Sunday, March 31, 2019

Ukraine’s War on Russian Disinformation Is a Lesson for America / The New Republic

Ukraine’s War on Russian Disinformation Is a Lesson for America
Forget the Mueller report. Russia is still meddling in democracies everywhere, and Ukraine is trying to fight back.
By GEOFFREY CAIN
March 30, 2019


The eighth and ninth graders didn’t realize their teacher was wrapping another skill inside their classes: how to spot fake news and hate speech. Students learning about world history also learned about how propagandists could manipulate the historical narrative. Language and literature students learned about the political uses of language. Art students learned how to check whether photographs had been manipulated, or video footage was being deployed as an emotional weapon.


Long before Russian fake news and troll farms roiled American politics, Ukraine was Russia’s testing ground, a guinea pig in the bigger disinformation wars to come. Classroom education like this is one of the ways Ukrainians are fighting back. The education group IREX, working with the Ukrainian government, rolled out the pilot project Learn to Discern in 50 schools in four cities across the country in September 2018. Compared to students who didn’t get these lessons, the group’s report released last Friday declared, those receiving Learn to Discern training were twice as likely to detect hate speech, 18 percent better at identifying fake news stories, 16 percent better at sorting out fact from opinion, and 14 percent more knowledgeable about the role of the news media industry. IREX plans to expand its pilot curriculum to the U.S.
With Ukraine’s national elections approaching on Sunday, and American elections approaching next year, Ukraine’s story can be the U.S.’s biggest lesson for how to prepare for more Russian disinformation and cyber-warfare. Despite the now ample body of evidence that Russian internet campaigns were a significant force in the 2016 presidential election, the story began well before Trump’s presidency, when Russian trolls and commentators began drumming up the idea of ethnic unity with the Crimea, the strategic land jutting out into the Black Sea. After protesters ousted the Russia-friendly president of Ukraine in February 2014, militias claiming to be acting in the name of the Russian majority of the Crimea seized the peninsula. The Crimea was annexed into Russia a few weeks later. The ongoing and little-covered civil war in eastern Ukraine has since amassed a death toll of more than 13,000.

The Crimean annexation was an early masterstroke of fake news and pseudo-history that set the tone for what was to come—a Russian hybrid playbook of geopolitical and military advances into strategic regions alongside a propaganda war. Fake news plunged parts of Ukraine into a post-truth, alternate reality. President Vladimir Putin’s disinformation machine convinced his supporters that fascists and enemies lurked everywhere, and that only Russia could protect its supposed brethren against the hysterical mobs in the capital, Kiev, agitating for Western imperialism.

When Putin unleashed similar disinformation tactics during the run-up to Trump’s 2016 election, Ukrainian and Russian journalists knew the playbook.
But if anything, Putin underestimated the resolve of Ukrainians, whose national identity—as a country founded only in 1991, with large regions historically a part of Poland, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire—turned out far stronger and more resilient than many thought. “Most Ukrainians recognize exactly what Russia is doing, and they don’t like it,” James Appathurai, the NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia, told me. Russian disinformation “is not succeeding,” he said.

What, exactly, is Russia doing in Ukraine? Before the Crimea annexation, Russia’s FSB security service took over the servers of a social media network popular in Ukraine, an easy venue for blasting propaganda, and giving it access to pictures, locations, and personal data on 16 million Ukrainians. In the year prior to the Russian navy’s seizing of three Ukrainian ships in the Sea of Azov in November 2018, Russian propaganda spread falsehoods that Ukrainian authorities were dredging its seabed in preparation for the residence of a NATO fleet, and that Ukraine had infected the sea with cholera. Russian hackers have attacked the electrical grid, leading to crippling blackouts, and have attempted to gain access to electoral voting systems.


When Putin unleashed similar disinformation tactics during the run-up to Trump’s 2016 election, Ukrainian and Russian journalists knew the playbook, even as U.S. media were slow to take notice. By the mid-2010s, when the world was just realizing social media could be a destructive political force, the Ukrainian government was among the first to lobby hard for the help of Facebook and Twitter, only to get the brush-off. The social media sites have since realized their errors, taking down state-tied accounts in Russia and Iran; Facebook announced a ban on white supremacist content on Wednesday. Since 2014, Ukraine has stepped up its leaky cyber-defenses, upgrading its software systems and teaching government staff to recognize server attacks and viruses.
Perhaps most interestingly, Ukraine has ferreted out fake narratives in bottom-up campaigns through projects like the IREX’s training of eighth and ninth graders to spot fake news, and through the aggressive exposure of fake news on StopFake.org. It’s also learned to treat media outlets like RT as state actors, rather than regular media companies, and has taken the brash step of blocking hundreds of websites without court orders, several of them popular Russian websites. In the West, such censorship would be unthinkable. But the U.S. has seen a movement to unmask and expose state propaganda actors, rather than let them operate in the same vein as any old news source. In 2017, RT registered as a foreign agent in the U.S. at the request of the Department of Justice. How many more propaganda arms remain unregistered?

As Ukraine heads to the polls on Sunday to elect a president for the second time since protesters overthrew Russian influence in the form of President Viktor Yanukovych, the results will resonate far beyond Eastern Europe. Ukraine’s security service has already alleged “several” Russian attacks against the central election commission—a charge Moscow denies. The presumption is that disinformation campaigns will target Yanukovych’s replacement, current president Petro Poroshenko, in particular.

Though the vote’s result remains uncertain, the frontrunner is Volodymyr Zelenskiy, a comedian with no political experience whom Ukrainians are calling a populist, and whose supporters plan to vote for him because they’re fed up with corruption and Ukraine’s sluggishness in joining the EU and NATO under the current Poroshenko presidency. In addition to the incumbent Poroshenko, Zelenskiy is up against former two-term prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko, who fell from grace after spending nearly two years in prison for abuse of power, a charge criticized by the European Union. The perception that she’s corrupt and untrustworthy has long tainted her popularity.

With a growing bottom-up movement, educational programs, and government pressure, the Ukrainian election will tell us what lies ahead—and whether Russia plans to step up its interference with new tactics and technologies. Whatever happens on Sunday in Ukraine, and in its parliamentary elections in October, will be a signal for how to protect our own institutions in 2020.

Geoffrey Cain, a foreign correspondent and author, writes about the growing struggles between the U.S., China and Russia.
@geoffrey_cain

The Democratic Presidential Primary Needs the Democratic Party by Brendan Nyhan

The Democratic Presidential Primary Needs the Democratic Party
Trump’s win taught us that weaker parties can allow demagogues into office

Brendan Nyhan
Mar 28
Credit: Mark Wilson/Getty Images

For anyone concerned about democratic norms and the rule of law, the 2016 election offered a clear lesson: Parties need to exercise more control over candidate selection. In this era of high partisanship, the official party nomination puts any candidate within striking distance of the presidency. This great power thus carries a profound responsibility: to deny the party endorsement to would-be demagogues. So why are Democrats reducing the role of party elites in the primary process this time around?

The changes Democrats have made to the nomination process were prompted by Hillary Clinton’s win over Bernie Sanders in the 2016 Democratic primary. That victory generated accusations that her campaign was coordinating with the Democratic National Committee to rig the nomination contest. Wary of such charges, the party has since scaled back its influence over the primary process. First, so-called superdelegates — party leaders and elected officials — were stripped of their power to decide a closely contested nomination on the first ballot at the party convention. These elites had previously played an important role in the nominating process; though they typically supported the candidate who won the nomination via primary and caucus victories, their presence helped make support from party elites an important factor in the primary campaign.

Democrats should know better than to diminish their control over their own nomination process.
Democrats also yielded to pressure to open access to presidential debates. In fact, they’ve now promised to include any candidate with 65,000 donors on the debate stage, in addition to those with qualifying levels of polling support. Not surprisingly, this rule is already being gamed: Recently, the Washington Post reported that John Delaney, a wealthy former member of Congress, is matching $1 donations with $2 contributions to charity to try to attract enough support to be included despite having no measurable support in polls.

This debate inclusion rule is shortsighted. Should the self-help guru Marianne Williamson be included on stage with Bernie Sanders, Kamala Harris, and Elizabeth Warren if she attracts enough donations? Her staff claims she’s likely to qualify. And as Politico’s Bill Scher points out, loathsome figures, like David Duke, might be able to raise enough donations to participate as well. What would Democrats do then? In a world of ubiquitous small-dollar fundraising, 65,000 donors might not be an insurmountable threshold for fringe candidates.

Americans frequently malign political parties, but they play a critical role in our democracy. While voters (and, by extension, the Electoral College) determine who is elected to public office, it’s the responsibility of parties to put forth their best candidates for those offices. There is no rule or principle stating that party nominees must be selected by popular vote. Indeed, party insiders chose presidential candidates in the U.S. until recent decades (and continue to do so in many other democracies).

More recently, however, the parties have moved toward increasingly plebiscitary systems in which the delegates required to win the nomination are allocated based on voting in statewide primaries and caucuses. The most notable failure of this system came, of course, in 2016. During his campaign, Donald Trump engaged in a clear pattern of authoritarian behavior, including encouraging political violence at his rallies. Such behavior should be disqualifying for any candidate, especially one who aspires to our most powerful office. However, the GOP failed to screen him out, defying expectations that party insiders exerted an important level of control over the process. Though Trump attracted virtually no support from Republican elites, he took advantage of saturated media coverage and favorable delegate allocation rules to help him convert his early polling lead into an insurmountable advantage.

In a general election, the pressures of partisanship and competitive elections ensure that few legislators will cross party lines. Once Trump won the nomination in 2016, GOP elites felt compelled to fall in line, which helped him maintain very high rates of support among Republican identifiers. With his party base firmly in place, Trump built a strong enough electoral coalition to capture the presidency, where he continues to challenge democratic norms and practices. Expert ratings show a consistent decline in the quality of democracy in the U.S. since Trump took office.

In their book, How Democracies Die, the political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt emphasize the danger of parties, and other elites, failing to screen candidates effectively, early in this process. Our record on this score is enviable. Though the U.S. has never been free of demagogues and has a terrible history of racial oppression, the parties have largely denied figures like Huey Long and George Wallace access to high office. By contrast, other countries have seen such figures enter the mainstream and acquire power. All too often, the result has been an erosion of democratic norms and institutions. “Blatant dictatorship — in the form of fascism, communism, or military rule — has disappeared across much of the world,” Levitsky and Ziblatt write. “Since the end of the Cold War, most democratic breakdowns have been caused not by generals and soldiers but by elected governments themselves.” For instance, Freedom House, a democracy watchdog, now rates Hungary as only partly free because of the deterioration of its democracy since Viktor Orbán took power.

Democrats see what is happening to democracies across the world; they should know better than to diminish their control over their own nomination process. The move to open their presidential primary process contrasts sharply with the party’s approach to the candidates who they most fear — primary challengers to incumbent legislators. Curiously, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, the party’s House campaign arm, announced last week that it will punish campaign vendors and consultants who work against its members in Congress by refusing to contract with them or recommend them to its candidates. By essentially penalizing primary challengers to incumbent legislators, the party seems intent on preserving that status quo.

This decision leaves us with a paradox: Why are Democrats so willing to screen candidates for office at lower levels but abdicating their role in the campaign for the highest office in the land?

Saturday, March 30, 2019

Conservatives Can’t Distinguish Between Democratic Reform and Authoritarianism by Jonathan Chait


nymag.com
Conservatives Can’t Distinguish Between Democratic Reform and Authoritarianism
Jonathan Chait
7-9 minutes

Photo: Andrew Harrer/Bloomberg via Getty Images

Conservatives have spent three years explaining away the overt authoritarian tendencies of President Trump — who, just in the last week, called the media the “enemy of the people,” demanded retribution against satirists, urged his attorney general to reopen an investigation into his opponent who has already been cleared of wrongdoing, and goaded his supporters in the police and military to unleash extra-legal political violence on the opposing party. But now they have decided it is their turn to take sweet revenge and throw the same accusations back in Democrats’ faces.

The pretext is a series of calls for political reform by Democratic presidential candidates — to end the Electoral College, abolish the filibuster, and perhaps add non-partisan justices to the Supreme Court. Conservatives present these ideas as equally dangerous as anything Trump has proposed, if not more so.

“Democrats once tried to present themselves as defenders of national norms If there are any Democrats left who still believe in that stuff, we suggest they come forward now and try to save their party from the power-hungry crazies who are taking it over,” editorializes the Washington Examiner. “Today it is Democrats who are declaring war on the Constitution … allowing them to marginalize Americans who do not support their increasingly radical agenda and impose it on an unwilling nation,” argues Marc Thiessen. “Fighting one norm-breaker by creating another is an excellent way for the Democrats to fail again,” argues National Review’s David French.

This accusation rests on a series of complete misapprehensions about Constitutional history and what it is Democrats are proposing. It’s true that some left-wing activists have loosely talked about “packing” the Supreme Court. A court pack is when you change the number of seats in order to give your party an advantage. (During the Obama administration, Senate Republicans tried to do this by reducing the number of seats in the powerful D.C. Circuit, spuriously claiming the judges were underworked.)

But Democratic presidential candidates aren’t proposing to do this. What they’re advocating instead, as Eric Levitz points out, is reforms outlined by legal scholars that would correct the highly partisan incentives that have distorted the system. Supreme Court nominations have increasingly turned into a politicized war to manipulate lifetime appointments by appointing loyal apparatchiks vetted by opposing partisan legal teams. The reforms being discussed would not give Democrats a permanent advantage, but would instead permanently create a balanced court in which neither party can confidently secure a majority.

Obviously, from the partisan Republican standpoint, a balanced court is less attractive than the currently Republican-controlled one. Just as obviously, Democrats have a partisan interest in undoing the conservative majority. But this is still not the same as scheming to engineer their own majority.

As for Democratic plans to make the president national vote winner, or to eliminate the legislative filibuster, these are both reforms in keeping with the long tradition of increasing small-d democratic mechanisms. The original Constitution was wildly undemocratic. The Electoral College was originally designed to create elite electors who would make their own decision on who should serve as president, as well as to give slaveholders extra representation via the three-fifths clause. Senators were originally appointed rather than elected, and of course voting was originally restricted primarily to white male landowners. The filibuster was created as an accidental glitch, then required complete unanimity, then 70 votes, the threshold of which was reduced to 60 in 1975, and several exemptions have been carved out.

The system has frequently evolved toward majoritarian principles. Its capacity to do so is, in fact, its greatest feature. The current Republican posture asserts that any change to its features — even change conducted within the Constitutional structure itself — amounts to a rejection of the document and its spirit. You can’t defend the Constitution while trying to tear it up at the same time,” cries Thiessen. A recent Fox News chyron charges, “2020 DEMS TEARING UP THE CONSTITUTION.”

The notion that the Constitution is perfect — as it currently stands, not the original version with slavery and male-only voting and so on — is a completely novel one for the Republicans. This is a party that has in recent decades embraced the routine advocacy of Constitutional amendments to advance or cement right-wing policy. The 2016 Republican platform called for Constitutional amendments on abortion, same-sex marriage, term limits, balanced-budget, and education.

The deeper confusion afflicting the Republicans is that they think the problem with Trump is simply his assault on “norms.” A norm is just want it sounds like — what’s normal, the way things are done. Not all norms are important or worth keeping. Some are trivial (i.e., before Trump, the president always had a pet) and others actively harmful (before Barack Obama, the president was always a white man.)

Not all norms matter. The particular threat posed by Trump is to democratic norms, because they’re one way in which democracies sustain themselves. Not every possible abuse can be prevented with a formal rule. You need some norms to prevent ruling parties from abusing their power in order to perpetuate their control of government and to discourage political violence.

Many left-wing critics who downplay the unique threat posed by Trump have made exactly the same error, treating defenses of democratic norms as though they were defenses of all norms.

Yes, Democratic proposals to change presidential elections so that the second-place vote-getter doesn’t win (i.e., the same rules we use in every other election in this country) and Trump’s proposal to unleash a bloody crackdown by right-wing members of the armed forces are both changes to political norms. One side is proposing to make the system (small-d) democratic, and the other is … not. The conservative intelligentsia is divided between those who actively cheer on the president’s authoritarianism, and those who pretend it’s no different than making the system more democratic. Either way, they are enabling him.
Conservatives Can’t Distinguish Reform From Authoritarianism

Friday, March 29, 2019

The Barr Gambit by Josh Marshall

The Barr Gambit
200+ Editor’s Blog – Talking Points Memo by Josh Marshall  /  7h  //  keep unread  //  hide

A former federal prosecutor has some thoughts on the Barr Gambit …

    A few thoughts on the Barr Gambit, which I think will go down as a singular achievement in the annals of intellectual dishonesty and bad faith legal jujitsu:

    1. It is undisputed that the Russian government brazenly interfered in the 2016 election to support Donald Trump. In so doing, the Russians and those acting on their behalf committed a variety of federal crimes including computer hacking and conspiracy to defraud the U.S. Those crimes were committed to benefit (a) Vladimir Putin and the interests of the Russian government; and (b) Donald J. Trump. It is also undisputed that Trump and his campaign joyfully used and weaponized the information the Russians stole against Hillary Clinton. Trump personally trumpeted the Wikileaks disclosures 141 times during the campaign, and his surrogates countless more times. While Mueller’s team apparently “did not establish” (i.e., did not find enough evidence to charge criminally) that Trump personally conspired with the Russian government to commit the underlying crimes, there is no question that he was (along with Putin) the single biggest beneficiary of those criminal efforts.

    2. Mueller apparently pulled together significant evidence that the President attempted to obstruct the investigation into these crimes. But to support his decision not to prosecute the President for obstruction of justice, Barr relied in part on Mueller’s conclusion that he could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the President was involved in an underlying criminal conspiracy. Therefore, Barr’s reasoning goes, Trump lacked corrupt intent to obstruct because, at least in part, he was not involved in any underlying crime. This argument is both legally wrong (obstruction charges don’t depend on the existence of an underlying crime, just an investigation or proceeding), and it flies in the face of one simple fact: Trump was a prime beneficiary of the undisputed criminal conduct that did occur. He of course had a strong personal interest in seeking to obstruct this investigation for a variety of reasons. If you receive and use stolen money, even if you weren’t involved in the theft, you have a strong interest in thwarting any efforts to investigate the underlying theft. Why? Because you don’t want to lose the right to hold onto your money. Same here. This investigation posed a direct threat to the Presidency. It also posed a direct threat to prying open Trump’s shady business empire. Barr’s argument might hold water if the Russian election interference was intended to help Hillary and Trump’s campaign was not the subject of the investigation. As it stands, the President had a deep personal stake in the outcome of the investigation and it appears he used his executive power to thwart it. That cannot be countenanced.

    3. The non-charging decision on obstruction by Mueller cannot be explained as a failure of evidence. On conspiracy or coordination, it appears Mueller made a clear decision not to charge because of a lack of evidence. As too many members of the media seem to get wrong, this was not a “no evidence” situation, but rather a failure to get to the required level of admissible evidence to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. And the level of proof had to be something in between probable cause (you can’t get 500 search warrants without it) and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. I have no problem with that decision from a prosecutorial discretion standpoint. There was lots of evidence of an underlying conspiracy, but it was always going to be very difficult to prove the President’s direct involvement with sufficient admissible evidence (classified intercepts from foreign governments won’t do it). And Manafort and Stone holding the line seems to have been the stopped the Mueller team short. Mueller made a decision not to charge conspiracy because of a lack of evidence, so why not obstruction? If it’s a 50-50 call and a pure “jump ball” that’s easy. You decline. If it’s “more likely than not,” the civil standard, you also decline. Even if it’s “clear and convincing” evidence that doesn’t rise to the level of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, you decline the case. So what is going on here? To me, the only answer is that they had a chargeable obstruction case but stopped short of making a decision to charge the President–because he’s the President. It could have been the policy not to indict a sitting President, it could have been the legal and policy arguments around executive authority, or it could have been out of deference to the legislative branch and its impeachment prerogatives. Any way you cut it, I just can’t see Mueller shying away from a tough evidentiary call. If we ever get to see it, I fully expect the actual Mueller report to contain a devastating case against the President for obstruction of justice. This is why we should expect to see Barr, the White House, and the Republicans in Congress fight like hell to keep as much of the report as possible away from the public and House Judiciary. Democrats cannot let this go.

Thursday, March 28, 2019


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The Russia Skeptics Are Committing the Sins They Despise The New Republic / by Alex Shephard

The Russia Skeptics Are Committing the Sins They Despise
The New Republic / by Alex Shephard / 43min
For two years, anti-Trump pundits breathlessly speculated about what Mueller Time, when it finally arrived, would bring—an airtight case for impeachment, perhaps? Those hopes were dashed last week when Attorney General William Barr informed Congress that the special counsel “did not establish that members of the Trump campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian government in its election interference activities” and “determined not to make a traditional prosecutorial judgment” as to whether or not the president obstructed justice. Mueller Time thus became Mueller Madness, the New York Post’s NCAA-style bracket of the worst takes on the special counsel’s investigation, featuring #Resistance luminaries like Rachel Maddow and Alec Baldwin.

Russia skeptics are feeling smug, declaring that media coverage of Mueller’s probe was not just a debacle but perhaps even a generational failure. Rolling Stone’s Matt Taibbi compared it unfavorably to the media’s gullibility about Saddam Hussein’s supposed weapons of mass destruction, writing, “As a purely journalistic failure . . . WMD was a pimple compared to Russiagate.” National Review’s Rich Lowry called the coverage “abysmal and self-discrediting—obsessive and hysterical, often suggesting that the smoking gun was right around the corner, sometimes supporting its hoped-for result with erroneous, too-good-to-check reporting.”

Just as Trump and his allies are claiming the Mueller report was a “total and complete exoneration,” the Russia skeptics feel vindicated after years of being ridiculed by anti-Trumpers on Twitter. The truth has won out: The Russia story was “all a big hoax” after all. Time to take scalps!

I’m collecting admissions of pundit wrongdoing and error regarding Trump/Russia. Just today, I have elicited two such admissions (to their credit). Much as I think there will be zero accountability, finding exceptions is good. So please send me any others you may come across

— Michael Tracey (@mtracey) March 26, 2019
Taibbi, Lowry, and Tracey have seen as much of the Mueller report as the rest of us, which is to say almost none of it (other than a few quotes cited by Barr). It’s premature to spike the football. Worse, the skeptics today are guilty of the very media behavior they’ve been criticizing for more than two years: the rush to celebrate the latest nugget of Russia news, to declare its significance with hyperbolic certainty. Convinced of their own righteousness, the skeptics are conflating embarrassing cable news talking heads, a handful of discredited stories, and the speculative fantasy that Trump was a Russian asset with the entire field of journalism—while leaving out a lot of relevant information that proves that the Russia story is anything but a hoax.

News organizations, driven either by a need for ratings, Cold War fear-mongering, or Trump Derangement Syndrome, latched onto the idea that, in Federalist co-founder Sean Davis’s words, “the president of the United States was a Russian asset.” This theory, as Davis notes in The Wall Street Journal, originated from the now-infamous pee tape dossier, which was “produced by a retired foreign spy whose work was funded by the Democratic National Committee and Hillary Clinton’s campaign.” Once that salacious document was out in the world, “no unverified rumor was too salacious and no anonymous tip was too outlandish to print.” The Intercept’s Glenn Greenwald, appearing on Democracy Now, was even more direct, calling the Mueller investigation “a scam and a fraud from the beginning” that spurred “the saddest media spectacle I’ve ever seen.”

Taibbi accused the media of creating a grotesque cult of personality around the special counsel and trusting too easily in a government authority figure. “Mueller knows became the cornerstone belief of nearly all reporters who covered the Russia investigation,” he wrote in Rolling Stone on Monday. “Journalists reveled in the idea of being kept out of the loop, thrilled to defer to the impenetrable steward of national secrets, the interview-proof Man of State. He was no blabbermouth Donald Trump, this Mueller! He won’t tell us a thing!”

Some of these critiques should be well taken. The Mueller investigation was hardly a scam, but it did bring out the worst in some corners of the media—an italicized distinction that the Russia skeptics refuse to make. To them, the entire coverage of the Russia story was a frothy mix of reckless speculation on a series of screw-ups, like ABC News reporter Brian Ross’s swiftly retracted claim that in 2016 Trump instructed campaign adviser Michael Flynn to contact the Russians. (Ross was swiftly suspended for four weeks for the error. He and ABC quietly parted ways seven months later.)

These skeptics leave out quite a bit, like the fact that Trump’s former national security advisor, Michael Flynn, and former Attorney General Jeff Sessions lied about their contacts with Russian officials, that Mueller produced 37 indictments that have led to multiple convictions, and that the president himself told NBC’s Lester Holt that he had fired FBI Director James Comey over “this Russia thing.” As The Washington Post’s Erik Wemple wrote earlier this week, “the media pursued Trump and Russia because there was a great deal to pursue”—and because the president talked and tweeted about it constantly.

It’s worth debating the media’s priorities. Coverage of Russia surely crowded out other stories about the Trump administration, like its rampant corruption, its incoherent strategy in several Middle East conflicts, and its response to Hurricane Maria. But the story was hardly baseless, or on par with media failures in the lead-up to the Iraq war, which led to tens of thousands of deaths. The problem was that too many people, Russia skeptics and Mueller enthusiasts alike, couldn’t bother to differentiate between speculative fantasies about mysterious servers and, say, the more than 100 contacts between Trump and his associates and the Russians. Either all of it was true, or none of it was. Either the Mueller investigation would prove the president was a longtime Russian asset, or it would prove itself to be a gnarled sham.

The lack of nuance in our political discourse is hardly new, nor is the media’s urge to declare winners and losers immediately after any bit of news breaks. But the Mueller report has amplified these weaknesses. The failures of a pundit like Maddow, who devoted a truly insane amount of her show to Trump’s connections to Russia, and a few cherry-picked stories are being used as a cudgel to beat the entire media.

“No unverified rumor was too salacious and no anonymous tip was too outlandish to print. From CNN to the Times and the Post, from esteemed and experienced reporters to opinion writers and bloggers, everyone wanted a share of the Trump-treason beat,” Davis wrote, declaring that “America’s blue-chip journalists botched the entire story, from its birth during the presidential campaign to its final breath Sunday—and they never stopped congratulating themselves for it.”

The cycle of self-congratulation continues today with the Russia skeptics. It will likely continue for the next several weeks, as Congress dithers over whether to release the full Mueller report. If and when the report drops, it may contain new information that’s damning for Trump and his supporters in the media—definitive evidence of misjudgment and wrongdoing that justifies the extensive media coverage. And then today’s supposed losers will proudly take their victory laps.

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Wednesday, March 27, 2019

Court-Packing Is Not a Threat to American Democracy. It’s Constitutional / The New Republic

Court-Packing Is Not a Threat to American Democracy. It’s Constitutional.
Congress is allowed to change the size of the Supreme Court, and it has done so seven times. The country survived just fine.
By TIM BURNS
March 16, 2019

America’s founders probably would not have been surprised by former Attorney General Eric Holder’s statement last week that if he were president—though he’s not running—and the Democrats controlled Congress, he would “seriously consider adding two seats to the Supreme Court” to counteract Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell’s “power-grabbing antics.” The same goes for a competing proposal from South Bend Mayor Pete Buttigieg, who is running for president, seeking to expand the court to 15 justices. Within 20 years of establishing the new federal government, our early statesmen had changed the size of the Supreme Court three times to ensure that a politically hostile judiciary did not thwart the goals of the party controlling Congress and the presidency.

The Constitution does not entrust to public officials the responsibility to check their own power. The founders assumed that people with political muscle (including judges) would show little self-restraint, and they built a government that would provide each branch with many checks against the others. The Supreme Court was no exception. Rather than leaving the size of the Court in the hands of the justices, or fixing the size for all time, the Constitution grants that power to Congress. As soon-to-be Justice Robert Jackson testified to the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1937, “It was obvious at the founding of the Government that the Court would not always remain of the same size, and that changes in its size would be made, as they have been made, at those times when its decisions caused dissatisfaction.”

Critics of Holder’s remarks, including at The New Republic, argue that if Democrats violate the “norm” of a nine-person court, Republicans will do the same once they return to power. This tit-for-tat allegedly will spell the end to an independent judiciary and our democracy.

Such end-time worries are nothing new. When Congress voted to increase the size of the Court during the Jefferson administration, one newspaper wrote that “the Constitution has received a wound that it will not long survive.” Another lamented: “The independence of the judicial power is prostrated. A judge, instead of holding his position for life, will hold it during the good pleasure of the dominant party. The judges will of course become partisans, and the shadow of justice alone will remain in our courts.” Despite these histrionics, a moment’s reflection on the history of the Court shows that it remained fiercely independent after each of the seven instances in which Congress changed its size. It is difficult to believe that a future expansion of the Court would break this mold.

Far from leading to democratic death spirals, changes to the size of the Court have gone hand in hand with the most vibrant periods of our democracy. The first three changes centered around the political reaction to the “Revolution of 1800,” when Thomas Jefferson and his new political party swept into power. The outgoing Federalist Party, which represented big-money interests, reduced the size of the Court from six to five to keep Jefferson from filling an anticipated vacancy. Once Jefferson’s Democratic-Republican Party was firmly in power, they increased the size back to six justices, then to seven, to allow Jefferson to appoint new justices. Over the next 30 years, Congress denied repeated attempts to expand the Court, but President Andrew Jackson gained sufficient power to add two new justices in 1837.

The final changes to the Court’s size flowed from the upheaval and revitalization of our democracy during the Civil War and Reconstruction. Abraham Lincoln and the Republicans first increased the size to ten to prevent judicial attacks on his war policies. After Lincoln’s assassination, Congress reduced the size to eight to prevent the new president, Andrew Johnson, from harming Congress’ reconstruction efforts. Shortly after assuming the presidency, Ulysses S. Grant and his supporters added a justice to ensure the overturning of a recent Court decision that invalidated the legal tender law that had allowed the government to finance its war efforts. FDR’s failed attempt to pack the Court similarly took place at a time when political and economic elites were being replaced by a new coalition. These were not times of democratic decay, but of rebirth, and leading figures of the day knew that political change could and would be thwarted by the Supreme Court.

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We were never intended to be a government by judicial fiat, but the threat has always existed. As Alexis de Tocqueville famously noted, every major political dispute in the United States eventually finds its way into the courts, and courts have the final say in these disputes. Courts can, and have at times, stagnated our government’s ability to respond to critical political and economic issues of the day. That is exactly what is happening today. A Supreme Court majority, sharing a constitutional vision that harkens back to the days when political power was enjoyed by only a landed, male, white aristocracy, is preventing our democratic processes from solving problems that go to the very heart of our democracy. The court’s conservatives stand in the way of our efforts to keep dark money out of politics, to prevent the suppression of the voting rights of people of color, and to solve the polarization that has come with political gerrymandering.

But as the Court’s originalists must acknowledge, it’s no accident that the Constitution grants Congress the right to make the Supreme Court as large or small as it likes. Having the ability to change the composition of the Court in this way ensures that Congress has the power to prevent stagnant visions of our law from threatening the growth of our democracy.

Tim Burns is an attorney in Madison, Wisconsin.

Tuesday, March 26, 2019

Right Makes Might The New Republic / by Sarah Posner

Right Makes Might
The New Republic / by Sarah Posner / 12h
Since taking office, President Donald Trump has eagerly embraced foreign autocrats, portraying brutal dictators as allies to be courted and celebrated. He has backed Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, despite evidence that he ordered the gruesome murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi; praised North Korea’s Kim Jong Un as a “tough guy” with whom he has “very good chemistry”; congratulated Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on successfully pushing through a referendum that granted him vast new powers; applauded Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte for waging his bloody drug war “the right way”; and, of course, repeatedly said that he’d welcome a close relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Meanwhile, Trump has shaken America’s longstanding alliances with Western European nations like France and Germany, spurning the idea of global cooperation in favor of a rising nationalism that threatens to overturn the liberal democratic order. “You know what I am? I’m a nationalist, O.K.? I’m a nationalist,” Trump famously told supporters at a rally in October. “Nationalist! Use that word! Use that word!”

For all the attention that such outbursts garner in the media, the alignment of Republican support behind autocratic right-wing leaders across the globe long predates Trump’s elevation to the presidency, an investigation in partnership with Type Investigations reveals. For years, Republican members of Congress, lobbyists, and political consultants have worked to forge bonds with far-right leaders across Europe—in Hungary, Germany, Austria, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Macedonia, and beyond. You might call this loose federation of fellow travelers for the nativist global right the strongman caucus.

Sometimes these alliances have taken shape off the public radar. In other cases, though, U.S. Republicans have paraded their connections to far-right political figures, inviting them to meetings with lawmakers; major conservative events, including the Republican National Convention; gatherings at influential think tanks like the Heritage Foundation; and agenda-setting confabs such as the Conservative Political Action Conference.


This article was reported in partnership with Type Investigations.
The lines of influence run both ways. Republican political consultants have exported their battle-tested campaign theme of liberalism as an elite assault on traditional values to European far-right candidates. Powerful K Street lobbyists, including Paul Manafort, the former Trump campaign manager and convicted felon, have made their fortunes by burnishing the images of strongman leaders in the eyes of Washington policymakers. Some Republican lawmakers, including diehards of the party’s right flank, such as Dana Rohrabacher of California, Steve King of Iowa, and Louie Gohmert of Texas, have openly forged alliances with leading figures in the European far right.

All these unsightly charm offensives might have escaped sustained public notice had Trump not swept into power and lent them the tacit legitimacy of the nation’s highest office. The inner workings of a lobbying firm like Manafort’s might have remained obscure had special prosecutor Robert Mueller not swept him up into his two-year probe of the Russia-Trump nexus. Indeed, for the most part, Republican leaders in Congress have been passive enablers of the strongman caucus, standing by as Trump demolishes global alliances and the infrastructure of U.S. diplomacy, unraveling America’s commitment to promoting human rights, democracy, and civil society—however imperfectly—in the young, postcommunist democracies of Eastern and Central Europe.

Following their sweeping gains in the midterm elections last fall, Democrats in the House of Representatives are now in a position to hold Trump accountable—at least to a degree. Democratic lawmakers are preparing to launch investigations into everything from Trump’s dealings with Russia to his family’s business affairs to his tax returns. In Orange County, California, Rohrabacher was voted out of office—a rebuke of Trump’s agenda and a sign of how the demographics in former conservative bastions are shifting. These Democratic gains, however, will not erase the rightward drift of the GOP in foreign affairs. These are dangerous, potentially calamitous changes—changes that began to emerge long before Trump entered office and, no matter how vigorously Democrats oppose him, will likely continue long after his presidency ends.

While he’s no longer in Congress, Dana Rohrabacher was a driving force behind the strongman caucus. In November 2015, Rohrabacher—a 15-term lawmaker—​convened a hearing of the Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to address the growing refugee crisis in Europe. Over the preceding ten months, nearly one million migrants and refugees had crossed into Europe from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, and other war-torn countries—a fourfold increase over the previous year. That September, the image of a young Syrian boy’s dead body washing ashore in Turkey after a failed attempt to cross the Mediterranean served as a rallying cry for officials who sought to provide relief. “This is a defining moment for the European Union,” said the head of the U.N. refugee agency. “Europe cannot go on responding to this crisis with a piecemeal or incremental approach. No country can do it alone, and no country can refuse to do its part.”

Yet Rohrabacher, long one of the Republican Party’s most outspoken critics of undocumented immigration, viewed the influx of migrants into Europe as an existential threat. “Clearly, what we have seen over the past few months is unsustainable, and if not checked, will change the fundamental nature of European countries, which are now being inundated,” Rohrabacher told the subcommittee. “What we are witnessing is the destruction of Western civilization, not by an armed invasion, but instead, through envelopment.”

Rohrabacher’s hearing, convened at the height of the refugee crisis, did not draw much public attention. But it serves as a vivid reminder that extreme right-wing lawmakers like Rohrabacher were working to advance nationalist views at a time when Donald Trump was still best known as a reality TV star. Rohrabacher argued that the best response to the refugee crisis was not taking place in Germany, which had welcomed more than a million refugees, but in Hungary, where Prime Minister Viktor Orbán was intent on turning them away. “Europe’s response is madness,” Orbán wrote that September in Germany’s Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. “Those arriving have been raised in another religion, and represent a radically different culture. Most of them are not Christians, but Muslims.... Is it not worrying in itself that European Christianity is now barely able to keep Europe Christian?” Two weeks later, Hungary closed its border with Serbia, and in mid-October, it shut its border with Croatia as well.

The Obama administration viewed Orbán’s demonization of refugees as part of a larger anti-democratic campaign to silence political opposition, stifle the free press, erode the independence of the judiciary, and scapegoat supposed outsiders as conspirators against Hungary’s sovereignty. A few days before Rohrabacher’s committee hearing, Colleen Bell, the U.S. ambassador to Hungary, delivered a public condemnation of Orbán’s open xenophobia. “Every sovereign nation has the right to protect its borders,” Bell said. “But every nation, as a part of the international community, also has a fundamental obligation to help refugee populations seeking safety. Words of intolerance and xenophobic characterizations of refugees—some of the world’s most vulnerable people—as invaders and antagonists have no role in our efforts to find a solution.”

That line of criticism did not sit well with Rohrabacher. At the committee hearing a few days later, the congressman thanked Hungary’s then-ambassador to the United States, Réka Szemerkényi, for attending. The right-wing lawmaker then praised Hungary as a “tremendous friend and asset to the peace and stability of the world.”

“I am personally upset,” Rohrabacher continued, “that our administration has sought to find out and try to complain about every little thing they disagree with, with Hungary. Hungary has every right to set their own policies, and I am pleased that Hungary has a track record of doing good things with the United States.”

At the time, Rohrabacher’s support for Orbán placed him outside the political mainstream in the United States. Obama White House officials weren’t the only public figures calling out Orbán’s strongman rule; Republicans were as well. In 2014, Arizona Senator John McCain called Orbán “a neofascist dictator getting in bed with Vladimir Putin” and accused him of “practicing the same kinds of anti-democratic practices” as the Russian president. And in the years immediately following Hungary’s admission into nato in 1999, the George W. Bush administration also confronted Orbán when he departed from basic commitments to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law—criticism that Orbán believed cost him his bid for reelection in 2002, and that fueled his animosity toward the United States.

This broader consensus on authoritarian rule in Hungary rendered Rohrabacher a bit of a pariah among some of his Republican colleagues, the foreign policy heavyweights. “There’s a lunatic fringe in every organization,” McCain said of Rohrabacher in 2016. But while Rohrabacher may have been on the outs with some Republicans, he made fast friends with like-minded politicians across the Atlantic. And when figures like Orbán looked at Rohrabacher, they saw a kindred spirit.

Other Republican lawmakers associated with the strongman caucus embraced Europe’s far-right nationalists long before Trump’s election. In April 2015, King, the Iowa Republican known for his virulent anti-immigrant diatribes and racist tweets, invited Geert Wilders, the founder of the Netherlands’ far-right Party for Freedom, to speak to a weekly breakfast gathering of House Republicans. There, Wilders issued a call to arms. “Our duty is clear,” he told the lawmakers. “We have to stop mass immigration to the West from Islamic countries. And we have to get rid of the cultural relativism.”

King was eager to spread the word. “Geert Wilders speaking now before Members of Congress & national security experts,” he tweeted. “Islam will not assimilate. Western culture is superior.” The next day, the congressman called a press conference on the Capitol grounds. Flanked by fellow Republican Representatives Gohmert and Scott Perry of Pennsylvania, King argued that the United States needed to form tighter bonds with Europe’s nationalist leaders. “It’s important for us to expand and build our networks across the ocean, and to tie together the anchor that is Western civilization,” he said. In 2016, Wilders secured an invitation to the Republican National Convention.

Far-right Dutch politician Geert Wilders on Capitol Hill in April 2015, flanked by GOP lawmakers Louie Gohmert (left) and Steve King (right) Brendan Smialowski/AFP.Getty
Mainstream GOP leaders have long regarded King, like, Rohrabacher, as a loudmouth on the party’s far-right flank. In 2013, after King accused undocumented immigrants of having “calves the size of cantaloupes because they’re hauling 75 pounds of marijuana across the desert,” Republican Speaker of the House John Boehner condemned the comments as “deeply offensive and wrong” and said King’s remarks did not “reflect the values of the American people, or the Republican Party.” (Later, when King’s comments were brought up in a private conversation, Boehner reportedly replied, “What an asshole.”) Boehner resigned from Congress in 2015, however​—forced out by the ascendant far-right Freedom Caucus—and the current Republican leadership was long disinclined to criticize King for his outlandish remarks, particularly as his views gained currency in Trump’s Washington. During the 2016 election cycle, Republican presidential hopefuls sought King’s endorsement ahead of the Iowa caucuses, and Ted Cruz named King co-chair of his presidential campaign. Last June, when King approvingly retweeted a well-known Nazi sympathizer, House Republican leaders remained silent. It was only in January, after King explicitly defended white supremacy in an interview with The New York Times, that House GOP leaders finally sanctioned him, stripping him of his committee assignments, a move that King’s far-right and evangelical defenders roundly denounced.

In November 2015, with the presidential primaries in full swing, and just after Rohrabacher held his hearing on the refugee crisis, King traveled to Europe to investigate the crisis himself. The trip, which went unnoticed in the national media, was recorded in the congressional record as official business of the House Judiciary Committee, on which King served. But King was the only lawmaker to go—an unusual arrangement, since taxpayer-funded congressional travel usually involves a bipartisan delegation. (King did not respond to interview requests from The New Republic.)

King provided updates from small towns along the Serbia-Croatia border via his Twitter feed. “6000 migrants/day transit through here at Adasevci, Serbia. From as far as Pakistan, mostly young Muslim males,” King wrote. From Sid, Serbia, he shared another observation: “trains bound 4 Croatia-Slovenia-Austria then Germany. 1000 people per train. 6 trains per day. No end.” He praised the fence along Hungary’s borders with Croatia and Serbia for keeping refugees at bay. Europe was committing “cultural suicide” by admitting so many Muslim refugees, King told The New York Times, and he worried that President Obama was encouraging a similar decline in the United States. “The president is determined to import to America hundreds of thousands of displaced persons who will never assimilate into the American civilization.”

Members of Austria’s far-right Freedom Party attended a gathering in Trump Tower. “Things are changing,” the party’s general secretary said. “And we get to be a part of it.”

The following year, in October 2016, King once again traveled alone on an official congressional trip to forge new ties with nationalist leaders—this time to France, Finland, and Austria. In Vienna, King met with members of the far right, Putin-backed Freedom Party, which is hostile to Islam and the influx of refugees into Austria, and which secured a place in Austria’s coalition government in 2017. “It’s the beginning of a friendship,” King told Freedom Party leader Norbert Hofer in a video posted on the party’s web site.

About a week before the presidential election, a delegation of Freedom Party officials visited New York, Washington, and North Carolina to meet with supporters. They spent time with General Mike Flynn, then Trump’s national security adviser, in Trump Tower—a meeting arranged by King, according to The Wall Street Journal. In Charlotte, North Carolina, Republican Representative Robert Pittenger hosted the politicians and said he had known them for years from meetings in the United States and Europe. In Washington, the Austrians met with supporters they knew from earlier gatherings, including the National Prayer Breakfast and CPAC, according to the Journal. Finally, the Austrians witnessed Trump’s presidential victory at an election night party in Trump Tower. “Things are changing,” Harald Vilimsky, the Freedom Party’s general secretary, wrote on Facebook that day. “And we get to be a part of it. What an honor.”

Trump’s election may have accelerated the transformation of America’s foreign policy. But just as right-wing lawmakers like Rohrabacher and King had spent years cultivating relationships with like-minded leaders across the Atlantic, so too had nationalist politicians in Europe worked diligently to make inroads in America. In 2008, still stinging from the Bush administration’s rebuke, Viktor Orbán began plotting his return to power in Hungary. To help him, he hired Arthur J. Finkelstein, the reclusive American political strategist who was an early mastermind of red-meat Republican attack ads, as a political consultant for his Fidesz party.

Finkelstein, who died in 2017, made his reputation as a major campaign player on the right by successfully recasting the word “liberal” as a pejorative in U.S. politics—and through his counsel to clients that a winning strategy was to “polarize the electorate.” Over the decades, he advised the campaigns of Ronald Reagan, Jesse Helms, Orrin Hatch, and many other Republicans, as well as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu; his many protégés, known as “Arthur’s kids,” include recently indicted Trump adviser Roger Stone and Trump campaign pollster Tony Fabrizio. In 2011, in a rare public appearance at the CEVRO Institute, a university in Prague, Finkelstein predicted that voters, provoked by cataclysmic world events, would become increasingly drawn to xenophobia and nationalism. This combustible realignment of political views, Finkelstein explained, would translate into a resurgent longing for strongman leaders throughout the world, short on specific policy proposals, but long on authoritarian swagger. “I don’t know if anybody is watching Donald Trump in the United States, but it’s mind-boggling, it’s just pure personality,” Finkelstein said, presciently.

In his work for Orbán, Finkelstein took his signature strategy of political polarization and masterminded a campaign that cast Hungary as a victim suffering at the hands of the United States, the United Nations, and other purveyors of Western liberal democracy. Finkelstein was, according to Politico, behind the anti-immigration billboards that have proliferated in Hungary over the past decade. Thanks at least in part to Finkelstein’s strategy, Orbán won his reelection bid in 2010. After winning reelection again in 2014, Orbán openly declared his intention to make Hungary an “illiberal democracy.”

Marion Maréchal-Le Pen addresses the Republican crowd at CPAC in February 2018.Tom Williams/CQ Roll Call/Getty
Rather than court the American diplomatic establishment, which was openly critical of him, the Hungarian prime minister turned to a more pliable institution: K Street. In October 2014, his government signed a contract with Connie Mack IV, a Republican congressman-turned-lobbyist from Florida who served four terms in the House before losing a bid for the Senate in 2012. Mack was one of the founding members of the House’s hard-line Freedom Caucus and served on the Foreign Affairs Committee. He had hired Finkelstein as a consultant on his campaigns and described him as “a friend” to whom he often turned for advice.

Mack’s contract with the Hungarian government catapulted him into the top ranks of the revolving-door profiteers on K Street. In 2015, he was one of the five most highly paid foreign agents in Washington, pulling in more than a million dollars from his lobbying work for Orbán, according to an analysis by Politico of filings under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. (Mack also did not respond to interview requests from The New Republic.)

Mack’s job on behalf of Orbán was to craft “political messages” to deliver to the White House, Congress, and the media, in order to “have an influence on political decision making,” according to his contract, obtained through a review of his FARA filings. J.D. Gordon, a former Pentagon spokesman who himself went on to develop relationships with powerful Hungarians and promote Trump’s burgeoning ties with Budapest as a national security adviser to the 2016 Trump campaign, described Mack to me as “a very effective and influential ally.”

Connie Mack’s contract with Orbán paid him more than a million dollars in 2015—catapulting him into the top ranks of the revolving-door profiteers on K Street.
According to disclosures Mack filed with the U.S. government, he maintains regular contact with members of Congress and their staffs, as well as with conservative think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation. He also has ongoing contact with the Trump White House. He has communicated with Vice President Mike Pence, National Security Adviser John Bolton, and, before he resigned in August 2017, White House adviser Sebastian Gorka, a native Hungarian with far-right ties. Mack also distributes a newsletter, “Hungary Insights,” which includes frequent reminders of Orbán’s early support for Trump and roundups of positive news reports about Orbán, such as coverage of his friendly relationship with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (though Mack makes scant reference in this p.r. offensive to Orbán’s condemnation by human rights advocates for fomenting anti-Semitism).

On the day of another Rohrabacher hearing on mass migration in Europe, in April 2018, Mack sent Rohrabacher a packet of materials that included a letter from the new Hungarian ambassador to the United States, László Szabó, arguing that “public sentiment in Europe is largely on Hungary’s side” on the issue of migration. Rohrabacher entered the document into the congressional record.

In a November 2017 appearance on Blunt Force Truth, a podcast hosted by former Love Connection host Chuck Woolery, now a conservative celebrity, Mack explained his support for Orbán. He is “a conservative,” Mack said. “I wish that our State Department would treat him more like a friend and an ally instead of some of these underlings attacking him for things that George Soros is making up.”

Soros, the Hungarian-born philanthropist who has spent hundreds of millions of dollars promoting civil society and liberal democracy in Eastern Europe over the past three decades, has become a bête noire for Republicans and for far-right extremists; last fall, a Trump supporter from Florida allegedly mailed a pipe bomb to Soros’s home. (Type Investigations, the journalism nonprofit that is an editorial partner on this story, has received support from the Open Society Foundations, which Soros founded.) In Mack’s framing, therefore, Orbán was not an illiberal autocrat who abused human rights and destroyed democratic institutions, but rather a crusader for Western civilization whom the global left was unfairly demonizing. Orbán’s goal in working with Washington insiders was to get “the foreign policy world that could make life miserable for Hungary to think that he was just an ordinary conservative government—a garden-variety conservative state besieged by liberals,” said Kim Lane Scheppele, a Hungary expert at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton.

Other nationalist politicians in Europe have employed a similar strategy. A 2017 investigation by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, a transnational consortium of investigative journalists that is partially funded by the Open Society Foundations, found that between 2015 and 2017, the far-right VMRO party in Macedonia engaged in a concerted lobbying campaign in Washington, which “prompted U.S. conservatives to join in on an anti-Soros line of attack favored by Russia and Europe’s authoritarian nationalists.”

The Obama State Department had condemned the “inflammatory rhetoric” of some Macedonian politicians, which “gives license to attacks on democratic institutions.” Three days before Trump’s inauguration, however, Senator Mike Lee, the influential Republican of Utah, who chairs the Senate Steering Committee, the powerful caucus of the chamber’s conservatives, wrote an angry letter to Jess Baily, the U.S. ambassador to Macedonia, criticizing America’s meddling. “I have received credible reports that, over the past few years, the U.S. Mission to Macedonia has actively intervened in the party politics of Macedonia, as well as in the shaping of its media environment and civil society, often favoring groups of one political persuasion over another,” Lee wrote. This, the senator argued, was “highly problematic.” (In contrast, Lee has sought to wave away Russian interference in the 2016 election, arguing that the Mueller probe is unconstitutional. He also blocked a Senate resolution to protect Mueller’s investigation against interference by Trump.)

Hungarian Ambassador Réka Szemerkényi socialized with Trump and the first lady at an event at Mar-a-Lago in February 2017. Réka Szemerkényi
Two months later, Lee followed up with another letter to then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, specifically attacking Soros-funded programs that “push a progressive agenda and invigorate the political left.” Lee, along with five Republican Senate colleagues—James Inhofe of Oklahoma, Thom Tillis of North Carolina, David Perdue of Georgia, Bill Cassidy of Louisiana, and Ted Cruz—demanded an investigation into “all funds associated with promoting democracy and governance.” The language of the letter echoed that of a pamphlet distributed on Capitol Hill by a VMRO-backed Macedonian group called Stop Operation Soros.

When countries “are getting in trouble on human rights, rule of law, the governance direction of the country,” said Heather Conley, who served in the George W. Bush State Department, they “flood Washington with funding” to lobbyists and think tanks to soften the story or make it go away. According to the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project report, for example, Macedonia’s VMRO party spent more than a million dollars on lobbyists and p.r. firms between 2015 and 2017. “Instead of us fixing the problem,” Conley said, “they fix us.”

A high-profile example of this dynamic is the now-infamous lobbying contract that Paul Manafort signed with Ukraine’s strongman president, Viktor Yanukovych, in 2013. Yanukovych enlisted Manafort to mount a charm offensive on his behalf; from 2012 to 2014, according to the Associated Press, Manafort helped steer at least $2.2 million to two Washington lobbying firms. In a memo to Yanukovych in February 2013, buried in a court filing in his criminal tax fraud case, Manafort argued that changes in the composition of the U.S. Congress created an opportunity to “expand relationships, open minds, and demonstrate to the global community that Ukraine is a modern democracy.”

In particular, Manafort noted, Yanukovych had a dependable ally who had just been installed by the House leadership in a powerful position: Dana Rohrabacher, then the new chair of the Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Rohrabacher, Manafort assured his client, is “a good appointment for Ukraine and will be open minded about key policy issues.” In contrast, Manafort noted, the Human Rights and Democracy Subcommittee will “seek to pressure the VY Government.” Therefore, Manafort wrote, “the best block of its actions is to have the pertinent SubCommittee on Europe take more positive stands. This is the strategy we are building.”

By the time Trump was elected president, the trope that conservatives were under assault by left-wing elites, as epitomized by George Soros and the Obama administration, was an article of faith in the GOP. Indeed, an infamous Trump TV spot aired widely during the last week of the campaign featured an image of Soros as a sinister, unaccountable funder of globalist interests who was seeking to sway the election on Hillary Clinton’s behalf. In April 2017, at a Heritage Foundation event, Mike Lee argued that under Obama, U.S. diplomacy “took a decidedly leftist turn,” taking up the “pet causes of a privileged global elite” such as abortion and “alternative family structures”—a reference to the Obama administration’s support for LGBT rights. Lee mocked American efforts to bolster embattled civic institutions in fledgling democracies as “the substance of a global re-education campaign, funded by American taxpayers, from whom they were hidden under the guise of innocuous sounding program titles like ‘democracy assistance,’ ‘government transparency,’ and ‘human-rights.’”

Mainstream conservative media outlets echoed and amplified Lee’s views. That spring, the American Spectator published a series of laudatory articles on Macedonia’s far right, as did other conservative outlets, including Fox News, Breitbart, and The Daily Caller—as well as Russian state media outlets RT and Sputnik. In one article, the Spectator described “small but mighty Macedonia” as “the mouse that roared this year, declaring war on George Soros . . . and his U.S. Government handmaidens, who, incredibly, have financed a left-wing agenda to divide the nation and bring a socialist-Muslim coalition to power.”

In February 2017, the Conservative Political Action Conference welcomed in its exhibit hall the Europe of Nations and Freedom, a coalition of far-right political parties in the European Parliament, including Austria’s Freedom Party, France’s National Front, and the Netherlands’s Party for Freedom. A coalition representative told me that he hoped their attendance at America’s premier conservative gathering would lead to “harmonized cooperation between the United States and Europe.”

The following year, CPAC featured a speech that won wide acclaim from the event’s activist Republican audience, by a woman billed as a supporter of “school choice, private property, lower taxes, less government spending, market competition, and traditional marriage.” This was Marion Maréchal-Le Pen, the granddaughter of National Front founder Jean-Marie Le Pen, a notorious Holocaust denier. In her nationalistic remarks, Maréchal-Le Pen embraced Trump’s “America First” rhetoric and anti-immigration policies, and decried “the development of an Islamic counter-society in France.” She criticized the European Union, calling it “an ideology without land, without people, without roots, and without civilization,” and warned that France was “passing from the eldest daughter of the Catholic Church to the little niece of Islam.” To the assembled Republicans, she vowed, “This is not the France that our grandparents fought for. . . . Just like you, we want our country back.” Over the course of her ten-minute address, the CPAC crowd clapped, cheered, and cried “Vive la France!” Slowly but surely, the extreme nativist views that just a few years earlier had occupied the outer reaches of the Republican fringe had become firmly ensconced in the mainstream.

In years past, seasoned diplomats and career government officials might have been able to use America’s political and economic influence to pressure European autocrats to conform to an American worldview that, however inconsistently applied, included lifting up democratic values and institutions. But Trump has hollowed out the State Department. The president has yet to name a nominee to 37 senior State posts, 38 of his department nominees still await Senate confirmation, and he has yet to name replacements for more than a dozen others. Early in his tenure, Rex Tillerson, Trump’s first secretary of state, signaled to his employees at State that promoting human rights and democracy abroad could often create an “obstacle” to advancing U.S. interests.

It is in fact the Trump administration’s view that America’s interests are aligned with the likes of autocrats like Viktor Orbán. Réka Szemerkényi, who served as Hungary’s ambassador to the United States until July 2017, was in frequent contact with Trump campaign and administration officials—even mingling with the president and first lady at Mar-a-Lago. In the fall of 2016, Trump campaign adviser Carter Page traveled to Budapest at Szemerkényi’s behest, he later told congressional investigators, for a private meeting with Jeno Megyesy, a top Orbán adviser. Jeff Sessions also met with Szemerkényi in April 2016 and later sent her a letter, which has not been previously reported, praising Hungary as “a global beacon for the power of freedom, democracy, and human rights.” In December 2016, Trump campaign adviser J.D. Gordon also traveled to Budapest, where he delivered a speech at the Antall József Knowledge Center, a local think tank. “We very much admire and respect Prime Minister Orbán and what he is doing to make Hungary great again,” Gordon said, according to the Budapest Business Journal. “He is one of the best world leaders, in my opinion, because he has common sense and he understands the threats from open borders.” Trump and Orbán, Gordon predicted, “will be good friends.”

Marion Maréchal-Le Pen’s nationalistic speech at CPAC won wide acclaim from the Republicans in attendance, who clapped, cheered, and cried “Vive la France!”
In the absence of pressure from the U.S. foreign policy establishment, Europe’s far-right regimes have become emboldened. In June 2018, for example, the Hungarian Parliament passed a law that criminalizes aid to refugees and migrants. Human Rights Watch condemned the measure as an attempt to silence critics and block the work of NGOs attempting to aid asylum seekers. But neither the White House nor the State Department raised any criticism, and both have called for stronger U.S.-Hungarian ties. The following month, the State Department canceled a program intended to support media outlets engaged in fact-based reporting in Hungary. The Obama administration had invited organizations to apply for $700,000 in funding that would go toward training journalists, expanding their audiences, and increasing the public’s access to “reliable and unbiased information.” Connie Mack and pro-Orbán Republicans in Congress, however, including Rohrabacher and Maryland’s Andy Harris, the co-chair of the Hungarian American Congressional Caucus, demanded that the government ax the program.

The Trump administration has continued to close ranks behind Orbán. In November, after meeting with the prime minister in Budapest, Energy Secretary Rick Perry tweeted a photograph of the pair in a warm handshake, saying he hoped it “can mark the beginning of an even closer relationship between the U.S. & Hungary.” The meeting was not covered in the U.S. press. Orbán’s office boasted that “Hungarian-U.S. relations are excellent,” and noted that the two countries “confirmed that historical traditions and Christian roots must also play an important role in modern governance.”

Even though the Democrats regained control of the House last November, the reversal of party control in one chamber will not produce any swift pushback to this rising autocratic tide. Trump has used the prerogatives of the executive branch to nearly obliterate U.S. censure of anti-democratic regimes. What’s more, the strongman caucus is continuing to accrue power on the GOP side of the aisle. Dana Rohrabacher may be gone, but many other influential members of the party’s far-right flank remain in office, including Ted Cruz, Mike Lee, Andy Harris, Steve King, and Louie Gohmert.

Nationalist orthodoxy within the Republican Party has gained additional ground as more moderate voices on foreign policy, like Ed Royce of California, who long chaired the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and Bob Corker, the former chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, have retired, leaving their party to more extreme factions. In November, Tennessee voters elected longtime Representative Marsha Blackburn to fill Corker’s seat. In 2017, Blackburn, along with King and other Republicans, met with Heinz-Christian Strache and other members of Austria’s Freedom Party.

Moreover, conservative think tanks like the Heritage Foundation, activist groups like Judicial Watch, and conservative media outlets like Fox News and Breitbart have created a powerful opinion echo chamber that reinforces the nationalist and xenophobic positions of the autocratic right. By cheering the GOP’s embrace of autocrats—and packaging it in familiar conspiracy theories that cast Soros and other liberal donors as shadowy puppet-masters plotting against well-meaning, patriotic conservatives—they have helped convince the Republican base of the acceptability of these far-right ideas. A “Republican phalanx” has effectively dislodged Washington’s longstanding bipartisan foreign policy consensus around democracy promotion, said Scheppele, to the point that “you can’t take that for granted anymore.”

This is why future administrations will have a hard time stemming the ominous global advance of right-wing strongmen. Right-wing lawmakers, lobbyists, consultants, media outlets, and think tanks have worked for years to foment the Republican base’s opposition to “global elites.” Trump helped stoke that same anger, and won the presidency as a result. But in truth, the most significant change is not Trump’s ascension; it’s something much larger and more unsettling. Today’s conservative leaders—the voices who now make up the strongman caucus—have come of age under the conviction that U.S. policies supporting democracy, human rights, and a free press abroad are all essentially equivalent to their domestic enemy—liberalism—and therefore must be destroyed.

Additional research was done by Julia Herrnböck and Jaime Longoria.

Illustration: Prominent members of the strongman caucus and their far-right allies (clockwise from top left): Marion Maréchal-Le Pen, Connie Mack, Geert Wilders, Vladimir Putin, Viktor Yanukovych, Paul Manafort, Norbert Hofer, Viktor Orbán, Louie Gohmert, Dana Rohrabacher, Mike Lee, and Steve King. (Getty x 12)
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The Christianization of U.S. Foreign Policy The New Republic / by Kathryn Joyce

The Christianization of U.S. Foreign Policy
The New Republic / by Kathryn Joyce / 1h
Last Thursday, Donald Trump announced, via Twitter, a radical shift in foreign policy, saying it was time to recognize Israel’s sovereignty over the occupied territory of Golan Heights, seized from Syria in 1981. As international headlines quickly pointed out, the tweet contradicted both international law and a UN resolution; seemed a transparent gift to embattled Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, just weeks before he faces re-election amid a corruption scandal; and cheered Israeli conservatives hoping to have Israeli control of the West Bank recognized as well. Upon hearing the news, NBC reported, Netanyahu hugged U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who was visiting Israel as part of a five-day tour of the Middle East. Less discussed was the way in which the tweet capped off a week showcasing the Trump administration’s favored relationship with American evangelicals.

The Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN), among Pompeo’s traveling press team, sat down with the secretary in Jerusalem, and breathlessly reported something quite different from the mainstream press’s legalistic coverage: that Trump might just be “a modern-day Esther, poised to defend Israel and save the Jewish people.”

To convince U.S. evangelicals to overlook Trump’s personal failings, the president has previously been compared to Persian King Cyrus, a nonbeliever in the Bible who nonetheless became an instrument for fulfilling God’s will, conquering Babylon and allowing Jews to return to Israel. The comparison has also resonated elsewhere: Last March, an Israeli organization minted a coin pairing images of Cyrus and Trump, while Netanyahu underscored the comparison in a Washington, D.C., speech thanking Trump for moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem.

Pompeo’s statement elevated the stakes, referring to the biblical story of Queen Esther, who used her beauty and wiles to prevent a massacre of Persian Jews—a feat commemorated in the annual Jewish holiday of Purim, also celebrated last Thursday. Netanyahu, too, declared Trump’s tweet “a miracle of Purim.”

Republicans have ventured the comparison before, with both Sarah Palin and George W. Bush. The story of Esther, journalist Sarah Posner has observed, has long been used by Christian Zionists—evangelicals who believe the return of Christ depends on an apocalyptic scenario in which Jews return to Israel, and convert to Christianity—to argue for an invasion of Iran.

For Trump, it’s a particularly audacious comparison. “Esther’s story is that of a young Jewish woman in the ‘harem’ of the Persian king, and through her wit, grace, and charm ends up as queen—and able to avert the bloodlust of an antisemitic minister,” Steven Gardiner, an anthropologist and senior research analyst at Political Research Associates, wrote to me via email. “In other words, Esther was a woman placed in the terrifying and untenable position of sexual servitude, but nonetheless managed to save her people. No one less resembles that position than Donald Trump.”

Much ink has already been spilled over the bargain Christian leaders in the United States made regarding Trump, backing a candidate with a highly questionable personal life in exchange for Supreme Court seats. Less noticed is how the Trump administration, particularly when it comes to foreign policy under the deeply religious supervision of Mike Pompeo and Vice President Mike Pence, continually pitches itself to the Christian Right.

Last Monday, just before his departure to the Middle East, Secretary Pompeo held a press call about international religious freedom. Domestically, the Trump administration has chiefly interpreted religious freedom as a matter of exemptions to laws protecting LGBTQ people and women’s healthcare, or efforts to lift restrictions on churches’ political campaigning. Internationally, religious freedom has meant a laser-like focus on Christian persecution, with scant attention to the plight of any other religious minorities: The October release of North Carolina pastor Andrew Brunson, detained for two years in Turkey on terrorism charges, was one high-profile victory.

Monday’s call excluded the entire State Department press corps, restricting participation to a small group of “faith-based” media outlets. When an invitation was accidentally sent to a member of the mainstream press and then rescinded, bringing the exclusive briefing to light, the department doubled down, refusing to provide a transcript of the call or a list of its participants, and arguing that, as a roundtable discussion targeted at “audience-specific media,” it wasn’t subject to normal transparency practices.

Journalists as well as former State Department spokesperson John Kirby were appalled. “These officials are public servants,” Kirby told CNN. “What they say—in its entirety—is inherently of public interest.” Particularly, he added, on a topic as “universally relevant as religious freedom in the Middle East.”

One of the media organizations on the call, Religion News Service (not itself a faith-based publication, but a secular outlet that covers the religion beat), reported a partial list of other participants, including the Jewish wire service Jewish Telegraphic Agency; the center-right Jewish magazine Algemeiner; the evangelical World Magazine; and two Catholic publications, America magazine and the newspaper of the Catholic Archdiocese of Kansas City.

Notably missing from this line-up were any Muslim media organizations, remarkable given the call’s reported inclusion of the administration’s soon-to-be-released Israel-Palestine peace plan.

Monday’s call wasn’t the first time that Pompeo’s department has privileged faith-based media over mainstream reporters. Last July, just ahead of the department’s first-ever “ministerial for international religious freedom,” as New York Times religion reporter Elizabeth Dias noted on Twitter, Pompeo had sit-down interviews with four evangelical news outlets, including the Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN), before a press conference call where evangelical publications World Magazine and Christianity Today were picked first for questions, and mainstream newspapers, including The New York Times and The Washington Post, only invited to pose questions at the end of the call. And evangelical figures have also had enhanced access to policy decisions. In early March, the administration hosted a meeting with evangelical leaders—including prominent (and deeply controversial) Christian Zionist leaders like Pastor John Hagee—to “hear any concerns and red lines” they might have on a potential Israeli-Palestinian peace plan, according to an Axios source, and to reassure them that any plan would protect Israeli interests.

CBN’s sit-down with Mike Pompeo was only the latest episode in the network’s close relationship with the Trump administration—one that, as Al Jazeera argued last fall, is just as mutually beneficial as the better-known link to Fox & Friends, but is often overlooked as a part of the administration’s effective state media because of the niche audience it targets. CBN’s audience, and its interests, both help explain the administration’s policy moves and may exert influence on them, appealing to a president known for being easily swayed by flattery.

CBN’s stated mission is to ready the U.S. “for the coming of Jesus Christ.” To that end, it focuses heavily on Middle East issues. It airs the weekly program Jerusalem Dateline, and regularly features guests like Joel Rosenberg, the author of a series of Middle East-set evangelical apocalyptic or political thriller novels and a member of Pompeo’s inner circle, who has helped broker interviews between the Secretary and the network. Earlier this month, Rosenberg appeared on CBN to discuss his latest work of fiction, The Persian Gamble, which posits that Iran used U.S. money to buy North Korean nukes. Rosenberg said he’d recently explained the book’s plot to President Trump. “How do you know that’s not happening already?” Trump apparently replied.

The steady undercurrent to CBN’s focus is the Christian Zionist conviction that the return of Christ depends on a specific scenario involving the return of Jews to Israel.

It’s a belief that Pompeo seems to share, having told a Kansas church audience in 2015 to keep fighting “until the rapture.”

Even amid an administration stacked with evangelical staffers and advisors, Pompeo stands out. As former CIA director he described the “war on terror” as a holy war and said the U.S. “worshipped other gods and called it multiculturalism.” He now readily tells audiences about how he keeps a Bible open on his State Department desk to remind him of God’s truth. One of the driving motivators of Pompeo’s State Department increasingly seems to be what Gardiner calls “well-documented beliefs in the prophetic necessity of the establishment of a ‘Greater Israel’ in order to usher in the End Times”—hardly a stabilizing central principle in an era of nuclear risk. Meanwhile, holding “separate interviews with religious broadcasters,” Gardiner pointed out, means “reaching the white evangelicals who are the single most unwavering part of the voting base of an embattled president.”

It’s easy to get distracted by the secular spectacle of Trump’s manic Twitter feed, filled with arbitrary bits of outrage or lavish praise, depending on whichever leader has flattered him lately. But as last week showed, better than others, there’s a more disciplined administrative force at work behind the scenes, crafting an intensely ideological foreign policy.

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Monday, March 25, 2019

Yes, Trump Obstructed Justice. And William Barr Is Helping Him Cover It Up / by Marcy Wheeler / The New Republic












Yes, Trump Obstructed Justice. And William Barr Is Helping Him Cover It Up.
The New Republic by Marcy Wheeler  /  March 24, 2019

In a letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee leaders on Sunday, Attorney General William Barr revealed that he would not charge President Trump with obstruction of justice over his efforts to thwart the investigation into whether his campai

In a letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee leaders on Sunday, Attorney General William Barr revealed that he would not charge President Trump with obstruction of justice over his efforts to thwart the investigation into whether his campaign conspired with Russia to swing the 2016 election. In order to do so, Barr performed a remarkable gimmick that allowed him to not only break promises he made during his confirmation process, but also gloss over the crimes that Trump is suspected of committing.

It is widely believed that Barr had already categorically ruled out charging a president with obstruction. In a June 2018 memo, shared with Trump’s lawyer before his nomination, Barr argued that the theory of obstruction he believed Special Counsel Robert Mueller to be adopting would not be proper. But in that very same memo—on the very first page!—Barr conceded, “Obviously, the President … can commit obstruction in [a] classic sense of sabotaging a proceeding’s truth-finding function.” Barr envisioned that if a president “suborns perjury, or induces a witness to change testimony … then he, like anyone else, commits the crime of obstruction.”

That’s important, because we know that Trump has been involved in getting his aides to lie. His own lawyer, Jay Sekulow, reportedly edited the prepared statement Trump’s longtime personal attorney Michael Cohen gave to Congress about an effort to build a Trump Tower in Moscow. Cohen goes to prison in May, in part, for telling lies that Sekulow reviewed.

And Trump has repeatedly dangled pardons to subordinates under investigation, reportedly including former National Security Advisor Mike Flynn, former campaign chair Paul Manafort, and Cohen. Indeed, in a hearing in February, Mueller prosecutor Andrew Weissmann argued that Manafort lied about the details of sharing Trump campaign polling data with the Russian political operative Konstantin Kilimnik on August 2, 2016—knowing that the data would be passed on to others including other Russians—specifically to “augment his chances for a pardon.”

In Barr’s confirmation hearing in January, Senator Amy Klobuchar asked him whether a president “persuading a person to commit perjury [or] convincing a witness to change testimony would be obstruction.” He said yes, both would.

And yet he just decided that a president who has apparently done both of those things did not commit obstruction of justice. Why?

Controversially, Mueller didn’t decide whether Trump obstructed justice. His report stated, “[W]hile this report does not conclude that the President committed a crime, it also does not exonerate him.” Instead, Mueller provided Barr with the evidence for and against charging Trump with obstruction, leaving the decision up to the attorney general.

The contortions Barr goes through in his letter to renege on his confirmation hearing promises are extraordinary.

First, Barr describes the conclusions about the main crimes he says that Mueller investigated. “[T]he Special Counsel did not find that any U.S. person or Trump campaign official or associate conspired or knowingly coordinated with the IRA in its efforts,” Barr wrote. (The IRA, or Internet Research Agency, is a Russian troll farm with ties to the Kremlin.) He continued, “The Special Counsel did not find that the Trump campaign, or anyone associated with it, conspired or coordinated with the Russian government in [its] efforts ... to gather and disseminate information to influence the election.”

This language doesn’t even bother to exonerate Trump’s associate Roger Stone, who during the campaign was in cahoots with WikiLeaks as it dumped Russian-hacked emails that damaged Hillary Clinton’s campaign. Barr’s statements only pertain to the Russian government, not Russian individuals or WikiLeaks or anyone else. This is a crucial distinction, given that we know the Trump campaign knew of and encouraged Stone’s coordination with WikiLeaks.

In his testimony to Congress, Cohen revealed that Stone called Trump around July 19, 2016, to tell him about the upcoming WikiLeaks dump. “Wouldn’t that be nice,” Cohen describes Trump responding. After the July 22 release of the emails, “a senior Trump Campaign official was directed,” Stone’s indictment describes, without saying who did the directing, “to contact STONE about any additional releases and what other damaging information” WikiLeaks had on the Clinton campaign. In October 2016, WikiLeaks released emails stolen from Clinton campaign chair John Podesta, deflecting attention away from a damning video showing Trump making sexually abusive comments; in response, “an associate of [a] high-ranking Trump Campaign official sent a text message to STONE that read ‘well done,’” the indictment says.

More importantly, Barr’s letter doesn’t address something else Mueller investigated: whether a series of exchanges between Trump’s campaign and Russians amounted to a crime. The sworn testimony of Trump’s aides reveal that, at least through June 2016, he continued to pursue a $300 million real estate deal in Moscow that required Vladimir Putin’s assistance. While hoping to land that deal, Trump’s son, Don Jr., took a meeting with some Russians offering dirt on Clinton as “part of Russia and its government’s support for Mr. Trump.” At the end of the meeting, Don Jr. said his father would consider sanctions relief for Russia if he won.

Then, on August 2, 2016, in the same meeting where Manafort gave Kilimnik polling data, he discussed a “peace” deal in Ukraine that would also amount to sanctions relief for the Russians. Finally, after he was elected but before he was president, Trump undercut President Obama’s response to the Russian hacks, suggesting that he would give Russia sanctions relief.

The hack-and-leak is not the crime Trump may have committed. It is, instead, a quid pro quo deal by which Russia would help Trump win and Trump would relieve Russia of the sanctions imposed for engaging in human rights violations, annexing Crimea, and hacking the election to help Trump win.

In deciding that Trump didn’t obstruct justice after a paltry 48 hours of review, Barr “concluded that the evidence developed during the Special Counsel’s investigation is not sufficient to establish that the President committed an obstruction-of-justice offense.” He came to this conclusion—in spite of saying during his confirmation hearings that what Trump is known to have done amounts to obstruction—because Mueller found that “the evidence does not establish that the President was involved in an underlying crime related to Russian election interference.”

That’s not the crime that, the evidence quite clearly shows, Trump may have committed. This is not the crime that Manafort appears to have lied about in hopes of getting a pardon.

In giving Trump the all-clear on obstruction charges, Barr appears not to have considered whether Trump obstructed the actual crime in question. He instead considered whether the president obstructed a different crime. This is the legal sleight of hand that has allowed Barr to proclaim that Trump will not be charged.

The Democratic-controlled House Judiciary Committee now has abundant reason to get all the underlying materials from the Mueller inquiry, because the attorney general just cleared the president of something he agreed constituted a crime just a few months ago.