Friday, February 3, 2017

##419 The free Society is an open society



##419 The free Society is an open society

January 31, 2017
The Free Society Is an Open Society
by Jacob T. Levy
“He has endeavoured to prevent the population of these States; for that purpose obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their migrations hither…” — Declaration of Independence
“Mister Gorbachev, tear down this wall.” — Ronald Reagan, June 12, 1987
In my previous essays between the election and the inauguration, I discussed how we got here, and how we didn’t, as well as what’s distinctively worrying about the new style of politics. In the first week of the new administration, it’s worth noting that we saw an outpouring of an identity-based politics of protest against rising illiberalism and misogyny, an extraordinary level of public untruth repeated by a spokesman who showed signs of not believing what he was saying but being forced into it, and the continued surrender of Republican elites to the new order.
I’m going to return to those themes in future posts; but given that the new administration is now in power, and it’s time to interrupt analyses of how and why, with discussions of what it is doing.
The populist authoritarianism that is rising across developed countries, the United States very much included, is characterized by a zeal to harden borders. Trade and migration are, between them, the great villains of the modern populist imagination, surpassing even domestic dissent. And, unsurprisingly, the first week of Donald Trump’s presidency included sharp blows against both the gradually liberalizing international trade order that the United States has led since World War II, and the freedom of human beings to move from place to place in the world. The chaos of the administration’s cruel and poorly-planned action against border-crossing by those born in seven Muslim countries is emerging as the defining act of these early days. For an earlier generation of conservatives, a militarized wall on an international boundary symbolized the evils of Communism and Soviet domination in eastern Europe. Now, such a wall will be the symbol of the Trump era as a whole. The administration is moving astonishingly quickly to make the United States a closed society.
Walls work in both directions—they keep people in, as well as out. The administration’s decision to suspend reentry for lawful residents who were abroad at the time of the order tells non-citizens in the United States—permanent residents, long-since admitted refugees or those granted asylum, spouses and students and H1-B visa holders doing highly skilled work that the country needs—that they travel outside the United States at risk of not being allowed to return. Even the eventual decision to allow permanent residents to re-enter on a case-by-case basis was presented as an exercise of agency discretion, not a disavowal of the tactic. The word of the United States isn’t good anymore—”permanent” resident now means something much less than that, and refugee status once granted might be revoked with no notice. Henceforth, peaceful, law-abiding residents will be much more afraid to leave the country. The barriers to letting people in thus act as a kind of cage to keep people in. Caged people aren’t free.
I wrote in Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom that “The core of liberal ideas includes religious toleration and freedom […], the rule of law, and especially the control by law of the executive’s security apparatus through habeas corpus, procedural rights, and prohibitions on torture and extrajudicial executions, imprisonment, or dispossession[…], and the desirability of commerce and international trade.” (p. 87)
Not only have all three elements of this core come under assault in Trump’s first week in office—they have come under assault specifically in association with his war on migrants: religious discrimination in migration, extrajudicial detention being carried in airports as we speak, and the idea of a 20% tariff wall on goods to pay for the physical border wall.
Notwithstanding some current talking points, the new immigration restrictions are religiously discriminatory in both intent and effect. Rudy Giuliani has openly acknowledged that this was the policy crafted in order to get as close as possible to the ban on Muslim immigration Trump called for on the campaign trail, while maybe being able to legally get away with it. And the combination of the identification of seven overwhelmingly-Muslim countries as the source of the supposed security threat (though zero nationals of those countries—zero—have killed anyone in an act of terrorism on U.S. soil) with special exemptions for Christians from those countries turns the new restrictions into exactly what Giuliani’s account leads us to expect: a religiously-exclusionary act with a veneer of a security excuse.
As Dylan Matthews argues, the liberal political theorist Judith Shklar’s essay “The Liberalism of Fear” helps us to see the centrality of resisting cruelty and lawless state violence to the liberal vision of the free society. (My first book aimed to apply Shklar’s insights to the political treatment of ethnic and cultural minorities; its title was a direct reference to the essay.) Until the end-of-week Muslim ban and abandonment of refugees, I would have said that the great horror of Trump’s first week was the mooted possibility of reopening black site prisons and his enthusiasm about torture—an enthusiasm he says he’ll reluctantly hold in check in deference to the views of some of his top appointees, though it’s hard to imagine his “deference” to these subordinates lasting forever.
But the developing war on immigrants puts us squarely into liberalism-of-fear terrain now. Coercive border control is an especially central location for those fearful rule-of-law concerns. It routinely involves indefinite detention without legal counsel or trial. While intelligence agencies all too often exercise state violence without legal oversight, for those charged with border control it is a constant. This weekend, legal residents of the United States were prevented from boarding their planes home, or on arrival in the U.S., were physically detained without counsel or legal process.
While at this writing the situation remains unclear, there are reports that even after judicial rulings against aspects of the new policy, border patrol agents were refusing to recognize court orders. Trump advisor Stephen Miller seemed to adopt an especially strong attitude of disregard for judicial oversight, maintaining that a court order neither “impedes or prevents the implementation of the president’s executive order which remains in full, complete and total effect.” And even before the Muslim ban was announced, the new executive orders on border control significantly expanded the arbitrary authority of immigration control officers to decide whom to deport, and insisted on a huge increase in those undocumented migrants—including asylum-seekers—who would be kept in indefinite detention. (Dara Lind at Vox, author of that latter piece, has been providing especially important and valuable coverage of these issues.)
For four months, all refugee admissions will be suspended, from everywhere in the world, abandoning many to the repression and war from which they are fleeing. The refugee suspension has perhaps gotten the least attention in the U.S., as it lacks some easily-understood and high-profile features of the Muslim ban: both the religious discrimination and the exclusion from reentry of people who have already lived here.
But it is no less cruel. People whose claim for refuge has already been judged valid, people who have already been “vetted” as posing no security risk, people fleeing war zones and repression from anywhere in the world, now find themselves locked out. This keeps refugee camps that much fuller, leaving that much less space for new people also fleeing. It further encourages very dangerous alternatives, such as families entrusting themselves to smugglers or to risky self-help in boats or on foot. Locking refugees out is a violation of international law; more to the point, it is monstrous, and renders the U.S. a kind of jailer for people at risk, keeping them locked in where they are now.
In treating peaceful civilian migration the way states treat invading armies, coercive border control always involves a deeply suspect kind of lawless violence. These aren’t permanent features of political life. The system of passports and visas as required for international movement and migration is surprisingly recent. Open, document-less borders within Europe were closed as an emergency measure during World War I; the generalized world system of passports wasn’t imposed until 1920. The passport as a document was much older, but mainly offered protection to local subjects traveling abroad. It could confirm one’s identity, but was not normally a requirement for crossing frontiers.
The liberal understanding of free societies and politics grew in part out of life in commercial medieval European cities—cities whose walls were to keep out armies, not civilians (or goods, as the cities were entirely dependent on trade). In the famous legal principle that governed those cities, “city air makes you free;” one who lived in such a city for a year and a day gained the freedom of city life against the oppression of the feudal countryside. The cities were proud of this, and grew by it.
After enjoying open borders for half of its history, the U.S. has had a deeply unhappy series of experiences with border control. The first federal regulation on entry was a racist restriction on Chinese migrants, the second a similar de facto regulation of those from Japan. There have been recurring restrictions on the grounds of political beliefs. During the middle decades of the 20th century when U.S. immigration was most severely limited, Franklin Roosevelt turned away Jewish refugees fleeing Hitler on the grounds that they might include German spies—an approach that is all but indistinguishable from the contemporary conflation of those fleeing war and persecution in majority-Muslim countries with radical Islamist terrorists. (Many of those turned away then died in the Holocaust; and many of those turned away now may die in their home countries’ civil wars or despotic regimes.) And the long effort to prevent migration across the southern border has seen a constant expansion of intrusive police power, and an extension of border control authority deep into the territory of the United States, putting a majority of the American population in regions where border agents wield extra-Constitutional powers.
Many people have gradually come to acknowledge the failure of a drug war focused on militarized border interdiction, and the cost in subjecting Americans to a domestic militarized police force trying to suppress supply of drugs for which there is demand. Such policies finally turned much of northern Mexico into a near-war-zone, with wealthy and violent drug cartels enjoying the profits of U.S. prohibition. (This is, of course, not unrelated to many Mexicans’ attempt to flee into the U.S.)
We should expect no different from a war on immigration. A wall can’t stop the operation of supply and demand, whether for labor or for safe refuge; it can only enrich the illegal smugglers who learn how to defeat it. And hunting migrants peacefully living inside the U.S. requires constant invasion of everyone’s privacy and liberty, not just that of the migrants themselves. Every relationship from the workplace to the classroom to marriage is subject to regulation and prohibition: you may not employ, or teach, or marry whom you wish. But they’re also all subject to policing: who are your students? Have you checked your employees’ papers? Are you really married to your spouse?
Far too many people seem to believe that the system of walls, cages, and lawless state action can be safely aimed only outward—against strangers, against those with no claim on the United States—and that the shift toward populist authoritarian nationalism at the border can be cordoned off from domestic liberty. Even if it were right (which it’s absolutely not), to disregard the cost to those strangers’ liberty—to lock them in their countries of origin, however tyrannical, violent, or impoverished they may be—that’s not how it works. A society can’t close itself off and remain free.
Jacob T. Levy is Tomlinson Professor of Political Theory and Director of the Yan P. Lin Centre for the Study of Freedom and Global Orders in the Ancient and Modern Worlds at McGill University; author of Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom; a blogger at Bleeding Heart Libertarians; and a Niskanen Center Adjunct Fellow and Advisory Board Member
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##251 Trump and Putin’s game theory

##251 Trump and Putin’s game theory

Trump and Putin’s Game Theory
Why Cooperation Won’t Last
By Alexander J. Motyl
What happens when one unstoppable force meets another? We’ll see at the first face-to-face Trump-Putin meeting, which will probably take place in the next few months. Despite the mercurial nature of both men’s style of governance, we know at least one thing to be true about them: both have a loose relationship with the truth. They readily exploit fake news, and they believe that reality is what they say it is. Worse, both men have a strong paranoid streak, with Trump primarily seeing enemies at home and Putin primarily seeing enemies abroad. Both are also certain of their own greatness: Trump regularly asserts that he’ll be the greatest president since time immemorial, while Putin asserts that he and Russia are one and the same.
It’s hard to see how such men can come together on anything of substance. Imagine for the sake of argument that Russia and the United States do indeed share a variety of common national interests. Imagine, as well, that they hammer out a deal: the United States will do A, B, and C in exchange for Russia’s doing D, E, and F.
Given the traits that they share, a rational Trump could never believe that Putin will stick to his word, just as a rational Putin could not believe that Trump will stick to his. This would be true even if, objectively, a deal might benefit both sides: each side would stand to gain even more if it failed to do its part of the bargain while its interlocutor stuck to its own. U.S. President Ronald Reagan understood this when he famously stated that the United States should “trust, but verify” Moscow with respect to nuclear arms reductions. But nuclear weapons can be counted, and their reduction can therefore be verified. In contrast, it would be difficult to verify any Russian withdrawal of troops from the occupied Donbass, especially since Putin insists that there are no troops there at all. Likewise, Putin would have a hard time verifying that the United States really did cut all aid to Ukraine.
As such, both men would have to assume—rightly—that their interlocutor has no intention of fulfilling his part of the bargain. If both men were even marginally familiar with each other’s past behavior, their mutual mistrust could only grow. Putin has cavalierly suspended, ignored, or violated many of Russia’s international commitments, the key one being the 1994 Budapest Memorandum that supposedly obligated Russia to guarantee Ukraine’s territorial integrity and security. Meanwhile, Trump has demonstrated in his first few days in office that he intends to end America’s involvement in free trade pacts and alliances.
Complicating things even more is that there is no sovereign authority to enforce international deals. And neither man would want to call on international institutions, other nations, or alliances of nations to do so, since both of them disavow the right of those parties to interfere in their country’s internal affairs. As a result, the deal could not survive.
Since both sides would likely assume that the other would violate its commitments as soon as the ink dried, they would rationally conclude that they would be foolhardy not to violate the deal as well. Naturally, both sides would accuse the other of mendacity and of being responsible for the deal’s failure to take root. Very quickly, the initial claims of trust and friendship would be followed by accusations of bad faith. The “bromance” would end, and Russo-American relations would be worse than they were before Putin and Trump tried to outwit each other.
There is a larger moral to this story, one that relates specifically to what U.S. policy toward Russia should be. Realist analysts such as Henry Kissinger, John Mearsheimer, and Stephen Walt insist that states interact on the basis of their national interests; in that sense, their analysis seems to overlap with Putin’s and Trump’s own views of international relations. But national interests are divined by policymakers such as Trump and Putin, who have their own personality quirks, ideology, culture, and the like. We can all agree that survival, stability, power, and wealth might be defined as permanent national interests. But the real question is how to decide what those words mean, both in general and in particular circumstances.
Both Trump and Putin claim to place their countries first and to want make their countries great again. Their approach to international politics has often been called nationalist, but Lenin’s term “great-power chauvinism” could be more appropriate. Can great-power chauvinism be squared with realism? The former is rooted in a peculiar ideology and mindset; the latter purports to be an objective assessment of national interests.
In an ideal realist world, Putin would not be a great-power chauvinist committed to imperial grandeur, and Trump would not be a disrupter. In fact, the United States and Russia wouldn’t even be at odds, since Russia wouldn’t have pursued imperialist aggression in Georgia and Ukraine, and the United States wouldn’t be creating strategic disasters in the Middle East.
In reality, Putin’s Russia is a dangerous adversary. It has launched two wars already—in Georgia and Ukraine. It is also threatening to seize Belarus, rattling sabers and violating the borders of the Baltic states, and arming Kaliningrad and Crimea with medium- and long-range missiles; moreover, it has officially stated that it would use nuclear weapons in response to a conventional threat and is actively supporting anti-Western, anti-American, and anti-European parties in the West. Such activities are deeply destabilizing for Europe and the United States. Even worse than the crushing of democracy, the potential streams of refugees from Ukraine and Belarus, and the spillover of war into Poland, Finland, Hungary, and other states is the fact that Russia could soon overreach and find itself on the brink of collapse.
Vital U.S. interests are threatened by Putin—not because it is in Russia’s objective interest to threaten them, but because Putin and the regime and ideology he has created require such a hostile policy. The United States should be concerned and should attempt to prevent his aggression. Yet Trump appears to believe that Putin has been misunderstood, or that his recent aggression relates to NATO enlargement. According to that line of thinking, Putin invaded Ukraine because of some possibility of Ukraine joining NATO (a possibility that no one, either in Ukraine’s policy circles or in NATO’s, would consider realistic). If that were the case, it would follow that by defanging NATO, the United States could turn Putin pacific.
Alternatively, if one takes Putin at his word and examines the nature of his regime, one has to realize that Russian aggression is largely motivated by an imperialist ideology that serves Putin’s power and has deep roots in Russian political culture. And if one dispassionately examines the military capacity of NATO states and sees that they pose no conceivable objective threat to Russia, one may also have to realize that Putin’s invocation of the NATO threat is either a cynical ploy or the symptom of a paranoid megalomania. NATO is therefore anything but “obsolete,” as Trump calls it. The United States benefits directly from a strong and defensible Europe—as well as a strong and defensible Ukraine—because that is the only way Putin’s aspirations can be contained.
Both Trump and Putin want to make themselves and their countries number one. That is impossible. Sooner or later, U.S.-Russian relations will take a serious turn for the worse. At that point, Putin will long for the moderation and predictability of Barack Obama.
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## 293 Donald Trump, Stephen Bannon and the coming crisis in American national life | Kaiser | TIME



## 293 Donald Trump, Stephen Bannon and the coming crisis in American national life | Kaiser | TIME

Donald Trump, Stephen Bannon and the Coming Crisis in American National Life
David Kaiser
Updated: Nov 18, 2016 5:22 PM Tokyo
During the 1990s, two amateur historians, Neil Howe and the late William Strauss, developed a new theory of American history in two books, Generations: the History of America’s Future (1991), and The Fourth Turning: An American Prophecy (1997). They identified an 80-year cycle in American history, punctuated by great crises that destroyed an old order and created a new one.
Though their theory is not widely taught in colleges or discussed in the media, Strauss and Howe may well play a major role in Donald Trump’s administration. Stephen Bannon, the former head of Breitbart News who has been appointed Trump’s chief strategist in the White House, is very familiar with Strauss and Howe’s theory of crisis, and has been thinking about how to use it to achieve particular goals for quite a while. I know this because Bannon interviewed both Neil Howe and myself in 2009 while he was making a documentary film about the ongoing financial crisis. The film, called Generation Zero, discussed those ideas in some detail.
Bannon focused on the key aspect of their theory, the idea that every 80 years American history has been marked by a crisis, or “fourth turning,” that destroyed an old order and created a new one: The great crises identified by Strauss and Howe included the era of the American Revolution and the Constitution (1774-1794); the Civil War and its immediate aftermath (1860-68); and the Depression and the Second World War (1929-45). Doing the math, they predicted another great crisis sometime in the first 15 years of the 21st century.
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Strauss and Howe’s major prediction has now obviously come true: Few would deny that the U.S. has been in a serious political crisis for some time, marked by intense partisan division, a very severe recession, war abroad and, above all, a breakdown in the ties between the country and its political establishment.
I was one of very few professional historians to become interested in the work of Strauss and Howe, and I incorporated their insights into books on the origins of the Vietnam War and Franklin Roosevelt’s role in leading the nation into World War II. I have also incorporated their theory into analyses of European history and current events. I must admit that I did not know exactly what I was getting into when Bannon, who was then working at the conservative group Citizens United, contacted me to ask me for an interview, but I appreciated any chance to discuss Strauss and Howe’s ideas and the crisis that was by then indisputably upon us. Bannon is both intelligent and charismatic, and he clearly enjoyed our interview as much as I did. In the finished film, he used my interview perfectly fairly, without attempting to give it his own extreme right-wing slant.
The power of Strauss and Howe’s theory of crises comes from its lack of a specific ideology. My own interpretation of it is that the death of an old political, economic and social order creates an opportunity for any determined movement or leader to put a new vision in place. To use the most striking example, both the United States and Germany were in the midst of a terrible economic and political crisis in 1933. The United States turned to Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal; Germany turned to Adolf Hitler and National Socialism.
In 2009, when Bannon and I met, I hoped that Barack Obama and the Democratic Congress would use the economic crisis of our own age to revive the values of the New Deal. Bannon obviously had other ideas about where the crisis would lead.
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As it turned out, Obama failed to embark on a New Deal. He evidently believed that there was nothing fundamentally wrong with our system and that it could be fixed with only marginal adjustments. Late in his term, he told David Remnick of The New Yorker that Presidents could not, in fact, remake American society, and that that was a good thing. That differentiated him from Lincoln and FDR—and also from today’s Republican Party.
Since at least 2000, in my opinion, the Republican Party has managed to seize and generally keep the initiative during our current crisis precisely because it is the revolutionary party of change, while the Democrats are essentially the party of the status quo. The Republican stance goes back, of course, to the early career of Newt Gingrich in the 1980s. (Gingrich was interviewed at great length in Generation Zero and is evidently destined for a very high position in the new administration. John Bolton, another possible Secretary of State, is also interviewed.) Meanwhile, House Speaker Paul Ryan has been dreaming for years of undoing Medicare and Social Security. The opportunity to do so has now come.
Trump, Bannon and the rest of the Trump campaign have already managed to destroy the old political order. Trump wiped out a slate of traditional Republican candidates and has won the White House, despite losing the popular vote. Meanwhile, a ceaseless Republican political offensive at various levels of government has given Trump an entrenched majority in the House of Representatives and a small majority in the Senate. Soon the conservatives will have a majority on the Supreme Court.
What will they do? Their rhetoric and personalities, viewed in the context of Strauss and Howe’s theory of crisis, suggest that they will not be bound by existing precedents and that they will rely on their own view of the heroes and villains of our time.
Generation Zero slanted the story of the economic crisis rather cleverly. On the one hand, plenty of contributors pointed out that greed and shoddy banking practices had brought about the economic collapse, but the ultimate blame is placed on liberals, bureaucrats and established politicians. And just as Republican politicians and commentators have done for the last seven years, many of the contributors—speaking at the dawn of the Obama administration—pictured a horrible fate under Barack Obama, featuring economic catastrophe and attempts to impose socialism.
This, however, is one of the terrible things about crisis periods: many people will believe almost anything. The United States faces a terrible crisis right now even though our economy is much improved from eight years ago and we are not involved in a large war. And the Republican Party and Donald Trump are poised to take advantage of it. In my opinion, Trump, Bannon, Gingrich, Ryan and the rest will use their opportunity during the next year or two to undo as much of the Democratic legacy as they can—not only the Obama legacy, but that of FDR and LBJ as well.
Meanwhile, however, two other dangers lurk—one of them embodied in my most vivid memory of my own encounter with Bannon.
When I was first exposed to Strauss and Howe I began thinking how their ideas explained the histories of other countries as well, and during our interview, I mentioned that crises in countries like France in the 1790s and Russia after 1917 had led to reigns of terror. Bannon included those remarks in the final cut of Generation Zero.
A second, more alarming, interaction did not show up in the film. Bannon had clearly thought a long time both about the domestic potential and the foreign policy implications of Strauss and Howe. More than once during our interview, he pointed out that each of the three preceding crises had involved a great war, and those conflicts had increased in scope from the American Revolution through the Civil War to the Second World War. He expected a new and even bigger war as part of the current crisis, and he did not seem at all fazed by the prospect.
I did not agree, and said so. But, knowing that the history of international conflict was my own specialty, he repeatedly pressed me to say we could expect a conflict at least as big as the Second World War in the near or medium term. I refused.
Apocalyptic rhetoric and apocalyptic thinking flourish during crisis periods. This represents perhaps the biggest danger of the Trump presidency, and one that will bear watching from all concerned citizens in the months and years ahead.
The Long ViewHistorians explain how the past informs the present
David Kaiser, a historian, has taught at Harvard, Carnegie Mellon, Williams College, and the Naval War College. He is the author of seven books, including, most recently, No End Save Victory: How FDR Led the Nation into War. He lives in Watertown, Mass.
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## 388 Trump’s refugee ban was emotion, not policy | John Pod-horetz Trump’s Refugee Ban Was Emotion; Not Policy 1 Item added Trump’s Refugee Ban Was Emotion; Not Policy By John Podhoretz, www.commentarymagazine.com View Original January 29th, 2017 paul musgrove tweet Politics & Ideas A Policy of Feelings, Not Facts Abdollah Mostafavi, center, ar-riving from Tehran, Iran, is met by his family including son-in-law Nasser Sorkhavi, left, daugh-ter Mozhgan Mostafavi, second from right, and grandson Kou-rosh Sorkhavi at San Francisco International Airport Saturday, Jan. 28, 2017, in San Francisco. Mostafavi was held at the airport for some time as a result of Pres-ident Donald Trump’s executive order barring citizens of seven predominantly Muslim countries from entering the U.S. Photo by: AP Photo/Marcio Jo-se Sanchez This institution, COMMEN-TARY, has been at the forefront of the conversation about radical Islam since the publication of Bernard Lewis’s seminal article “The Return of Islam” in January 1976, forty-one years ago. Almost 30 years later, in September 2004, Norman Podhoretz published his seminal “World War IV” about the nature of the civilizational struggle between radical Islam and the West. In between and since, COMMENTARY has published literally hundreds of thousands of words on the subject. I bring this up in the context of Donald Trump’s executive order suspending all refugee entries from Syria, which is based, the president says, on protecting the United States from radical Islam coming to our shores. Indeed, nothing could be more important for the future of the United States, and nothing could be worse than enacting policies that are theoretically designed to serve that purpose but which complicate it immensely instead. The refugee executive order is not a policy based in fact. The facts do not support it. The facts since 9/11 do not offer the hint of a suggestion that refugees who have already gone through a vet-ting process pose a terrorist threat, either here or (as yet) in Europe. The most horrifying recent acts, the ones that triggered Trump’s initial announcement he wanted a total ban on Muslim travel to the United States, involve radicalized homegrown native-born citizen terrorists. Omar Mateen of the Orlando massacre was born in New York. Tafsheen Malik of the San Bernardino slaughter was born in Chicago (his wife, who came into the country because she married a citizen, was from Pakistan, not any of the countries named in Trump’s executive order). The Bataclan killers in Paris were born and raised in Belgium, not in Syria. And so on. Only the Tsarnaev brothers, who commit-ted the Boston Marathon bomb-ings, count as refugees, but they came after securing political asy-lum from Russia—another coun-try not on the list, obviously. So what does this tell us? It tells us this is a policy based on feelings. It is the very partial ful-fillment of a wild and radical campaign promise made hurried-ly after the San Bernardino kill-ings to ban all Muslims from the United States. Given the very partial nature of it, the policy is simply an immigration-restrictionist version of the classic liberal approach to problems; just do something. And do it big. And like such liberal solutions, it is also a form of virtue-signaling to those who support such wild ideas. It’s a way the president who got their vote flat-ters them for their seriousness of purpose and their uncompromis-ing understanding of the need to pursue the truth no matter the cost. Already, apologists and cynics alike are all pointing out Trump is merely doing what he said he would do during the campaign. Well, that’s not really true; you might even say he has taken the coward’s way out for failing to follow through on his proposal to ban all Muslims. Af-ter all, his promulgation of a mass Muslim ban in late 2015 was one of the many reasons many of us were horrified by his candidacy and opposed him, and he won the nomination and the election anyway, so as with everything that’s happened since election day, no one should be surprised. Which doesn’t make it good policy–taken on its own terms—as a way of preventing terrorism inside the United States. There are only two solid de-fenses of it. One is that the Unit-ed States posture toward refugees is entirely voluntary; we need not accept them if we don’t wish to. The problem there is the harsh judgment of history when we haven’t, though we could have. While it’s a solid argument, it’s an awful one, morally and, indeed, politically. The second is that the political correctness of the Obama administration made it impossible for prior officials to do the kind of screening we need—screening to ensure not just that terrorists don’t enter our country and stay here, but that radical Islamists who believe in the supremacy of sharia and promote a specifically non-American view of the proper political order of our liberal re-public are kept out as well. That, I believe, is the theory undergird-ing the baffling decision (appar-ently by Steve Bannon and Ste-phen Miller at the White House) to suspend all entry even by permanent residents with green cards who have traveled to the seven banned countries and are there now. The speculation is that this has been done to close a sharia/terror loophole as follows: Someone who goes back to visit can get radicalized and could be the next terrorist so if you want to dot all the “i”s and cross the “t”s you’ve got to keep them out, too. But in both these cases, it ap-pears even the Trump admin-istration is too politically correct to say any of this out loud, so how are its people going to pre-vail in an argument about it? That’s why I say this is a policy about feelings—about feelings relating to terrorism and sharia and Islam itself. It is a policy that, in its most dangerous it-eration, conflates Islam with rad-ical Islam precisely because it is not accompanied by an argument that separates the two. Rudy Giuliani gave the game away on television this morning. According to The Hill: Former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani (R) said in an in-terview on Saturday that Presi-dent Trump had previously asked him about legally implementing a “Muslim ban.” But Giuliani during then dis-puted the notion that the presi-dent’s sweeping executive order barring refugees and people from seven predominantly Muslim na-tions amounts to a ban on Mus-lims. “I’ll tell you the whole his-tory of it: We he first announced it, he said ‘Muslim ban,’” Giuli-ani said on Fox News. “He called me up, he said, ‘put a commission together, show me the right way to do it legally.’” Giuliani said he then put together a commission that included law-makers and expert lawyers. “And what we did was we focused on, instead of religion, danger.” What Giuliani was admitting here is that the overarching goal was a Muslim ban, but the dial-back was to focus on “danger” rather than “religion” even though “religion” was the true target. His panel of experts un-derstood a religious test could not pass constitutional muster, so they came up with a face-saver. In the end, Trump wanted this to fulfill his campaign promise—to show he’d follow through. Bannon and Miller, it seems, want to use it to send an ideolog-ical message about the new, harsher, more no-bull foreign policy approach they are cham-pioning. What the people who will actually have to implement the policy and defend it think—people like the secretary of state and the secretary of homeland security and the like—was not taken into consideration. The feelings ruled. So if this is a policy about feel-ings, feelings about building a wall not only between the U.S. and Mexico but between the U.S. and a whole bunch of other plac-es around the world, counter-feelings deserve a hearing as well. So let me tell a story about my feelings. In 2006, speaking before an audience in suburban Chicago synagogue at an event sponsored by a conservative Jewish organi-zation, I heard the first boos from a friendly audience I’d ever heard. I was asked a question about immigration and the out-rage then being expressed on the Right at George W. Bush’s im-migration reform package. I said, simply, that as an American Jew, I considered America’s openness to immigration the very reason for my existence and one of the nation’s glories. As an American Jew, I considered the knowledge that hundreds of thousands of potential refugees from Nazi Ger-many were turned away under the restrictions placed on immi-gration in a 1924 act of Congress to be one of the great tragedies of our time. Given these facts, I did not feel it would be moral for me to speak out against relatively loose immigration. The boos startled me because we were in a synagogue. But an-gry questioners went at me, that night and many other appearances to follow over the years, with the simple question: “Don’t you believe in enforcing the law?” And they were sure they had me. For how could I, a law-and-order conservative, defend illegal immigration when it was, in fact, illegal? All the pro-immigration arguments aside from the simple moral framework I had proposed—that immigration was a net positive for our economy, that crime had dropped over the course of the past decade even as illegal immigration from Mexico had surged so it couldn’t be a crime producer—could not answer that simple question. The way 12 million Mexicans, in particular, had come to the United States and settled here was illegal. Period. We were actually talking about two different things, but I have to admit we were both conflating them. I was talking about the im-portance of accepting refugees and immigrants fleeing persecu-tion generally, but my view had slid over from that into a more “let everyone in” view that was somewhat antinomian given the nature of the law at the time. They believed they were talking about illegality, but I don’t really think they were. Those driven to rage by illegal immigration— rather than, say, those who have come to accept the powerful but problematic ar-gument that illegal immigration has depressed working-class wages in the United Sates—are operating on the basis of culture, not policy. They believe the country cannot absorb these people and shouldn’t have to; that recent changes in the way our country functions give them no incentive to become good citi-zens or believers and participants in the American experiment, as was the case with previous gen-erations of (legal) immigrants. The organizations that exist to promote illegals do not promote the United States but rather a multicultural worldview that says it is racist to insist on a common language in English and a com-mon belief in American ideals. The more serious voices against freer immigration are right about this. It is a huge problem, and by rejecting the American gospel even as they insist on the right of illegals to live here and share public benefits and the like, these organizations have irresponsibly, foolishly, and reprehensibly helped feed the backlash against them. It is shameful that liberal cul-ture in the United States is no longer willing to say those who come into this country need to become Americans, and indeed, that is the kind of PC that “helped give us Trump.” Living here is a gift to those who were not born here, and it confers an obligation to become part of the American idea and the American experiment. But if Trump and his denizens are unwilling to make that argu-ment—and they are because, af-ter all, in their eyes this country isn’t great any longer and is a disaster and makes bad deals and is awash in crime and carnage—then they are justifying the argument against them that they are making horrible policy for naked political advantage based in disingenuousness. And that’s no way to run a country. ...



## 388 Trump’s refugee ban was emotion, not policy | John Podhoretz


Trump’s Refugee Ban Was Emotion; Not Policy
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Trump’s Refugee Ban Was Emotion; Not Policy
By John Podhoretz, www.commentarymagazine.com
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January 29th, 2017
paul musgrove
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Politics & Ideas
A Policy of Feelings, Not Facts
Abdollah Mostafavi, center, arriving from Tehran, Iran, is met by his family including son-in-law Nasser Sorkhavi, left, daughter Mozhgan Mostafavi, second from right, and grandson Kourosh Sorkhavi at San Francisco International Airport Saturday, Jan. 28, 2017, in San Francisco. Mostafavi was held at the airport for some time as a result of President Donald Trump’s executive order barring citizens of seven predominantly Muslim countries from entering the U.S.
Photo by: AP Photo/Marcio Jose Sanchez
This institution, COMMENTARY, has been at the forefront of the conversation about radical Islam since the publication of Bernard Lewis’s seminal article “The Return of Islam” in January 1976, forty-one years ago. Almost 30 years later, in September 2004, Norman Podhoretz published his seminal “World War IV” about the nature of the civilizational struggle between radical Islam and the West. In between and since, COMMENTARY has published literally hundreds of thousands of words on the subject.
I bring this up in the context of Donald Trump’s executive order suspending all refugee entries from Syria, which is based, the president says, on protecting the United States from radical Islam coming to our shores. Indeed, nothing could be more important for the future of the United States, and nothing could be worse than enacting policies that are theoretically designed to serve that purpose but which complicate it immensely instead.
The refugee executive order is not a policy based in fact. The facts do not support it. The facts since 9/11 do not offer the hint of a suggestion that refugees who have already gone through a vetting process pose a terrorist threat, either here or (as yet) in Europe. The most horrifying recent acts, the ones that triggered Trump’s initial announcement he wanted a total ban on Muslim travel to the United States, involve radicalized homegrown native-born citizen terrorists. Omar Mateen of the Orlando massacre was born in New York. Tafsheen Malik of the San Bernardino slaughter was born in Chicago (his wife, who came into the country because she married a citizen, was from Pakistan, not any of the countries named in Trump’s executive order). The Bataclan killers in Paris were born and raised in Belgium, not in Syria. And so on. Only the Tsarnaev brothers, who committed the Boston Marathon bombings, count as refugees, but they came after securing political asylum from Russia—another country not on the list, obviously.
So what does this tell us? It tells us this is a policy based on feelings. It is the very partial fulfillment of a wild and radical campaign promise made hurriedly after the San Bernardino killings to ban all Muslims from the United States. Given the very partial nature of it, the policy is simply an immigration-restrictionist version of the classic liberal approach to problems; just do something. And do it big.
And like such liberal solutions, it is also a form of virtue-signaling to those who support such wild ideas. It’s a way the president who got their vote flatters them for their seriousness of purpose and their uncompromising understanding of the need to pursue the truth no matter the cost. Already, apologists and cynics alike are all pointing out Trump is merely doing what he said he would do during the campaign. Well, that’s not really true; you might even say he has taken the coward’s way out for failing to follow through on his proposal to ban all Muslims. After all, his promulgation of a mass Muslim ban in late 2015 was one of the many reasons many of us were horrified by his candidacy and opposed him, and he won the nomination and the election anyway, so as with everything that’s happened since election day, no one should be surprised.
Which doesn’t make it good policy–taken on its own terms—as a way of preventing terrorism inside the United States.
There are only two solid defenses of it. One is that the United States posture toward refugees is entirely voluntary; we need not accept them if we don’t wish to. The problem there is the harsh judgment of history when we haven’t, though we could have. While it’s a solid argument, it’s an awful one, morally and, indeed, politically.
The second is that the political correctness of the Obama administration made it impossible for prior officials to do the kind of screening we need—screening to ensure not just that terrorists don’t enter our country and stay here, but that radical Islamists who believe in the supremacy of sharia and promote a specifically non-American view of the proper political order of our liberal republic are kept out as well. That, I believe, is the theory undergirding the baffling decision (apparently by Steve Bannon and Stephen Miller at the White House) to suspend all entry even by permanent residents with green cards who have traveled to the seven banned countries and are there now. The speculation is that this has been done to close a sharia/terror loophole as follows: Someone who goes back to visit can get radicalized and could be the next terrorist so if you want to dot all the “i”s and cross the “t”s you’ve got to keep them out, too.
But in both these cases, it appears even the Trump administration is too politically correct to say any of this out loud, so how are its people going to prevail in an argument about it?
That’s why I say this is a policy about feelings—about feelings relating to terrorism and sharia and Islam itself. It is a policy that, in its most dangerous iteration, conflates Islam with radical Islam precisely because it is not accompanied by an argument that separates the two. Rudy Giuliani gave the game away on television this morning. According to The Hill:
Former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani (R) said in an interview on Saturday that President Trump had previously asked him about legally implementing a “Muslim ban.”
But Giuliani during then disputed the notion that the president’s sweeping executive order barring refugees and people from seven predominantly Muslim nations amounts to a ban on Muslims. “I’ll tell you the whole history of it: We he first announced it, he said ‘Muslim ban,’” Giuliani said on Fox News.
“He called me up, he said, ‘put a commission together, show me the right way to do it legally.’” Giuliani said he then put together a commission that included lawmakers and expert lawyers. “And what we did was we focused on, instead of religion, danger.”
What Giuliani was admitting here is that the overarching goal was a Muslim ban, but the dial-back was to focus on “danger” rather than “religion” even though “religion” was the true target. His panel of experts understood a religious test could not pass constitutional muster, so they came up with a face-saver.
In the end, Trump wanted this to fulfill his campaign promise—to show he’d follow through. Bannon and Miller, it seems, want to use it to send an ideological message about the new, harsher, more no-bull foreign policy approach they are championing. What the people who will actually have to implement the policy and defend it think—people like the secretary of state and the secretary of homeland security and the like—was not taken into consideration. The feelings ruled.
So if this is a policy about feelings, feelings about building a wall not only between the U.S. and Mexico but between the U.S. and a whole bunch of other places around the world, counter-feelings deserve a hearing as well. So let me tell a story about my feelings.
In 2006, speaking before an audience in suburban Chicago synagogue at an event sponsored by a conservative Jewish organization, I heard the first boos from a friendly audience I’d ever heard. I was asked a question about immigration and the outrage then being expressed on the Right at George W. Bush’s immigration reform package. I said, simply, that as an American Jew, I considered America’s openness to immigration the very reason for my existence and one of the nation’s glories. As an American Jew, I considered the knowledge that hundreds of thousands of potential refugees from Nazi Germany were turned away under the restrictions placed on immigration in a 1924 act of Congress to be one of the great tragedies of our time. Given these facts, I did not feel it would be moral for me to speak out against relatively loose immigration.
The boos startled me because we were in a synagogue. But angry questioners went at me, that night and many other appearances to follow over the years, with the simple question: “Don’t you believe in enforcing the law?” And they were sure they had me. For how could I, a law-and-order conservative, defend illegal immigration when it was, in fact, illegal? All the pro-immigration arguments aside from the simple moral framework I had proposed—that immigration was a net positive for our economy, that crime had dropped over the course of the past decade even as illegal immigration from Mexico had surged so it couldn’t be a crime producer—could not answer that simple question. The way 12 million Mexicans, in particular, had come to the United States and settled here was illegal. Period.
We were actually talking about two different things, but I have to admit we were both conflating them. I was talking about the importance of accepting refugees and immigrants fleeing persecution generally, but my view had slid over from that into a more “let everyone in” view that was somewhat antinomian given the nature of the law at the time. They believed they were talking about illegality, but I don’t really think they were.
Those driven to rage by illegal immigration— rather than, say, those who have come to accept the powerful but problematic argument that illegal immigration has depressed working-class wages in the United Sates—are operating on the basis of culture, not policy. They believe the country cannot absorb these people and shouldn’t have to; that recent changes in the way our country functions give them no incentive to become good citizens or believers and participants in the American experiment, as was the case with previous generations of (legal) immigrants. The organizations that exist to promote illegals do not promote the United States but rather a multicultural worldview that says it is racist to insist on a common language in English and a common belief in American ideals. The more serious voices against freer immigration are right about this. It is a huge problem, and by rejecting the American gospel even as they insist on the right of illegals to live here and share public benefits and the like, these organizations have irresponsibly, foolishly, and reprehensibly helped feed the backlash against them.
It is shameful that liberal culture in the United States is no longer willing to say those who come into this country need to become Americans, and indeed, that is the kind of PC that “helped give us Trump.” Living here is a gift to those who were not born here, and it confers an obligation to become part of the American idea and the American experiment.
But if Trump and his denizens are unwilling to make that argument—and they are because, after all, in their eyes this country isn’t great any longer and is a disaster and makes bad deals and is awash in crime and carnage—then they are justifying the argument against them that they are making horrible policy for naked political advantage based in disingenuousness. And that’s no way to run a country.
...