoid style in American politics.” Where one person may see ineptitude, someone else might see a plot.

There are echoes of this tendency in communities where there is high coronavirus vaccine hesitancy, in the 9/11 Truth movement, even in communities of UFO believers that are increasingly overrun by right-wing extremists.

All of which brings us to today.

Over the past 20 years, sweeping technological change has dramatically accelerated the speed with which conspiracy theories can spread and has made it easier for people with fringe beliefs to find one another. I have seen in my reporting time and again that conspiracy theory communities online can often become more important to believers than their offline relations, a new kind of self-segregation that can eviscerate even family bonds. In our chaotic and divided moment, the stories we believe say something about the factions we belong to, like the music we listen to or the clothes we wear.

The Internet has not only made it easier for conspiratorial communities to organize, but it has also made conspiracy mongering substantially less arduous. No longer do those trafficking in conspiracy theories have to write books or stitch together grand presentations for maximum effect.

“In the old days, conspiracy theorists had to persuade you that the truth is out there. Now conspiracy theories have become tweets,” Goldberg told me one recent afternoon by telephone. “Conspiracy theories are no longer about persuading. They are just slogans.”

That shift, mixed with doubt and status politics and social alienation, can leave people extremely vulnerable to manipulation. It is why my mother, a Mexican immigrant and naturalized American citizen, refuses even now to get vaccinated, despite what I tell her about the conspiracy theory videos she sends me. Why so many of my childhood friends’ parents in Alaska, kind and smart people, believe the 2020 election was stolen.

And yet, even now in the Internet era, old themes in conspiracy theories constantly recycle, sometimes in surprising and fanciful ways. Numerology was used to tie the British monarchy to Satan during the revolutionary era, Goldberg noted, and now it is being used by JFK Jr. truthers on the fringes of QAnon in concert with Christian end-of-days theology. Fear of a Trojan-horse invasion was at the heart of McCarthyism in the mid-20th century and underlies the critical race theory moral panic today. Anti-papal warnings about a Catholic chief executive circulated when JFK ran for president in 1960, and I encountered them again among evangelical voters during President Biden’s campaign in 2020.

To gawk at the most nonsensical elements of conspiracy theories — at the fringe-of-the-fringe spectacle of something like QAnon — without understanding the underlying cultural currents that lead people there is to miss the point. Perhaps it is more productive to consider the mainstream delusions people embrace in order to understand how common it is for belief to be distorted by emotion, by status anxiety, by what we already believe.

Now, as in the past, conspiracy theories are about power — who has it, who wants it, who is losing it. In that way, they offer a reflection on American life. They reveal the deep anxieties people feel about the unknown. Distortions and rumors flood into the cracks that exist between individuals, and over time their overwhelming force can drown people and communities entirely.

* * *

The conversation about disinformation in America is often centered on the supply side — understandably and necessarily — with an emphasis on what technology companies and government regulators should do to stop the spread of falsehoods on the Internet.

But I wanted to better understand the demand side of the equation: susceptibility to false beliefs, person by person.

There are clues in the budding interdisciplinary study of disinformation and rumor, which is still fairly new and is often segmented across academic silos.

One factor that propels disinformation is confirmation bias, the well-known psychological phenomenon that explains why people easily accept information that aligns with their existing worldviews. We are all subject to that.

But it is also clear from research that certain types of people are simply much more susceptible to disinformation and conspiratorial thinking than others, and not just those struggling with mental illnesses or lacking in mental fortitude.

Some researchers have found that there is a connection between “magical thinking,” devout religious faith and conspiracy worldviews. Others say deeply ingrained anti-social personality traits are at the heart of extremist conspiracy theories. Individual predispositions to rational- vs. intuition-based thinking are a factor as well, as is lower educational attainment and formal academic training. Advanced age, too, appears to make people likelier to spread fake news on the Internet.

Consider, though, that simply being told a lie or false information multiple times can make people more likely to believe it, something called the illusory truth effect, which has been studied and affirmed by social scientists, scholars of propaganda and even neuroscientists who see susceptibility to disinformation as partially rooted in the very structures of the brain.

Now consider that effect in a media landscape that rewards partisan echo chambers.

Now consider it in the social media age.

“Our brains are not built for the truth,” David Linden, a professor of neuroscience at the Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, told me earlier this year. “Our brains weren’t even built to read. Our brains weren’t. Evolution is a very slow process. It takes many, many, many, many, many generations. And the change in technology and particularly in information is so rapid that there’s no way for evolution to keep up.”

“We’re really mismatched,” he added.

How, then, do people make sense of the flood of information they receive each day in the Internet era? In much the same way they always have: They rely fundamentally on trust, according to Cailin O’Connor, a philosopher of biology and behavioral sciences at the University of California at Irvine.

O’Connor, who uses mathematical models to study the spread of false beliefs, explained to me that people are likelier to believe new information from someone who is similar to them in terms of gender, race and political affiliation. This heuristic guides all sorts of decisions, such as the kinds of computer monitors people buy, what movies they watch and even who they vote for in elections.

“We learn almost all of our beliefs just directly from other people. Most of the processes by which we come to believe things are processes of trust. That’s the heart of how false beliefs spread,” O’Connor said. “In particular, people become misinformed because they tend to trust those they identify with, meaning they are more likely to listen to those who share their social and political identities.”

We choose who to believe, we choose who to trust, often before we realize we are doing it. It is no wonder our disinformation battles can feel so personal, especially within families.

From here, we can use myriad useful data points to help tell this story on a grand, social scale. Trust in government, according to various surveys of Americans, has dropped precipitously in the past half-century. Active distrust in newspapers and television news channels has exploded.

If our methodologies of truth are broken, I see again and again, then it stems from the fact that so, too, are our methodologies of trust.

* * *

Donald Trump arrived as a political force in America amid this confluence of history and technology and social unrest.

It was while I was covering the 2016 presidential election that I began to sense the powerful current of conspiratorial thinking that coursed through our nation’s politics.

A few weeks before Election Day that year, Trump began to make conspiratorial grievance an explicit feature of his stump speeches on stages across the country, where he would enumerate the list of plotters he said had already rigged the election against him, which included the media, pollsters, voting security experts, the political establishment from both parties in Washington and a global financial elite. All, he said, were working in concert to deny the will of the people.

Such good-vs.-evil rhetoric was deeply resonant and thus compelling, no matter that it echoed New World Order fears and even the anti-Semitic “Protocols of the Elders of Zion.” On the campaign trail, he accused Hillary Clinton, his Democratic rival, of meeting “in secret with international banks to plot the destruction of U.S. sovereignty to enrich these global financial powers, her special interest friends and her donors.”

Trump’s political rise had been facilitated by his amplification of the disproved, racist birther conspiracy theory about Obama. During the 2016 primary campaign, Trump had claimed the Iowa caucuses were stolen from him after he came in second there. He also claimed later that the father of Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Tex.) — one of his final rivals for the GOP nomination — was seen with Oswald around the time of JFK’s assassination.

Five years later, in Dealey Plaza, I see Trump-Kennedy campaign paraphernalia among QAnon believers and recognize it as a ripple in long-tainted waters.

I decide, in this case, against pursuing interviews with any in the group. They seem mentally unwell. I am not sure there is much to be learned from leering, and I am not sure they can consent to being interviewed. For all the attention it receives, QAnon alone does not tell the story of conspiracy theories in America. It is one tributary of delusion among many.

The former president’s willingness to amplify conspiracy theories from the White House made him a singular figure in American history, according to virtually every historian, social scientist and disinformation researcher I have spoken to on the topic. His rejection of the election results is without precedent.

But the conditions that made people amenable to those conspiracy theories, they each said, long preceded Trump.

The story of America involves him but is not about him.

Americans are angry. Americans are distrustful. Americans are looking for something to believe in. The Internet has transformed and twisted that search.

If there was once an illusion of consensus, that is gone now.

The hidden transcript of the American discourse is now explicit for anyone who can summon the courage to read it online, and doing so can help us understand people’s behaviors beyond it.

I think about how once you believe in one conspiracy theory, as research shows, you are likelier to start believing in others.

I consider once again the finer line between doubt and delirium.

As I leave Dallas, I am overwhelmed by the feeling that Truth, in the grand sense, cannot be treated merely like an accretion of facts. Truth is a story we tell, a history we accept, an agreement we make, a conversation and a negotiation. Truth is nothing without belief, and for one person to believe another, there needs to be trust between them.

Most evangelical objections to vaccines have nothing to do with Christianity

Most evangelical objections to vaccines have nothing to do with Christianity

A woman holds a sign during a protest at the State House in Trenton, N.J., on Jan. 13, 2020. Religious objections, once used only sparingly in the United States for exemptions from required vaccines, became a more widely used loophole in the pandemic. (Seth Wenig/AP)
Image without a caption
By Michael Gerson
Columnist
Today at 5:19 p.m. EST


As the United States ends the year with the highest levels in new infections of the covid pandemic, the historical question naturally arises: Were a hefty portion of Americans entirely out of their senses?

A woman holds a sign during a protest at the State House in Trenton, N.J., on Jan. 13, 2020. Religious objections, once used only sparingly in the United States for exemptions from required vaccines, became a more widely used loophole in the pandemic. (Seth Wenig/AP)
Some of this rapid spread has come from breakthrough infections, caused by the insidiously transmissible omicron variant. But after a ghastly year of rumor, alarm and needless death, nothing is going to erase the harsh verdict against Americans in 2021: They were granted a miracle drug, and tens of millions refused to take it (or take enough of it).

In the grab bag of reasons for vaccine resistance, the religious exemption claimed by evangelicals is perhaps the most perplexing. The default ethical stance of Christianity is the Golden Rule: “Do to others as you would have them do to you.” This principle was developed in a variety of other religious and moral traditions. (See the Babylonian Talmud: “What is hateful to you, do not do to your neighbor. That is the whole Torah.”) In the New Testament, the Golden Rule is the moral culmination of the Sermon on the Mount. And it is clear from the text that Jesus is not encouraging a calculating ethic of reciprocity. His goal is to inspire a kind of aggressive, preemptive generosity. “If anyone would sue you and take your tunic, let him have your cloak as well. And if anyone forces you to go one mile, go with him two miles.”

The proper application of this principle can be difficult, particularly when it comes to Christian participation in a just war. But the case of vaccination is not really a hard one. Here the tunic is the prick of a needle and a minuscule risk of a bad reaction. The result is a significant benefit for the vaccinated and the community they live in.

Many have come to a very different view. White evangelical Christians have resisted getting vaccinated against the coronavirus at higher rates than other religious groups in the United States. Some initial resistance came in the context of a familiar ethical debate: Did the creation of coronavirus vaccines involve cell lines produced from aborted fetuses?

The short answer is: no. A slightly longer answer is that the Johnson & Johnson vaccine is grown in fetal cell line PER.C6, which was derived from an elective abortion in 1985. “But contrary to social media claims,” Francis Collins, former director of the National Institutes of Health, told me, “there are no fetal cells or fetal DNA in the Johnson & Johnson vaccine.” The Vatican has indicated that Catholics can take the Johnson & Johnson vaccine.

“The Pfizer and Moderna mRNA are synthesized without the need for a cell line,” Collins said. “The only possible objection against those is that their effectiveness was tested in certain lab experiments that used fetal cell lines. But if that is sufficient reason to decline them, that would also need to apply to a very long list of current medicines, including aspirin and statins.”

The main resistance of evangelicals to public health measures does not concern abortion. Having embraced religious liberty as a defining cause, they are now deploying the language of that cause in opposition to jab and mask mandates. Arguments crafted to defend institutional religious liberty have been adapted to oppose public coercion on covid. But they do not fit.

More than that, the sanctification of anti-government populism is displacing or dethroning one of the most basic Christian distinctions. Most evangelical posturing on covid mandates is really syncretism, a merging of unrelated beliefs — in this case, the substitution of libertarianism for Christian ethics. In this distorted form of faith, evangelical Christians are generally known as people who loudly defend their own rights. They show not radical generosity but discreditable selfishness. There is no version of the Golden Rule that would recommend Christian resistance to basic public health measures during a pandemic. This is heresy compounded by lunacy.

It is worth recalling, as a matter of law, that someone does not need a good or theologically coherent religious-liberty claim to make a religious-liberty claim in court (absent fraud or opportunism). To deny such a claim, government needs a compelling interest advanced in the least restrictive manner. But it is hard to imagine a clearer, more fundamental example of a compelling state interest than preventing the spread of a virus that has already taken the lives of more than 800,000 Americans.

And when Christians are asserting a right to resist basic public health measures, what is the actual content of their religious-liberty claim? The right to risk the lives of their neighbors in order to assert their autonomy? The right to endanger the community in the performative demonstration of their personal rights?

This is a vivid display of the cultural and ideological trends of a warped and wasted year. It just has nothing to do with real Christianity.

Thursday, December 30, 2021

My favorite movies of 2021

My favorite movies of 2021
Like most people, I stopped going to see movies when Covid hit and stayed away even after theaters began to reopen.

By Matthew Yglesias

But during the height of the pandemic, I was struck by how much I love movies and how much I missed them, not just because of lockdown but because I’d gone less and less since my kid was born. And beyond that, I realized that I miss movies as a vital form of entertainment for grownups that has been fragmented by Marvel’s domination of the box office and the cultural clout of prestige television.

There are a couple of great TV shows and a bunch of good ones, but what I like about movies is that a screenwriter writes a whole script from beginning to end. That script is read and revised and completed and then production starts. The director and the director of photography capture a bunch of footage and work with an editor to put it together. They watch the rough cut from beginning to end and decide how they want to tweak it. When they’re done, critics watch the whole movie — all the way through to the end — before writing their reviews. And as a member of the audience, especially if you’re watching in theaters, it’s customary to see the end of the movie before commenting on it. In other words, a movie is a finished product whereas TV shows are like a boat that’s still under construction as you’re sailing across the ocean.

Ever since getting vaccinated, I’ve been making a point to get to theaters — with friends when possible, but frequently alone. And I’ve been loving it. Judging by the box office results of 2021, my hope for cinema to come back as a vibrant commercial and artist medium is doomed — tons of good stuff bombed and everything that did well was a sequel. Nonetheless, a lot of good films got made. Also “Red Notice.”

Disappointment of the year: “Red Notice”
I badly miss the 1990s R-rated action movie. It’s not coming back for some pretty profound economic reasons, but for roughly the same reasons it makes sense for a streaming platform like Netflix to invest in making some of them.

I did not love “Triple Frontier,” their initial foray into this terrain, but I did like it. And I loved that it happened because I thought it meant Netflix would make more action movies.

But in 2021 we got “Red Notice” and it sucked. It has big stars and a director whose previous movies I’ve liked. It’s about heists and everyone likes a heist movie. But man, it just sucks! It’s everything that’s bad and annoying about Netflix's original programming, which often seems to be throwing stuff up against the wall for no reason. Netflix claims the movie was a big success, which would be terrible because then they’ll make more terrible movies. So I am begging Netflix executives: go watch the classics like “Predator,” “The Last Boy Scout,” “Die Hard With a Vengeance,” “Hard Target,” “Passenger 57,” “Air Force One,” and “Under Siege.” Then make us some cool movies.

#5: “The Last Duel”

Are you not entertained?
I was incredibly amped for this when it came out. Ridley Scott collaborated with Matt Damon, Ben Affleck, and Nicole Holofcener on a script. Damon and Affleck are in it with Adam Driver and Jodie Comer. What’s not to like?

Well, America disagreed and did not want to see Damon in a mullet and a suit of armor or Affleck as a weird lecherous count. But the people are wrong and this movie was amazing. You get essentially the same story of a rape and its aftermath from three different points of view. First Damon as the aggrieved husband of the victim, then Driver as the perpetrator, then Comer as the victim. Each run through the story is quite different, but it’s not exactly “Rashomon;” the key facts are in dispute legally, but the three POVs essentially agree on what happened.

What makes the movie fascinating is the use of subtle differences in dialogue, blocking, and acting, as well as the inclusion or exclusion of different scenes that only some of the characters witnessed to totally change the story.

This is the kind of movie that would traditionally count on the star power of its leads to get people to come see it despite a premise with little obvious appeal. But those days seem to be behind us. Still, it’s a classic case of good things happening when a lot of very talented people collaborate.

#4: “West Side Story”

Instantly iconic
I really love “West Side Story,” but I think a lot of the recent efforts to modernize it (putting whole songs in Spanish for the 2009 revival, whatever the hell they were doing in the 2020 revival) have made things worse. My inclination was always to defend the 1961 movie version against critics of its politics by saying that “West Side Story” is no more “about” Manhattan gangs in the 1950s than “Romeo and Juliet” is about the politics of Renaissance Verona.

But Stephen Spielberg and Tony Kushner are really good at what they do, and they managed to actually deliver what people were asking for, building these songs around a book that actually says something substantive about ethnic conflict in Lincoln Square. Their previous collaboration, Lincoln, was a little didactic for my taste (though I agreed with their didactic message), but there are sharp limits to how didactic a movie can be when people burst into song when overcome with emotion or fight while doing ballet. I thought it was a nice balance between fun song-and-dance numbers, a sappy love story, and some sociopolitical commentary.

Rachel Zegler, Mike Faist, and David Alvarez are all just absolutely incredible. And I did not love Ansel Elgort’s singing, but with help from the the script revisions, he brought some real depth to what’s kind of an empty character in the original. Like “Last Duel,” this one bombed at the box office as part of the ongoing collapse of cinema as an enterprise. But what can you do? I think we need more popularism in our politics but less in our cultural commentary.

#3: “Dune”
As previously discussed, I am a major Dune-head and I loved “Dune.”

Denis Villeneuve’s craftsmanship on this movie stands out. People talk about it in a sort of abstract way, but I found Thomas Flight’s video breaking down on a technical level exactly why it’s so impressive to be incredibly helpful. To steal one of his points, these are both scenes with background explosions digitally inserted behind characters. But Villeneuve has arranged his shot to look like an actual photograph of people backlit by an explosion. Both scenes are fake, but the Black Widow scene looks fake.


But I heard an interview with Villeneuve where he said the hardest thing about bringing “Dune” together was the script. He, Eric Roth, and John Spaihts had to make a lot of choices about what from the book to cut and what was left in and how to end the first movie. And I think their choices really worked well. It’s fun to dunk on the slightly slipshod way the MCU throws its visual design together, but I think the real difference is on the level of story. The premise is every bit as fantastical as the weirdest stuff you’ll see in a comic. But like all really good sci-fi, “Dune” is about taking its own fantastical premises seriously. The better stretches of the MCU flirt with taking their own premises seriously, but they inevitably end in a generic CGI slugfest and a handful of quips. “Dune” has really brought the seriousness of some very weird books onto the screen.

I feel ambivalent about putting this at #3 only because there’s going to be a second movie. If it’s as good as the first, that’ll not only be great but will reflect incredibly well on the first “Dune.” But it’s also possible that problems with “Dune 2” will reveal that some of the story choices made to construct “Dune 1” were in fact mistakes. It’s a little bit of an incomplete for me.

#2: “No Sudden Move”

Weird lenses everywhere
This was a pandemic production, shot under Covid-19 protocols, then I believe sent directly to HBO Max without coming out in theaters. It’s really fucking good.

I have to confess, though, that the first time I put it on as a casual stream I got confused and turned it off. It was only after I put it on again in serious movie-watching mode that I got it. Yes, this is a Stephen Soderbergh heist movie. But it’s not light and effortless like “Ocean’s Eleven” — you need to pay attention. If you do pay attention, though, you’ll be richly rewarded with tremendous performances from Benicio del Toro and Don Cheadle. By the time Matt Damon shows up for a cameo, the movie is enthralling, and the scene with del Toro, Cheadle, and Damon is the best thing I’ve seen on film in years.

I feel like this hasn’t gotten the love it deserves, and I really urge you to check it out.

It’s a couple of cool performances, lots of trick shot cinematography from Soderbergh (who DPs his own movies under a pseudonym for some reason) to capture the emotion of a couple of guys who are out of their depth, and a screenplay that actually has something to say about the world at a time when I feel like more and more work is trying to incorporate political themes while staying fairly vacuous.

#1: “The Power of the Dog”

Montana looks like Mordor in this movie because they shot it in New Zealand
The best movies do only-in-a-movie things, and the combination of visuals with music in “The Power of the Dog” — some of it diegetic (that’s the fancy word for when the characters on screen are supposed to be able to hear the music), some of it not, some of it genuinely unclear whether it’s diegetic or not — is really cool.

I will not spoil this movie because I’ve heard some people say their enjoyment was compromised by spoiling. But I will say is that I knew the major plot beats before I saw it, and I didn’t mind. And to me, that’s actually the essence of good storytelling. “Hamlet” doesn’t hinge on your suspense; it’s the artful unfolding of the story that makes it great. Here I would say Jane Campion unravels a mystery over time rather than presenting us with a twist. It’s also a fascinating exercise in doing a character study of some very strange characters — eccentric people who have made odd choices in their lives and continue to do weird things. But all beautifully and compellingly realized. At first, I thought Benedict Cumberbatch’s strange effort to do an American accent was a weak point; but by the end, I was sold on it as a method choice. It’s of course possible that in reality, it’s just bad dialect work.

But however it came together, it worked for me in a just perfectly constructed film that’s been haunting me ever since I saw it.

Wednesday, December 29, 2021

Why Wokeism Will Rule the World

Why Wokeism Will Rule the World
The woke movement could be the next great U.S. cultural export — and it is going to do many other countries some real good.

“White Lotus” is more than an American cultural phenomenon. Photographer: Mario Perez/HBO
“White Lotus” is more than an American cultural phenomenon. Photographer: Mario Perez/HBO

By
Tyler Cowen

September 19, 2021, 8:00 AM EDT
I am decidedly un-woke. As a professor of economics, I strongly favor a market-oriented approach. I have worked hard to defend the positions of non-woke right-wing and libertarian colleagues in academia. What’s more, I am on record as saying that wokeism is stupid and inflexible, and will state here and now that it is also boring and predictable.

And yet: I have a nagging sense that, among its opponents, wokeism is underrated. (Its proponents, meanwhile, tend to overrate it.) Consider this essay my attempt to explain why and how its enemies should learn to live with wokeism. 1

Wokeism is global.

Too many critics of wokeism make the mistake of focusing on purely local status relations. They are obsessed with the influence of woke forces in their intellectual communities — their universities, their media universe, and so on. Oddly but perhaps appropriately, this is exactly the mistake that the woke themselves make. 

But the woke are engaging in a much larger international arena. One question raised by the woke movement, though hardly ever asked, is whether the U.S. will be able to deploy this new intellectual tool for exporting American cultural influence. Put another way: If there is going to be an international progressive class, why not Americanize it?

Wokeism is an idea that can be adapted to virtually every country: Identify a major form of oppression in a given region or nation, argue that people should be more sensitive to it, add some rhetorical flourishes, purge some wrongdoers (and a few innocents) and voila — you have created another woke movement.

As the technology writer and lawyer Paul Skallas has written: “MeToo and BlackLivesMatter are essentially US culture issues which provide an effective identity for internationals of the progressive class.” Almost every other country now has its own version of woke, though it may differ greatly from the American version.

The French clearly see wokeism as a carrier of American cultural influence. “French politicians, high-profile intellectuals and journalists are warning that progressive American ideas — specifically on race, gender, post-colonialism — are undermining their society,” the New York Times reported in February. It quoted France’s education minister on the need to fight “against an intellectual matrix from American universities.’’

But even the un-woke among us might think Francophone society and culture could stand to be a little more woke. The boss needs to know he doesn’t have the right to sleep with his secretary. And Belgians need to come to terms more honestly with their colonial heritage in Africa. Wokeism has turned out to be a way to get them to do that.

I also think French culture and society will emerge just fine from this engagement with wokeism. Most of all, wokeism is a way of spreading ideas from a relatively feminized American culture to a world less supportive of women’s rights.

FRANCE-US-RACISM-PROTEST
American cultural influence in France.
Photographer: JEFF PACHOUD/AFP
Returning to the glories of American cultural imperialism, consider the British philosophical pessimist John Gray. He recently wrote the following, weird but insightful:

Wokery is the successor ideology of neo-conservatism, a singularly American world-view. That may be why it has become a powerful force only in countries (such as Britain) heavily exposed to American culture wars. In much of the world — Asian and Islamic societies and large parts of Europe, for example — the woke movement is marginal, and its American prototype viewed with bemused indifference or contempt.

Does that make you feel better or worse about wokeism? I say better. Again, keep the bigger picture in mind. It doesn’t much matter who controls the English department at Oberlin College. But it would be nice if the Saudis moved to allow more rights for women.

Note that it is not necessary to approve of all U.S. cultural exports to view the spread of wokeism as a net positive for the world. I do not like either Big Macs or Marvel movies, for instance. But at the end of the day I think American culture is a healthy, democratizing, liberating influence, so I want to extend it.

As the motivational speakers like to say, Winners win! And woke is right now one of America’s global winners. Part of what makes America great, and could help to make the rest of the world greater yet, is accepting a certain amount of semi-stupid, least-common-denominator culture.

If not woke, then what?

Another question is what are the alternatives to woke. Some people are going to be extremists no matter what.

One possible alternative belief system, for example, is QAnon. According to a poll released in May by the Public Religion Research Institute and the Interfaith Youth Core, 15% of Americans “agree with the sweeping QAnon allegation that ‘the government, media and financial worlds in the U.S. are controlled by a group of Satan-worshipping pedophiles who run a global child sex trafficking operation.’” The same share said that “true American patriots may have to resort to violence” to restore order.

If QAnon were considered a religion, it would have more adherents than many other denominations. Even if not all of those believers are locked in, 15% is still a lot.

Of course there are many possible alternative belief systems more moderate than either wokeism or QAnon. But recall the question of the counterfactual: What exactly is wokeism a substitute for? If the woke didn’t believe in wokeism, what would they believe in? Something like the ideology of the Weather Underground of the 1970s? Classical liberalism? Moderate 1990s-style Clintonism? Or would they simply become disillusioned?

Woke and wokeism are a way to keep people engaged. To be clear, I think there are better alternatives to woke on the relevant margins. But simply asking the question is to realize the costs of woke are not as high as they might seem. The relevant comparison is not “woke vs. what I believe to be best,” but rather, “woke vs. a lot of the other crazy stuff people are going to believe if they weren’t woke.”

Wokeism does not necessarily confer partisan advantage.

Now to make a pair of narrower point about U.S. politics.

First, a lot of Republicans like to portray wokeism as a Democratic movement, and some even plan to campaign against it. The idea is that wokeism will take over the party, then the government, then the culture, not necessarily in that order.

I am not a Republican, but I agree that America needs greater ideological diversity in its universities, media outlets and corporate human resource departments. Nor am I a terrified conspiracy theorist who thinks leftists are taking over everything. They are, however, taking over some things — and perhaps wokeism will be part of what stops them. In this sense, it is not something to be feared.

Maybe wokeism will become more popular, even among Republicans (consider the generational shift in views of gay marriage, among both liberals and conservatives). Alternatively, perhaps wokeism will cause the Democrats to overreach and thus make the party less influential, not more. Already many on the left are worried about this possibility, as this excellent Thomas Edsall column makes clear.

The larger point is that there aren’t very many good macro theories of social change. Wokeism may well be the rope that the anti-capitalists will use to hang themselves. Wokeism does not poll very well with the public.

It’s also possible that wokeism will encourage truly original and dynamic thinkers to look to the right for support and inspiration. There might still be many more left-wing than right-wing intellectuals in the world, but the leftists would all be dull and predictable. The thinkers on the right would have more influence with the rebels and with the broader creative class.

Again, it’s useful to take the long view: When it comes to the long-term political consequences of wokeism, it’s better to be agnostic.

Just as there is a danger in Republicans making too much of woke Democrats, there is an accompanying risk that anti-woke Republicans will impoverish conservative policy debate.

“The anti-woke portion of conservatism,” writes the political scientist Richard Hanania, “increasingly seems to be the most animated part of the movement.” He cites cancel culture as “the animating focus of the political right today,” but notes that “the political movement devoted to fighting this ideological matrix is quite short on policy ideas.”

A few months ago, the conservative talk-show host Jesse Kelly tweeted this (since deleted): “If you’re a small-government type, you should be smart enough to realize we cannot ‘live and let live’ our way out of this now. We could’ve. But not now. Now the communists control every pillar of power in America. Now you’re gonna have to do things that make you uncomfortable.”

As the saying goes, if you spend your life fighting dragons, you tend to become a dragon yourself.

Will wokeism help Black Americans?

America’s Black communities still lag considerably on economic and socioeconomic indicators. A perennial question is whether or which ideology can help to close this gap.

Like the Beatles, the ideologies of the civil rights movement transformed U.S. society and culture, mostly for the better, but they eventually ran out of steam. The Black church has also had a great beneficial influence, but more secular ideas are needed as well.

Black conservatives such as Shelby Steele and Thomas Sowell have experimented with a “tough talk” approach, which former President Barack Obama sometimes used as well. But whatever your opinion of the substance, those views are not political winners. They are more likely to lose rather than gain ideological influence.

So now there are the woke and Black Lives Matter movements, in all their varying manifestations, as dominant ideologies among significant portions of the Black intellectual communities. The idea is to try something new.

Many critics of woke are convinced this will end in disaster for Black people, with some kind of ideology of rights replacing an ideology of responsibility. Alternatively, they might argue that the woke ideology is impractical.

I am not so sure. Ideologies can operate in genuinely roundabout and counterintuitive ways. Way back when, who would have predicted that Christianity would prove so effective in mobilizing the creative energies of Europe? After a lot of arcane debate and various councils, we have decided to emphasize this idea of the Holy Trinity. Really? And yet it worked. How about the principle that the meek shall inherit the earth — what would Hernán Cortés have to say about that?

The world is full of false belief. No successful human community has ever been based on completely true ideas. I am hoping for the best, and I don’t trust anyone’s predictive abilities about what wokeism will lead to, including for America’s Black communities. But critics of wokeism should root for at least some parts of it to succeed.

This is not necessarily a defense of wokeism. It is merely to point out that a lot of its critiques are not as well-grounded or as certain as they might seem. 

Wokeism is stronger in the private sector.

It drives conservatives and libertarians crazy that woke ideas often have more purchase in the private sector than in the public sector. Private universities, for example, seem “more woke” than public universities.

Still, you read it here first (or maybe not): The halls of power in Washington just aren’t that woke! They are nothing like Twitter or Google or Yale University.

Yes, many woke opponents cite the role of government and the fear of lawsuits as forces driving woke behavior and corporate attachment to wokeism. And surely they have a point. Yet in much of the corporate and nonprofit world, wokeism is not merely a reflexive defense against lawsuits. It is embraced with enthusiasm.

Wokeism has passed a market test that has been going on for decades. That should give pause to anyone seeking to dismiss it.

Conclusion: What is America, really?

Why is the debate over wokeism so wide and deep? In part it is a function of the internet. But it is also because it is the intellectual equivalent of potboiler, implicating politics, race, ethnicity, gender, education and international relations. All it needs is a subplot about luxury real estate.

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On a more serious note: The arguments have been so fully joined because they are about how to define success, which is the fundamental American ideology. I believe such debates are not only healthy but also necessary. I also believe that the ideology of success will endure, though it may take less familiar forms over time. In some ways wokeism is what a feminized, globalized version of 21st century U.S. triumphalism looks like.

You don’t have to like that. But you may have to get used to it.

Rather than spend too many words trying to define wokeism, I ask readers — if only for the purposes of this essay — to accept the Wikipedia definition.

This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.

To contact the author of this story:
Tyler Cowen at tcowen2@bloomberg.net

To contact the editor responsible for this story:
Michael Newman at mnewman43@bloomberg.net


Tuesday, December 28, 2021

Charles Mills' "Black Wrong, White Rights"

Charles Mills' "Black Wrong, White Rights"

A persuasive critique of Kant and Rawls that leaves us ... I'm not sure where

I always think of the Roosevelt Institute as offering the avant-garde of progressive coalition thought, so for weeks now I’ve been puzzling over a document they put out titled “A New Paradigm for Justice and Democracy: Moving beyond the Twin Failures of Neoliberalism and Racial Liberalism,” and I was thinking of writing a defense of racial liberalism in response. But after a couple of re-reads, it became clear to me that the authors were using the term “racial liberalism” in a way that was a bit unfamiliar to me, and to an extent, the position I wanted to defend was not the one they wanted to attack.


Specifically, they are referring to the concept as developed by Charles W. Mills, who I’d never read but had heard mentioned more and more frequently over the past few years.


So I picked up Mills’ last book “Black Rights / White Wrongs: The Critique of Racial Liberalism” which turns out to be much more up my alley than I’d expected. Mills is a philosopher who died just this past September (see Liam Kofi Bright’s remembrance) and I was a philosophy major in college, so I can actually understand what he’s writing about and its significance to the field. The “racial liberalism” that he’s critiquing is specifically an academic/intellectual tradition in which the central figures are Immanuel Kant and John Rawls, and while other things come up in the different essays that make up the book, that’s really what it’s about — Kant and Rawls and the people working in the Kantian and Rawlsian traditions and how we should understand that project.


And in terms of what it is, this is a real tour de force. I thought Susan Moller Okin’s 1989 book “Justice, Gender, and the Family” (which I was assigned as an undergrad) had already left Rawlsian political theory in disarray, and when you bring Mills’ critique (which I was not) into the frame, it’s really crushed. I wish I’d been taught Mills in school and I hope this profoundly changes how these specific subjects are treated in academia going forward.


At the same time, I agree with Mills’ critique of this contractarian thinking maybe even more than he does — it’s genuinely a huge mess! — which is to say that precisely because Rawlsian philosophical liberalism is such a terrible guide for thinking about major political issues, I’m pretty skeptical that further critiquing it is going to help us either.


Contractarian liberalism and its history

I can’t do 300 years of intellectual history in one blog post, but suffice it to say that in modern moral philosophy there are two main traditions and then several smaller ones.


One tradition is consequentialism (associated with Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill) and the other is deontological rights-based thinking associated with Kant. The differences between these ideas are nuanced, but they often get expressed in terms of the famous trolley problem, with consequentialists more inclined to say that you kill the one guy in order to save the five and the deontologists leaning more on the distinction between doing and allowing.



For Mills’ purposes, the important thing about Kantian thinking is not this trolley business but its association with social contract political philosophy. This was a big deal during the heyday of the Enlightenment, fell into some disrepute, and then was revived in a big way by John Rawls in his book “A Theory of Justice.”


I think the general perception in academia is that political philosophy was regarded as a dead subject in Anglo-American philosophy by the middle of the 20th century. Some philosophers like A.J. Ayer and Bertrand Russell were outspoken on social and political issues, but they didn’t have philosophical systems that they were pushing in order to address political topics beyond a kind of general rationalist and cosmopolitan worldview. Rawls revived social contract thinking, and in doing so revived political philosophy as a subject. An incredibly large share of 20th century political philosophy is just people either expounding Rawlsian ideas or arguing with them.


And Mills’ book is very much in that vein. He argues that philosophy as a field has been basically covering up the significance of Kant’s profound racism and that Rawls and the whole Rawlsian tradition are engaged in “white ignorance” and obfuscating many of the key issues in politics.


Mills on Kant

Kant’s ethical works that normally get assigned don’t say anything about race and are all about how people need to respect each other and treat each other as ends-in-themselves and not means. But he has other writings that are pioneering works in the then-new field of scientific racism that are normally just ignored.


Mills argues, convincingly in my view, that this makes a hash out of the actual intellectual history of the western world. The western states that operated under the influence of liberal political thought in the 19th and 20th centuries did so in some extremely racist ways. Those practices of enslavement, indigenous genocide, and imperialism are often portrayed as contrary to the ideas of mainstream liberalism. But the fact that one of the leading lights of said liberalism was also super-racist puts this into doubt. Mills says we should read Kant’s ethics in light of his racism and see that he arguably really was saying that Black people and Native Americans were sub-humans who are excluded from the Kantian circle of mutual respect. There’s a tradition in American jurisprudence that reached its apogee in Dred Scott which says that we are living in a society of white people who have rights as per the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, but that Black people do not have rights that white people are bound to respect.


A big part of Mills’ intellectual project is trying to urge people to take this racial contract vision of herrenvolk liberalism seriously and not just see it as a sloppy error or casual bias. Kant’s contractarian is a game of insiders and outsiders in which he explicitly leaves non-human animals as outsiders whose interests we don’t have to care about. Liberal polities often acted as if non-white people are also outsiders whose interests we don’t have to care about — in Mills’ view, in part because this is what foundational figures in liberalism said.


And this is what Mills means by racial liberalism — liberalism for white people. To use an example that’s not in Mills’ book, after the Civil War, factions emerged in the Republican Party. The more moderate faction that opposed Ulysses Grant and wanted to throw African American rights under the bus for the sake of white reconciliation was called the Liberal Republicans. Because even the anti-slavery version of American politics was split between a faction that actually cared about Black rights and a faction whose primary interest in halting the spread of slavery was to preserve western lands for white settlement.


Mills on Rawls

There’s no hidden file drawer of Rawls doing racism.


Mills’ point about Rawls is that it’s extraordinary to publish a book in 1972 on the subject of justice and have nothing to say about racial justice. Not everyone is attuned to every issue, but even the most clueless white person imaginable who was born in 1921 couldn’t possibly have missed Strom Thurmond’s third-party run in 1948, the Brown v. Board of Education decision in 1954, the murder of Emmett Till, the congressional fights over civil rights in 1957 and 1960, the subsequent and more successful fights in 1964 and 1965, the George Wallace campaign in 1968, and the assassinations and riots that also happened that year. This was a big deal in a kind of obvious way.


And Mills shows that in subsequent works, Rawls would kind of occasionally concede that he’s skipping over something important. But then across a multi-decade career, he never gets around to addressing it. Instead, when he expands his vision to consider international relations in “The Law of Peoples,” things get worse as he’s sweeping aside the way that many modern states are post-colonial entities while many others are settler-states founded on expropriation.


In “Ideal Theory as Ideology,” Mills argues that these errors and omissions all stem from Rawls’ weird methodological choice to focus on what he calls “ideal theory.” In ideal theory, you abstract away from all present-day problems and just ask in the abstract what an ideal society would look like. Since an ideal society wouldn’t be racist, you wouldn’t need to ask how you dismantle racism or address the legacy of racism. So problem solved!


But this is really dumb. Reviewing the list of preconceptions of academic ideal theory, Mills writes:


Now look at this list, and try to see it with the eyes of somebody coming to formal academic ethical theory and political philosophy for the first time. Forget, in other words, all the articles and monographs and introductory texts you have read over the years that may have socialized you into thinking that this is how normative theory should be done. Perform an operation of Brechtian defamiliarization, estrangement, on your cognition. Wouldn’t your spontaneous reaction be: How in God’s name could anybody think that this is the appropriate way to do ethics?


I think that this is absolutely correct, and the ideal theory concept — while a sort of interesting intellectual puzzle — is ultimately fruitless. I’ve been out of philosophy for a while, but my sense is that this critique is one that a lot of people are converging on from some different directions. I’m familiar with Jacob Levy’s “There Is No Ideal Theory” (arguing, among other things, that “wholly ‘ideal’ normative political theory is a conceptual mistake”) and Gerald Gaus’ “The Tyranny of the Ideal.” I think Mills is going to win this fight and his chapter/essay focusing in on it is the best prosecution of the case that I’ve read.


Why not consequentialism?

To the extent that I had a problem with the book, it’s that by the end I felt like I was watching Mills repeatedly pummel an opponent who’d already been knocked out. Can’t we move on from saying “Rawls and Kant are bad” and talk about consequentialist thinkers’ treatment of race? Can’t we try to outline a positive agenda instead of a critical one? Then I stepped back and remembered my own education, and given the sheer volume of work in political philosophy that happens on these themes, there’s nothing wrong with a book-length critique.


But I do question Mills’ assertion that Kantian thinking has “triumphed over the previously dominant consequentialist (welfare-based/utilitarian) version of liberalism originally associated with Jeremy Bentham and the two Mills, James and John Stuart.”


I think that in practice, if not in academic philosophy, consequentialism continues to be extremely important. The burgeoning effective altruist movement is grounded in consequentialism. Most of the leading thinkers in the animal welfare movement are grounded in consequentialism. And the hugely influential field of economics largely operates within a consequentialist framework. There is potentially fruitful work to be done in the vein of a racial justice critique of consequentialism, but I think there’s also a potential argument that we should push even deeper on Mills’ critique of Kant and see deontology as inherently inspired by insider/outsider thinking in a flawed way.


Certainly this is my preferred way of thinking about the various lines of criticism of Rawls that appear in Mills, Okin, Charles Taylor, and others — that trying to operate at an extremely high level of abstraction is both blinding us to a huge share of the problems that people care about and also obscuring the extent to which we need practical solutions not just like “ideally this problem wouldn’t even exist?”


The reparations question

Mills did not do a policy book nor even a work of constructive philosophy where he lays out a new system. He writes that “that — large — task will have to await another time and another book,” but unfortunately he fell ill and passed away, so we won’t get that book.


There are really only two specific policy issues that Mills mentions as important, but beyond the capacity of Rawlsian liberalism to grasp: affirmative action and reparations.


Mills’ treatment of affirmative action is, to me, a bit odd:


He writes that “Affirmative action is basically dead, most whites regarding it as unfair ‘reverse discrimination.”


Then later he refers to “the effective defeat of affirmative action policies.”


Now depending on what the Supreme Court does with the current litigation Harvard is embroiled in, those claims may become true. But the reason there is a Harvard affirmative action lawsuit is that affirmative action is widely practiced by American universities including some very well-known ones like Harvard. And Harvard’s position in the litigation is supported by the Biden administration. Mills is right that affirmative action is very unpopular, but that didn’t stop the entire California Democratic Party from fighting for the losing side in an affirmative action ballot initiative.


In other words, affirmative action is not dead (at least not yet), and it seems to me to enjoy more support at elite levels — and specifically among academics — than among the mass public.


This is obviously a complicated subject, but I think the big frustration with affirmative action from a racial justice standpoint is that it just hasn’t proven to be a lever that actually accomplished very much. Thanks to affirmative action, my quarter-Cuban self from an affluent family in New York got to be a below-average student at Harvard rather than going to Cornell or the University of Chicago, but an admissions boost at the most selective colleges in America does not actually do anything to help the majority of Black or Hispanic people who are not attending selective colleges at all. And here, I do think a Rawlsian perspective at least raises a pertinent question — shouldn’t our efforts at justice be aimed at helping the most disadvantaged people?


Mills also writes favorably of reparations at several points, though also pessimistically about white people’s views of it. I wish Mills had lived to write a thorough philosophical treatment of reparations, as I think it could use one.


But I would just say in the vein of reparations being underrated that at this point, what I think the reparations movement needs is a clearer political program. In my lifetime, I’ve seen two boomlets of interest in reparations — one sparked by Randall Robinson’s 2000 book “The Debt” and then a more recent one sparked by Ta-Nehisi Coates’ article “The Case for Reparations.” These are both good, intellectually influential works. But they don’t advocate for a specific program. Instead, we’re stuck on H.R. 40 which calls for creating a commission to study and develop reparations proposals for African Americans originally introduced over 30 years ago by John Conyers and now led by Sheila Jackson Lee. As a political intervention in 1989, I think Conyers’ bill was a masterstroke. As something to talk about in 2021, I feel like it’s a political booby trap — passing it would not help anyone in any concrete way, but it’s also unpopular, so Democratic leaders keep stopping it from coming up for a vote. Some day, it’s just going to be weaponized as a wedge issue by Republicans.


It’s not 1989 anymore and racial justice is a big topic for philanthropy — MacKenzie Scott Bezos alone gave over $500 million to these causes last year. Funders should convene their own panel of experts and stakeholders to think in a comprehensive way about what they want to advocate for. In “From Here to Equality,” William Darity and Kirsten Mullin outline a program for $11 trillion in cash payments from the federal government to the Black descendants of people held in bondage in the United States. Is that, all things considered, a smart thing to spend time and energy pushing for? Is there a smaller program that might be easier to achieve but that would still be worthwhile? I think the points about the pitfalls of ideal theory cut in both directions to an extent, and you don’t achieve racial justice by counting the angels on the head of a needle.


Mills’ political vision

If Mills is not doing a policy book, he is definitely not doing a political strategy book.


But he does at a couple of points stop to consider what kind of political vision would fulfill his ideas of an appropriately radical and de-racialized liberalism. He says that “the natural constituency is, of course, the population of color would be the obvious beneficiaries of the end or considerable diminution of white supremacy” but also that “they will clearly not be able to do it on their own” and will need white allies.


He sketches two possible paths to this:


A “centrist strategy” that offers the argument “that in a sense racism hurts everybody given the costs of racial exclusion.”


A “left strategy” that aims “to disaggregate the white population and target in particular those whites who benefit less from white supremacy: the working class, the poor, the unemployed.”


Later, Mills mentions Piketty’s work on inequality and offers the “hope that an increasing number of the white poor/white working class may begin to wake up to the reality that the prospects for their children and grandchildren under plutocratic capitalism — albeit white-supremacist plutocratic capitalism — are not that great either.”


This seems very appealing to me. But the people who I normally see citing Mills are people who I also normally see saying that my ideas are wrong and bad. I don’t want to rehash points I’ve made a million times before (see here, here, here, and here for some non-paywalled flavors), but this sounds to me primarily like a program for race-neutral economic redistribution. Not necessarily dogmatic adherence to the idea that policy needs to be “race-blind” at all times and in all respects, but also not a politics centered on a push for an $11 trillion reparations campaign. After all, while it’s true that “the population of color” would in some sense “be the obvious beneficiaries of the end … of white supremacy,” it’s not the case that Hispanics or Asians or other ethnic or cultural minority groups would benefit from Darity’s reparations program. Even if you are simply seeking non-white allies, you need an agenda with broader appeal.


Ending by accusing Mills of lacking a realistic political program feels churlish since I’m not sure I’ve ever read a philosophy book that concluded with a convincing case for a realistic political program. “Black Rights / White Wrongs” is primarily a scholarly critique of the (white) social contract tradition in philosophy and it is brilliant. I was not assigned Mills as a philosophy student but I hope that future students will be. The job of taking these ideas and formulating them into a practical theory of action rests with people like the Roosevelt Institute whose “new paradigm” paper is what inspired me to read Mills. But I’m skeptical that they have come up with something that works here or really that there has been any significant conceptual advance in terms of an ambitious-but-plausible policy agenda for American social justice since Martin Luther King’s poor people’s campaign or the Philip Randolph / Bayard Rustin “freedom budget.”


On Biden initiatives, Republicans like to have their cake and eat it, too

On Biden initiatives, Republicans like to have their cake and eat it, too

Catherine Rampell — Read time: 3 minutes


Democracy Dies in Darkness

Opinion: On Biden initiatives, Republicans like to have their cake and eat it, too


The U.S. Capitol on Dec. 18. (Samuel Corum/Bloomberg News)

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By Catherine Rampell

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PHOENIX — Always remember the First Law of Fiscal Policy: “Wasteful” government spending is only the spending that goes to other people — not to me.


This unearned credit-hoarding began almost immediately. Before the bill even hit President Biden’s desk, Sen. Roger Wicker (R-Miss.) trumpeted its benefits for restaurant owners (while omitting mention of his own “no” vote, naturally).


Republican state officials who once derided the bill as irresponsible, mistargeted or unfair are also now eagerly hoovering up its money. Even so, some still claim to oppose it.


In her recent budget address, South Dakota Gov. Kristi L. Noem (R) blamed Biden’s agenda for “horrifically high inflation” and called the stimulus package a “giant handout.” She then indicated she was happy to stick her own hand out: Noem urged state lawmakers to spend South Dakota’s covid-relief allotment on investments in water infrastructure, public health, workforce development, child care and many other issues that … sound a lot like Democratic priorities.


Noem said she considered refusing the funds. But she changed her mind, she said, because the money might then go to “California, to New Jersey, maybe Illinois, Michigan or Minnesota.” That is: bluer states, where politicians are presumably less capable fiscal stewards.


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Over in Ohio, Republican Gov. Mike DeWine also initially opposed the American Rescue Plan; then he signed GOP-sponsored state legislation appropriating billions of the federal package’s funds toward Ohio’s unemployment system, water and sewer management, pediatric behavioral health and other purposes.


In Texas, federal funds went to the unemployment system, hospitals, the tourism industry and food banks. Some dollars have also been reserved for tax cuts, though there are ongoing legal challenges about whether the money can be used this way.


And here in Arizona, Gov. Doug Ducey (R) recently used the federal windfall in part to expand high-speed broadband to underserved areas. As Arizona Republic columnist E.J. Montini observed at the time, Ducey publicly thanked Republican state lawmakers for this “historic investment” — even though the money had come courtesy of federal Democrats.


Arizona has also used American Rescue Plan money to undermine covid precautions by offering special grants to schools that don’t implement mask or vaccine requirements. Pretty rich given pervasive GOP complaints about abuse of federal funds.


This “money for me but not for thee” approach is hardly unique to the American Rescue Plan. Consider a recent plea for disaster relief from Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.).


Paul has long opposed federal aid when other states requested it for victims of hurricanes, 9/11 or other mass tragedies. He told The Post’s Mike DeBonis that his objections — including for aid for 9/11 — were driven by concerns about fiscal responsibility, and that he simply wanted new spending to be paid for. But Paul has opposed such spending even when it was paid for, arguing that any identified fiscal offsets should be used to pay down the debt rather than assist disaster victims.


“Everybody wants something, and somebody says, ‘Oh, there’s money in the treasury! Guess what? There’s not. There’s a big hole. A big, black hole in the treasury, $28 trillion dollars’ worth,” Paul fumed when his Republican colleague Sen. John Neely Kennedy (La.) asked for hurricane relief in July.


After tornadoes devastated Kentucky this month, Paul changed his tune. He asked Biden to “expeditiously” deploy federal assistance to his constituents. (Biden agreed and sent federal aid.)


We have, of course, seen this First Law of Fiscal Policy play out before, particularly in debates about safety net programs.


Not only among Republicans, by the way. Seemingly every American thinks they, and they alone, merit Uncle Sam’s beneficence — unlike those shirkers from other states, political persuasions or backgrounds. (The Second Law of Fiscal Policy is a corollary: The only acceptable tax hike is a tax hike on someone else.)


None of this is to suggest that Democrats should make, say, universal pre-K available only in blue states. Nor that tornado-ravaged Kentuckians and hungry Texans and broadband-less Arizonans don’t deserve federal resources. (Though I have some qualms about using federal dollars to subsidize state tax cuts or to incentivize anti-vaccine policies in schools.)


Constituents are entitled to relief funds and public investments, even if the Republicans they elect sometimes claim otherwise. But it might be helpful if voters, on occasion, noticed that Republicans are having their cake and gorging on it, too: condemning unspecified “Biden policies” as irresponsible and inflationary, while gobbling up credit for those same policies whenever they prove popular.

Monday, December 27, 2021

The anatomy of a sanctions failure

The anatomy of a sanctions failure

Daniel W. Drezner — Read time: 4 minutes


Democracy Dies in Darkness

The anatomy of a sanctions failure

There is now consensus that the Iran sanctions have failed. This leaves a mess.


Deputy Secretary General of the European External Action Service Enrique Mora and Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, Ali Bagheri Kani, in Vienna on Dec. 9. (EU Delegation in Vienna/EEAS/Reuters) (Handout/Reuters)

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Daniel W. Drezner is a professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a regular contributor to PostEverything.

December 14, 2021 at 7:00 a.m. EST

Labeling something a “success” or a “failure” in foreign affairs is tricky work. Part of it depends on the moment in time when one is assessing. What looks like a colossal failure in retrospect might seem like a good idea in the moment — and vice versa.


When the federal government decided not to bail out Lehman Brothers, there was a half-day of great press extolling the decision. Pundits proclaimed the end of moral hazard. Then credit markets started seizing up and the true ramifications of Lehman’s bankruptcy became apparent. Neville Chamberlain earned some wonderful press immediately after the Munich agreement. Only later did “Munich” acquire the symbolism of “foreign policy catastrophe.”


Similarly, policy outcomes that are judged to be failures in the moment can be reinterpreted as successes in later years. In 1975, the Helsinki Final Act was viewed by many American observers as a capitulation to the Soviet Union’s forcible annexation of territory after World War II. Only in later years did observers — including the Soviet leaders who rejoiced in the deal — realize that the agreement would empower Charter 77 and other civil society movements within the Warsaw Pact.


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So when I say that the Trump administration’s 2018 exit from the Iran nuclear deal and reimposition of economic sanctions have proved to be a colossal failure, it is fair to wonder whether such a definitive conclusion is warranted. But let’s sort through the evidence.


The sanctions to date have failed to achieve the United States’ stated intentions. The most obvious example of failure has been Iran’s decision to restart its nuclear program in 2019. It is now much closer to building a functional nuclear device. As Politico’s Nahal Toosi and Stephanie Liechtenstein noted late last month, Iran “is increasing its stockpile of 60 percent-enriched uranium. The estimates for how long it would take Iran to build a nuclear bomb have fallen from a year under the 2015 deal to a few months, or even weeks.”


Surely, however, Iran has curtailed its adventurism in the Middle East because of the crippling effect of the sanctions, right? Apparently not. Economic sanctions failed to prevent Iran’s proxies from increasing their influence in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan over the past three years. The 2019 terrorist attack on Saudi Aramco appears to have emanated from Tehran, as did the June 2019 attacks on oil tankers and U.S. drones in the Persian Gulf. Nowadays, Iran is even trying to expand operations into Latin America.


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None of this describes a weakened Iran. It is undeniably true that the sanctions have hurt Iran’s economy and increased domestic unrest. But Iran’s supreme leader was able to handpick his hard-line prime minister this past summer. Despite Trump administration officials repeatedly claiming that Iran’s regime was close to collapse, the theocracy outlived their time in office. There is no success to locate in this case.


Maybe I’m biased. After all, three and a half years ago, I categorically asserted that this was a dumb move. I warned Iran hawks about their “hope that renewed sanctions will lead to regime change in Tehran. … Hope is not a viable Plan B. It is far more naive than anything contained in the (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action).” I have some skin in this game.


So don’t take my word for it — take the word of those who initially supported the idea of reimposing sanctions against Iran. Last month, Ha’aretz reported that former Israeli defense minister Moshe Ya’alon acknowledged on the record that “looking at the policy on Iran in the last decade, the main mistake was the withdrawal from the agreement.”


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Ya’alon is just the most prominent former Israeli official making this point. My Washington Post colleague Shira Rubin reports, “a growing number of former Israeli security officials are publicly faulting their government for opposing a nuclear deal negotiated in 2015 between Iran and world powers, and warning that economic sanctions on Iran are not deterring it from dangerously advancing its nuclear program.”


Bloomberg’s Eli Lake supported the 2018 move and in a recent column tried to claim that the gamble was still worth it. The best that Lake can come up with, however, is that “Trump’s decision to leave the nuclear deal is not necessarily an open-and-shut case of foreign policy malpractice.” This is not exactly a ringing endorsement. And even Lake concedes that “it is true that Trump’s gamble did not pay off.”


The New York Times’ Thomas Friedman did not mince words: “President Donald Trump’s decision to tear up the Iran nuclear deal in 2018 — a decision urged on by his secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, and Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu — was one of the dumbest, most poorly thought out and counterproductive U.S. national security decisions of the post-Cold War era.”


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The problem now is that the lack of a Plan B is becoming more disconcerting. The Vienna negotiations about Iran and the United States rejoining the JCPOA are not going well. The Iranians are being intransigent. Everyone else is worried about the lack of progress, except the Israelis, who are worried that there’s some secret progress being made.


Catastrophic policy failures live in infamy. The best Iran hawks can hope for in the next few years is a policy failure that does not quite compare to Munich.